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a mir o  g u r d ia n  Ortiz was an up-and-coming banana producer from 
an elite Leon family when the Sandinista revolution occurred. On 
a farm his father "carved out of the jungle/' Gurdian had built up one 
of Nicaragua's larger banana plantations and was moving rapidly up the 
administrative ladder of Standard Fruit's Nicaragua operation. He was 
skeptical of the insurrection that swept the regime of Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle from power in 1979 and brought in the leaders of the f s l n , and 
he remained aloof from the political imbroglio that followed. But in 1980, 
Jorge Salazar, the president of his private sector association, the Nica 
raguan Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers (u pa n ic ), began 
organizing a counterrevolutionary expedition and was killed by state secu 
rity forces during an arms transaction. Gurdian agreed to serve as his 
replacement in u pa n ic . During the next ten years, he became one of the 
nation's most outspoken critics of the Sandinista regime. He was arrested, 
convicted, and placed on probation for violating the censorship provisions 
of the 1982 National Emergency decree; his farm was confiscated without 
compensation; his family scattered, leaving him as the sole continuing 
resident of Nicaragua.
Ricardo Coronel Kautz was a part-time rancher and full-time admin 
istrator of the livestock enterprise owned by the region's largest sugar 
mill, the Ingenio San Antonio, prior to the revolution. Son of Jose Coro 
nel Urtecho, a prominent Nicaraguan intellectual who had served as a 
diplomatic representative of the Somoza regime but became increasingly 
disaffected, and his muse, Maria Kautz, a Nicaraguan of German descent 
whose family had been dispossessed of its primary estate by the Somoza 
regime during World War II, Coronel had developed an abiding antipathy 
for the Somoza dynasty. As a top administrator of Nicaragua's most promi 
nent agroindustrial complex, Coronel helped organize an underground 
political movement among the technical staff in support of the Sandi 
nista insurrection. In 1977 he was named to the prestigious Los Doce, 
a group of twelve prominent business, religious, and intellectual leaders
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who lobbied for international political support for the Sandinista cause in 
the final years of the insurrection. When he returned to Nicaragua after 
Somoza's departure, he was appointed a vice-minister of agriculture and 
agrarian reform. For eleven years, Coronel served in the Nicaraguan gov 
ernment, exercising considerable influence over the state farm sector and 
agricultural development policy throughout the Sandinista era.
These vignettes suggest the range of views held by Nicaraguan eco 
nomic elites about the Sandinista revolution. The relationship between 
the revolutionary government and most of Nicaragua's traditional busi 
ness elite was generally antagonistic. Yet during the same period, some 
endorsed the revolution and became active participants in the social tran 
sitions it produced. Others ranged in between, reaching a tenuous accom 
modation with the regime but retaining a critical distance.
Two broad questions shape this study. The first addresses the theoreti 
cal debate about the composition and segmentation of the bourgeoisie. 
This analysis explores the unity/division of the capitalist class as it inter 
acts with other social sectors. The second focuses on the capacity of eco 
nomic elites to participate in a process of social change. This discussion 
evaluates the capacity of the elites to contribute to or to impede equitable 
distribution and the collective development of the nation.
Structural analysis, which has provided the dominant theoretical and 
methodological framework in Latin American studies for the last two de 
cades, typically assumes a high degree of class cohesion. According to this 
approach, "capital" has clear interests and needs defined by its structural 
position in the economy. The dominant class is found to use its resources 
to impose constraints on other actors, limiting the options for structural 
change. The state may attain a "relative autonomy" from the business sec 
tor, but this autonomy is ultimately limited by the structural dependence 
of the state on capital. Capital, therefore, is understood as an increasingly 
united, cohesive actor. To the extent that segmentation occurs within 
the bourgeoisie, one fraction tends to emerge as the dominant force and 
exercise direction over the others.
Because of the fundamental cohesion of the bourgeoisie alleged in this 
model, any notions of cross-class alliances between the underclass and 
elements of the bourgeoisie are seen as inherently flawed. The participa 
tion of capitalist partners in a reform coalition is seen as ultimately under 
mining the movement because they are expected to serve the long-run 
interests of the dominant fraction of their class. For any structural trans 
formation to occur, this exploitative class must be removed from power.
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Yet Popular Front struggles and many progressive electoral strategies 
have been premised on the assumption that movements for social change 
can draw on the energies of a range of class actors, including elements 
of a "nationalist" or "progressive" bourgeoisie. Both Social Democratic 
and Democratic Socialist coalitions have understood the necessity for a 
continually evolving class compromise involving a component of the pri 
vate sector in their movement. Latin American Populist and Third World 
National Liberation movements have traditionally drawn on a multiclass 
coalition that, while limiting the redistributive impact of the outcome, 
also allows for the participation of economic elites who can insert them 
selves into the changing economic order.
New research traditions, such as strategic choice analysis, explore more 
open, less deterministic models of social change.1 These approaches as 
sume that actors are not fully bound by their structural positions. Partici 
pants in political negotiations are viewed as volitional agents who operate 
with an element of discretion, allowing the use of analytical schemes 
that are more dynamic and interactive. In these models, changing calcu 
lations of costs and benefits, combined with multilevel bargaining, pro 
duce highly complex and varied alliance strategies. This relatively open 
approach may better capture moments of "extraordinary" politics, when 
regimes undergo transitions and the social compact is subject to revision.
Attention to complex alliances and ongoing bargaining reopens ques 
tions about the character and political roles of capital in Latin America. 
These questions will become increasingly central in the study of Latin 
American politics in the 1990s. Throughout much of this region, the fiscal 
crisis of the state and the weakness of foreign financial support now move 
the local business elite toward the strategic center of the development 
debate. Finding a way to engage the resources and energies of business 
elites and break the cycle of capital flight, while simultaneously open 
ing new social and economic opportunities to nonelites, will be a central 
challenge for Latin American leaders in the coming years.
My research on the relationship between the state, capitalists, and revo 
lution began in 1982 when, with support from the National Endowment 
for the Humanities, I started a research project on the Sandinista concept 
of the "mixed economy." That year my annual trek to Nicaragua began. 
Support from the University Research Council and the College of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences of DePaul University allowed me to mount an ongoing 
research effort on the shifting dynamics of the Nicaraguan revolution.
My attention was increasingly drawn to the anomalous role of the
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local bourgeoisie in the revolution. Much of the material on Nicaragua 
during this period focused on the contra war and the conflict with the 
United States. Less understood were the complex, internal relationships 
that played a critical role in shaping the development of the revolution. To 
analyze the way in which the revolution unfolded, I carefully examined 
these internal dynamics. Given the centrality of the agricultural sector in 
the national economy, I concentrated on the agricultural and agroindus 
trial sectors. In 1985-87,1 began a series of interviews with leaders of the 
major private sector organizations.
By the time I began my interviews, a sizable core of the prerevolution 
ary economic elite had left the country. The effort to better understand 
elite-state dynamics in the Somoza era and the impact of emigration on 
the revolution took me to Miami, where I conducted a round of inter 
views in 1988 with seventeen former and current Nicaraguan private 
sector leaders. The Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida Inter 
national University generously provided housing accommodations during 
my stay; Mark Rosenberg and Doug Kincaid provided intellectual and 
logistical support for this phase of my work.
Most of the research for this book was completed in 1989-90 with 
support from the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the 
Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Soci 
eties with funds provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the 
Ford Foundation, and with support from the Howard Heinz Foundation. 
A fellowship at the Kellogg Institute of International Studies at Notre 
Dame provided a congenial environment in which to begin writing this 
book. I am grateful to generous and supportive colleagues at all of these 
institutions for facilitating this research.
Research in Nicaragua would not have been possible without the ex 
tensive assistance provided by Laura Enriquez, Amalia Chamorro, Peter 
Utting, Peter Marchetti, Eduardo Baumeister, Rodolfo Delgado Caceres, 
and Paul Oquist. I am also grateful for the research assistance provided 
by Freddy Quesada, Carlos Molina, and Edith Munoz. Invaluable intel 
lectual companionship was provided at different phases in this process 
by Florence Babb, Martin Diskin, David Dye, Dennis Gilbert, Richard 
Grossman, Barbara Kritt, Shelley McConnell, Alice McGrath, Jack Spence, 
George Vickers, Phillip Williams, and Daniel Wolf.
Several colleagues read versions of my work as it wended its way toward 
the final draft. John Booth, Laura Enriquez, Ilja Luciak, Steven Sanderson, 
Richard Stahler-Sholk, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and Carlos Vilas deserve
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special thanks for their constructive criticisms, as do my colleagues Mike 
Alvarez and Pat Callahan. For their useful comments on the comparative 
framework and some of the theoretical constructs employed here, I want 
to thank David Collier, Sandra McGee Deutch, Francisco Durand, Jeffrey 
Paige, and Eduardo Silva. Lisa Milam and Veronica Diaz helped me to 
polish and produce the final version of the manuscript. David Perry at 
the University of North Carolina Press gently and efficiently shepherded 
the manuscript to publication, and Stephanie Wenzel proved a remarkably 
keen-eyed copyeditor. The usual disclaimers about responsibility for the 
remaining flaws in this work apply.
I also want to thank the private producers in Nicaragua who gave gen 
erously of their time to introduce an unschooled chela to the world of 
Nicaraguan business and agricultural production. Ramiro Gurdian, for 
many years the president of upa n ic  and currently the president of c o s e p, 
and Daniel Nunez, long-term president of u n a g , provided invaluable ad 
vice and suggestions,- without their help this book would not have been 
possible. I am also deeply indebted to Mario Hanon and his family for their 
many kindnesses over the years. While most of those producers whom 
I have interviewed will take issue with different parts of my analysis, I 
hope that they will see merit in it as well.
Finally, I want to thank my patient and generous husband, William 
Denton, who sacrificed as much as I did to get this book written and who 
wasn't able to share much of the fun; my daughter Claire, who walked 
this long journey right by my side,- and my daughter Grace, who was born 
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It is a complex problem, but we have not given up the search for ways 
of integrating the more-or-less large individual producers who live in 
Nicaragua today into a social formation in which revolutionary hege 
mony prevails.
—Jaime Wheelock Roman, El gran desafio
D
ev e l o pme n t a l is t s , social theorists, and revolutionaries have long 
puzzled over the problematic role of economic elites in the process of 
social change. Much of the general literature on revolution and structural 
reform presents the dominant class as a homogeneous entity intransigent 
in its opposition to significant change. As beneficiaries of the status quo, 
economic elites are seen as a primary obstacle to social restructuring, 
often in close cooperation with foreign capital.
In recent years, however, many of the standard categories used to chart 
contending social forces, such as "workers," "peasants," and "bourgeoisie," 
seem increasingly inadequate to describe what are often highly differenti 
ated clusters of people. Workers moving steadily into the informal sector 
now lack a formal employer counterpart and become self-employed; peas 
ants have weaker ties to the land and rotate annually through a series 
of job categories and residences,- the bourgeoisie is divided into a series 
of competing layers whose relative fortunes rise and fall. The inability of 
the traditional conceptual categories to accommodate this acute diversity 
calls for the use of different analytical methods and the development of 
new conceptual schemes. For studies of the bourgeoisie, a closer analysis 
of the social sectors that make up the elite is in order.
The search for the fissures within the dominant elite is not simply 
an analytical exercise in social dissection. This task has been a central 
preoccupation of proponents of social change. Underlying much of this 
kind of analysis has been the desire of both academicians and political 
practitioners to locate a "progressive" sector of the bourgeoisie. Academic 
analysts such as Barrington Moore (1966) claimed to find such a sector, 
arguing that there were circumstances under which an urban bourgeoi 
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sie could break with traditional landholding elites and nudge the political 
system toward democracy. Some reform-oriented political leaders also 
claimed allies within the economic elite. Needing the economic capabili 
ties, international credibility, and domestic leverage that such coalition 
partners would provide, these politicians searched assiduously for busi 
ness leaders with whom to link arms.
Leaders of populist movements were particularly inclined to seek an 
alliance with a "nationalist bourgeoisie." Populism as an ideology pre 
sented no barrier to the inclusion of national elites; indeed, the overriding 
nationalism embedded in populism called these leaders to strengthen 
local economic strongholds. Cultivation of emerging industrialists often 
secured their support. Juan Peron's success in building an alliance with 
small and medium-sized capitalists through the Confederacion General 
Economica in Argentina has been well documented (Acuna 1991; Teich- 
man 1981). In spite of its social base in labor, the Peronist coalition an 
chored the support of emerging elites in the light industry sector, firms 
that manufactured for the domestic market, and industries that were less 
dependent on imports. Since these kinds of industrialists benefited from 
an expanding local market, they could find common cause with union 
ized labor in its bid for increased earnings. Although old, established elite 
organizations moved firmly into the opposition, emerging elites included 
prominent allies.
Even democratic socialist movements typically found it necessary to 
court a segment of the economic elite, in spite of ideological reservations. 
To locate a theoretical rationale for this compromise, the concept of a 
"non-monopoly" bourgeoisie was sometimes employed. A non-monopoly 
bourgeoisie was differentiated from the hegemonic, monopoly sector by 
the former's unfavorable economic position and tendency to be eroded by 
the monopoly sector. This alliance was reinforced in dependent nations 
by the tension between subordinated local capital and hegemonic foreign 
capital. Alliances between a nonhegemonic, small- and medium-sized 
local capitalist faction and the peasant and worker underclass, it was ar 
gued, would undercut the foreign-oriented, hegemonic bourgeoisie and 
allow for a process of socialist transition.1
This form of social theory and consequent alliance strategy had its 
critics. For analysts of the bourgeoisie like Nicos Poulantzas and Andre 
Gunder Frank, the effort to locate a sector of the dominant class that 
could accept social change was futile and self-defeating.2 In a monumental 
study of agrarian, industrial, and financial factions of the Chilean hour-
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geoisie, Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratcliff add empirical support 
to this interpretation. Their detailed study of the social structure of the 
top Chilean elite in the 1960s produced "a discovery of great import: an 
incomparably large effective kinship unit, formed of multiply intermar 
ried banking, industrial, and landowning families, erases any ostensible 
social cleavages between supposedly contending landowning vs. capitalist 
'upper' classes in these economic sectors" (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988,173).
Because of the presence of close family members who straddled sectoral 
divisions, Zeitlin and Ratcliff concluded that contradictions between top 
capitalists with different structural locations in the economy were muted. 
Clashes and divisions between capitalist sectors in the twentieth cen 
tury, they argued, "arose not between ontologically real rivals, but within 
the bosom of the same class" (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988, 208). Divisions 
that other analysts had found to segment the capitalist class—between 
bankers and industrialists, owners and managers, large landowners and 
urban capitalists, foreign and local capital—are minimized here, since 
bonds of kinship ultimately were found to weave these sectors together.3
This discussion of the character and political predilections of the Latin 
American bourgeoisie reflects two competing visions. In one view, the 
bourgeoisie, in spite of some sectoral divisions, is essentially a unitary 
actor. Interpenetration through family, financial, or contractual ties over 
comes any tendency toward segmentation. In the other, real differences 
exist within the bourgeoisie that incline different segments or clusters 
toward different political projects.
This book tackles the question of the unity/division of the economic 
elite by focusing on the elite's political interactions with the state during 
periods of state-led reform. Episodes of structural change put enormous 
pressure on both the state and the bourgeoisie. Established social hierar 
chies and resource allocation patterns are called sharply into question. A 
sense of peril propels the elite into direct political action. This moment 
can either increase the unity of the elite, as it attempts to defend estab 
lished privileges or obtain new ones, or divide it, as different segments 
negotiate for an improved position relative to the others.
The way the bourgeoisie responds, I argue, depends on a series of fac 
tors. Central among these are (1) the degree to which oligarchical control 
over the elite has been ruptured, (2) the organizational autonomy and den 
sity of private sector associations, (3) the degree of perceived class-based 
threat posed by the state, (4) the extent to which the revolutionary regime 
succeeds in institutionalizing a new political order, and (5) the capacity of
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the regime to consolidate a viable economic system. The first two factors 
focus on the inherited character of the economic elite. The last three shift 
the attention to the nature of the revolutionary state.
To explore the segmentation of the bourgeoisie, this chapter briefly 
analyzes two types of outcomes: cases in which the bourgeoisie unites in 
opposition to the reform movement and defeats it, and cases in which the 
bourgeoisie divides and some sectors reach an accommodation with the 
regime.4 Each of these subtypes will be analyzed by a review of cases in 
Latin America where the central dynamics diverged. Analysis of the oppo 
sitional bourgeoisie focuses on the democratic socialist regime in Chile 
under Salvador Allende (1970-73) and the reform regime in El Salvador 
(sputtering between 1979 and 1989). Information about the accommoda- 
tionist bourgeoisie is drawn from the study of state-capitalist relation 
ships under revolutionary populism in Mexico during the Lazaro Carde 
nas era (1934-40) and in Peru under the Juan Velasco regime (1968-75 ).s
Not all of these experiences are conventionally regarded as revolutions, 
either because they were quickly reversed or because the changes actually 
introduced were not profound enough to warrant the label. Each of these 
cases did, however, entail a major effort to restructure what had been core 
features of the nation's social and economic order. In this sense they all 
qualify as major initiatives in structural change. Lessons drawn from the 
analysis of these experiences will be used to sketch an interpretation of 
the variations in state-capitalist relations and devise a framework within 
which to analyze state-capital relations during the Sandinista revolution.
A cautionary note is needed here before we proceed. The literature on 
these cases has been compiled by hundreds of scholars, most of whom 
have spent decades working on a single country. Because there have been 
so few cross-national studies of revolutionary processes and none that 
focus specifically on the reaction of economic elites, the task of building 
up this broad comparison is both daunting and perilous. Epistemological 
assumptions and methodologies vary from study to study. Concepts that 
are frequently used in this literature such as "family clans" or "oligarchy" 
may refer to different phenomena in different national settings. Standards 
used in making judgments about the degree of economic concentration 
may vary from case to case. For example, Chile's long experience with 
multiparty electoral democracy allowed it to be linked analytically to the 
study of Western European politics. Analysts studying the Chilean sys 
tem, therefore, may be implicitly comparing the Chilean social structure
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with those found in Italy or France rather than those found in Peru or 
Mexico.
Since the same set of assumptions and standards is not applied consis 
tently by scholars analyzing each of these cases, similar characterizations 
(for example, the claim that the economy is dominated by an oligarchy) 
may reflect rather different realities. I have attempted to look beyond the 
summary judgments to appraise the evidence on which those judgments 
are based and to use comparative statistics when possible, but my work 
is necessarily constrained by these limitations.
The Bourgeoisie in Opposition
Democratic Socialism and the Coalesced Bourgeoisie in Chile
Prior to the election of President Salvador Allende in 1970 and his 
attempt to introduce "democratic socialism,"6 economic diversification 
had generated some divisions in the Chilean bourgeoisie, and the deepen 
ing of democratic processes had diminished its power. The experience of 
the Allende era, however, reunited the economic elite and propelled their 
offensive against the regime. Several characteristics of the Chilean elite 
and the Allende regime contributed to this outcome.
The Chilean bourgeoisie was shaped by a centralization of resources at 
the top and a norm of forceful organization that extended even into the 
middle sector of the elite. At the end of the 1960s, for example, 2 percent 
of all industrial establishments produced over two-thirds of all industrial 
output in Chile,- the top five banks allocated over half of all credit (de 
Vylder 1976, 18).7 Land concentration was marked. Prior to the adoption 
of the agrarian reform law by Christian Democratic president Eduardo 
Frei in 1967 there were 11,000 large, multifamily estates averaging 2,200 
hectares each. These large estates represented 4.2 percent of all agricul 
tural units but occupied 79 percent of the country's agricultural land (de 
Vylder 1976, 166). Zeitlin and Ratcliff's (1988, 163—64) detailed analysis of 
the upper reaches of the Chilean economic elite in the 1964-66 period 
identified 24 "kinship groups" that were located among the top stratum of 
bankers, corporate executives, and landowners of the country, including 
one large "maximum kinship group" that included 56 percent of the top 
bankers, 16 percent of the top corporate executives, and 30 percent of the 
top landowners.
In spite of a relatively sustained tradition of political democracy and
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the dense organization of civil society in Chile,8 the business elite re 
tained significant political influence. The economic elite pressured the 
state directly through leadership of political parties and indirectly through 
privileged access to state institutions.9 Six private sector associations 
provided an organizational forge for the economic elite. The venerable 
National Agricultural Society (s n a ) was formed in 1838; leaders of this 
association, in turn, formed the Society for Industrial Promotion (s o f o f a  
or s f f ) in 1883, after the minister of finance requested their assistance in 
promoting the industrial development of the country. The National Cham 
ber of Commerce (previously the Central Chamber of Commerce) dates 
from 1858, and the National Mining Society, representing Chilean mine 
owneis, from 1883. Of the associations representing economic strong 
holds, only the Chamber of Construction and the Association of Banks 
and Financial Institutions were of twentieth-century origin (Menges 1966, 
344-46; Campero 1984, 312-18).10 To defend their collective interests, 
the four older associations came together in 1935 to form one central 
peak association, the Production and Commerce Federation (c o pr o c o ). 
Chile's elite business associations tended to be very selective, drew 
heavily from larger establishments, and had restricted internal democ 
racy.11
Nonetheless, a large population of medium-sized producers had 
emerged in Chile including small- and medium-sized industrialists, urban 
professionals, a self-employed petty bourgeoisie, and small- and medium 
sized agricultural producers. Reflecting the norm of political pluralism, 
this medium-sized economic elite had devised its own network of asso 
ciations in Chile, albeit in more recent decades. The largest of the pri 
vate sector organizations serving small- and medium-sized businesses, 
the Chilean Trade Federation of Retailers and Small Industry, was founded 
in 1938; a host of transportation federations developed in the 1940s- 
60s (Campero 1984, 316-19). Unlike their larger counterparts, these busi 
ness associations lacked a central organizing agency that could pull them 
together, and they were not given the representational prerogatives in 
government agencies that the elite institutions had acquired. Compared 
with most other Latin American cases, however, these small and mid 
sized capitalists in Chile were relatively mobilized and autonomously 
organized.
Allende s u p coalition was designed to divide the Chilean bourgeoi 
sie and incorporate small- and medium-sized producers. The u p's official 
campaign Programa opens by expressing concern about the suffering "by
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workers, peasants, and other exploited classes as well as in the grow 
ing difficulties which confront white collar workers, professional people, 
small and medium businessmen, and in the very limited opportunities 
open to women and young people/7 Against this broad coalition of the 
disadvantaged are placed the interests of "imperialist nations/' "bourgeois 
groups who are structurally related to foreign capital" and the "national 
monopolistic bourgeoisie" ("Popular Unity's Programme" 1973, 255-56).
In practice, however, deep divisions remained within the coalition 
about how to deal with this sector. The traditional Communist party 
position had favored a broad "People's Front" that included "progressive 
sectors" of the national bourgeoisie. The Socialist party, on the other 
hand, raised doubts about the existence of any such progressive sector 
and favored a more narrowly based coalition of proletarian forces. The 
u p government, composed of Socialists, Communists, segments of the 
old Radical party, and heretical leftists from the Christian Democratic 
party, began without consensus on the role of the bourgeoisie. There was 
agreement that the hegemonic faction of the bourgeoisie should be elimi 
nated, both to undercut the political capabilities of the right and to secure, 
through expropriation, economic resources with which to finance the new 
order. But there were sharp divisions within the coalition about what to 
do with the nonhegemonic faction of small- and medium-sized producers.
Allende began his presidency by avoiding that divisive issue; he sought 
national consensus by focusing attention on foreign capital. In nationaliz 
ing the copper mines, he fulfilled a broad, national aspiration and secured 
unanimous support within the legislature. Although the subsequent deci 
sion to impose a retroactive tax on the mining companies' excess profits 
and not pay compensation was more controversial, the initial expropria 
tion was a widely supported move that rallied even local elites against 
foreign control.
The government's subsequent move to acquire control over the com 
mercial banking system was more controversial and had a much deeper 
impact on local elites. Financial institutions were often the linchpin that 
held together large economic groups. Their expropriation undercut the 
ability of these groups to assure capital flows to their affiliates. But the 
government's willingness to pay handsomely for the buyout of existing 
stockholders muted the opposition to this measure.
The u p's agrarian reform initiatives were yet more controversial, and 
the majority opposition in congress prevented the government from secur 
ing more sweeping change. Forced to use the agrarian reform legisla 
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tion passed previously by the Christian Democrats, the regime possessed 
limited redistributive capabilities.12 Consequently, the Chilean agrarian 
reform program was somewhat smaller than that which took place in 
Mexico or Peru.13
The regime's most controversial property reform measures were in the 
industrial sector.14 In spite of formal plans to delimit narrowly the firms 
that would be expropriated, and repeated official guarantees to small- and 
medium-sized producers that their properties would not be affected, the 
actual expansion of the state sector proceeded according to a different 
dynamic. As Peter Winn points out in his study of the expropriation of 
the Yarur textile factory, the Chilean revolution was not encapsulated by 
political leaders but often flowed from base-level initiatives. When union 
leaders and factory workers at the Yarur plant decided to seize the factory 
and called on Allende to incorporate it into the state sector, for example, 
Allende's resistance was eroded by labor militancy and the defection of 
his own cabinet officials, like the independent socialist Pedro Vuskovic 
who ran the powerful Economic Ministry (Winn 1986, 193-95).
Unceasing pressure to expropriate led to the rapid expansion of the 
state sector. Unable to get congressional authorization for these expro 
priations, the government resorted to the use of a little-known piece of 
legislation passed during the brief Popular Front government of the 1930s 
that allowed the government to intervene in industries producing items 
of "basic necessity" when labor disputes threatened to halt their opera 
tion. The "requisitioning" of such factories, followed by offers to buy, al 
lowed the state to expand its domain. Beginning with 46 enterprises in 
1970, the state sector grew to 507 firms (plus 19 banks) by September 
1973.15 This rapid expansion of the state sector to include 44 percent of 
industrial production by mid-1973 (Bitar 1986, 189) in spite of congres 
sional opposition led to a constitutional crisis that contributed to the 
institutional breakdown of the regime.16
Initially, the private sector's reaction to the new government was am 
biguous. There was a brief run on the banks, and stock values plunged, as 
some of the wealthy panicked. Some of the most prominent elites, such 
as key members of the Matte and Edwards families, sounded the alarm 
and actively conspired with the Nixon administration against the confir 
mation of Allende by the Chilean legislature.17 Other bourgeois leaders, 
however, while not pro-up, adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the 
new government. Indeed, a few private sector organizations, such as the 
Chilean Trade Federation of Retailers and Small Industry, even publicly
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congratulated the new president on his victory. Others, like the Central 
Chamber of Commerce or the president of the National Mining Society, 
expressed a willingness to work together for economic growth and devel 
opment (Campero 1984, 46; Silva 1992, 3).
The private sector responded to the uncertainties surrounding the new 
government with a general decrease in investment. According to calcula 
tions made by Barbara Stallings (1978, 248), the private sector's portion 
of fixed capital investment in industry dropped from an already low 43 
percent in 1970 to only 20 percent in 1971, and declined still further to 
around 10 percent of the total in 1973.18 Outside the construction sector, 
private domestic investment reportedly dropped 71 percent between 1970 
and 1971 (Valenzuela 1978, 56).
This reluctance to continue investment did not, in the initial phase, 
signify open political rebellion. By the end of 1971, however, concerted 
opposition swept through the national bourgeoisie. Both the outcome of 
the April 1971 municipal elections, in which the u p vote increased to 
49.8 percent of the total (Valenzuela 1978,54), and the pattern of increased 
expropriations, which included the symbolically important Compania 
Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones presided over by former president 
Jorge Alessandri, alarmed economic elites. In December 1971, several pri 
vate sector organizations representing both large and small entrepreneurs 
called the Encuentro del Area Privado attended by 5,000 affiliates. At this 
meeting, Orlando Saenz, s o f o f a 's new president, denounced the gov 
ernment for "breaking with Chilean tradition" and launched the Frente 
Nacional de la Actividad Privada to protest government policy (Campero 
1984, 56-64). Unlike in Mexico, where no united private sector opposition 
to the revolution emerged, or in Peru, where such attempts repeatedly 
failed, by the end of 1971 a forceful opposition business front had emerged 
in Chile.
Many businesses apparently benefited economically during the 1971- 
72 period.19 Although the dramatic reduction of foreign credit affected 
access to certain imports and major wage increases were decreed, many 
producers oriented toward the domestic market benefited from the sharp 
upsurge of domestic consumption. The economy grew rapidly at first, ex 
panding 7.7 percent in 1971; industrial production, drawing on installed 
capacity, jumped 13.7 percent in the first half of 1972 (Bitar 1986, 46, 93).
Nonetheless, within a short period of time, the economic elite closed 
ranks against the regime and joined the effort to topple the government. 
The most graphic evidence of sweeping bourgeoisie opposition came in
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October 1972 with the "bosses' strike." This movement was not con 
fined to the top elite; it drew support from even small- and medium-sized 
capitalists who had been courted by the Allende regime. Bolstered by 
foreign financing from the CIA as well as private corporations in other 
Latin American countries (Stallings 1978,142), 109 trade and professional 
associations called a national lockout that lasted for three weeks and 
brought the country to the point of crisis. Transportation halted, food sup 
plies dwindled, and panic swelled. Six days into the strike, the National 
Command Center for Gremio Defense (Comando Nacional de Defensa 
Gremial) was created and charged with the task of summarizing the bour 
geoisie's demands. The subsequent list of the "Demands of Chile" (Pliego 
de Chile] called for a reversal of several u p measures such as the take 
over of the banking sector and Alessandri's paper company, limitations 
on agrarian reform, and the elimination of local price control boards. The 
massive mobilization of workers to defy their employers' attempted lock 
outs produced sharp class confrontation that was attenuated only when 
Allende brought the military into his cabinet in November (Campero 
1984, 68-73).
In spite of the u p program and Allende's commitments, the government 
was unable to divide the bourgeoisie and win any appreciable segment of 
business support. The political homogeneity of the elite was not simply an 
ontological given.20 Marveling at the inability of the government to cor 
ner some elite support, s o f o f a  president Orlando Saenz, one of the u p's  
most entrenched opponents and business's more effective organizers, con 
cluded, "Allende managed things so poorly, so poorly that he wasn't able 
to divide the business sector" (cited in Campero 1984, 58). The coalescence 
of the bourgeoisie was due to the specific historical features of the case. A 
history of elite interpenetration at the top and a strong tradition of organi 
zational autonomy laid the groundwork for cooperation, but the Allende 
regime's pattern of concessions to more radical elements on expropriation 
decisions, especially of smaller and medium-sized domestic firms, trig 
gered a deepening of elite unity.21 Although the Allende government had 
broadened its political base in 1971, it remained a weak, plurality govern 
ment with limited penetration of the state apparatus. By 1973 the regime's 
political debilities had combined with a sharp economic contraction and 
the advent of hyperinflation to further undermine its capacity to govern. 
The Chilean bourgeoisie fused in its opposition and actively sought to 
destabilize the regime. This unity prevailed through the military coup of 
September 1973 into the period of military government.
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Fearing that they had no future, and knowing that they could be next, 
even the small- and medium-sized producers rejected the government. 
This rejection was skillfully nurtured by larger business leaders and pri 
vate sector associations who cultivated links to less prominent or politi 
cized producers.22 Painted in simple terms and appealing to consensual 
values, the bourgeois opposition deepened the political polarization of the 
society and fed the military's hostility to the regime—and to the demo 
cratic system that had allowed it to come to power.
This analysis suggests that democratic socialist regimes are likely to 
generate sweeping private sector opposition. Although the bourgeoisie 
may not be vociferously or uniformly oppositional at the beginning, it 
will tend to move toward open opposition over time, with the pace and 
intensity of that movement dictated in part by the pace and intensity of 
the regime's reform effort. The fissures and internal differentiation of the 
bourgeoisie will tend to dissipate as the "national" and "nonhegemonic" 
bourgeoisie increasingly adopts the antireform stance of the more conser 
vative sectors. This move is fueled by a "free" press, in which conservative 
economic elites can project a virulently antireform message in the name 
of protecting liberty and individual freedom.23 Fundamental features of 
democratic socialism (the close alliance between the state and a powerful 
working class, ideological hostility to a dominant elite, and the political 
freedom of opposition groups) make successful courtship of any sector of 
the business class very difficult for political reformers.
The Habit of Command and the Salvadoran Oligarchy
In the Chilean case, democratic development had withered the tradi 
tional social and political power of the elite, and economic diversification 
had increased the complexity of the bourgeoisie. This heterogeneity and 
stratification allowed a reform regime to emerge and introduce structural 
change, at least temporarily. In contrast, in the Salvadoran case the resi 
due of oligarchical power remained relatively undiluted. Reform, in this 
setting, faced more formidable obstacles and was more readily circum 
scribed.
The concept of "oligarchy" has been much discussed and debated; it 
remains somewhat ambiguous. Although the term is frequently used to 
describe a traditional rentier class, oligarchies that survive into the mid 
twentieth century must display some dynamism and capacity for skillful 
investment. Jimenez (1986, 22-28) defines an oligarchy as an identifiable 
group of families who possess concentrated economic power, social pres 
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tige and authority, and either direct or indirect control over dominant 
political actors. Oligarchies are typically defined by the transfer of these 
powers through hereditary means, with family notability dating back at 
least several generations.24
In most of Latin America's larger, economically diversified countries, 
this kind of concentration of political-economic-social power tended 
to dissipate in the twentieth century. Traditionally, the oligarchy was 
grounded on its control of land and the preeminence of agroexport produc 
tion. With economic diversification, industrial growth, and the expansion 
of an industrial workforce, these rural elites tended to be displaced from 
power. The creation of competitive electoral systems with extended suf 
frage and mass mobilization also undercut the political and social privi 
leges of traditional oligarchs. But if the oligarchical families succeeded in 
diversifying into varied economic sectors, particularly nodal institutions 
like the banking system, and if political pluralism was relatively weak, 
then oligarchical networks could retain considerable influence.
One concrete case of continued oligarchical power can be found in El 
Salvador following the collapse of the Romero government and the proc 
lamation of a revolutionary junta in 1979.25 Reform efforts were blocked 
largely through the work of an oligarchical, antireform elite that remained 
powerful and well organized even into the 1980s.
Scholarly consensus on El Salvador holds that an oligarchy rooted in 
coffee production developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
(Baloyra 1982,- Lopez Vallecillos 1979; Jimenez 1986; de Sebastian 1986; 
Colindres 1977). After the bourgeois revolution of 1870, this ascendant 
elite ruled the country directly for over sixty years, with top political 
positions circulating among two or three groups, including the Araujo, 
Melendez, and Quinonez Molina families (Baloyra 1982, 5). This group's 
direct control of government ended following the collapse of the agro 
export sector during the depression and the rise of labor militancy, which 
was triggered by falling wages and a rural male unemployment rate of 40 
percent in 1929 (North 1985, 33). Military leaders seized control of the 
state, and the incipient labor uprising was brutally repressed.26 In the years 
that followed (1932—44), General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez gov 
erned as a personalistic dictator. The military subsequently governed the 
country as an institution from 1948 to 1979 by rotating top government 
offices among ranking military officers.
The passing of direct political control from the elite families to the 
military signaled a decline of the traditional oligarchy, but this economic
Capitalists and Revolution 13
elite remained a very potent economic, social, and political force. This 
powerful coffee-based network was still able to dictate the rules for the 
economic order and kept issues like agrarian reform off the political 
agenda.27 Coffee continued to be the primary export, generating 53 per 
cent of export earnings even as late as the 1975-79 period (Brockett 1990, 
60). Key state institutions such as the Central Reserve Bank were run by 
this elite.28
Modest economic diversification29 did not displace the coffee oligarchy; 
it remained a vibrant participant in the diversification process. Beginning 
in the 1880s, coffee wealth had been used to found a private banking sys 
tem. The Banco Salvadoreno and the Banco Occidental emerged first in 
the 1880s. In 1934 the government created an additional bank, the Banco 
Hipotecario, to funnel yet more resources into the agricultural sector, and 
large producer associations were brought in as major partners.30
Profits generated from coffee production were high during much of the 
postwar period and allowed for the formation of a series of spinoff ventures 
(Baloyra 1982, 28). In addition to the banking system, coffee oligarchs di 
versified into the relatively lucrative processing and commercial export 
sectors. Data from Colindres' (1977) monumental study of the Salvadoran 
elite show substantial overlap between large coffee producers (those pro 
ducing over 10,000 quintals in 1970/71) and large coffee exporters (those 
exporting over 1 percent of total coffee crop in 1974). Furthermore, ac 
cording to that analysis, the country's 36 largest landowners controlled 
66 percent of the capital of the 1,429 largest firms in 1971.31 The com 
mon reference to Salvador's "fourteen families" overstates the case, but 
there is little debate about the claim of acute concentration of resources 
in pre-1979 El Salvador.
No economic elite, even one that is fully grounded in a single sec 
tor or interpenetrated through family ties, can be entirely homogeneous. 
Predictably, some segmentation existed within the Salvadoran elite. Sal 
vadoran analysts like Lopez Vallecillos (1979) divide the elite into two 
sectors: a traditional sector based in coffee production and banking (the 
"agro-financial sector"), and a sector that had also extended into indus 
trial activities, including coffee processing (the "agro-industrial-financial 
sector").
Baloyra takes this segmental analysis a step further by separating the 
"oligarchy," which dominated export agriculture and the banking system, 
from "the bourgeoisie," which was dominant in industry and commerce. 
But even Baloyra sees the bourgeoisie as essentially following the lead of
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the oligarchy, not representing an independent political force. "A bour 
geoisie did indeed emerge in El Salvador/' he concludes, "but it remained 
bound to the traditional groups or at least dependent on them for the 
finance of major projects. The bourgeoisie remained unable to secure the 
resources necessary to embark on the type of economic projects that 
would have made it socially and politically hegemonic" (Baloyra 1982, 30).
A sector of middle-sized industrialists, commercial establishments, 
and agricultural producers did emerge, but this stratum represented a 
small portion of the strategic sectors of the economy (only 8.9 percent 
of coffee production, for example), and these producers were not inde 
pendently organized or powerful.32 Unlike the Chilean case, where small- 
and medium-sized elites had long had their own organizations and were 
courted by contending political parties, these mid-level elites in Salvador 
were characterized by their lack of effective mobilization. The limited size 
of the medium sector, the low levels of foreign investment in El Salvador 
compared with the rest of the Central American region (Bulmer-Thomas 
1987,103), and the organizational weakness of the middle elite meant that 
established oligarchs remained the hegemonic and largely unchallenged 
force in the local economy. Accustomed to power, and unaccustomed to 
negotiation, this elite dominated the social order. A powerful peak asso 
ciation, a n e p,33 was formed in 1966 to further consolidate and bolster the 
power of this traditional elite.34
Reform moves did come, however, in 1979, in the form of a military 
putsch that abruptly embraced the reform proposals of a broad coalition of 
center-left political parties and mass organizations. Jolted into action by 
the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, military reformers founded the 
Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno in October 1979 with the participation 
of political party leaders, intellectuals, and a handful of business elites.35 
Drawing on the recommendations emanating from the Foro Popular, a 
rally of reformers in September 1979, the new junta adopted a series of 
initiatives designed to revolutionize the social and economic systems.
The three reforms inaugurated by the government were (1) a major 
land reform program that was designed to alter fundamentally the land 
distribution patterns, (2) the nationalization of the banking system, and 
(3) a state takeover of foreign trade. These reforms precisely targeted the 
three legs of oligarchical economic power: land, banking, and trade. Re 
curring and rapid turnover in the governing junta between October 1979 
and March 1980 reflected uncertainty about the military's commitment 
to reform, but by early 1980 changes had been legislated in each of these 
three areas.
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By May 1980, over 300 agricultural estates had been seized, thus com 
pleting what is generally known as Phase I of the land reform program.36 
Land affected in this round was 70 percent pastureland; only 12 percent of 
the coffee crop was produced on these large estates (Reinhardt 1989, 459). 
From the standpoint of the coffee elite, the second phase of the reform, 
which was designed to break up estates of 100-150 hectares (depending 
on land quality) to 500 hectares where the core of coffee cultivation took 
place, was more threatening. Since Phase II would most affect the tra 
ditional coffee oligarchy, that segment of the plan was bitterly resisted. 
Phase III was a land-to-the-tiller program that would allow peasants rent 
ing small plots (up to 7 hectares) to claim that land for themselves.
The goals of this reform were exceptionally ambitious. If implemented 
as designed, the program was to redistribute roughly 48 percent of agricul 
tural land to approximately 50 percent of Salvador's rural poor (Reinhardt 
1989, 459-60).37 Resistance and complications soon took a toll, however. 
Phase II was annulled by the dominant center-right coalition in the first 
legislative session of the Constituent Assembly elected in March 1982. 
The following year, the constitution of 1983 provided more durable pro 
tection to this sector by raising the land size threshold and delaying im 
plementation for two years, during which time owners could reduce the 
size of their holdings to avoid expropriation. In the end, this part of the 
plan was never implemented.
The regime was slow to regularize land reform titles, and war and terror 
in the countryside undermined Phases I and III of the process. Beneficia 
ries of the land reform sometimes abandoned their land and their claims, 
terrorized into leaving by death squads and military threats.38 Few bene 
ficiaries could pay for the land they had received, so unmanageable debts 
burdened the participants 39
Ultimately, the program did allocate approximately 20 percent of the 
arable land to around 20 percent of the rural labor force (Strasma 1990, 
5/ 14-15)- In comparative terms, the Salvadoran reform falls roughly in 
the middle of Latin American agrarian reform outcomes in the portion of 
land and of rural population affected, distributing more, for example, than 
Ecuador but less than Mexico and Peru (Thiesenhusen 1989, 10-n). The 
fact that most coffee land was sealed off from expropriation and that the 
program fell far short of its initial goals, however, suggests that traditional 
elites remained powerful enough to resist incursions into their domain.
From the standpoint of the traditional elite, the other two reforms were 
probably more damaging. In March 1980 the banks were surrounded by 
military vehicles, and eleven financial institutions were nationalized.40
J
16 Capitalists and Revolution
Private sector representation on the board of directors of the Central Bank 
was also decreased from 3 of 8 members to 1 of 7 after the reform (Ramirez 
Arango 1985, 158).
But nationalization did not mean that the old structure was trans 
formed. Two issues are relevant here: the compensation paid to former 
owners, and credit priorities of the bank following nationalization. First, 
to placate former owners, generous compensation was provided. In almost 
all banks, former owners received substantially more than the real value of 
their shares as determined by the evaluation commission.41 Second, bank 
control and credit distribution became, if anything, yet more concentrated 
than they had been before the reform (Valdes 1989). Bank workers could 
not afford to buy into the system; they acquired no more than 10 percent 
of the stock, and the state retained virtually all of the remainder. Central 
Reserve Bank lending went heavily to the public sector (more than 60 per 
cent of the total in 1982-85), and those private operations that received 
loans tended to be the large ones (Valdes 1989,795-97)42 The coffee sector 
actually increased the portion of agricultural credit that it had absorbed 
(from 51 percent of the total in 1979 to 65 percent in 1984) (Valdes 1989, 
802). The economy still revolved heavily around coffee, and the banking 
system continued to reflect that reality.
For most of the traditional economic elite, the worst blow came with 
the nationalization of export trade, in c a f e  was established in December 
1979; this was followed in May 1980 with the creation of the Instituto 
Nacional del Azucar. Between them, these two state trade monopolies 
controlled 58 percent of foreign trade in the 1980-83 period (Orellana 
1985, 20). Under the new rules, coffee producers were now to be paid only 
in local currency at prices fixed by the state.43 Profits were still to be made 
by producers with medium to high levels of efficiency, but the gap be 
tween international prices and the price paid locally by in c a f e  provoked 
a steady denunciation by cafetaleros who felt victimized and maligned by 
the regime.44 One member of the coffee elite reported to a North Ameri 
can academic, "When coffee reached $200 per quintal, Duarte said that 
was too much money. . . . He said we would just spend it on cars" (Paige 
1993/ T9)- With producers earning less than half the FOB price in 1986, 
in c a f e  and the Christian Democratic government became a prime target 
for elite hostility.
The disaffection of coffee producers and their unwillingness to keep up 
investments contributed to the rapid spread of coffee rust and the decline 
in coffee yields. By the end of the decade, this drop-off was exacerbated by
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the collapse of the international coffee organization and the subsequent 
fall in coffee prices. The coffee harvest in 1988-89 had dropped to one- 
third what it had been a decade before (Barry 1990,80).45 The coffee decline 
fed into the overall erosion of the Salvadoran economy. With stagnant 
public investment, little private investment, and droning warfare, the per 
capita gross domestic product declined 15.2 percent in the 1981-90 period 
(c e pa l  1990b, 26).
Confronting this decline was a weak reform regime. The 1979 reform 
movement was quickly curtailed by military countermoves and electoral 
defeat in 1982. The private sector peak association, a n e p, mobilized to 
take advantage of the frailty of the reform movement.46 By mid-1980 this 
organization had not only reestablished bonds with sectors of the armed 
forces but had sponsored the creation of the Alianza Productiva, a politi 
cally charged private sector association composed of a n e p and several of 
its affiliates, two small business associations, and two associations of pro 
fessionals and managers. This new organization formed a bridge between 
the private sector and a r e n a , a right-wing political party founded in 1981. 
Only major pressure from the Carter and Reagan administrations, who 
supported these policy changes as a means of avoiding leftist revolution, 
prevented the edifice of reform from crumbling in 1982 when a r e n a  and 
the conservative Partido de Conciliacion Nacional secured thirty-three of 
the sixty seats in the new Constituent Assembly, a r e n a  leader Roberto 
D'Aubuisson became president of the assembly and narrowly missed being 
named the provisional president of the country.
The Christian Democrat party and its perennial leader Jose Napoleon 
Duarte did not attain the presidency until 1984 or gain a legislative ma 
jority until 1985. Reformers had a precarious hold over the state apparatus 
and none over the military. Confronted by an economic elite that still had 
considerable wealth, organizational capabilities, traditional authority, and 
an enormous capacity for violence, the reform agenda could not be sus 
tained. Unable to create a strong political party or to mobilize an array of 
mass organizations, preempted from the left and vilified from the right, 
reformers failed.
Right-wing legislative victory in 1988, in which a r e n a  secured an 
absolute majority in the national assembly, was a prelude to easy presiden 
tial victory the following year. With a 55 percent turnout rate, a r e n a  got 
54 percent of the vote,- under the mantle of recent a r e n a  affiliate Alfredo 
Cristiani, economic elites regained center stage. Cristiani, a political nov 
ice but former president of the Association of Processors and Exporters
j
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of Coffee, incorporated other prominent business leaders into the new 
government.47 In addition to the presidency, a r e n a  dominated the legis 
lature, nearly 70 percent of the mayoralties, and the court system (Miles 
and Ostertag 1989). Forced by the changing rules of the 1980s to play an 
electoral game in order to secure political power, the traditional elites 
funneled resources into the right-wing party and proved to be skillful 
strategists.
A reform movement that had been deflected for several years was now 
derailed. After its victory, the a r e n a  government moved to reverse sev 
eral key reforms. A supreme court decision in 1989 had declared in c a f e  
to be an unconstitutional monopoly, and this program was replaced by a 
modest supervisory board, the Salvadoran Coffee Council. Unlike its pre 
decessor, the coffee council did not determine prices. Former private ex 
port companies reestablished their operations, and prices were now set by 
the international market. The banking system was targeted for speedy pri 
vatization (although bank insolvency complicated the process); agrarian 
reform was formally halted, and previous land grants were decollectivized 
(Martinez 1989). a r e n a 's ideology, which combined an assertive nation 
alism with a commitment to neoliberal economics, promised to counter 
lingering reform sentiment. Having demonstrated its considerable skill 
in playing by the rules of electoral democracy, the elite now pushed to 
restrain reform through the democratic route.48
Structural change and redistribution in El Salvador during the reform 
era was not as profound as in Allende's Chile. Without an organized work 
ing class or ideologically coherent and highly mobilized leftist parties, the 
reform movement in El Salvador remained narrowly delimited and mod 
est. But the Salvadoran elite reacted with perhaps even greater ferocity 
to the reform, not only conspiring with the military but financing its 
own death squads to annihilate opponents. The Salvadoran opposition 
was due less to the threat of unstanched expropriation of even small- and 
medium-sized firms, which proved so significant in Chile, and more to 
the continued clout of a relatively unreconstructed oligarchy. The reform 
movement, which succeeded in electing Duarte to the presidency only in 
1984 and which had lost power by 1988, was even weaker in Salvador than 
in Chile, and provided little incentive for cooperation by business leaders. 
Furthermore, a sharp economic erosion that began immediately after the 
reform was launched in El Salvador fed further elite disdain and disillu 
sionment.49 Although the combination of factors differed somewhat in 
each case, in both El Salvador and Chile the bourgeoisie coalesced quickly 
in opposition to reform and contributed forcefully to its overthrow.50
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Accommodation to Reform
Symbiotic Interdependence and Silent Partners in Mexico
The bourgeoisie is not always able to coordinate sweeping opposition 
to reform. Indeed, in several Latin American cases, revolutionary regimes 
not only deflected an elite opposition movement but won a segment of 
elite backers. The ability of a revolutionary government to gain overt 
bourgeois supporters, in spite of its commitment to agrarian reform, state 
expansion, and redistribution, is an anomalous process that deserves close 
analysis. It has been most evident in Latin America during periods of 
revolutionary populism.
Populism is a rich and contradictory ideology that emphasizes con 
trolled mobilization of marginal groups under the leadership of an activist 
state. This dynamic is typically fostered by a multiclass coalition domi 
nated by emerging middle-class forces that have a commitment to nation 
alism, economic growth, and a degree of redistribution. In Latin America, 
this model has generally been found to emerge during the "Bonapartist 
interlude/7 a period after traditional oligarchic power has been checked 
but before new industrial elites have consolidated their own power base 
(lanni 1975, 53-54). During this phase, the state is said to attain a rela 
tive autonomy that allows it to act independently of, and even at times 
in opposition to, the preferences of economic elites. The state pursues 
either the long-term interests of capitalist development, which may not 
be apparent to the local bourgeoisie at the moment, or its own specific 
interests (Hamilton 1982, 4-25,- Skocpol 1979).
During episodes when the traditional elite struggles with economic 
collapse or the devastation of war, the populist state can mobilize new 
class actors to replace it. State support is provided for priority sectors 
such as manufacturing, production for the domestic market, or high em 
ployment industries, and the economic elite is recomposed along those 
lines. The surging nationalism of the populist project generally pushes 
the state to check the power of foreign capital. The resulting nationaliza 
tions or expulsions of foreign firms serve the populist cause by expanding 
the resources and economic leverage of the state when the state acquires 
expropriated concerns, or by strengthening domestic producers as local 
businesses move into the space created by the removal of foreign opera 
tions.
Populist movements are not identical; some involve much stronger 
mass mobilization and higher degrees of state autonomy than others.51 
Most populist projects have ended in collapse, due to fiscal crisis and
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financial dependency, internal division within the state, the inability to 
consolidate a mass base, or a series of conjunctural factors (O'Donnell 
1973; Stepan 1978, 282-316; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). In some 
cases, like Argentina, military coups or countercoups signaled the demise 
of populism; in others, like Mexico, antipopulist forces penetrated the 
state, leaving populist and antipopulist forces in an uneasy cohabitation.
In the Mexican case, the old Porfirian elite of landowners, industrial 
ists, and foreigners who had come to dominate the state in the last decade 
of Porfirio Diaz's presidency were thrown into decline with the depar 
ture of their leader and the following seven years of civil war (1911-17). 
Economic elites were not eliminated, but they lost wealth through ex 
propriations, evictions, vandalism, and depreciation.52 In the wake of the 
violence, a new elite emerged. The tattered remnants of the old bourgeoi 
sie were joined by revolutionary chieftains who had appropriated land and 
capital.53
State-sponsored change, which had sparked and fizzled in the 1920s, 
began in earnest when the revolutionary coalition elected Lazaro Carde 
nas to the presidency in 1934. Using legislation that limited estate size 
to the equivalent of 150 irrigated hectares, Cardenas expropriated vast 
tracts of land.54 Unlike many agrarian reform programs, these expropria 
tions included land of good quality held by prominent local and foreign 
elites. By 1940, 47.4 percent of all cultivated land and 57.3 percent of all 
irrigated land had been allocated to ejidos (Hamilton 1982, 177).55 Carde 
nas also undercut the urban elite by rechanneling resources to labor. Real 
wages soared as the regime promoted strikes and legislative protections 
for workers.56 The state-sponsored mass organizations, the Mexican Labor 
Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico) and the National 
Peasant Federation (Confederacion Nacional de Campesinos) linked the 
popular sectors to the regime.57
Business elites were predictably alarmed. Producers, particularly in re 
gional strongholds like Monterrey, retaliated and threatened lockouts in 
protest. Going into the lion's den, Cardenas addressed the Employers' 
Center of Monterrey in February 1936, chastising business leaders for their 
hostility to reform. He announced: "Entrepreneurs who feel fatigued by 
the social struggle can turn over their industries to the workers or the gov 
ernment. That would be patriotic, the lockout would not."58 In the wake 
of rising strikes and presidential criticism, capital flight accelerated.59
In spite of rhetorical clashes and state expansion, Cardenas was hardly 
a simple opponent of business. The top-down developmentalists of the
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revolutionary government looked for ways to incorporate business into 
their new growth strategy. The national bourgeoisie benefited repeatedly 
from legislation and policy that edged out foreigners. The state itself ex 
panded, as with the nationalization of the petroleum sector, but so did 
Mexican capitalists. Legislation requiring insurance companies to invest 
their reserve in Mexico, for example, triggered the departure of foreign- 
owned companies that were replaced by both state insurance companies 
and a rapidly mushrooming number of locally owned insurance businesses 
(Hamilton 1982, 205). The revolutionary populist state undercut old, in 
efficient businesses or those that seemed not to favor Mexican national 
development, and warmly embraced others that contributed to national 
growth.
The industrial sector was especially favored by state resources and as 
sistance in the form of tax incentives and investment loans. Special at 
tention was provided to small and medium industries, which flourished 
during this era. Given a range of supports, including tax exemptions, sub 
sidies, investments, reduced rates for rail transportation of their cargo, and 
the elimination of some agricultural intermediaries, small- and medium 
sized producers expanded. The number of manufacturing firms (not in 
cluding artisan workshops) in the country increased from 6,916 in 1935 to 
13,150 in 1940, and most of the new enterprises were small (employing on 
average only ten workers) (Hamilton 1982, 201-2; Mosk 1954, 316). Dur 
ing the 1934-38 period, the gross national product grew by 22 percent, 
particularly in the industrial sector, which increased 33 percent (n a f in s a  
1978,19, 24).
Seeking to consolidate a state-business alliance, Cardenas built bridges 
into the business heartland. As long as it did not rebel, the bourgeoisie 
would be showered with praise and support. By 1939, in a speech given be 
fore the Camara de Comercio of Saltillo, Coahuila, Cardenas had altered 
his tone. He now proclaimed, consider your cooperation very valuable; 
I hold your knowledge, experience and entrepreneurial spirit in esteem,- I 
conceive of you as a prominent factor in our progress and as promoters of 
our homeland's culture" (quoted in Medina 1974, 278).60
To enhance its penetration of a rapidly growing business sector, the 
state redefined the organizational infrastructure of business. Prior to the 
revolution, business organizations tended to be fragmented and dispersed. 
Reflecting the strong regional tendencies and fractured nature of the econ 
omy, these organizations operated only at the local level and had not 
merged into broader national federations.
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Following a series of meetings with industrialists and merchants in 
1917, the Mexican state attempted to facilitate steady but controlled com 
munication with the private elite by creating two new associations—the 
National Federation of Chambers of Commerce (c o n c a n a c o ) and the 
Federation of Chambers of Industry (c o n c a min ). During the Cardenas 
era these organizations were merged into a single unit and strengthened 
through the requirement of mandatory membership.61 Another round of 
institution building occurred in 1941 with the founding of the National 
Chamber of Manufacturing Industry (c a n a c in t r a , sometimes referred 
to as c n it ), an association explicitly designed to serve the needs of small- 
and medium-sized industries that were emerging under the protection of 
the Mexican state.62
Given the requirement of participation in these organizations, few 
business leaders went beyond them to form associations of their own cre 
ation. One of the rare exceptions was the Mexican Republic Employers' 
Federation (c o pa r me x ), a forceful, antistate organization that dates back 
to the divisive 1928 debate about the Labor Code. Even this independent 
offshoot posed little threat to the regime. For several decades c o pa r me x  
remained essentially a regional, Monterrey-based organization; it failed 
to develop a broad national base and could not compete organizationally 
with the larger, state-sponsored federations.63
Through its influence over the major private sector organizations, 
selective distribution of resources, state investment funds, licenses, and 
tax exemptions, the state incorporated the bourgeoisie as a silent part 
ner in a state-sponsored development initiative. Mexican businesspeople 
were notoriously withdrawn from public political life, even to the point of 
eschewing party membership.64 Because of the revolution's formal com 
mitment to the masses and marginal groups, public alliances between 
the regime and economic elites would have been uncomfortable for both. 
Instead, linkages between the state and the bourgeoisie were generally 
informal and tacit rather than highly visible and overt. Through participa 
tion in state-created business associations, sectoral leaders, who tended 
to be drawn heavily from the largest firms and industrial groups, obtained 
representation on a host of government boards and agencies 65 In turn, 
they refrained from organizing independently and implicitly supported 
the line of the political leadership.
The entrepreneur who was savvy enough to cut through the socialist 
rhetoric and seek contacts with political elites often flourished. Whether 
the fictional Artemio Cruz of Carlos Fuentes's invention, or the pseud 
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onymous Pablo Gomez described so deftly by Larissa Adler Lomnitz and 
Marisol Perez-Lizaur (1987, 37-38, 61-63), entrepreneurs who energeti 
cally sought investment opportunities and political alliances with the 
revolutionary regime could expand rapidly during this period of historic 
economic growth.66
This complex political configuration endured through the subsequent 
decades. In a study of the recent relationship between the government 
and business associations, Luna et al. (1987,19-21) found that the twelve 
major private sector organizations in Mexico ranged along a five-point 
continuum from those that gave unconditional support to the govern 
ment (like the National Federation of Small Property Owners) to those 
that made fundamental criticisms of both the political and economic 
systems (like c o pa r mex ). Most organizations ranked somewhere in be 
tween, with some, like ca n a c in t r a , generally endorsing the government 
line and pushing to have business organizations formally integrated into 
the pr i party apparatus, c a n a c in t r a  became a durable base of support 
for government initiatives, backing legislation that recognized the state as 
the regulator of the economy in 1950, the nationalization of the electrical 
industry in i960, restrictions on foreign investment in 1973, the govern 
ment's decision to stay out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
in 1980, and even the nationalization of the banks in 1982 (Alcazar 1970, 
120-21; Arriola 1976, 45,- Basanez 1990,124-25; Maxfield 1987, 4). Other 
organizations, like c o n c a min , called for a gradual reduction in the eco 
nomic roles of the state and increased business autonomy, but generally 
cooperated with the regime.
This factionalism is in part related to the overall size and complexity 
of the Mexican economy. Regional economic differences were marked 
and played a role in the internal differentiation of the business elite. For 
example, the Monterrey group, developing prior to the revolution and, 
in the case of steel, in competition with parastate enterprises, was quite 
independent from and often critical of the government67 Private elites 
clustered in the capital city, on the other hand, were slower to confront 
the regime.
Unlike in Chile and El Salvador, where traditional elites remained 
niore autonomous and mustered broad opposition to the state, business 
hostility was undercut by state organizational intervention in Mexico. 
Through the distribution of investment, credit, subsidies, and protection, 
the state helped to create certain economic sectors and groups. These 
groups were dependent on the regime and had difficulty organizing au 
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tonomously around class needs or interests. Although expanded state 
roles and recurring expropriations caused consternation in some sectors, 
alliances and understandings forged in the aftermath of the revolution 
continued to facilitate cooperation and communication with others.
The Mexican regime was also exceptional in its ability to maintain 
economic growth, even during the period of most intense social trans 
formation. Continually expanding economic resources made it possible 
to avoid a zero-sum situation in which increased assets for the state or 
popular sectors meant reduced resources for capital. Growth allowed for 
multiple beneficiaries; even those who did not benefit directly could con 
sole themselves with the prospect of future gain. The result was what 
has been called a "symbiotic relationship" between the state and key seg 
ments of the private sector (Camp 1989, 250-52). State stability since the 
1940s has been premised on the prosperity of business,- business leaders in 
turn have relied on the support and stability provided by pr i dominance. 
In sum, the Mexican state has a complex, variegated relationship with a 
fragmented bourgeoisie based on the assumption of shared benefit and the 
persistence of mutual need, even as periodic conflicts have erupted.
Private Sector Alliances in Revolutionary Peru
The Peruvian experience with revolutionary populism did not produce 
an enduring alliance with the bourgeoisie like that found in Mexico, but 
it did drive a wedge into the elite and win support in some capitalist 
quarters.68 Like the Mexican case, the reform effort in Peru signaled the 
demise of the traditional oligarchy. Seizing control of the state, the Peru 
vian military launched a large-scale agrarian reform program that effec 
tively abolished the large landowning class. Rural estates were limited 
by Supreme Decree #265-7o-AG to a maximum of 150 hectares of irri 
gated land on the coast and a modest 15-55 hectares of irrigated land 
(depending on the province) in the highland or high-jungle region.69 As a 
result, roughly 35 percent of Peru's agricultural land was transferred into 
the reformed sector by 1977, benefiting around 24 percent of Peru's rural 
families (McClintock 1981, 62).70
The remainder of the bourgeoisie did not rush to defend the collaps 
ing rural oligarchy, which was "a class in the process of deteriorating" 
(Castillo Ochoa 1988, 195,- see also Bourricaud 1966). The economic cen 
ter of gravity was already shifting toward the industrial sector in Peru, 
and military president Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75) targeted the latter 
for special support. Some large landowners from the coast (what Gilbert
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[1980] calls the "metropolitan oligarchy") had relaxed their links to the 
land and diversified assets into mining, urban real estate, banking, and 
manufacturing.71 Most industrialists, however, were not from oligarchical 
families but from a new class of relatively recent immigrant extraction.72 
Because the traditional elite had already been displaced from the economic 
center in Peru, agrarian reform did not produce the same tooth-and-nail 
resistance among the bourgeoisie that it precipitated in El Salvador.
To encourage private investment in the industrial sector, the military 
authorized the redemption of bonds given in payment for expropriated 
land at 100 percent of their face value to ex-landowners who would in 
vest those payments in new industrial enterprises. A few landowners, like 
those in the Grupo Romero, used them to transfer resources into new 
industrial operations.73 Tariffs on imported manufactured products also 
helped stimulate industrial growth, particularly in household goods. The 
primary growth areas of the economy during the Velasco era were manu 
facturing and construction (FitzGerald 1976, 63, table 35; Malpica Silva 
Santisteban 1989, 48).
To prevent a rupture in the relationship with emerging domestic capi 
talists, Velasco attempted to shift much of the burden for financing this 
transformation onto foreign-owned operations. The revolution was to be 
financed through what Becker (1983, 61-71) has called the "bonanza devel 
opment" approach. In this model, the state would derive resources from 
the foreign-dominated large-mining sector, particularly that involved in 
the extraction of copper. These funds were to be spent on large-scale state 
investments including an oil pipeline, irrigation facilities, and turnkey 
projects in refining, chemical fertilizer, and fish processing.74 By 1974, 
the state controlled 26 percent of the GNP and over 40 percent of pro 
duction in the modern sector (FitzGerald 1976, 36). To achieve this state- 
led growth, some sectors of foreign capital were expropriated. Those that 
remained were required to adopt a profit-sharing scheme that would ulti 
mately apportion 50 percent of the stock in their companies to industrial 
communities representing the workforce in their firm.75
As in the Mexican case, the Peruvian regime was able to undercut the 
traditional landholding elite and cultivate ties with segments of the bour 
geoisie that benefited from the new, nationalist development scheme. The 
National Society of Industries (s n i) initially found common cause with 
the regime and was "cautiously cooperating" (Becker 1983, 258). This co 
operation reached its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the s n i 
Was dominated by executives from the larger, more modern firms. Contra 
dieting standard theory about the receptivity of small, domestic capital to 
populist reforms, it was the larger industrialists who were relatively open 
to reform in the Peruvian case. When questioned in a 1968—69 survey, for 
example, industrialists in multinational subsidiaries and large Peruvian 
consortia were more likely than their smaller counterparts to note the 
existence of structural problems in the economy and approve of a more 
dynamic role for the state (Wils 1975, 170). Building on that predisposi 
tion, a complex and sputtering understanding emerged between some of 
the larger industrialists and the revolutionary regime.
Bamat's (1978) close study of the Peruvian capitalist elite located sev 
eral business sectors that participated in affirmative negotiations with 
the state. These included the association of exporters, a d  e x  (founded in 
1973 by the large enterprise leaders from the s n i who had sought more 
active cooperation with the regime), which benefited from the govern 
ment's active promotion of exports; the National Chamber of Commerce, 
which benefited from an expanding internal market and was exempt from 
the profit and stock sharing requirement imposed on industry; the Min 
ing Society, which was buoyed by the massive foreign investment deal 
arranged by the state for southern Peru's Cuajone project76; and the Peru 
vian Institute of Business Administration, which sponsored an annual 
conference of executives ( c a d e ) that drew together a number of managers, 
executives, industrialists, and bankers who provided support for some 
reforms (Bamat 1978, 212-19; see also Becker 1983, 271-72; Wils 1975, 
210).77 To "reinforce the sensible elements" in the regime, private sec 
tor leaders like Pedro Reiser, former president of the National Chamber 
of Commerce, served as government advisers and appointees in key eco 
nomic agencies and provided a selective defense of government policies 
(Bamat 1978, 216).
On the other hand, many industrialists who were not in the top elite 
were historically skeptical of state economic interventions and resented 
the new rules. The regime dealt forcefully with these business critics. 
The National Agrarian Society, an old, elite organization that had repre 
sented the traditional oligarchy, was simply dissolved in 1972, and its 
assets were seized by the state. It was replaced by a state-created peasant 
federation, the National Agrarian Confederation, which was emphatically 
pro-Velasco. After several of the larger, more modern industrialists chan 
neled their energies into the formation of a d  e x , small- and medium-sized 
industrialists became more prominent in the s n i leadership, and the s n i 
became the leading critic of the military's project (Bamat 1978, 192—219;
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Becker 1983, 258). The requirement of stock allocation to workers gener 
ated some harsh disputes at both the firm and the national level, and the 
s n i led the charge. In response, the military flexed its muscles and with 
drew legal recognition of the association. As tensions built, the regime 
forced changes in the s n i, requiring, for example, that workers be included 
in its national directorate and that it change its name.78
As in Chile and Salvador, some disgruntled private sector leaders at 
tempted to organize a cross-class response to the revolution. For ex 
ample, two movements to create a peak association that would allow 
economic elites to mount a collective front in opposition to the regime 
were launched. Unlike the Chilean and Salvadoran cases, however, both 
failed in Peru.79 Throughout the revolution, the private sector in Peru 
continued to be divided into more than a dozen different national orga 
nizations (Durand 1988b, 275). The regime's ability to divide and rule by 
playing exporters, for example, against small industrialists allowed it to 
prevent the consolidation of a united bourgeois front.
As in Mexico, this fragmentation is due in part to the collapse of 
the traditional oligarchy and the economic and ideological weakness of 
the emerging industrial-commercial elite that replaced it. Stratified into 
layers that had different needs and organizational styles, divided into sec 
tors with often competing interests, and played against each other by 
regime policies that favored some over others, the Peruvian bourgeoi 
sie was unable to form a political consensus about its relationship with 
the state.80
Also as in Mexico, economic reform was accompanied by economic 
growth in Peru. The gross domestic product increased by over 5 percent 
per year between 1970 and 1974, and by 4 percent in 1975 (McClintock 
1981, 60). Continued growth both reflected and contributed to a less ex 
treme elite opposition, at least as compared with that found in Chile 
and El Salvador. In spite of this success, economic and political prob 
lems eventually erupted for the regime. The rapid economic growth of 
the 1970-75 period subsequently dropped off, and economic performance 
slowed. Growth was increasingly dependent on the state sector, and the 
state sector was increasingly dependent on foreign financing (Stepan 1978, 
2-84, table 7*4/ FitzGerald 1979, 164).81 Unlike in Mexico, where the ex 
pansion of the state sector proceeded gradually over the course of several 
decades, state enterprises expanded rapidly in Peru into industries that 
needed massive investments, leaving a heavier financial burden for the 
state to assume. Increased financial dependency made the regime highly
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vulnerable to external forces. By 1976 this dependency gave foreign banks 
and the imf  considerable influence over the model and ultimately contrib 
uted to the erosion of the revolutionary project (Stallings 1979, 242—48 ).82 
In contrast, during the crucial period when the Mexican revolution was 
consolidated, state expansion could be managed by internal borrowing. 
This buffered Mexican populism somewhat from foreign influences.
Operating in a relative institutional vacuum after the 1911—17 revolu 
tion, the Mexican leadership was also freer to fill the landscape with orga 
nizations of its creation. Whereas most of the private sector organizations 
in Mexico were established by the state, the Peruvian military confronted 
an array of existing associations, many of which became regime oppo 
nents. The Peruvian regime focused its energies on taming or dissolving 
relatively autonomous organizations. It failed to institutionalize a net 
work of business support; it even failed to institutionalize a network of 
support among peasants and labor, the purported beneficiaries of the revo 
lution. For these and other reasons, the Peruvian revolutionary regime 
proved less durable than that of Mexico (Stepan 1978, 304-11).
In spite of these differences, there are certain notable similarities in 
these two cases. In neither did the bourgeoisie as a class publicly revolt 
against the regime,- instead, segments of this elite operated in tandem with 
the revolutionary project.83 Neither had, as we found in the Chilean and 
Salvadoran cases, a strong, well-organized bourgeoisie capable of coordi 
nating cohesive resistance to reform. Both of these regimes were capable 
of targeting sectors of the economic elite that would be incorporated 
into the new development model. Because of these characteristics, these 
regimes could, under certain circumstances, secure a cooperative relation 
ship with key sectors of the bourgeoisie and maintain growth, even as 
the government attempted to restructure the social order and reallocate 
resources. Ultimately, this state-bourgeoisie alliance restricted the degree 
to which the society could be transformed; it also made some degree of 
transformation possible.84
Conclusions
There is a strong tendency for the bourgeoisie to reject revolutionary or 
strongly reformist regimes. The pattern of opposition, however, is not 
uniform. It varies in two key ways. First, differences may be observed in 
the breadth of private sector hostility. In some cases, like Chile and El 
Salvador, this opposition was sweeping and included even nonhegemonic,
1
middle-sized businesses. In others, like Mexico and Peru, opposition was 
concentrated in pockets of the elite. Many business organizations stayed 
out of the fray,- some even aligned with the regime.
The second variation is found in the depth or intensity of the oppo 
sition. Reform regimes are likely to generate resistance from those who 
benefit most from the status quo, but the degree of hostility ranges 
from spirited grumbling to concerted sabotage. In Chile and El Salvador, 
business organizations actively conspired with paramilitary and military 
groups for the overthrow of the regime. They organized a formidable 
campaign against the government in the press to mobilize hostility and 
fear, rejecting the regime's feeble attempts at dialogue. Elite opposition in 
Mexico and Peru never reached this level. Emphasis in the latter cases was 
placed on economic measures, like an investment slowdown and capital 
flight, which could in some measure be compensated for by a speedup in 
government investment.
The degree of hostility evoked depends much on the character of the 
bourgeoisie, the nature of the reform regime, the resources held by popu 
lar sectors, and the state's ability to institutionalize its authority as a 
hegemonic actor. These characteristics will be analyzed more systemati 
cally in the concluding chapter of this book. Overall, however, we can 
identify five kinds of variations that seem to shape the unity/division of 
the bourgeoisie.
First, when a traditional oligarchy remains dominant and other busi 
ness leaders are predisposed to follow its lead, economic elites tend to be 
come intransigent, implacable foes of reform; conversely, when the power 
of the traditional oligarchy has been ruptured, there is a greater tendency 
toward political fragmentation and sectoral accommodation.
Second, business elites who have succeeded in establishing a dense net 
work of elite associations prior to the reform era may be relatively forceful 
critics, inured from state cooptive strategies; those that are weakly orga 
nized or whose organizations depend heavily on state resources, on the 
other hand, are more easily drawn into an alliance with the regime.
Third, not all of these regimes were perceived as equally threatening. 
Those that expropriate widely, concentrating on domestic firms, and blast 
the bourgeoisie with class-laced rhetoric tend to trigger fuller opposition 
than those that focus on the nationalization of foreign holdings and em 
ploy more inclusionary communication strategies.
Fourth, the regime's success in consolidating a new order also affected 
state-business relations. Weakly institutionalized regimes with fragile
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electoral bases and little control over key state agencies (such as the mili 
tary, the courts, the legislature) invite strident opposition in the hope of 
triggering regime collapse; well-consolidated regimes, on the other hand, 
elicit begrudging dialogue from business elites who see no obvious alter 
native.
Finally, the performance of the economy both responds to and shapes 
the response of the local elites. If the economy declines precipitously and 
inflation reels out of control, this may propel the business sector into 
opposition,- if the government can keep the economy from collapsing and 
develop a model that is perceived as viable, if not ideal, then it may be 
able to coax out private sector acquiescence to the new order.
The most recent revolution in the region, that in Nicaragua, blends 
together a complex pattern of elite confrontation and accommodation. 
Unlike the elite in neighboring El Salvador, the business community in 
Nicaragua lacked an oligarchical center. The Nicaraguan elite developed 
its political capabilities only relatively recently, and sectoral, regional, 
and strata distinctions pulled it in contradictory directions. Unlike that 
in Chile, the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie lacked a strong tradition of inde 
pendent organization at the national level, making it more susceptible 
to manipulation by the state. Although the bourgeois opposition rallied 
under the c o s e p banner, this class was never well fused; both the Somoza 
and the Sandinista regimes' policies and organizational efforts succeeded 
in peeling off some elites and drawing others into sustained negotiation.
Threats to property and social status did promote unity within the 
Nicaraguan bourgeoisie during the revolution, since domestic producers 
were targeted and, as in Chile, succeeding waves of expropriations sug 
gested no clear boundaries to the process. This cohesion diminished, how 
ever, when the post-1988 deradicalization of the revolution opened fur 
ther avenues of negotiation with the bourgeoisie. By the end of the era, 
the Sandinistas were actively courting elites, using language and symbols 
that paralleled those used in Mexico and Peru, to the dismay of grassroots 
revolutionaries.
During the decade of the revolution, the Sandinistas were particularly 
successful in the realm of political institutionalization. Much like the 
Mexican regime, the f s l n 's ability to build a broad mass base, produce 
sweeping electoral victories, and consolidate control over all vital state 
institutions fostered elite acquiescence. However, Nicaragua's unprece 
dented rate of economic decline during the 1980s seriously undermined 
the credibility of the revolution from the standpoint of the business elite.
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Economic deterioration eventually even eroded the regime's mass base. 
This decline encouraged elite opposition and helped bring the revolution 
ary period to a close.
The next five chapters detail these shifting relations between the bour 
geoisie and the state in Nicaragua, probing for underlying characteristics 
that have shaped this dynamic. The concluding chapter weaves the Nica 
raguan case into the discussion of the four cases described above to refocus 
on the comparative dimension.
chapter
From Elite Quiescence to Elite
Confrontation in Prerevolutionary 
Nicaragua
Up to the present time, domestic private enterprise has, with few ex 
ceptions, done relatively little to develop the country’s productive 
capacity. . . . Private enterprise . . . has often been unimaginative and 
unduly cautious. It has been too prone to seek either the safe invest 
ment or a quick return.
—ib r d , The Economic Development of Nicaragua
It was a weak agroexport bourgeoisie whose ability to put itself at the 
head of the nation as a social class was brutally cut off by the years 
of North American intervention. From 1912 to 1933, that intervention 
not only took over the management and control of the most important 
mechanisms of the emerging agricultural and mining economy, but it 
took away the sense of nationhood from this mentally impoverished 
and little educated class. This class lost the historic opportunity to 
consolidate itself as a national bourgeoisie.
—Sergio Ramirez Mercado,
“Los sobrevivientes del naufragio”
C
ompa r e d  with capitalists in the rest of Latin America, the Nicara 
guan private elite was long characterized by its weak entrepreneur- 
ship, organizational fragmentation, and political incompetence. Although 
this elite was small in number, its modest proportions did not ensure 
political affinity or coherent organization. The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie 
was both heterogeneous and regionally divided, suggesting that the politi 
cal organization of the bourgeoisie may respond more to historical rival 
ries and sectoral fissures than to the size of the national economy.
Unlike El Salvador or Peru, Nicaragua never experienced a long, un 
relieved period of oligarchical rule, which might have sedimented the 
political authority of a branch of the bourgeoisie. Unlike Chile, it lacked 
a durable experience with political pluralism, which might have sparked
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the broad and spontaneous organization of private sector elites. Instead, 
the private sector organizations that sprang up in Nicaragua tended to 
have limited scope and little authority; they rose and fell rapidly. As 
in Mexico, the more durable organizations were generally those that re 
ceived the favor of the regime and were given special representational 
status within state agencies. Fractured into a series of discrete organiza 
tions and manipulated with discretionary rewards provided by the state, 
the Nicaraguan elite remained politically ineffective through much of the 
prerevolutionary era.
By the early 1970s, however, this splintering was attenuated, and the 
private elite made a bid for greater political influence. Nicaraguan repre 
sentatives from an array of regional and sectoral business organizations 
formed their first broad, national peak association in 1972. This new orga 
nization began to push for a reformulation of the character of the state 
and the national development model.
In spite of its growing organizational capacity, the Nicaraguan private 
sector was unable to emerge as the hegemonic force in the campaign to 
overthrow the Somoza regime. It did learn, by the end of the era, to employ 
collectivist strategies in high stakes confrontations with the regime, but 
it was swept aside by the rising momentum of a revolutionary movement 
under the f s l n .
The Development of the Nicaraguan Bourgeoisie
The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie historically was poor. Travel testimonials of 
the mid-i8oos note the uncertainty of economic life in Nicaragua 
and the modest standard of living of its elite. Commenting on conditions 
m Nicaragua, historical chronicler Paul Levy concluded: "This society 
has one fundamental problem: it is poor" (cited in Burns 1991, 83).
Local notable families emerged, some of whom traced their family his 
tory to the conquistador cs (Stone 1990). The ready availability of land 
in this lightly populated country, combined with the weakness of the 
state, however, allowed much of the local population to continue subsis 
tence production, often on communal lands, instead of serving as a labor 
force on the estates of the elite (Burns 1991, 138-39, 235). The scarce and 
relatively expensive labor supply, along with the constant warfare of the 
Postindependence period, retarded the process of accumulation.
What surplus there was in the nineteenth century evaporated in re 
gional warfare between the Conservatives of Granada and the Liberals of
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Leon. Competing for political control in interminable internecine feud 
ing, the Liberals brought in U.S. filibuster William Walker, whose seizure 
of the Nicaraguan presidency led to intervention by neighboring coun 
tries. In the words of President Tomas Martinez, who took office in 1858 
as the smoke cleared following the " Walker War": "Our fields lie bleached 
by the ashes of our dead; our cities lie ruined, a reminder for many years 
to come of the horrors wrought by foreign invaders; even now, agriculture 
and commerce remain paralyzed as a consequence of a recent Costa Rican 
invasion; the public treasury is empty,- private property is destroyed; the 
schools remain closed. Such is the present picture, sad as it may be, of 
Nicaragua" (cited in Burns 1991, 223).
This economic morass began to lift with the advent of coffee. In part 
because of the Liberal-Conservative warfare, Nicaragua was slower to ini 
tiate coffee production than neighboring countries like Costa Rica. By 
the 1850s, however, the visibility of the Costa Rican success prompted 
Nicaraguan state efforts to push coffee cultivation.1 President Martinez 
approved a package of incentives to cafetaleros in 1858 and the Law for 
Uncultivated Lands was adopted in 1859. The benefits offered to cof 
fee growers included exemption from military service (for producers and 
workers for twelve years as long as peace prevailed), tax exemption on 
coffee earnings, exemption of import duties on agricultural machinery 
the provision of inputs (seeds, plants) at cost, and subsidies for planting 
new crops. A port was built at Corinto in 1859 to handle increased exports 
(Burns 1991, 233).
To attract immigrants and open new lands, the government provided 
500 mz. of land to those who would plant 25,000 cafetos and maintain 
them until they could be harvested.2 The erosion of communal lands was 
accelerated, both to provide land for the new export crop and to reduce the 
economic alternatives available to peasants. The Liberal administration 
of Jose Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) deepened the country's commitment 
to coffee production by sharpening the antivagrancy laws passed in the 
1840s and 1850s to increase the available labor supply and by expanding 
the transportation infrastructure (Barahona 1989,15-18).
In spite of these trends, Nicaraguan elites were never fully entrenched 
in coffee cultivation. Whereas the Salvadoran coffee elite reigned supreme 
and became the direct occupants of top political positions in their country 
for a half-century, coffee producers in Nicaragua remained an important 
but not singularly dominant sector (Torres-Rivas 1989, 178). In 1929, on 
the eve of the depression, coffee accounted for 93 percent of export earn 
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ings in El Salvador and 77 percent in Guatemala. In contrast, a more 
modest 54 percent of Nicaragua's export earnings were obtained from 
coffee (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 34,. Compared to its neighbors, Nicaragua's 
export profile was relatively diversified, with bananas and timber each 
contributing over 10 percent of export earnings at that time.
Unlike the Salvadoran coffee elite, which expanded quickly into the 
banking and export trade sectors, the Nicaraguan coffee bourgeoisie con 
fined its activities largely to cultivation. Lucrative finance and export 
activities were monopolized in the Nicaraguan case by a partnership of 
the state and foreign investors, limiting the economic terrain available to 
domestic producers.3 Coffee production in Nicaragua tended to shift over 
time from the more populated and historically dominant Pacific coastal 
regions into the more mountainous interior, and Nicaraguan coffee pro 
ducers were increasingly located away from the mainstream of national 
political life in the relatively inaccessible Matagalpa and Jinotega regions.
Perhaps a more important factor explaining the Nicaragua elite's rela 
tive impotence was the political role assumed by the United States. Dur 
ing the 1911-33 period, the U.S. government took control of most of the 
economic and military functions of the Nicaraguan state,- the U.S. col 
lector general of customs took charge of the collection and dispersal of 
state revenues, and the marines set up a military academy and constabu 
lary national guard. Political power was subsequently commandeered by 
National Guard Commander Anastasio Somoza Garcia, and a long era 
fT937~79, of personalistic and familial control was launched. This mo 
nopoly over political power in Nicaragua left other contenders, such as 
those enriched by coffee export, scattered on the sidelines. The coffee 
elite in Nicaragua was only one of several contending powers, and it vied 
weakly for political authority. Its relatively modest contribution to the 
national economy and inability to extend into banking and exports, com 
bined with the political intrusion of the United States and the lock on 
power held by the Somozas, impeded the development of a hegemonic, 
coffee-based oligarchy in Nicaragua.4
The Post-World War IL Era and Economic Diversification
Economic activity in Nicaragua became more dynamic and diversified in 
the period after the 1940s as the Nicaraguan economy became increas- 
mgly integrated into an expanding international market. This trend was 
reinforced by the interventions of international financial and develop 
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ment authorities, particularly World Bank and id b  consultants and u s a id  
missions. In addition, expansion and diversification were supported by 
eclectic interventions on the part of the Nicaraguan state.5 The most im 
portant new sectors to emerge during this period were cotton, livestock, 
and manufacturing.
The Cotton Boom
During the 1950s cotton boom, cotton was established as the dominant 
crop in the fertile Pacific region around Leon and Chinandega. In 1950 
the international price for cotton fiber reached a historic $57.61 per qt. 
These prices were extraordinary; they were not seen again until the end 
of the 1970s. Inspired by the windfall profits to be made in cotton trade, 
increasing numbers of producers shifted into this sector.6
The ability of these producers to take advantage of this opportunity 
was restricted by the weakness of the transportation and financial infra 
structure of the country. The World Bank mission that visited Nicaragua 
in 1951-52 pointed the finger at these bottlenecks and called the Somoza 
regime to task. The mission praised the regime for starting a program to 
build major highways on the Pacific side of the country but criticized the 
limited scope of the project and called for the construction of local access 
and farm-to-market roads to complement the highway system (ib r d  1953, 
xxviii). The mission also criticized the country's frail credit system for 
failing to rechannel savings efficiently into productive investments (ib r d  
1953/ 4)/ indirectly pressuring the state to relinquish its monopoly over 
the banking system.
Following this report, the road-building program in the Pacific region 
was expanded (Williams 1986, 20-24). Two new private banks, b a n ic  and 
b a n a me r , were founded and helped funnel private sector profits back 
into other productive activities. Even the state bank responded to the new 
dynamic,- the credit capacity of the state-owned b n n  grew exponentially 
and the bank became a hub of national economic growth. The develop 
ment of this physical and financial infrastructure facilitated the rise of 
a new entrepreneurial sector of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, particularly 
in cotton production.7 In 1951-52, 1,305 producers cultivated cotton; by 
1960-61, 2,015 producers did so. This figure continued to rise, reaching 
5,080 in 1965-66 (Biderman 1982,182).
This emerging cotton bourgeoisie had several distinguishing charac 
teristics. A large number of these producers were primarily urban profes 
sionals who bought or rented land as an outlet for entrepreneurship and
1
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speculation (Nunez Soto 1981, 30-33).8 Their growing participation in cot 
ton production sharpened the distinctions between the Nicaraguan class 
structure and that found generally in Central America. Whereas the rural 
oligarchy that dominated Guatemala and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador 
emerged from a traditional landholding elite, cotton expansion in Nica 
ragua followed the "merchant road" to capitalist development, drawing 
heavily from a professional urban class that maintained multiple occu 
pations. Unlike Guatemala and El Salvador, where agroexport production 
was concentrated on larger estates, or Honduras, where banana production 
developed in an enclave economy, Nicaraguan agricultural development 
rested more fully on a foundation of locally owned middle-sized estates.9 
These distinctive local characteristics gave agricultural development in 
Nicaragua a less dualistic twist than that found in much of the region.
In part because of the intense regional divisions in the country and 
the weakness of the transportation system, the cotton and coffee sectors 
tended to evolve as distinct entities with little overlap between them. 
Unlike their more traditional counterparts in coffee production, Nica 
raguan cotton producers were quick to adopt technological innovations. 
Whereas the yields of Nicaraguan coffee producers lagged far behind the 
average rates for the region, yields for the country's cotton producers were 
among the world's highest.10 Nicaraguan algodoneros experimented with 
seed varieties and fertilizer use and turned readily toward mechanization 
iBelli 1968, 46-48). They represented a new type of producer in Nicaragua, 
one who was more dynamic, less risk averse, and more technologically 
sophisticated.
Although bitter regional disputes among elites were suppressed under 
the authoritarian rule of the Somoza dynasty, economic diversification 
sharpened the sectoral differentiation of this class. In the 1960s, two addi 
tional sectors, livestock and manufacturing, grew rapidly. As with cotton, 
their development was supported by the international market and inter 
national development consultants and backed by the Nicaraguan state. 
Cattle Sector Development
Following its 1951-52 visit, the ib r d  mission recommended the con 
struction of a modern slaughterhouse with refrigerated storage to replace 
the inefficient export of live animals, and it endorsed the establishment 
nt several new milk processing plants capable of producing condensed or 
powdered milk for export (ib r d  1953,141-45). In the years that followed, 
both recommendations were implemented.
j
38 Prerevolutionary Nicaragua
The Nicaraguan state became increasingly interventionist in support 
of livestock development. The expansion of the b n n  and the creation 
of in jo n a c  in 1953 gave the Somoza regime conduits through which to 
funnel resources into the cattle sector. When in f o n a c  was founded, it 
provided the only significant source of medium- and long-term loans in 
Nicaragua. It served as an important conduit of foreign credits, securing 
over 9 percent of all resources in the financial sector by 1964 (Vichas 1967, 
81-82).11
in f o n a c  signaled its vision by financing the Matadero Modelo, a beef 
export facility that opened in 1957-58. This facility was the first u s d a - 
approved packing house in Central America, giving Nicaragua a jump on 
beef exportation for the region. The relatively low cost of land in Nica 
ragua provided a “comparative advantage" for the production of range-fed 
cattle, and the rise of hamburger chains in the United States raised the 
demand for inexpensive, lower-quality hamburger that range-fed cattle 
could satisfy (Williams 1986, 77-98). By the 1960s Nicaragua's cattle 
industry had been largely integrated into the U.S. beef market.12
As a result of these domestic and international interventions, the live 
stock sector grew rapidly. The value of beef exports rose from US$3 mil 
lion in i960 to US$44.5 million in 1973- At their I9/4 peak< earnings for 
Nicaragua's beef exports surpassed even those for its coffee exports and 
were second in value only to cotton (Biderman 1982, 177). Land used for 
pasture expanded sharply during this period, rising from 1.5 million mz. 
in 1960-61 to 4.1 million mz. in 1978-79. Whereas a little over 70 per 
cent of the agricultural land was used for pastureland in 1960-61, over 80 
percent of the agricultural land was so used in 1978-79 (f id a  1980,1). 
The Growth of Manufacturing
New primary sector activities created related opportunities in agro 
industry and international trade. During the 1960s, for example, the cot 
ton sector was increasingly integrated into a network of industries and 
markets both inside and outside Nicaragua. Backward linkages were de 
veloped with industries and commercial firms that provided inputs into 
cotton production. Sales of fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural machin 
ery soared, and local firms were increasingly involved in the production 
and distribution of these products. Forward linkages were also developed 
for the processing of the fiber, the extraction of cottonseed oil, the export 
of unprocessed cotton, and textile production.13 Not only did the agricul 
tural bourgeoisie become more dynamic and diversified, new industrial 
and commercial sectors also developed rapidly.
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National economic policy became more proactive and began to favor 
industrialization. To stimulate industrial expansion, the Nicaraguan gov 
ernment approved the 1956 Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras that encouraged 
the entry of foreign capital (La Gaceta, March 10,1956). Following the as 
sassination that year of Anastasio Somoza Garcia and the assumption of 
the presidency by his oldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, the regime deep 
ened its commitment to industrial growth. The 1958 Ley de Proteccion y 
Estimulo al Desarrollo Industrial declared industrial development to be 
of "general interest" and provided an array of tax and tariff concessions to 
both established and new industries (La Gaceta, March 12, 1958).14
The formation of the c a c m in i960 and the Alliance for Progress de 
velopment programs further stimulated industrial and commercial ex 
pansion.15 On the recommendation of the U.S. government, the Corpo 
racion Nicaraguense de Inversiones was created in 1964 with financing 
from u s a id .16 By 1966 three-fifths of the organization's loans had gone 
to industrial enterprises (Lethander 1968, 359). Many of these projects 
were joint ventures involving foreign banks, Latin American-based trans 
national corporations, and local industrialists, including members of the 
Somoza family (Dosal 1985, 91; Wheelock Roman 1980b, 181).
Local financing also supported industrial development. In the 1960s, 
the domestic banking system shifted credit toward the secondary sector. 
In i960 only 18 percent of bank loans went to the manufacturing sector, 
less than half those received in agriculture. Lending to the manufactur 
ing sector rose in the early 1960s, however, exceeding 24 percent in the 
1962-65 period. By the mid-1970s, loans for the industrial sector often 
surpassed those for agriculture. (See Table 2.1.)
Financial support from international agencies, the state, and the bank 
ing system combined with changing trade policy to fuel industrial expan 
sion. Nicaragua's annual GDP growth rate in the 1960-70 period was a 
formidable 6.9 percent, the highest in the region (Weeks 1985, 50). The 
industrial sector spearheaded this expansion, growing a phenomenal 15 
percent annual average in the 1960-65 period, and a still-remarkable 8.9 
percent annual average in 1965-70 (Weeks 1985, 64). At an overall average 
annual growth rate of 12 percent during the 1960s, Nicaragua's industrial 
sector expanded much more rapidly than that in any other Central Ameri 
can country. As a result of this dramatic growth, this sector assumed a 
significant role in the national economy. Whereas only 12 percent of Nica 
ragua's GDP was derived from manufacturing in i960, this rose to 22 
percent in 1975 (Weeks 1985,135).17
As a result of these surge areas, the Nicaraguan economy grew rapidly,
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Table 2.1
Financial System Loans to the Private Sector by Economic Activity, 




1960 40.3 12.6 0.0 17.8 0.0
1961 43.6 11.8 0.0 19.1 0.0
1962 38.6 12.8 0.0 25.0 0.0
1963 38.2 12.2 0.0 23.7 0.0
1964 35.7 14.4 0.0 23.7 0.0
1965 30.3 16.2 0.0 24.4 0.0
1966 29.9 15.7 0.6 23.0 0.5
1967 31.0 15.1 0.5 21.7 0.4
1968 31.1 13.9 0.4 19.7 0.3
1969 30.5 12.1 0.4 20.4 0.5
1970 31.3 12.1 0.9 22.0 1.6
1971 28.7 12.0 1.2 22.1 1.5
1972 26.1 12.5 0.9 22.7 1.3
1973 22.8 15.7 0.7 23.1 1.8
1974 21.9 14.0 0.8 22.7 2.0
1975 20.2 12.4 1.1 24.3 2.2
1976 18.1 11.3 1.0 22.4 2.1
1977 20.5 10.7 0.6 19.9 0.9
1978 21.9 9.7 0.6 20.7 0.8
1979 22.6 8.2 0.3 26.2 0.8
Source: b c n  (1979, 29).
though unevenly, during these decades. In the early 1950s the GDP growth 
rate surpassed that of all other Central American nations with the ex 
ception of Costa Rica; in the early 1960s it topped even the Costa Rican 
rate, rising more than 10 percent per year. (See Table 2.2.) This growth 
rate provided resources for the local bourgeoisie that were historically 
unprecedented.
Economic Groups and the Commanding Heights
The rise of new economic sectors was intimately associated with the 
rise of a series of "economic groups." These groups were composed of a 
network of investors bound together in what Strachen (1976, 3) calls a 




Year Housing Commerce Services Other
1960 6.0 12.1 0.0 11.3
1961 5.1 11.9 0.0 8.4
1962 6.2 10.6 0.0 6.8
1963 6.4 13.9 0.0 5.7
1964 6.8 12.7 0.0 6.7
1965 8.4 13.0 0.0 7.6
1966 7.8 11.2 2.1 9.3
1967 8.1 9.9 2.7 10.7
1968 10.6 8.5 2.4 13.1
1969 11.6 8.4 2.8 13.3
1970 13.1 10.2 4.1 4.8
1971 14.4 10.9 4.7 4.4
1972 14.6 11.2 4.9 5.7
1973 12.1 12.0 4.8 7.1
1974 14.7 12.9 4.2 6.8
1975 16.2 11.0 4.5 8.1
1976 18.0 13.2 4.7 9.2
1977 20.1 16.9 4.1 6.3
1978 20.5 14.7 4.0 7.2
1979 18.6 15.1 3.3 4.9
of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie were three rapidly expanding and highly 
diversified economic groups that emerged in the 1950s (Strachen 1976; 
Wheelock Roman 1980b, 148-76). Two were formed by private entrepre 
neurial networks,- the third was built around the Somoza family's busi 
ness operations. An important part of the innovative economic activity in 
Nicaragua of the 1950s and 1960s was orchestrated by these groups.
The principal economic groups were centered on the private banking 
system that emerged in the 1950s. The b a n a me r  group was organized 
around the nation's largest private bank and included investments in 
sugar, cattle, rum, large-scale commerce, construction, land development, 
food processing, and the apparel industry.18 The b a n ic  group had a less ex 
tensive realm of operation but included not only the Banco Nicaragiiense 
but also a notable swath of cotton and coffee production, cotton gins and
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Table 2.2
Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates in Central America (Percent)
GDP/Capita 
Dollars (1970)
Country 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-78 1950 1978
Costa Rica 8.3 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.1 322 758
El Salvador 4.6 4.7 6.8 4.5 5.2 203 347
Guatemala 2.2 5.3 5.2 5.8 5.6 255 450
Honduras 2.5 4.6 5.2 4.1 4.4 234 297
Nicaragua 8.3 2.3 10.2 4.2 4.0 223 409
Total Central
America 4.7 4.6 6.0 5.1 5.4 242 428
Source: Rosenthal (1982, 20).
brokerages, the nation's largest brewery, and a vegetable oil processing 
facility.19 Both of these groups were linked to a series of other financial 
agencies, including savings and loan associations, finance companies, and 
insurance agencies.20
The Somoza group was launched on a base of agricultural production in 
every major subsector and expanded into commerce and industry (airline, 
shipping, fishing, construction, cement, and real estate,.21 The financial 
component of this group rested on its own small bank, the Banco Centro- 
americano, and, more importantly, its ability to influence the distribution 
of resources in the state banking system. Labeled the "loaded dice" group 
(Wheelock Roman 1980b, 163), this network of political and economic 
allies drew heavily on its political connections and effectively parried 
periodic jabs from other private sector elites.
The rise of these economic groups involved a new form of convergence 
across sectors. Unlike other sectors of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, the 
economic groups and various other "grupitos" that emerged in the 1950s 
linked disparate economic activities. Private investments made before the 
evolution of these groups in the 1950s tended to be narrowly sectoral; in 
contrast, investment by the emerging economic groups in the 1950s and 
1960s crossed categories to fuse agriculture, industry, and trade. These 
groups used their respective components of the emerging banking sys 
tem as a mechanism to transfer resources from waning but profitable 
activities toward rising sectors that promised increased future return. The 
banks were the linchpin in the system, providing credit and investment
1
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opportunities for group members on terms that were widely perceived as 
concessionary (Strachen 1976, 70). The banks also developed connections 
to foreign banks, such as the link between b a n a me r  and Wells Fargo 
Bank, helping group insiders to get access to foreign credit (Wheelock 
Roman 1980b, 162).
Theoretically, the development of economic groups could have led 
to greater class cohesion within top bourgeoisie, and to their increased 
hegemony over the society. In Nicaragua, however, these groups failed 
to play that role. They remained sharply competitive among themselves 
and generally eschewed political action. Although the Nicaraguan elite 
was interlinked through kinship bonds (much like Zeitlin and Ratcliff 
[1988] found in the Chilean case), those family bonds did not automati 
cally produce economic collaboration. Competition among the groups re 
mained intense. Strachen's (1976, 17) close study of the composition of 
these groups in the 1970s found little overlap in the top membership.22
Not only did the competition among groups impede the fusion of this 
elite, but so did the group leaders' unwillingness to assume political roles. 
Unlike the Chilean elite, which figured prominently in Liberal and Con 
servative party politics (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988, 186-214), Nicaragua's 
top elite adopted a low political profile. Instead of stepping into leadership 
positions or welding together private sector organizations, group leaders 
avoided these commitments. More like top elites in contemporary Peru 
(Durand 1991) and Brazil (Weyland 1992), the largest Nicaraguan capital 
ists preferred the politics of individual bargaining in which they could 
trade on their economic prominence to secure special concessions or 
bureaucratic exemptions. This particularistic negotiation process under 
cut the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie's ability to serve as a hegemonic force. 
The economic groups evaded confrontation with the regime even as they 
faced rising competition from the Somoza family group.
State Control over the Economic Elite
Three mechanisms fostered state control over the local elite: (1) quasi- 
corporatist linkages with the bourgeoisie, (2) "sultanistic" dominance of 
private sector organizations, and (3) clientelistic politics that encouraged 
individual petitions and class segmentation.
Quasi-corporatist Controls
Even before the creation of the Somoza dynasty, during the period of 
U.S. occupation, the Nicaraguan government was already sponsoring pri-
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vate sector associations by granting them representational monopolies 
and providing state subsidies for their operations. This process created a 
series of quasi-corporatist mechanisms that the state could use to control 
private sector organizations.23 As early as 1923 the government granted 
legal recognition and subsidies to handpicked organizations. The Asocia 
cion Nacional de Ganaderos, with the prominent participation of sev 
eral military generals, was recognized in that turbulent year. Labeled an 
"enterprise of public usefulness" [empresa de utilidad publica], this orga 
nization was given tax exemptions and discounts on tariffs [La Gaceta, 
August 13, 1923 ).24
Chambers of commerce began to organize autonomously in cities like 
Managua and Leon as early as 1928 (c a d in  1975; Camara de Comercio 
de Leon n.d., 3), but these organizations soon fell under state sponsorship. 
When the chambers of commerce, agriculture, and industry were given 
legal recognition in 1934, they were designated as the legal intermediary 
organizations between businesses and the regime [La Gaceta, Septem 
ber 3,1934). As in Mexico and Ecuador during this era, the state mandated 
participation in these organizations. In Nicaragua, all businesspeople, 
agricultural producers, industrialists, and intermediaries were legally re 
quired to join these chambers; those who did not were denied the right 
to bring judicial proceedings or petitions before the state. This legal privi 
lege secured the status of these associations but also created a bond of 
dependency between these fledgling organizations and the regime.
The Somoza regime incorporated carefully selected private sector orga 
nizations into government boards and was often directly involved in nam 
ing their representatives. For example, a small number of private sector 
organizations were given representation on the board of directors of the 
b n n  when it was reestablished in Nicaragua in 1940.25 Representatives 
of the private sector were also named to the board of the national devel 
opment bank in f o n a c  when it was created in 1953 [La Gaceta, March 13, 
1953).26 Trying to shore up the national economy and build elite support,27 
Somoza Garcia created the Consejo Nacional de Economia in 1949 as an 
advisory board for the Ministry of Economy (Walter 1993, 186-88). Rep 
resentatives of several private sector organizations, including the Camara 
de Comercio de Managua, the Sociedad Anonima de Cafetaleros, the Co- 
operativa Nacional de Agricultores, and the Asociacion Agricola de Nica 
ragua, were appointed to this council.
Private sector representatives were also named to sectoral agencies and 
commissions. The creation of c o n a l  in 1965 by newly installed Presi-
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dent Rene Schick solidified the relationship between the state and the 
cotton bourgeoisie. The legislation creating c o n a l  gave five of its eleven 
permanent seats to the regional cotton cooperatives that had emerged in 
the 1960s [La Gaceta, Decree #1078, April 24, 1965). This assured the 
medium- and large-scale producers who dominated these cooperatives 
that they would have monthly meetings with political luminaries like 
the minister of agriculture and livestock or the presidents of the b c n  and 
the b n n . Similarly the rice growers' association (Asociacion de Produc 
tores de Arroz de Nicaragua) was given representation on the board of the 
state grains marketing agency (the Instituto Nacional de Comercio de Ex- 
portacion e Importacion), and a coffee growers' association (the Sociedad 
Cooperativa Anonima de Cafeteros) was given a position on the board of 
the Instituto Nicaraguense del Cafe.
The regime also moved to channel private sector activity in the emerg 
ing industrial sector. Selected business associations, like the newly 
formed Asociacion de Industrials de Nicaragua, were allowed to name 
members to the Comision Consultiva de Desarrollo Industrial created by 
Luis Somoza in 1958.28 The Camara de Comercio and the Asociacion de 
Industrials (renamed the Camara de Industrias de Nicaragua or c a d in  
in 1965) enjoyed substantial state support. Import licenses, for example, 
were granted only to those who could demonstrate membership in these 
business chambers, and the concessions granted in the 1958 industrial 
development law were available only to affiliates of c a d in . These re 
strictions compelled the emerging urban bourgeoisie to join these orga 
nizations. These associations gained in size and resources, and the state 
developed a generally cooperative private sector affiliate.
Sultanistic Participation and Control
In some sectors, where relations with the state were complicated by 
the extensive, direct participation of the Somoza family in production and 
marketing, a "sultanistic" political arrangement emerged.29 The political 
clan that ran the country used its public power to advance its own eco 
nomic interests and those of its wealthy allies, currying favor and winning 
support in these quarters. Bolstered by the family's business interests, the 
state provided loans, infrastructure, and international connections that 
were essential to the success of the sector. In the most extreme cases, 
Somoza family members even served as top officials in private sector orga 
nizations for economic sectors where family resources were concentrated.
Livestock provided an important terrain for investment and accumu 
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lation by the Somozas beginning in the 1950s.30 To promote this activity, 
Luis Somoza founded a new ranchers' association, a s g a n ic , in 1955 and 
actively served as its president even after he became president of the coun 
try. Membership was confined to a small number of elite cattle producers 
and carried substantial privileges. Among other benefits, membership 
enabled this elite to meet regularly with the top ministers, bank presi 
dents, and directors of development projects. It provided a regular forum 
in which these producers could coordinate activities and press their case 
for additional resources.31 Unlike cotton growers, who suffered from the 
regional fragmentation of their organizations, the cattle elite was shaped 
by Somoza family powerholders into a forceful association from the mid- 
1950s on.
The state development bank in f o n a c  joined with a s g a n ic  to found 
a holding company, if a g a n  Si Cia. Ltda., and establish the Matadero Mo- 
delo, Nicaragua's first modern beef slaughterhouse. Controlling 50-60 
percent of export slaughter (Ballard 1985, 30), if a g a n  became in effect the 
state-sponsored beef commercialization agency, overseeing prices paid to 
both producers and consumers and coordinating the export of Nicaraguan 
beef.32 In 1973 if a g a n  opened a new facility, the Fondo Ifagan de Desarro 
llo Ganadero, providing members with low interest, subsidized, long-term 
loans. These loans offered borrowers up to three grace years before any 
payment was due and eliminated all bank commissions (a s g a n ic  1975, 
4-5). Using profits from the Matadero Modelo, a fund of US$10 million 
was set up, providing these prominent cattle ranchers with an attractive 
alternative to the regular banking system.
The penetration by the Somoza family brought certain benefits to their 
allies. The increased state support for cattle production in the 1960s at 
tracted loans and investment into the sector, and the regime helped to 
secure steady access to the U.S. beef quota. Those affiliated with the 
regime reaped ample rewards. Through a s g a n ic  the established cattle 
elites had access to government resources, and their co-ownership of 
if a g a n  generated additional profits and loans. As affiliates became in 
debted to the regime, their capacity for autonomous action was stifled. 
Nor was this effect limited to members. Although elites who were ex 
cluded from these private associations were less compromised, many of 
them aspired to membership. Those aspirants became supplicants whose 
ability to oppose the regime was undercut by their hope for admission 




To extract concessions from the regime, business elites typically re 
sorted to informal, individual communication with well-placed bureau 
crats. Discussing bureaucratic solicitation of that era, one prominent 
cattle rancher described how he would court the regional state bank offi 
cial, taking him to lunch and metaphorically "stroking his hair" in order 
to get long-term credit (interview, August 6,1991). Others recalled the era 
more fondly. "If we needed something," one former leader in the construc 
tion sector observed, "we would just call the right minister. The ministers 
were mostly our friends, anyway" (interview, August 7, 1991).
The Somoza regime limited the power of formal state economic agen 
cies and concentrated decision making in the hands of family members. 
The paper-thin legal and regulatory structure in Nicaragua was routinely 
circumvented through skillful bargaining and deal making. Personal con 
tacts and bonds were widely used by elites to secure special privileges. 
Interaction between regime elites and leaders of the domestic bourgeoi 
sie, consequently, had an unpredictable, ad hoc quality. Even prominent 
figures in the elite had to deal with a highly personalistic authority struc 
ture. Power was discretionary, not governed by formal rules. Without rou- 
tinized channels of communication and a more fully institutionalized 
bureaucracy, private sector leaders faced recurring uncertainty.
Since regime functionaries were susceptible to individual appeals, there 
was little need to work through private sector organizations. Indeed, push 
ing for a collective response invited a harsh response.33 When collective 
efforts were made, the results were often disappointing; they did not pro 
vide the individual capitalist with any special advantage or privilege. The 
bargaining process that prevailed bound the elite to the state in the role 
of individual supplicant and set up conditions that fostered intra-elite 
rivalry and competition.
As a result, Nicaraguan capitalists scattered into a series of sectoral 
and regional clusters. Without strong or autonomous national associa 
tions, producers retreated into regionalism and infighting. Producers often 
formed local "societies" or "cooperatives,"34 which were only regional 
groupings without a strong national counterpart. Conflict developed be 
tween and among subsectors (cotton growers battled vegetable oil proces 
sors; small livestock producers competed with beef processors)35 over how 
the profits generated by a sector would be divided up. Intrabourgeois con 
flicts also flared over access to bank credit. Agricultural producers were
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alarmed when agricultural loans dropped from 40 percent of the total in 
i960 to 30 percent in 1965, and the portion of loans allocated to industry 
and livestock tended to rise. (See Table 2.1.) In the absence of autonomous 
national organizations that might mediate these disputes, and in a setting 
that favored particularistic bargaining, intra-elite conflict was routine.
Movement toward Private Sector Opposition
In a system where fluctuating resources are seen as the product of a neu 
tral market responding to the laws of supply and demand, the impact of 
political decisions on rising or declining profits may not be clear. Under 
those circumstances, producers often adjust to their shifting fates with 
out raising the issue in the political arena. When "political capitalism" 
(Schneider 1988-89, 91) prevails, however, economic performance is regu 
larly and visibly tied to political decisions. Bank credit, trade options, and 
labor costs are all the product of political negotiations, and those elites 
favored by the regime receive substantial benefits. Groups not favored by 
economic policy understand this as unfair treatment and may become 
politically alienated.
Political capitalism had long prevailed in Nicaragua. By the mid-1970s 
those elites who were relatively disadvantaged turned increasingly against 
the regime. Old cooptive mechanisms were failing to function as effec 
tively as they had in prior decades. Expectations rose, needs changed, and 
performance deteriorated. Important sectors of the bourgeoisie were be 
ginning to take aim at the regime. One indicator was the 1972 formation 
of c o s ip, Nicaragua's first business "peak association."36
Comparative literature on private sector organization in Latin America 
points to a series of factors that contribute to or impede the formation 
of peak associations (Durand 1991,- Acuna 1991,• Weyland 1992). Key fac 
tors analyzed have included (1) the size, heterogeneity, and regionalistic 
tendencies of the bourgeoisie (Acuna 1991; Weyland 1992); (2) the degree 
of corporatist control over private sector organization (Weyland 1992); 
and (3) the degree of threat that private elites face from popular groups, 
especially labor (Durand 1991; Conaghan 1991).
According to this body of literature, peak associations are more likely 
to form when the private sector is relatively small, homogeneous, and free 
of regional fissures. This kind of national association may also be encour 
aged by the absence of corporatist controls that bind the private sector 
to the state. The mobilization of mass organizations that are perceived as
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threatening to the collective interests of private sector elites can trigger 
the formation of peak associations. The recent democratization/redemoc- 
ratization process in Latin America has also been seen as a galvanizing 
force behind more cohesive private sector organization, since it fosters 
mass mobilizations that can challenge business interests (Durand 1991). 
Conversely, business peak associations are less likely to emerge when the 
bourgeoisie is heterogeneous, fractured, and regionally divided; heavily 
shaped by corporatist controls,- and free from major threats by labor or 
popular organizations.
In the Nicaraguan case, the absence of a dominant economic sector 
and the persistence of regional divisions contributed to delays in the for 
mation of cohesive private sector organizations. Yet a peak organization 
was finally formed in Nicaragua in the early 1970s, in spite of the rising 
heterogeneity of the national economy in the 1950s and 1960s. The co 
incidence of this organizational development and increasing economic 
heterogeneity supports the argument that the socioeconomic characteris 
tics of the bourgeoisie may be less important in determining their political 
organization than other political and organizational considerations.37
The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie began to converge organizationally when 
two developments coincided. First, as the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie devel 
oped and became better linked to a competitive international economy, 
it needed a state apparatus that was developmentally competent. Second, 
the quasi-corporatist and clientelistic mechanisms developed by the state 
to channel private sector participation deteriorated over time. The state 
dipped deeper into avarice at the same time as the aspirations of producers 
and their expectations regarding supportive state actions gradually rose. 
As the political elite concentrated on private accumulation, its ability to 
continue stoking the system was undermined.
The Somoza regime had, of course, long used public power to pursue 
private gain. Dynasty founder Somoza Garcia was notorious for his use 
of kickbacks, "presidential commissions," extraction of bribes, demands 
to be included in lucrative enterprises, and seizure of properties held by 
politically vulnerable groups (Walter 1993, 109-10,• Booth 1985a, 66-68). 
Over time, however, these practices became increasingly objectionable to 
other economic elites, who were adversely affected by the partial diver 
sion of their surpluses and the considerable uncertainty this introduced 
into the economic environment. Instead of gradually curtailing these 
abuses, the regime became yet more corrupt in the 1970s during the reign 
of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Particularly in the wake of the 1972 earth-
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quake that devastated Managua, as international assistance poured into 
the country, the regime proved visibly corrupt. Moving into new business 
sectors (land development, construction supplies, housing), the Somoza 
family jostled broader sectors of the Nicaraguan elite and violated an un 
written assumption that economic gains would be more widely shared. 
As the informal boundaries that had delimited the sphere of public cor 
ruption widened and the sweep of the Somoza family's economic empire 
expanded, elite opposition sharpened.
The regime's approach to economic policy, with its emphasis on per 
sonalistic connections and its tendency toward erratic decisions, was no 
longer acceptable to an increasing number of economic elites. Instead, 
they began to push for a more neutral, regularized state apparatus that 
would better serve the needs of modern business. Economic elites needed 
wider access to improved technology, a more skilled and better-trained 
labor force, a more fully developed transportation and communication 
infrastructure, and social peace. What they got was an uneven and erratic 
distribution of these resources accompanied by widespread popular re 
pression. As the regime became more acquisitive, rewards and resources 
were increasingly absorbed by its close political allies. The corporatist 
and clientelistic features of the regime were gradually overwhelmed by 
its sultanistic tendencies.
The political performance of the regime became more repressive and, 
simultaneously, less authoritative. Private sector leaders began to develop 
new points of reference, drawing on international connections that by 
passed the regime. International business associates and u s a id  programs 
designed to support civic action may have unwittingly undermined the 
Somoza regime's bonds with its business class by providing an alternative 
vision of state-business linkages and by supplying the financial resources 
with which to buy greater independence.
In contrast to other cases in Latin America such as Peru or Mexico, in 
which business peak associations developed in response to a threat from 
the left, Nicaraguan private elites converged before any leftist threat had 
materialized. The f s l n  in the early 1970s was still a tiny organization 
that had been largely defeated during the counterinsurgency campaign of 
the 1960s. Organized labor in Nicaragua barely existed, and the prospects 
for a successful insurrection seemed remote. Yet business did feel increas 
ingly threatened. The threat to the collective interests of business was not 
posed by labor or popular groups, which were only weakly organized in 
authoritarian Nicaragua, but by the regime itself. The heavy-handed use
1
of public power for private gain and the fundamental corruption of the 
judicial and legal systems undermined the predictability of the economic 
system and cut into the resources of the private sector. Episodic forays 
into different economic activities by members of the Somoza family or 
close allies meant that the terrain open to private competitors was reduced 
and uncertain. No business sector seemed immune to this threat, since 
even those not currently menaced could become tomorrow's victims.
The simultaneous deterioration of the quasi-corporatist and clientelis- 
tic mechanisms that had linked the private sector to the state, and the 
rising threat posed by a cleptocratic state elite, therefore, created circum 
stances favorable for the consolidation of a business peak association, 
co s ip moved timidly and uncertainly toward an increasingly oppositional 
stance to the regime.
This peak association was the brainchild of in d e , a business-civic orga 
nization that had been created in 1964. Reflecting the changes under way 
in the economy and society, this association drew primarily from the 
emerging urban bourgeoisie.38 Unlike so many private sector organiza 
tions that developed at the behest of and under the protection of the state, 
in d e  was relatively separate from the regime. Instead of focusing exclu 
sively on local issues, this organization was closely tied to international 
organizations and foreign donors like u s a id  and the Inter-American Foun 
dation. This financial tie allowed it to obtain an element of independence 
from the state (although not necessarily from its foreign donors) that had 
eluded other private sector organizations.39
in d e  acted as a political lobbyist for a reform sector of the bourgeoisie.
In contrast with the elite organizations established before it, in d e  pro 
moted a broader vision of private sector responsibilities and aspirations. 
Inspired by the concept of noblesse oblige, in d e  called the "most respon 
sible citizens" to preserve the values of the free world while promoting 
national development and social justice (in d e 1965, n.p.). This organi 
zation was particularly active in promoting educational projects and a 
self-help cooperative movement.40 It recruited a professional staff to sup 
port its development projects and produced annual publications complete 
with detailed financial accounting.
The creation of in d e and its efforts to influence the direction of 
national development represented an important departure in the evo 
lution of the private sector in Nicaragua. Through this organization, a 
segment of the country's small bourgeoisie was shifting from narrow sec 
toral activity toward broader class-based organization. Instead of focusing
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on particularistic interests of clusters of producers reacting to problems 
with taxes or bank credit, this organization pushed producers toward 
greater collective class awareness and broader concern about social and 
economic development. Instead of fragmenting into regional groupings, 
in d e  functioned as the missing agglutinative, bringing economic elites 
together across sectoral and regional lines. These characteristics allowed 
in d e  to inject an element of class coherence into the Nicaraguan political 
system.41
The Uncertain Evolution of COSIP/COSEP
At the end of the 1960s, in d e  headquarters began serving as an infor 
mal gathering place in which leaders of private sector organizations could 
discuss their collective political concerns. By 1972 the in d e  leadership 
moved to bring this array of sectoral leaders together in co s ip. This new 
umbrella organization linked twelve established associations, including 
most of the significant groups that had emerged in the previous twenty 
years.42 Although the capacity of the organization to challenge the regime 
was muted by the inclusion of several associations closely tied to the 
Somozas, such as a s g a n ic , the Asociacion de Productores de Arroz de 
Nicaragua, and the Camara Nicaraguense de la Industria Pesquera, the 
most important affiliates, like in d e , were relatively independent from 
the regime.43 Although functionally distinct from in d e , c o  s ip operated 
under in d e 's  tutelage and direction.44
co s ip's  capacity to mobilize business opposition deepened appreciably 
during its first year of operation. In the aftermath of the December 1972 
earthquake in Managua, the Somoza regime's capacity for self-indulgence 
and indifference to national needs was starkly revealed. The imposition of 
a series of new emergency taxes, combined with the unrelieved suffering 
resulting from the earthquake, the accelerated theft of relief assistance 
by officials, and open profiteering by Somoza family members, led private 
sector leaders to adopt a more critical attitude toward regime misman 
agement and corruption. The rebuilding process triggered the expansion 
of Somoza family businesses into growth industries—construction, real 
estate, and banking—that had traditionally been the province of the domi 
nant economic groups. Direct economic threat merged with a smoldering 
sense of moral disdain to prompt elite intervention.
in d e /c o s ip leaders decided to organize a national conference to air 
a series of their concerns. The Primera Convencion Nacional del Sec-
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tor Privado, held on March 1,1974, in the Teatro Nacional Ruben Dario, 
was organized and led by some of c o s ip's  most prominent and articulate 
affiliates. The keystone of the meeting was the session entitled "Socio- 
Economic Development Strategy in the 1970s" (in d e 1975), which cul 
minated with a series of critical observations about the regime and rec 
ommendations for change (Cruz 1974).
The convention's final resolution called for a political housecleaning 
(cos ip 1974). This statement conceded the need for public order and rec 
ognized the Somoza regime's efforts to maintain stability. It concluded, 
however, that the "preservation of order" was not enough; state respon 
sibilities extended beyond this. Private sector representatives proposed 
"new joint efforts" (esfuerzos mancomunados) with the state to achieve 
these broader objectives. They agreed to accept a new tax system that 
would provide the state with increased resources if the state in turn would 
undertake internal reform. The government was called on to apply the 
law neutrally and use its revenues correctly (i.e., conduct public bidding 
on state projects, adopt an auditing system, and document spending in 
government accounts). Furthermore, the state would be required to cul 
tivate a spirit of public service among its employees and eliminate the 
expectation of bribery. The private sector further demanded the participa 
tion of "genuinely designated" private sector representatives in state deci 
sion making instead of representatives who were handpicked by Somoza. 
Finally, the recommendations called for a program of effective economic 
planning to address national needs in housing, public transportation, and 
food and energy production. This state planning was to complement but 
not interfere with private sector initiatives.
These demands were hardly visionary. As Vilas (1986,132) argues, "The 
kind of state demanded by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was thus a modern 
capitalist state that would efficiently fulfill its political-economic func 
tions." In many ways, the co s ip meeting called for little more than the 
rule of law and elite participation in decision making. Given the nature 
of the Nicaraguan state, however, these demands would have required a 
profound change in the regime.
c o s ip's first conference was an unexpected public success. Initially, 
organizers expected 500 people to attend, but attendance swelled to 
around 2,000 (Ramirez Arango 1985, 253-54; La Prensa, March 1, 1974). 
Observers came from the broader religious, academic, and political com 
munity to listen to this unique discussion. Somoza, attending the final 
session, left abruptly before the meeting concluded, signaling his distaste
for the proceedings. No longer did the private sector present its position 
wrapped in the unctuous courtesy and recurring honorifics that charac 
terized its earlier communication with government officials. It was now 
more direct, sharply critical, and increasingly insistent.
The formation of a national peak association, however, does not ensure 
its durability or power. Durand (1991) found in the Peruvian case that the 
first two business peak associations formed in the 1970s dissolved quickly 
as a result of internal policy disputes. The process in which the bour 
geoisie consolidates politically in spite of its divergent priorities and a 
history of competition is often a gradual one that proceeds through several 
phases. In the Nicaraguan case, after its initial success, co s ip faded into 
the political background, in d e , which had been the prime mover behind 
the formation of co s ip, stepped forward again as the direct negotiator 
for the private sector. With an established institutional structure, a pro 
fessional staff, and a budget that was relatively independent of the regime, 
in d e  became the stalwart of private sector opposition during the esca 
lating conflicts of the 1970s. Public confrontation with the regime only 
served to strengthen this organization, in d e 's membership rose rapidly 
from 89 in 1974 to 523 in 1976 (in d e  1975,1977).
For its part, the Somoza regime grew increasingly intransigent. Losing 
the political agility that had enabled Somoza Garcia to survive several 
earlier challenges, the descendent regime now ignored public pressures 
or responded with violence. Elections in 1974 renewed the presidency of 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, this time for a long, seven-year term. The 
fledgling f s l n , then about 150 members strong, surprised the country 
in December 1974 with an attack on a farewell party given by former 
minister of agriculture Jose Maria "Chema" Castillo Quant for depart 
ing U.S. Ambassador Turner Shelton. To get those taken hostage freed, 
Somoza paid a $1 million ransom, published an f s l n  communique, and 
released Daniel Ortega and thirteen Sandinista supporters (Wheelock 
Roman 1980a). Although initially giving the Sandinistas visibility and 
new credibility, this incident led to the imposition of another round of 
martial law. The dynasty's grip on the Nicaraguan state tightened, and 
the prospects for institutional or structural reform dimmed further.
Conflicts between economic elites and the regime recurred through 
the early 1970s. Cotton growers denounced the regime's alliance with 
foreign buyers instead of Nicaraguan producers during conflicts over con 
tract compliance.45 The cattle bourgeoisie challenged the exclusiveness 
of a s g a n ic  and the prices paid by the slaughterhouses dominated by
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the Somoza family. Although marginal adjustments were made by the 
regime,46 elite dissatisfaction persisted.
Questions were increasingly raised about the basic political compe 
tence of the regime as it proved unable to stem or deactivate the growing 
mass insurgency. Repression was targeted at students and lower-income 
groups, but relations with private sector elites also deteriorated. Rising 
violence drew international attention to the repressive character of the 
state, feeding a negative image of the regime and further undermining 
private sector confidence. Following Somoza's heart attack in July 1977, 
momentum built again for regime change. Martial law was suspended in 
September upon Somoza's return to the country after a stay in a Miami 
hospital, raising hopes for some political opening. Using that moment, 
in d e  leaders launched a public critique of the regime over the dramatic 
increase in the foreign debt, continued delays in the reconstruction of 
Managua, the inadequacies of the state energy agency e n a l u f , the poor 
service provided by the state-run telephone company, corruption in the 
Instituto Nicaraguense de Seguro Social, and the continued lack of repre 
sentation of the private sector in many state agencies (ih c a  1978,1:31).
Still relying on traditional opposition tactics, in d e  leaders turned again 
in the fall of 1977 to the perennial notion of a dialogue. In the hope of 
forming a new political accord, in d e  called on Archbishop Miguel Obando 
y Bravo to convene and direct a new Dialogo Nacional. At this stage, the 
private sector lacked the skills and vision required for fuller innovation. 
As Somoza stalled discussions, in d e  was outflanked from the left by the 
rise of the alternative elite group, Los Doce.47
This latter group was composed of twelve business, religious, and intel 
lectual leaders who commanded considerable prestige both within Nica 
ragua and internationally48 Organized by Sergio Ramirez, a novelist and 
intellectual leader who had secretly joined the f s l n , this group repre 
sented a more confrontational elite. Los Doce publicly expressed oppo 
sition to another dialogue, noting that previous pacts had only served 
to consolidate the dictatorship. With this opposition, momentum for a 
dialogue dissipated by the year's end. The private sector became more 
confrontational. The regime became increasingly isolated.
This isolation deepened profoundly with the assassination of Pedro 
Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal. Chamorro came from an old elite family that 
had placed four of its members in the Nicaraguan presidency before the 
Somoza family took over Nicaraguan politics. The family was one of the 
foremost representatives of the Conservative party in the country, and
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young Pedro Joaquin had inherited the role of opposition leader. In that 
capacity he had endured periods of imprisonment, torture, and banish 
ment under Somoza. Chamorro's family legacy, plus his position as editor 
of the opposition daily La Prensa and leadership of u d e l , a multiparty 
opposition movement, made him one of the most visible and intractable 
opponents to the Somoza regime.49 His murder outraged many in the 
business elite who regarded him as one of their own.
Private sector leaders moved now to make a forceful statement of 
protest and directly confront the regime. Workers in several establish 
ments had gone on strike after word of the assassination spread; the strike 
momentum built when business leaders endorsed a walkout. On Janu 
ary 26, sixteen days after Chamorro's death, seven major private sector 
organizations formally endorsed a general strike and called on their mem 
bers to close down (in d e  1980).
This action received broad support from employers and workers alike. 
Although La Prensa's January 30, 1978, report of 80 percent participation 
in the work stoppage (paro) may be influenced by the paper's position on 
the issue, widespread participation is generally acknowledged. Business 
activities in the Centro Comercial de Managua with its 200 shops came 
to a standstill, and many factories on the industrial strip on the Carretera 
Norte closed their doors. Most private banks closed, the workers at the 
San Antonio sugar mill supported the strike, several cotton gins ceased 
activity, a number of livestock and dairy producers in Boaco stopped de 
livering their goods, and some members of the rice growers' Cooperativa 
del Oriente slowed production (ih c a  1978,1:44-48).
When the government announced that employers supporting the 
bosses' strike would have to pay their workers for missed days, the main 
business associations issued communiques accepting this obligation and 
insisting that the stoppage would last until Somoza left the presidency 
(La Prensa, January 25,1978). The government then threatened retaliation. 
The customs agency announced that it would suspend the import licenses 
of all striking businesses. A few days later, in an effort to break the cohe 
sion of the Camara de Comercio and the Camara de Industrias, the minis 
ter of economy declared that businesses no longer needed to be members 
of these organizations in order to obtain import licenses. Permission to 
import would now be granted on a case-by-case basis following a careful 
scrutiny of the activities of the firm (Novedades, January 26, 1978).
The minister of labor reported that any workers striking voluntarily 
would be dismissed. The b c n  mandated that all banks, public and pri 
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vate, must stay open. State employees who honored the strike were to be 
summarily fired (Novedades, January 26,1978). In spite of these pressures, 
the stoppage continued. Finally breaking their historical pattern of nego 
tiation with the state, the Camara de Comercio representatives refused 
Somoza's invitation to meet with him at his retreat in Montelimar (La 
Prensa, January 24,1978).
The number of private sector organizations endorsing the closedown 
grew steadily to sixteen at the beginning of February. The strike helped to 
sift out and reorganize the private sector, clarifying the lines of political 
cleavage. In spite of the defection of several private sector groups that were 
too closely tied to the regime or too detached from the political arena to 
accept the risks, a series of other, small associations now joined with the 
major groups in a deepening expression of private sector opposition to the 
regime.50
The strike was not an immediate success. Somoza reportedly re 
sponded: "As my father said, 'I'm not leaving, nor can they make me go'" 
(Nj  me voyni me van) (Novedades, January 28,1978). In the face of regime 
intransigence, the private sector strike slowly fizzled. Leaders of the pri 
vate sector then shifted gears. Former in d e  president and agroindustrialist 
Alfonso Robelo shepherded business affiliates into a new business-led 
political party, the md n . This organization was founded in March 1978 
to unite Nicaragua's fractious traditional political parties behind private 
sector leadership.
In their years of interaction with the regime, the private sector organi 
zations had never developed a political organ of their own. Nor had they 
much affinity for established political parties. In times of crisis they had 
used their sectoral associations to represent their case before the regime; 
more typically, they had simply drawn on personal contacts with regime 
leaders. This absence of a business-backed political party gave the pri 
vate sector leaders an appearance of political detachment and neutrality. 
In some ways this appearance served their interests, immunizing them 
against retaliation by the regime. In other ways, the absence of a rep 
resentative party made it difficult for them to present a sustained and 
coordinated response to regime initiatives. By 1978 these limitations were 
increasingly clear.
By the time private sector leaders realized this need, however, the 
leadership of the opposition was shifting away from them. Spontaneous 
uprisings in places like Monimbo, military skirmishes, and mass-based 
movements were gaining political ground. These mass movements took
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even the f s l n  by surprise, and it rushed to organize the growing insur 
gency. Repression by the national guard and populist promises by Somoza 
restored a veneer of order by March 1978, but opposition groups operating 
at the community level were beginning to gain momentum.
Encouraged by the popular uprising, the Sandinistas attempted to gain 
leadership of the rebellion by boldly attacking the presidential palace in 
August 1978, and another round of mass insurgency began. Five days after 
this attack, a second general strike was called. This time the strike was 
sponsored by the emerging political wing of the bourgeoisie, the f a o .51 
The f a o  had been created in May as a broad coalition of u d e l , Lo s  Doce, 
and the newly formed md n . Seventy-five percent of Managua's business 
establishments were reported to have joined the August strike (Booth 
1985a, 165).
Again, the government responded with its own forms of pressure. On 
the economic front, Roberto Incer Barquero, president of the b c n , issued 
an advisory statement to the Consejo Nacional de Planificacion denounc 
ing the private sector for "surrendering itself unconditionally" to political 
groups that repudiated private property, for eroding the financial base of 
the country, and for undermining the country's economic capacity. He rec 
ommended that both foreign and domestic bank loans be made available 
only to those firms that ignored the strike call and remained open; those 
that closed were to be denied new credit and their old loans were to be 
called in (memo, August 28,1978, published in Ogliastri-Uribe 1986, 19- 
22). On the political front, hundreds of opposition leaders were arrested, 
including leaders of the f a o .
In spite of this, the strike continued for almost a month. Business 
leaders were increasingly inclined to make use of their economic powers 
in opposing the regime. When a series of new taxes was passed in August 
to increase the revenues for the war, both in d e  and the Camara de Comer 
cio urged a policy of nonpayment by their members (Booth 1985a, 165). 
Business leaders also attempted to destabilize the regime by urging inter 
national lenders to suspend further credits for the Somoza government 
(in d e  1980).
This hostility spilled over into the bourgeoisie's investment and pro 
duction decisions. After years of overall growth broken only by the 1972 
earthquake, the Nicaraguan economy contracted by 7.2 percent in 1978 
(c e pa l  1984). Among the numerous forces leading to this sharp decline 
was the increasing economic withdrawal of the private sector. Production
1
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in the urban areas declined even more quickly than the national aver 
age; in the secondary and tertiary sectors, output dropped by 12 percent 
in 1978 (Spoor 1987, 3). The growing destruction unleashed by the war 
caused business confidence to decline. Capital flight soared, reaching by 
one account US$i .5 billion, at least $600 million of which was withdrawn 
by private elites (Vilas 1986,137).
Somoza finally agreed to o a s  mediation of the conflict in the fall of
1978. Predictably, OAS-sponsored mediation by the United States, Guate 
mala, and the Dominican Republic of the talks between the government 
and the f a o  soon faltered and collapsed. Acting on cues from the f s l n , 
Los Doce representative Sergio Ramirez withdrew from the f a o  on Octo 
ber 25 and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy. Somoza's subsequent 
rejection of a plebiscite ground the proceedings to a halt, and by the end 
of the year, the mediation had completely broken down (Pastor 1987,101- 
21). Several Latin American governments moved publicly into opposition 
to Somoza, and even Carter administration officials cut back support 
(Schoultz 1981, 62-63, 344-45; Pastor 1987,120-24).
By this point, however, the f s l n  had taken clear leadership of the oppo 
sition movement. Internal divisions among the Sandinistas, which had 
fractured the f s l n  into three hostile camps, were overcome in March
1979, and a coordinated military campaign to defeat the dictator advanced. 
Having been tainted by their prolonged participation in the doomed me 
diation efforts, established elites lost their claim to moral or political 
leadership of the opposition. The private sector's role in the final phases 
of the insurrection, while still important, became secondary to the main 
action of the war.
Nonetheless, the last six months of the dictatorship were a time of 
tremendous growth and political development for private sector organiza 
tions. Confrontations with the dictatorship deepened, and new organiza 
tions emerged. Cotton growers, who threatened not to plant in the coming 
agricultural cycle when credit shortfalls at the banks disrupted their work, 
were threatened with confiscation by the president of the b c n . Pressed to 
address this problem, Somoza threatened to take over their land and "rent 
it to the peasants" if the current producers left it idle (Navas Mendoza 
et al. n.d.[b], 65-66.) Neither profits nor property were fully secure, and 
the war continued to escalate.
Independent organizing among producers culminated in the creation 
of u pa n ic  in March 1979. At the outset, this organization drew together
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three core sectors: the cotton bourgeoisie, livestock sector dissidents, and 
coffee producers. Representatives of these three groups formed the first 
governing council of u pa n ic . Marcos Antonio Castillo Ortiz, a young 
cotton producer from one of Leon's wealthier families, was elected to 
the presidency (Minutes of the founding meetings, March 22, 1979 and 
March 28, 1979). In the next several months, u pa n ic  gradually incorpo 
rated more associations and became an umbrella organization that united 
a growing segment of the country's large- and medium-sized agricultural 
producers. Affiliates came from the cotton, coffee, cattle, dairy products, 
rice, sorghum, banana, and sugarcane subsectors.52 In May 1979 the brood 
ing division in a s g a n ic  came to a head, and the Somoza regime's last 
major private sector affiliate split in two.53 In addition to the broad opposi 
tion from industry and commerce, Somoza now faced a wall of opposition 
in the crucial agricultural bourgeoisie.
By 1979 dozens of associations and their regional affiliates were moving 
into the opposition, and the peak association formed in 1972 was reacti 
vated. To facilitate coordination, co s ip leaders organized all participating 
associations into one of seven sectoral chambers: in d e , c a d in , Camara 
Nicaraguense de la Construccion, c o n a pr o , Confederation de Camaras 
de Comercio de Nicaragua, u pa n ic , and Asociacion de Banqueros (which 
was dissolved following bank nationalization in July 1979). c o s ip, now 
renamed the Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (c o s e p), was stream 
lined and centralized. When the regime revoked the legal status of in d e  
and the Camara de Comercio, c o s e p, which had never sought legal status, 
continued to function. It now rejected Somoza's requests for dialogue and 
joined the f s l n 's  call for a national strike. The third and final strike began 
on June 4, 1979, and lasted until the dynasty was overthrown.
On June 6, c o s e p issued a communique calling for the immediate 
resignation of Somoza and the creation of a new government of national 
unity. Eleven days after the jg r n  was formed in Costa Rica, c o s e p issued 
a statement formally recognizing it as the new government. Two repre 
sentatives were sent to Costa Rica to make contact with the junta and 
discuss its plan for governing (in d e  1979). After years of battles and con 
frontations, organized economic elites finally broke with the regime and, 
at the last hour, formally threw their support behind the new government.
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Conclusions
By the end of the 1970s the relationship that the Somoza regime had 
fashioned with the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was no longer acceptable to 
growing portions of the elite. A policy of promoting growth, fragmenting 
the private sector, and parceling out favors failed to satisfy an economic 
elite that wanted a more predictable and efficient government. The eco 
nomic model of the prerevolutionary era was out of sync with the needs 
not only of the poor but even of relatively prosperous sectors. Increasingly, 
emerging middle elites aspired to rule directly.
After five years of recurring confrontations with the regime, the private 
sector in Nicaragua had gradually become more politically competent. 
c o s e p was resuscitated and invigorated by the proliferation of new private 
sector affiliates. In July 1979 private elites papered over their segmenta 
tion with shared political purpose to endorse the ouster of the old regime. 
With a hubris born of wealth, an exaggerated faith in the power and atten 
tiveness of the United States, and failed imagination, these elites viewed 
themselves as the natural heirs of the dynasty. As one business leader of 
that era concluded, "The businessmen thought of the Sandinistas as their 
peons. They thought they could put [the Sandinistas] in the field to take 
care of the guard. Then they would step in and take over when Somoza 
fell. If there was a problem, the United States would stop the Sandinistas 
from taking power" (interview, August 6,1991).
Drawing on their new organizational strength, private sector leaders 
began the task of developing a relationship with the incoming revolution 
ary government. The Nicaraguan private sector entered the revolution 
ary period better organized and more politically capable than it had ever 
been. The years of private sector division and individualistic bargaining, 
however, had a lingering effect. Fissures still lurked beneath the surface, 
and the revolutionary regime drew on them. Some private elites, such 
as u pa n ic 's first president, threw their lot with the Sandinistas. After 
the ouster of Somoza, these businesspeople took positions in the Sandi 
nista government. Other private elites took a contingent position, aligning 
with the government at the beginning but soon moving to the opposition. 
Private sector representatives in the governing junta—Alfonso Robelo, 
former president of in d e , c o s ip, and the md n , and Violeta Barrios de 
Chamorro, widow of slain La Prensa editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, for 
example—joined the government but resigned after only nine months.
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Finally, many private elites viewed the new regime with suspicion. Sev 
eral of the most prominent elites emigrated, following their capital to the 
United States. Those who stayed soon secured the leadership of c o s e p and 
its attendant associations and turned those organizations into the leading 
opponents of the revolutionary government.
chapter
Revolutionary Transition and the 
Bourgeoisie (1979-1986)
One has to raise theoretically the question of whether the bourgeoisie 
could just simply produce, without power; if it can limit itself as a class 
to a productive role. That is, can the bourgeoisie limit itself to making 
use of the means of production and using these in order to live, not as 
instruments of power, not to impose itself on others. I believe that this 
is possible in Nicaragua.
—Jaime Wheelock Roman, El gran desafio
The Sandinistas needed private enterprise like a zoo needs a gorilla.
—Large cattle rancher, August 6,1991
The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, like all bourgeoisies, are pigs. They are 
interested only in their own well-being. All they want is to take money 
out of the country, change it into dollars, send their sons and daughters 
abroad. They are rootless. They have no ties to the country.
—Former mid in r a  vice-minister, November 2,1990
Vision, Views, and Deeds
In the years after the f s l n  came to power, the relationship between 
the revolutionary government and most of the traditional economic elite 
was punctuated with hostility. Expropriations undercut the elite's hold 
on resources. Those producers who avoided expropriation faced a maze 
of bureaucratic controls that, many claimed, turned them into an "ad 
ministrative bourgeoisie." Private investment plummeted, and produc 
tion levels followed suit, c o s e p became the regime's prime domestic 
adversary.
Yet during the same period, many private producers started new eco 
nomic ventures. Throughout the country, businesspeople benefited from 
heavily subsidized credit from the state-owned banks. The state provided 
agricultural inputs ranging from fertilizer to tractors at prices that were 
only a fraction of their international costs. Staples producers sharply in-
63
creased output in response to state subsidies for domestic consumption. 
The Sandinista-sponsored u n a g  launched a membership drive that re 
cruited even medium- and large-sized producers. An array of joint ven 
tures and service contracts were negotiated between the state and more 
audacious private elites.
Competing images of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie—as a beleaguered 
class on the threshold of extinction at the hands of orthodox Marxist- 
Leninists, and as a protected class that benefited disproportionately from 
state development initiatives—continue to complicate the interpretation 
of the Nicaraguan revolution. For analysts like Nolan (1984) and Bugaj- 
ski (1990), the f s l n 's early links with Marxism profoundly shaped the 
ideology and practice of the revolution. Says Bugajski (1990, 1), "Sandi 
nista domestic policies provide a valuable laboratory and a largely acces 
sible case study of how a Marxist-Leninist system is imposed and adapted 
in a developing country." Careful analysis by country specialists (Vilas 
1986; Booth 1985a; T. Walker 1985; Conroy and Pastor 1988), on the other 
hand, casts doubt on the appropriateness of the Marxist-Leninist label. 
Arguing that the Nicaraguan revolution was "more anti-oligarchic than 
anticapitalist," Vilas (1986, 265, 268) defines the experience as a "popular, 
agrarian, and national liberation revolution, more than a proletarian or 
socialist one."
Close observation of the revolution reveals an array of concessions for 
the bourgeoisie interspersed with punitive batterings that defy simplis 
tic interpretation. One productive way to integrate different threads of 
the experience is to unpack the concepts of ideology and behavior and to 
approach both in dynamic terms. Andres Perez (1992) suggests a useful 
analytical framework by differentiating between "pure ideology," which 
emphasizes a coherent worldview, and "ideology in use," which serves as 
a more direct guide to action. We might pursue the distinction by further 
differentiating between the ontology or broad philosophical moorings of 
revolutionary ideologues (vision), the more specific views and predilec 
tions of the leadership rooted in their concrete experiences (views), and 
the actual behavior of state elites in which such factors as resource re 
straints, established alliances, and habits play a role (deeds).
This chapter explores the interplay between the vision, views, and 
deeds of Sandinista leaders during the revolutionary transition in the 
opening years of the revolution (1979-86). It charts the rise of a statist 
model that centered the economy in the state sector, the inroads made 
into the resources of the traditional economic elite, and the regime's
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efforts to differentiate among sectors of the capitalist class in its quest for 
intersectoral allies and control.
Revolutionary Transition and State Expansion
The f s l n  came to power in 1979 committed to the development of a 
mixed economy in which a private sector would continue to play a role. 
What that role would be was a matter of sustained dispute. For much of 
the f s l n  leadership, the private sector's role was initially conceived as 
a limited one that would become less important over time. Yet several 
forces pushed the regime to retain a substantial private elite in spite of 
its reservations. Grudging recognition of the role some economic elites 
had played in the ouster of Somoza slowed the new regime's opposition. 
The extensive economic losses associated with the insurrection and con 
cern about further erosion of national production also contributed to the 
decision to leave much of the bourgeoisie in place. The desire to avoid 
and, subsequently, blunt U.S. opposition, and to maintain political and 
material support from Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, served as a 
deterrent to precipitous antibourgeoisie action. The class extraction and 
family ties of some f s l n  leaders may have also made them reluctant to 
move against the bourgeoisie.1 A whole series of historical and political 
factors that were closely tied to the Nicaraguan context contributed to 
the Sandinista revolution's curious and fluctuating economic amalgam.
Although unwilling to move definitively against private sector elites, 
the f s l n  leadership was ideologically committed to blunting their eco 
nomic and social power. In the emerging revolutionary vision, the state- 
owned Area of People's Property displaced the private sector as the center- 
piece of the national economy. The new government's first economic plan 
concluded: "The new State which is being constructed will be converted 
into the axis of the reactivation process and the transition toward the 
New Economy that our Fatherland needs" (mipl a n  1980, 22). f s l n  leader 
and minister of planning Henry Ruiz concluded that the a pp "is the cen 
tral axis, the most dynamic mechanism in the revolution's economic and 
social transformations" (Ruiz 1980,15). In the emerging economic model, 
the state now became the "centre of accumulation" (Irvin 1983).
The newly formed state enterprises would not only absorb a growing 
proportion of the nation's workforce but would generate the surplus with 
which to finance the transformation of the country. The private sector, on 
the other hand, would play a subordinate role. As junta member and sub-
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sequent f s l n  vice-president Sergio Ramirez Mercado (1982, 83) explained: 
"The mixed economy should take as its starting point the harmonious 
and delimited insertion of the private economy within the great strategic 
flow of the Area of People's Property."
The initial expropriations allowed the government to begin pursuing 
this set of goals. The day after the jg r n  assembled to replace the collaps 
ing dynasty all of the property of the Somoza family military officers, and 
high-ranking functionaries who had left the country was confiscated (De 
cree #3, July 20, 1979).2 The result was a distinctive nationalization pro 
cess. Unlike the Mexican case, in which the revolutionary regime slowly 
constructed a parastate sector over several decades and transferred expro 
priated land to ejidos, the Sandinistas moved quickly to develop a large 
public sector under direct state control. Unlike the Chilean case, where 
the state sector expanded rapidly but each nationalization was the sub 
ject of intense contestation, the Sandinistas began their revolution with 
consensual support for sweeping expropriations. As a result, the Sandi 
nista state quickly acquired a considerable chunk of the economy without 
extreme polarization, as least at the outset.
Confiscations in the first years provided the state with 1.6 million mz. 
of farmland, roughly 20 percent of the nation's total, 78 percent of which 
was in estates larger than 500 mz. (c ie r a  1989,1:293). In addition to the 
roughly 1,200 estates that were acquired, the regime also took over five of 
the nation's six sugar mills, three of its four slaughterhouses, the whole 
tobacco industry, dairy plants, rice mills, cotton gins, coffee processing 
facilities, and a host of other agroindustrial activities owned by former 
Somoza affiliates (Mayorga 1990, 8). Foreign-owned mines were appropri 
ated, as were a welter of other businesses and industries owned by Somoza 
allies. Following the transfer of these and other resources to the state, pub 
lic sector production expanded from around 15 percent of GDP in 1978 to 
36 percent in 1980 (Ruccio 1987, 64-65).
The Sandinista state also gained control of the nation's financial appa 
ratus (Enriquez and Spalding 1987). The large private banks that had 
evolved since the 1950s had been bankrupted during the insurrection. 
Bank managers and major depositors had spirited their capital out of the 
country as the fighting heated up; borrowers who had taken out loans in 
the relative calm of early 1979 were either unable or unwilling to repay 
them. Only a handful of the smaller financial institutions in the country 
had avoided complete collapse. When the state took over the devastated 
financial system and assumed responsibility for its operations, there were 
few initial complaints.
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The most controversial of the early reforms was the establishment of 
a string of state trading monopolies.3 These operations were designed to 
replace the open trading system that had roused controversy in the late 
Somoza era. In the cotton sector, for example, the local and international 
export houses that had bought and sold Nicaraguan cotton in the pre-1979 
period were replaced by a new state monopoly, e n a l  (Nunez Soto 1981, 
47; Biondi-Morra 1990, 329). Although this new restraint on free trade was 
controversial, especially with larger private producers, it garnered sup 
port from some producers who welcomed its price stabilization aspects 
(Sequeira 1981,124-33). The commitment of these firms to use surpluses 
that were generated when export prices were high in order to bolster pay 
ments when export prices dropped made some producers who had been 
battered by wild price fluctuations in the 1970s initially sympathetic to 
this project.
These first steps delivered a heavy blow to the traditional bastions of 
economic power in Nicaragua. The disarticulation of the top economic 
groups through the takeover of the financial and export sectors left the 
remnant of the bourgeoisie yet more dispersed and directionless. The 
leadership of the bourgeoisie was initially seized by the sector of the eco 
nomic elite that had been most steadfastly anti-Somoza and had forged 
tenuous ties to the f s l n . Several prominent business elites who had en 
dorsed the insurrection were given highly visible positions in the revolu 
tionary government. Not only was Alfonso Robelo, the young manager of 
a foreign-owned cooking oil company and former c o s e p president, named 
to the first jg r n , but c o s e p was given a quota of seats (five of the original 
thirty-three) in the newly formed legislative body, the Consejo de Estado 
(Booth 1985a, 191-93). At all levels, prominent members of the business 
community were inserted into the government, from corporate lawyers 
in the cabinet to major landholders in the municipal councils. Business 
leaders also took on jobs in the rapidly expanding bureaucracy, working 
side-by-side with both Sandinista militants and lower- to mid-level offi 
cials from the Somoza government who remained in the country.
This visible presence of local and national economic elites in the gov 
ernment was a source of consolation to fearful producers. Assurances by 
people like Robelo that the Sandinistas were not communists held down 
the exodus of elites after the revolution. Some business leaders who had 
fled the country during the fighting even returned to sniff the air.
Soon, however, tensions began to rise. A scant nine months after the 
ouster of Somoza, Robelo and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro resigned from 
the junta. As the locus of political power shifted increasingly toward
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the nine-man national directorate of the f s l n  and away from the more 
broadly based jg r n , these representatives of the bourgeoisie were steadily 
marginalized. Sectors of the elite, who had expected to direct the revolu 
tionary government, now saw the regime taking a decidedly more radical 
direction than they had anticipated, and they were powerless to stop it. 
Chamorro resigned first, in April 1980, ostensibly for health reasons; her 
subsequent criticisms of the regime revealed an underlying political oppo 
sition. Robelo, who had weathered several skirmishes with the f s l n  over 
the political content of the literacy campaign and the electoral calendar, 
resigned four days later, denouncing the planned expansion of the Con 
sejo de Estado to include additional Sandinista-sponsored organizations. 
These defections signaled the fraying of the relationship with the reform 
bourgeoisie as they began to recognize the subordinate position they had 
been assigned in the revolution.
Seven months later, u pa n ic  president Jorge Salazar, who had entered 
into a counterrevolutionary conspiracy to divide the military and topple 
the regime, was killed by Sandinista state security amid allegations of gun 
running. Salazar became a martyr for the business elite, and the relation 
ship deteriorated further. The alliance between the private sector and the 
government did not unravel completely at this time, however, due in part 
to the intervention of U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezullo. U.S. officials 
still hoped to moderate the revolution by keeping some of the bourgeoisie 
on board (Pastor 1987, 211-12).
Tightening the Vise: The Critique of the Bourgeoisie
Revolutions are commonly shaped by internal conflicts between feud 
ing camps. Radicals are suspicious of moderates, and both wrangle with 
the revolution's conservative wing.4 These divisions may be held in 
check through the efforts of a strong, dominant leader or an ideologically 
grounded and cohesive revolutionary political party. At the outset both 
were missing in Nicaragua.
Since at least the mid-1970s the f s l n  has been an internally variegated, 
factionalized organization (Hodges 1986, 218-55 ).5 Although reunification 
agreements and military victory in 1979 helped the organization to con 
geal, internal tensions remained. Furthermore, the f s l n  did not have a 
monopoly over the Nicaraguan government; it governed in coalition with 
non-Sandinista reformers. The government papered over these differences 
in typical Nicaraguan style with agreements that gave something to all
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sides. The presence in the f s l n  leadership of people who had differing 
priorities, combined with the vagueness of the principles endorsed by the 
revolution and the inclusion of non-Sandinista reformers in high-level 
positions, undermined the cohesiveness of the revolutionary government.
Pushing for greater coherence, the Sandinista government moved dur 
ing the first year to replace conciliation figures in the cabinet with mem 
bers of the f s l n  national directorate and to fill the Consejo de Estado 
with representatives of the newly formed, pro-Sandinista mass organiza 
tions.6 Tensions, however, remained, both within the f s l n  and within 
the government apparatus. Top and mid-level Sandinistas understood the 
revolution in different ways, as did many of those in government who 
were not Sandinistas. Most of the lower-level positions in the government 
were occupied by holdovers from the Somoza period who could not be 
replaced because of the scarcity of trained professionals in the country.
In spite of these obfuscating features, the dominant trends in the emerg 
ing ideology soon became clear. Analysis of internal documents, speeches, 
and policies indicates that, from the beginning, the f s l n  leadership re 
garded the bourgeoisie as an adversary. In the first national meeting of 
the national directorate and the Assembly of the Cadre on September 21- 
25, *979, only two months after the new government was formed, the 
"sell-out bourgeoisie" (burguesia vendepatria] was at the top of the list 
of groups that threatened the revolution.7 Not all members of the eco 
nomic elite were included under this rubric, but the concept had a broad 
sweep. From the standpoint of the f s l n , threats were posed not only by 
the residue of the Somoza dynasty or the traditional financial oligarchy 
of the b a n a me r  and b a n ic  groups but by "the reactionary commercial 
and industrial sector which has not entered the financial oligarchy but 
which has played a leadership role in the private sector" and "the layer 
of the agricultural bourgeoisie that tries to establish alliances with the 
peasantry intending to create a counterrevolutioary social base" (f s l n  
1990b, 91).
The election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in November 
1980, followed less than two weeks later by the Salazar incident, exacer 
bated the growing tensions. The steady hostility that Reagan displayed 
toward the Sandinistas in his campaign rhetoric, and the historical lessons 
learned from observing how the United States undermined revolution in 
Guatemala and Chile, fueled the fear of an impending military interven 
tion. Whatever tendency the f s l n  leaders had toward "verticalism" or 
centralization of power8 left over from their experience as guerrilla leaders
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or their political training in socialist countries was quickly reinforced by 
the threat of a U.S.-backed counterrevolution. The results were tightened 
internal controls, even in the midst of gestures of moderation.
In spite of the Forum for Dialogue held with private sector leaders in 
early 1981, the relationship with the economic elite generally deteriorated 
(Winson 1985; Sholk 1984; Gilbert 1985). A series of developments at 
tested to the rift. First, recruitment efforts by u pa n ic , the newly formed 
organization of agricultural producers, were undermined with the forma 
tion of an FSLN-backed competitor. The establishment of u n a g  in April 
1981, under the leadership of f s l n  militants, usurped the position of 
u pa n ic  as the sole national producer organization in the countryside. 
Affiliates in cooperatives and small-scale producers, who had been in 
corporated into u pa n ic  associations through the organizational work of 
leaders like Jorge Salazar, were now drawn into a competitor organization 
closely linked to the f s l n .9
Second, the government began a series of urban and rural confiscations 
that went beyond the original Somoza holdings. On the second anniver 
sary of the revolution, junta leader Daniel Ortega announced the confis 
cation of fifteen major urban enterprises on the charge of "decapitaliza 
tion." 10 After months of tightening up on sharecropping and land rental 
by large landowners, the government also decreed an agrarian reform law 
(Decreto #782, July 19, 1981). This new measure gave the government 
legal authorization to expropriate idle, underutilized, or rented land on 
estates larger than 500 mz. in the Pacific region of the country and 1,000 
mz. elsewhere.11
Finally, a testy Sandinista leadership, put on edge by deepening U.S. 
involvement in the contra war and growing private sector hostility, esca 
lated a war of words with bourgeois leaders. Defense Minister Humberto 
Ortega, from the moderate Tercerista wing of the f s l n , bristled: "If they 
[those who consciously or unconsciously assist the plans of imperialism] 
do not mature, if they do not join the defense effort, when aggression 
comes they will be the first to be hanged along the roads and highways 
of the nation" (Nuevo Diario, October 10,1981). Taking this as a personal 
threat against dissenters like themselves, c o s e p leaders issued a commu 
nique distributed to the international press. They warned of the prepara 
tion of a "new genocide" in Nicaragua targeted against those who exercise 
the "right to dissent" and concluded, "We identify an unmistakable ideo 
logical line of a Marxist-Leninist tendency [corte] that is confirmed in the 
discourse of members of the national directorate" (c o s e p letter to Daniel
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Ortega Saavedra, October 19, 1981). Charged with threatening national 
security, signatories to the document were arrested and imprisoned, and 
c o s e p became the political archrival of the Sandinista revolution.12 By the 
end of 1981 the bourgeoisie's role in the revolution was widely understood 
to be limited. The campaign against the bourgeoisie was not narrowly tar 
geted against specific opponents but broadened to raise tough questions 
about the class as a whole.
In capitalist countries, business elites are often accorded a certain ideo 
logical or even moral authority. This occurs because economic elites have 
been successful in promulgating the belief that the general prosperity of 
the society results from their entrepreneurial activities. The perceived 
ability of the private sector to create jobs, growth, and prosperity affords it 
considerable political authority and ideological clout. In the Nicaraguan 
case, however, the bourgeoisie had failed historically to provide for gen 
eralized prosperity or even a clear future promise of it. Pervasive poverty 
made it difficult for the local elite to claim that they had played a socially 
constructive role or that their economic freedom was a prerequisite for 
rapid national development. From the standpoint of the f s l n  leadership, 
the bourgeoisie had been given the opportunity to develop the country 
under the Somoza regime, and they had failed in this historic mission. 
Speaking at the second anniversary celebration, f s l n  national directorate 
member Tomas Borge (1982, 134) pursued the point with rhetorical flare: 
"What have [the unpatriotic businessmen] done for Nicaragua? They made 
it into a rubbish heap, into a lake of blood, into a valley of tears. Because 
they didn't teach the people to read and write. Because they did noth 
ing for the health of the people. Because they took this country, which 
because of its natural resources should have been a paradise, and kept it 
backward and miserably poor."
The f s l n 's concept of national unity, which had initially embraced 
the local bourgeoisie, underwent gradual modification. The 1981 strate 
gic planning document of c ie r a , mid in r a 's research arm, describes the 
narrowing of this concept over three stages (c ie r a  1989, 1:45-154). Dur 
ing the insurrection (1977—79), national unity was defined broadly to in 
clude all except that sliver of the bourgeoisie that was directly linked to 
Somoza or the nation's key financial institutions. Agricultural and indus 
trial elites, including even large landowners [terratenientes], were culti 
vated by the f s l n  in order to isolate and defeat the dictatorship (c ie r a  
1989,1:47). In the second phase (1979-81), an effort was still made to win 
over the local bourgeoisie in order to reconstruct the country and have
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Table 3.1
Projected Participation of Property Sectors in Agricultural Production (Percent)
Total Agricultural Area Irrigated Area Production Value
Property Sector 1981-82 1990 2000 1982 1990 2000 1980-82 1990 2000
APP 18.30 22.29 27.40 40.60 54.90 57.70 16.00 23.00 30.00
CAS 1.30 11.75 25.10 — 10.30 10.90 2.60 11.00 20.00
CCS 13.60 17.85 23.30 — 9.00 9.90 18.00 16.00 20.00
Large estates 12.00 9.36 6.00 54.00 24.00 18.50 14.00 10.00 5.00
Small and
medium estates 54.80 37.75 18.20 5.40 1.80 3.00 49.40 40.00 25.00
Total 100.00 99.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Area (mzs.) 7,953,861 9,124,280 10,777,856 76,492 262,461 409,774
Source: me d a  (1983), from c ie r a  (1989,1:157,161).
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the time to build up key revolutionary institutions like the armed forces 
and the state farm sector (c ie r a  1989,1:50-51).
The third phase, which was to begin in 1982, would introduce a "new 
policy of national unity" that would "neutralize the bourgeoisie." "Neu 
tralize," according to the new strategy, "does not mean eliminating the 
bourgeoisie but to differentiate it, divide it and weaken it as a class." Five 
strata of the bourgeoisie were now identified, ranging from the "decapi 
talizing" and "counterrevolutionary" sectors to a sector that "invests and 
risks its own capital" (c ie r a  1989,1:75,76). If private elites could accom 
modate themselves to the new logic of revolution, those who continued 
producing without draining state resources or increasing their profit mar 
gins could fit into the scheme as subordinate partners; the others, pre 
sumably, would not.
Perhaps the most important policy planning statement issued in the 
early years was mid in r a 's  Marco Estrategico del Desarrollo Agropecuario 
or me d a , which was completed in 1983 (mid in r a  1989, 155-230). After 
years of debate and ideological tussling, the members of mid in r a 's frac 
tious directing team (Equipo de Conduction) came together and drafted a 
program of strategies and priorities that, it was envisioned, would guide 
policy development to the year 2000. This document was embraced by 
mid in r a  Minister Jaime Wheelock, who lobbied for and secured its en 
dorsement by the f s l n 's  national directorate. In the absence of any com 
peting, long-term national development plan, this mid in r a  document 
served as the main expression of the regime's economic vision.
According to this plan, the large landowners were destined to play an 
increasingly marginal role in the national economy. The portion of agri 
cultural land held in private estates larger than 500 mz. was projected to 
drop from 12 percent in 1981—82 to only 6 percent in the year 2000; this 
sector's contribution to the value of agricultural production would drop 
still more, from an average of 14 percent in 1980-82 to only 5 percent at 
the end of the century. (See Table 3.1.) Even small- and medium-sized indi 
vidual producers would experience an erosion as they were nudged into 
cooperatives. The landholdings of small- and medium-sized producers 
were projected to decline from an estimated 55 percent of the farmland in 
1981—82 to 18 percent in the year 2000, with their contribution to national 
production falling by almost half.
Private owners were to be gradually replaced by new sectors nurtured 
by the revolutionary regime. Determining who, exactly, would replace 
the declining private elite was a matter of some controversy.
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The New Economic Model: APPistas versus Campesinistas
To design the new economic approach, models of other socialist states 
were scrutinized to see how the land and ownership questions had been 
variously resolved (see, for example, c ie r a  1989,1: 110-22). The two com 
peting models were those that emphasized either the centrality of state 
farms, favored by the APPistas, or the preeminence of agricultural coopera 
tives, pushed by early campesinistas13 Sandinista planning documents re 
viewed cases in each camp, and the internal debate within Nicaragua mir 
rored the debate that had taken place more broadly in the socialist world.
The line of argument that took an early and sustained lead emphasized 
the centrality of state enterprises. The pro-statist camp passed through 
two phases in the first years of the revolution. Initially, emphasis was 
placed on reactivating and increasing production in the factories, firms, 
and farms that had been confiscated from the Somozas and their allies. 
By 1983, attention shifted from building on extant infrastructure to con 
structing new state agricultural and agroindustrial projects using long 
term planning and sophisticated technologies.
Ironically, three normally divergent groups (socialist technocrats, 
ardent fans of advanced capitalist technology, and nationalist develop 
mentalists of the e c l a  school) converged in their support for a central 
ized, high-tech state model. For some policymakers, the experience and 
apparent success of the economic model in revolutionary Cuba argued 
for an emphasis on modern, state-run farms. As a former mid in r a  vice- 
minister explained, "Cuba was our closest reference point" (interview, 
August 17, 1991). Through a powerful demonstration effect and direct 
planning support, the Cuban model had a significant influence on the 
economic vision that emerged in Nicaragua. Cuba's impressive accom 
plishments in both the development of advanced technologies and the 
eradication of grinding poverty made a forceful impact on Sandinista 
policymakers. At the invitation of the Sandinistas, Cuban planners played 
important advisory roles in the development of pivotal agroindustrial 
projects like the t ima l  sugar mill/energy project and the Chiltepe dairy 
project.14
The inspiration for large state enterprises was not, however, purely 
socialist. Managerial centralism and large-scale operations were forceful 
trends in capitalist economies as well. Several Sandinista policymakers 
were heavily influenced by their experience with advanced Western tech 
nology and their role in managing sophisticated, large-scale private busi-
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nesses in Nicaragua. At the vice-ministerial level of mid in r a , for ex 
ample, several Sandinista functionaries had cut their administrative teeth 
at is a  in the prerevolutionary period.15 is a  was not only, at that time, the 
largest sugar mill in Central America, but it was also at the center of a net 
work of related industrial and commercial operations.16 Convinced that 
the weak entrepreneurial impulse in much of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie 
made it a poor candidate for major development initiatives, these high- 
level functionaries moved to fill the gap with state entrepreneurs who 
would oversee the development of a vast network of state firms. Intense 
lobbying efforts for this kind of state capitalist model found sympathetic 
support within both mid in r a  and, eventually, other ministries involved 
in making economic policy.
Not only in Nicaragua but throughout much of Latin America the 
image of the state firm as the centerpiece in the industrialization process 
was well established through the dissemination of the e c l a  model in the 
1960s and i97o s (e c l a  195i ,- Furtado 1976).The intervention of an activist 
state that fosters increased production and rapid industrialization through 
various policies, including, in some circumstances, the creation of state 
enterprises, was generally consistent with e c l a  prescriptions. Variants 
of this model were employed in the Latin American countries, such as 
Mexico and Brazil, that had grown rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, ac 
counting for much of the appeal of the model. According to some analysts, 
therefore, the e c l a  model, rather than Cuban socialism or managerial 
capitalism, provided the central conceptual inspiration for the Sandinista 
transformation (Conroy 1984; Conroy and Pastor 1988). The Nicaraguan 
model in this early period differed from other structuralist programs in its 
more emphatic hostility to pure market forces and its deeper ambivalence 
toward its own private sector. For some analysts and policymakers, how 
ever, this difference was largely one of degree. The parallels between the 
state-centered approach being developed in Nicaragua and that endorsed 
elsewhere in the region lent further intellectual and theoretical support 
to the experience.
To summarize, the development of large-scale state enterprises, at first 
justified by the infrastructure and technological integration of the proper 
ties inherited from the Somoza family, was subsequently supported with 
an array of economic rationales. Although not entirely in agreement about 
the role of the private sector, most economic policymakers endorsed an 
economic model that centered on high-tech, state-owned corporations.
This vision of the state emerged clearly from program statements of
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the era. According to the 1983 me d a , where the long-range structural 
vision of the revolution was most clearly sketched, the state sector was 
to continue expanding through the year 2000, when it was projected to 
control 27 percent of the farmland in Nicaragua, up from 18 percent in 
1981-82. (See Table 3.1.) Furthermore, the state sector was projected to 
dominate the country's most productive land, with its control over the 
country's irrigated land rising from 41 percent of the total in 1982 to 58 
percent in the year 2000 (mid in r a  1989,161). Its contribution to agricul 
tural production was expected to almost double, rising from 16 percent in 
1980-82 to 30 percent of the production value at the end of the century.
Indeed, in the first two years after the revolution, the a pp property 
did continue to expand, even without the benefit of new agrarian reform 
legislation, through continued land invasions and a program of compac- 
tacion or land takeovers to smooth the geographical boundaries of state 
farms. Following the agrarian reform decree in 1981, the portion of agri 
cultural land under a pp control increased from an estimated 20 percent 
of the total farmland in 1980 to 24 percent in 1981 (Deere et al. 1985, 79). 
Land expropriated under this law was initially retained by the state sector, 
as mid in r a  waited for evidence that the emerging cooperatives would 
consolidate into stable organizations.17
The state's financial and organizational resources were funneled 
heavily into the a pp enterprises. Agricultural credit, for example, went 
disproportionately to this sector. Whereas it held only 20 percent of the 
farmland in 1983 (Deere et al. 1985, 79), the a pp received 43 percent of 
all agricultural credit that year (c ie r a  1989,1:318). Agricultural machin 
ery was also heavily concentrated in the state sector. Data for 1984, for 
example, indicate that the state sector had acquired 62 percent of the 
country's tractors and 71 percent of the harvesters (c ie r a  1989,1:353).
Some of the initial enthusiasm for the state farms was dampened as 
evidence mounted of their weak economic performance. By 1982 the state 
farms were experiencing clear difficulties; 47 percent of their bank obli 
gations were already more than ninety days overdue. This delinquency 
prompted the first debt clearing (saneamiento] for the a pp in 1983, in 
which around one-third of the debt was forgiven and the rest was re 
structured as long-term loans (Biondi-Morra 1990, 282, 283). According 
to Biondi-Morra (1990, 103, 136-41), between 1982 and 1985, two-thirds 
of the a pp enterprises had losses, with deficits continuing in most plants 
even after the 1983 saneamiento.
Multiple factors contributed to the inability of the state enterprises to
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generate surpluses, ranging from the "historic vacation" taken by workers 
who reduced their workday to as little as three hours a day,18 to the over 
valued cordoba that, in spite of low-cost imports and subsidized credit, 
ultimately eroded the profitability of the agroexport products that most 
state farms were cultivating (Biondi-Morra 1990,136-41,, to the extreme 
pressures placed on the state farms to raise production and participate 
in state development projects, regardless of the costs involved (Biondi- 
Morra 1990, 295-304), to the priority given to the political objectives of 
the state farm sector over the objectives of production and profitability 
(Colburn 1990,130). These problems helped Sandinista activists in the op 
posing camp to push for a shift from the state farm emphasis toward more 
attention for the peasantry.
Campesinistas, located primarily in c ie r a , mid in r a 's agrarian re 
form research arm, advocated more accelerated land redistribution and the 
more equitable parceling out of state resources. Initially, the campesinista 
camp was most enthused about the development of the fully collectivized 
cooperatives (c a s ). The formation of credit and service cooperatives (ccs) 
among current small- and medium-sized landowners was envisioned pri 
marily as an interim step in the development of collectivized holdings. By 
1983 the pro-peasant camp was able to secure a planning commitment for 
the allocation of 25 percent of the farmland to the c a s  and 23 percent to 
the ccs by the year 2000. (See Table 3.1.) Nor was this simply a planning 
projection,- the area organized into cooperatives actually did increase over 
time. The c a s  sprang from nothing to occupy almost 9 percent of the agri 
cultural land, and the ccs reorganized private holdings into cooperatives 
on over n percent of the land by 1988. (See Table 3.2.) mid in r a  pushed 
its regional directors hard to locate land for redistribution and sent teams 
into each region to sustain the pressure on regional officials. The number 
of cooperatives rose, reportedly reaching 3,160 with 71,539 members in 
1988, up from 2,849 with 65,820 members in 1982 (Mayorga 1990,15 )•
These cooperatives were extremely fragile, however, and tended to dis 
integrate quickly. As the contra war heated up, pressure for increased 
allocation of credit to these cooperatives, in order to make participation 
more attractive and bolster these frail institutions, resulted in some shift 
of bank credit. By 1986, 44 percent of agricultural credit was channeled to 
the coops and small producers affiliated with the credito rural program 
(c ie r a  1989,1:318).
This relative increase in attention to the peasant sector, however, failed 
to dislodge the state sector from its preeminent position. The land held
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Table 3.2
Land Distribution by Strata and Tenancy (Mz. and Percent)
1978 1984 1988
Sector Area % Area % Area %
Private 8,073.0 100.0 5,929.5 73.4 6,419.8 79.5
Farms >500 mz. 2,920.0 36.2 1,025.7 12.7 604.8 7.5
200-500 mz. 1,311.0 16.2 1,021.0 12.6 1,090.2 13.5
50-200 mz. 2,431.0 30.1 2,391.0 29.6 2,295.6 28.4
10-50 mz. 1,241.0 15.4 560.5 6.9 1,323.1 16.4
<10 mz. 170.0 2.1 127.0 1.6 188.6 2.3
Credit and service coops (ccs) 0.0 0.0 804.3 10.0 917.5 11.4
Production coops (c a s ) 0.0 0.0 626.6 7.8 705.0 8.7
State farms (a pp) 0.0 0.0 1,516.9 18.8 948.2 11.7
Total 8,073.0 100.0 8,073.0 100.0 8,073.0 99.9
Source: Wheelock Roman (1990,115, table 7).
in the a pp sector did decline after 1983 when the state began to pare 
down the size of the state sector and reallocate some a pp properties to 
cooperatives and small producers. As Table 3.2 indicates, the portion of 
the nation's farmland in the a pp sector declined from 18.8 percent in 
1984 to 11.7 percent in 1988. In spite of these trends, the state sector re 
mained central and, in some ways, was enhanced during this phase of the 
revolution.
Care was exercised to retain the core of the state farm system. A 
mid in r a  study of the area ceded between 1984 and 1986 concluded that 
71 percent of the land divested by state farms had not been under cultiva 
tion.19 According to one former mid in r a  director who had been in charge 
of mid in r a  operations in three different regions, the state farms gener 
ally trimmed off land that was less valuable due to its distance from the 
road system or its lack of infrastructure (interview, October 30, 1990).20 
Commenting on the a pp divestment process, one mid-level mid in r a  
employee concluded that regional directors were "giving the coops land 
around the periphery of the a pp farms in order to have a readily available 
labor force for the a pp harvest" (interview, August 6,1991 ).21 Not only did 
the a pp retain the best of its lands, but it also tended to siphon off many 
of the best-trained ministry personnel, complicating the development and 
implementation of programs for the peasantry.
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APP and the Grandes Proyectos
In addition to giving continued attention to the existing state farms, 
the regime launched a whole new series of state investment projects.22 
The initial plan in the me d  a  for the grandes proyectos13 envisioned the 
creation of thirteen large-scale agroindustrial projects (mid in r a  1989, 
227). Included were projects like lumber mills, a sugar mill, a cotton gin, 
and milk and fruit processing facilities. This agroindustrial development 
scheme was projected to cost, in the heady days of the early 1980s, US$1.5 
billion by the year 2000, with two-fifths of the funding coming from 
abroad (mid in r a  1989, 226). As this program was developed and refined, 
it grew to encompass thirty-eight agricultural and agroindustrial projects 
(Wheelock Roman 1985,128-29).
Because of its aggressive developmentalism, mid in r a  became the cen 
ter of investment planning in Nicaragua. This ministry was the only sec 
tor to produce a long-term development plan, and it quickly assumed 
center stage.24 In a 1985 study of state investment activities by the f n i, an 
affiliate of the b c n , 71 percent of investment spending in the forty autho 
rized projects then under way was targeted to the agricultural and agro 
industrial sector (Arguello Huper and Kleiterp 1985, 85). mid in r a 's  goals 
were ambitious: to meet national nutritional needs and make the country 
self-sufficient in food production while also increasing and diversifying 
export crop production.
The biggest projects were major agroindustrial schemes designed to 
dramatically increase exports. According to the f n i study, the new export- 
oriented sugar mill t ima l  (subsequently renamed Victoria de Julio) was 
to absorb 24 percent of the state's investments in the agricultural projects, 
and the export-oriented burley tobacco project another 14 percent (Ar 
guello Huper and Kleiterp 1985, 83). Even in production for the domestic 
market, investment focused on the introduction of advanced technology 
on state farms. The cattle industry was to be dramatically transformed 
with the introduction of new breeding and dairy production techniques in 
the Muy-Muy Matiguas, Chiltepe, and Leon Viejo-La Paz projects. Most 
remarkably, even maize production was to be shifted from the traditional 
low technology, peasant sector into high-tech production. The govern 
ment planned to transfer food production out of the mountainous interior 
where it was found to exacerbate soil erosion and relocate it in the fertile 
flatlands of the Pacific (Wheelock Roman 1985, 42-43).
This heavy emphasis on large-scale, modern production technologies 
was designed to overcome the social and economic problems that had tra-
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ditionally plagued the Nicaraguan economy. Production fluctuations that 
are the bane of agricultural economies, for example, were to be attenuated 
with the introduction of irrigation. Seasonal unemployment, a major lia 
bility of agroexport economies, would be addressed through a system of 
double cropping, in which cotton and maize would be produced in alter 
nate cycles (see Wheelock Roman 1984, 12-14; M. Coronel Kautz 1984, 
12-13). This new grains production program in the Pacific region, called 
the Plan Contingente, would also protect the country against the loss of 
staples production as the contra war heated up in the interior. A new 
vision, which emphasized the "development of production forces through 
the application of science and technology" (M. Coronel Kautz 1984, 12), 
was expected to raise the skills and productivity of the workforce, allow 
ing them to command better and more stable incomes.
The general policy of conserving the best of the a pp operations and in 
vesting heavily in building new production and processing facilities was 
defended as laying the foundation for the long-run development of the 
country. The standard Latin American practice of import-substituting in 
dustrialization and the newer injunctions about using "appropriate tech 
nology" were both rejected in favor of a state-of-the-art industrialization 
strategy that would allow Nicaragua not only to fill its own consumer 
needs but also to export competitively. As Wheelock Roman (1984, 14) 
concluded, "We're not a country of 'appropriate technology', which has as 
its philosophy the institutionalization of underdevelopment. Even though 
we do sympathize with the appropriate technology approach, we don't 
regard it as the fundamental solution for the country, but as a comple 
mentary effort that must also be made. We still have, as a major goal, the 
task of producing fertilizers, for example, and agricultural machinery. . . . 
We are already doing the studies in order to move in this direction." To 
transcend dependency and underdevelopment and become competitors in 
the world market, highly sophisticated technology was required. Long- 
run schemes envisioned energy self-sufficiency through the development 
of alternative energy sources such as hydroelectric and geothermal power. 
Eventually Nicaragua would even produce its own inputs and machinery 
for agricultural and industrial use.
In spite of growing economic difficulties, state investment continued 
to rise in real terms, reaching a peak in 1986 when investments equaled 
a remarkable 24 percent of the GDP. The investment rate in the agricul 
tural sector was particularly high and equaled 58 percent of the value of 
agricultural production in 1987 (c ie r a  1989, 1:341). Although the por-
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tion of long-term bank credit allocated to a pp declined after 1983, project 
development continued through the pip, a program of direct state invest 
ment. According to plans for the 1983-90 period, 71 percent of projected 
investment was to go to a pp enterprises, whereas only 25 percent was tar 
geted to the coops,- the medium- and large-sized private producers were 
projected to receive only 4 percent of the total (c ie r a  1989,1:350).25
The Bourgeoisie at the Margins: Adversarial Confrontation 
and Neglect
In the internal debate about sectoral priorities, the big loser was the local 
bourgeoisie. For much of this long first phase of the revolution, private 
economic elites were squeezed between the state sector, which sucked 
up many of the available financial and human resources of the society, 
and the peasantry, which pressed for increased attention and occasionally 
received it. The large- and medium-sized private producers experienced 
an erosion of land, credit, and political voice as state farms grew and 
monopolized resources.
The government's early approach to the private sector was generally 
one of adversarial neglect. Traditional economic elites were regarded with 
suspicion and disdain, and the official rhetoric about the bourgeoisie was 
often tinged with implicit threat. In terms of the government's medium- 
and long-range plans, the private sector's role was that of a minor ad 
junct. Evidence of the decline of the bourgeoisie is found in the patterns 
of land expropriation, land sales, credit allocation, and the distribution of 
agricultural technology.
Land Expropriation
To consolidate the state sector and respond to peasant land demands, 
private estates were taken over. Whereas the first phase of the land reform 
program (1979-80) concentrated on the Somoza properties, the second 
(1981-84) and third (1985-88) targeted non-somocista landowners, par 
ticularly the terratenientes or latifundistas who owned more than 500 
mz. of land. Marxist theoreticians and developmentalists converged in 
their intention to remove valuable national resources from the hands of a 
lackluster, nondevelopmental private elite. Large landowners, estimated 
to number around 1,700 in 1978 (Deere et al. 1985,78), experienced a major 
erosion. The portion of agricultural land in large estates declined from 
36.2 percent in 1978 to 12.7 percent in 1984 and dropped still further to
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Table 3.3
Number of Properties and Area (in mz.) Affected in Agrarian Reform, 1981-1988
Region
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area
I 84 24,231 70 43,202 17 4,937 29 7,047 41 51,275 28 7,483 3 1,870 272 140,045
II 73 72,582 44 35,271 36 39,941 70 58,451 114 47,084 30 4,872 18 l,262a 385 259,463
III 2 440 2 205 1 379 5 1,024
IV 13 16,412 16 8,539 85 51,111 7 4,305 93 12,052 168 33,581 4 2,320 2 100 388 128,420
V 61 82,097 13 28,601 19 13,547 13 7,722 71 38,807 57 27,851 2 28,515 236 227,140
VI 20 11,369 29 26,744 32 18,780 25 13,687 30 5,570 52 19,324 23 12,142 3 1,447 214 109,063
VII 2 825 2 825
VIII 1 2,050 1 2,050
IX 1 1,948 4 11,116 2 2,555 1 6,000 8 21,619
Other b 2 163 3 817 2 58 7 1,038
Total 33 27,781 268 217,129 251 188,898 106 76,857 239 93,455 449 192,326 142 54,668 30 39,573 1,518 890,687
Source: c ie r a  (1989, 9:40, table 2).
aDoes not include 28,500 mz. that were expropriated with the Ingenio San Antonio in June 1988. 
^Includes properties that cross regional boundaries.
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7.5 percent in 1988. (See Table 3.2.) Indeed, the contraction of these large 
estates proceeded even more rapidly than planned; the me d a  had pro 
jected that private estates over 500 mz. would still control 9.36 percent of 
the agricultural land in 1990 (see Table 3.1 ).26
The major instruments for the reduction of these estates were the 1981 
and 1986 agrarian reform laws. Data on the land acquisition process pre 
sented in Table 3.3 reveal the patterns of expropriation during the second 
two phases.27 (See Table 3.3.) In the 1981-84 period, reform began cau 
tiously but soon accelerated. The pace of expropriation was particularly 
rapid in Region I, the area where Sandino's army had historically pros 
pered and which remained a Sandinista stronghold. Over a quarter (171 
of 658) of the 1981-84 expropriations were carried out in Region I alone. 
Nationally, the average size of the estates expropriated during this phase 
was 776 mz., although the size of the estates taken varied from region to 
region.
The pace of land reform slackened in 1984, as land demands were met 
by the state farms shedding their less productive territories. By 1985, how 
ever, land reform accelerated again, now pressured by the wartime need 
to secure a stronger peasant constituency for the regime. As the contra 
war heated up, the Sandinistas were faced with a double problem. Land 
less and small peasant producers in the interior of the country, who had 
been a low priority for the regime and had received few concrete benefits, 
were being increasingly drawn into the contra army, often through ma 
terial rewards and promises (Bendana 1991). At the same time, the f s l n  
was having increased difficulty recruiting for its own army as draft eva 
sion became rampant. To undercut contra recruitment efforts and bolster 
its own, the f s l n  moved to step up land reform and land titling programs. 
By signaling a deeper commitment to the redistribution of resources, the 
Sandinistas hoped to secure an elusive peasant base.28
Large- and medium-sized landowners bore the brunt of this campaign. 
Faced with increased land needs, and unwilling to give up the state- 
centered model, mid in r a  quickened the pace of private sector expropria 
tions in 1985. After a year of controversial land seizures, particularly in 
the densely populated Region IV where traditional land pressures were 
now exacerbated by the influx of refugees from the war zone, the agrarian 
reform law was altered to give the regime more legal latitude. The 1986 
version of the law allowed the government to expropriate idle lands re 
gardless of the size of the property and legalized the practice of expropri 
ating lands for use in "national development zones."
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In 1986 the land reform movement exploded, particularly in Regions IV 
and II. In that year alone, 30 percent of all agrarian reform expropriations 
took place. Ironically, the contra war that was fought, from the Reagan 
administration's point of view, to stymie the expansion of communism 
now hastened the erosion of the Nicaraguan landed elite. Although the 
government claimed that "efficient" producers were still protected from 
expropriation, hundreds of private producers who had escaped the chop 
ping block in the preceding seven years now fell to the war-induced land 
reform push.29
Land Sales: Voluntary and Involuntary
In addition to land that was expropriated, mid in r a  also acquired 
land through donations and purchases. Indeed, around 200,000 mz., or 
roughly 8 percent of all "reformed" land, was obtained through sales, 
negotiations, or donations (interview, Mireya Molina Torres, October 1, 
1990). Sandinista partisans who were large landowners frequently donated 
family lands to the state, particularly after they were given positions in 
the government. Unable, because of constraints on their time, to attend 
to their private holdings, and uncomfortable about their status as large 
landowners, these officials commonly turned their lands over to the a pp 
sector.
In other cases, the transfer was less voluntary. The line between a prop 
erty sale and an expropriation was often fuzzy. Although some owners 
were willing to part with properties and reached a satisfactory agreement 
about the terms of the sale with the local mid in r a  representative, many 
agreed to a sale only to forestall an expropriation that was already under 
way. Faced with a land invasion or an expropriation notice, some producers 
moved quickly to negotiate a sale in order to secure a cash payment rather 
than receive the "worthless" agrarian bonds that accompanied many ex 
propriations.
In the early years, when the state still had some financial resources 
and could offer quick cash payments, these arrangements were often ac 
ceptable to the owners. Eighty percent of the land acquired in this fashion 
was obtained in the 1984-85 period, however, when the state's financial 
resources were becoming seriously strained (interview, Mireya Molina 
Torres, October 1, 1990).30 With the deepening of the war and the slide 
in production, land sales to the state became more problematic. Sellers 
received payments only after long delays during which inflation ate up 
most of their earnings. In some cases, the sellers then refused to accept
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the payment and attempted to reopen the negotiation, alleging that they 
had, in effect, been expropriated without cause.31
By 1986 the state's financial disarray made it increasingly difficult to 
make credible purchase offers to landowners or to have those offers ac 
cepted. The government reverted back to expropriations in order to ac 
quire land needed for redistribution.
Control over Credit
Land loss was accompanied by other reductions that attested to the 
eroding position of the agricultural bourgeoisie. One important area of de 
cline was in control over bank credit. Following the nationalization of the 
banking system in 1979, there was an explosion of bank credit.32 Most of 
the credit increase was absorbed by the expanding a pp sector and, second 
arily, by the growing cooperative and small peasant sector. The portion of 
bank credit received by medium- and large-sized producers declined from 
96 percent of the total in 1978 to only 43 percent after the dust had cleared 
in 1981 (c ie r a  1989,1:318).
In part, this reduction resulted from the shift of the somocista proper 
ties out of the credito bancario program over to the a pp sector. Further 
more, the rapid expansion of credit meant that even a declining percent of 
the total could adequately cover most of the private sector's credit needs. 
The decline in the regular private sector credit continued until 1984, how 
ever, when medium- and large-sized private producers held 55 percent of 
the farmland33 but received only 24 percent of the bank credit (c ie r a  
1989,1:318). This gap suggests the marginalization and mutual withdrawal 
taking place between the state and the private sector.
More of an issue was the limited access to long-term credit. The mush 
rooming state sector absorbed almost half of this credit in 1983, leaving 
only a quarter of it apiece for the still-considerable medium- and large- 
sized producers, on the one hand, and coops and small producers on the 
other. After 1983 the shift of a pp investment financing from the bank 
credit system to the pip reduced the state stranglehold on long-term 
credit. The state farms, however, were immediately replaced by the small 
producers and coops, who came to absorb 63 percent of the long-term 
credit in 1986. In contrast, the medium- and large-sized private producers 
were allocated only 24—27 percent of this credit in the 1983-86 period 
(c ie r a  1989, 1:319). Long-term credit was still available to private pro 
ducers, but it was highly competitive and relatively difficult to secure.34
Bank credit was heavily subsidized. In this sense the private producers
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who got bank funding received considerable benefits from the new regime 
along with other producers.35 Nonetheless, the credit patterns reflect the 
lower priority given to the eroding private sector as the regime consoli 
dated its new development scheme. This declining access occurred in 
spite of the fact that this sector's repayment rates were higher than those 
of the others.36 Indeed, the backlog of unpaid debts in both the peasant 
sector and the a pp was such that the bank system resorted to periodic 
saneamientos to reduce and restructure their outstanding debts. As the 
nationalized bank system shifted away from the profit logic and began to 
emphasize new developmental and social objectives, the traditional link 
between finance capital and economic elites unraveled.
Agricultural Technology
As with the credit system, the priority given to other sectors also 
reduced the agricultural bourgeoisie's access to new technologies. Even 
by regional standards, Nicaragua had acquired little modern agricultural 
technology at the time of the revolution. A readily available labor supply 
and very low wages led the country to import only modest levels of ad 
vanced agricultural machinery. In 1979, for example, Nicaragua had only 
2,850 tractors (c ie r a  1989,1:352). The Sandinistas' commitment to rapid 
development led to the quick expansion of this paltry fleet. An additional 
997 tractors were imported in 1983-84.
Most of the new agricultural machinery went directly to the state sec 
tor, again reflecting the regime's commitment to a state-centered model 
of accumulation. In 1984, 62 percent of the nation's 4,051 tractors were 
located in the state sector; only 30 percent were owned by private indi 
vidual producers (c ie r a  1989, 1:353). The coops were least favored in 
terms of access to advanced technologies, receiving only 8 percent of the 
tractors in 1984.
Constraints to Ideology: Elite Fragments and Strategic Alliances
Shaped by vaguely socialist aspirations and a forceful commitment to 
rapid national development, the Sandinista regime pushed for a state- 
centered economy that alternately confronted and neglected the local 
bourgeoisie. But its ability to realize a social transformation was con 
strained by a range of domestic and international forces. In spite of the 
new statist model, the regime remained economically dependent on the 
private elite. Not only was the presence of a stable bourgeoisie neces 
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sary to hold down Cold War aggression, but the production of both con 
sumer staples and essential export income still depended heavily upon 
this sector. One study of sectoral production patterns found that as late as 
1986-87, large- and medium-sized producers generated 41 percent of total 
agricultural production. Their contribution to export production was a 
slightly more pronounced 45 percent of the total (Baumeister 1988, 30).37 
Furthermore, much of the labor force still depended on employment in 
the private sector.
The Sandinista leadership recognized that many of the particular char 
acteristics of Nicaraguan society impeded full centralization. Wheelock 
(1983, 101-2), noting the importance of small producers in the Nicara 
guan economy, concluded, "We cannot resolve the transformation of our 
society via the expropriation of all the means of production. This would 
not lead us to socialism; on the contrary, this could even lead to the 
destruction and disarticulation of society." For both pragmatic and tacti 
cal reasons, the Sandinistas attempted to accommodate more variation in 
their model than was common in socialist states.
Instead of adopting a rigid, ideological opposition to the bourgeoisie 
as a whole, the Sandinista regime ultimately opted for an approach in 
which the "rules of the game would be defined in the process itself, to 
identify, not theoretically but historically an original role that private 
enterprise can play in the construction of the new Nicaraguan economy" 
(mipl a n  1980, 14). Sectors that played a useful role or made a contribu 
tion would receive rewards,- those that did not would not. Although the 
bourgeoisie as a whole eroded in Nicaragua during this period, some sec 
tors survived and even flourished. In spite of the generally adversarial re 
lationship that emerged between the Sandinista state and the bourgeoisie, 
the complexity of both the state and the local elite impeded the impulse 
to unwavering opposition. The result was an often sharp differentiation 
between the vision and views of state leaders, on one hand, and their be 
havior or deeds on the other. Although a pattern of adversarial neglect 
characterized the overall relationship with the elite, more positive link 
ages emerged with specific subcategories, reflecting practical political and 
economic considerations.
In practice, the Sandinista model identified several axes along which 
the economic elite could be divided during the first years of the revo 
lution. An effort was made to differentiate between the productive and 
the unproductive economic elites, to favor medium-sized over large pro 
ducers, to provide special support for those who produced essential prod 
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ucts for the domestic market over the traditionally dominant agroexport 
ers, and to build alliances with the “homegrown" bourgeoisie instead 
of its more cosmopolitan counterpart. Producers who employed efficient 
production practices, who refrained from egregious forms of decapitaliza 
tion, who had strong links in their local communities, who produced in 
priority sectors, and who were not conspicuously wealthy or hostile to 
the regime were identified as patriotic and generally given a protected 
position within the revolution. Large capitalists, with sharply declining 
production levels or in low priority areas, who were denounced locally 
for decapitalization or abuse of their workers and who had extensive ties 
abroad, on the other hand, were viewed negatively and became targets for 
expropriation.
Productive/Unproductive
The first cut made in the economic elite divided those who were pro 
ductive from those who were not. As c ie r a 's 1981 planning document 
indicated, the bourgeoisie was first differentiated by dividing those who 
could produce without draining the nation's resources from those who 
produced little or did so only by drawing heavily on the state's coffers 
(c ie r a  1989, 1:73-79). Using this criterion, the commercial sector and 
"non-priority urban services" fell into disfavor relative to the agricultural 
sector (c ie r a  1989, 1:85). The industrial sector, which was quite import 
dependent and tied to the collapsing Central American market, also be 
came a lower priority for the government. The agricultural sector, which 
not only supplied most of the country's food needs but also generated 
needed foreign exchange, quickly became the national priority.
Within the agricultural sector, further differentiation took place. Un 
like many Latin American agrarian reform programs, including those in 
Mexico and pre-1973 Chile, the Nicaraguan variant did not use size as 
the primary criterion for determining which properties would be expro 
priated. Productive use of the land by its owners was the key legal factor 
employed in Nicaragua. Although this provision was not always honored, 
in most cases where productivity was high and maintained, the land was 
not expropriated.
Middle- versus Large-sized Producers
Like the revolutionary regimes in Mexico and Chile, the Sandinista 
regime sought to build an alliance with small- and medium-sized pro 
ducers. Producers with extensive holdings were expected to be closely tied
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to the traditional regional oligarchies. In contrast, small- and medium 
sized producers were thought to be less wedded to the status quo and 
more open to economic and political change; these producers could serve 
as a battering ram to challenge traditional rural social structures. Further, 
promotion of the middle sector was consistent with a growth model that 
dispersed wealth more widely through the population.
Middle-sized producers had long been economically significant in 
Nicaragua. As Baumeister's (1984b) work on the stratification of produc 
tion in the 1952-76 period indicated, middle-sized producers were gen 
erally responsible for a larger percentage of national production of key 
exports than were large producers. In 1971, for example, middle-sized pro 
ducers generated 53 percent of the cotton crop (vs. 42 percent for large 
producers), 44 percent of the coffee (vs. 30 percent for large producers) 
and owned 29 percent of the cattle (vs. 19 percent for large ranchers) (Bau- 
meister 1984b, 12).38 Polarization of production and landholding in Nica 
ragua was much less acute than that found in regional neighbors like El 
Salvador and Guatemala.
The prominence of this middle-sized sector encouraged the Sandinista 
regime to assume that the contraction of large private estates would not 
seriously damage the economy, and that a development model which 
allowed private ownership for small- and medium-sized producers could 
be viable in Nicaragua. Initially, the middle-sized producers were not 
legally subject to expropriation, and property held in medium-sized 
estates remained relatively stable over time.39 Whereas the portion of 
farmland held in large estates had declined from 36 percent of the total in 
1978 to 7.5 percent in 1988, the portion in medium-sized estates dropped 
only from 46 percent to 42 percent. (See Table 3.2.) Private farms of 200- 
500 mz. held 16.2 percent of the farmland in 1978; this sector retained 
13.5 percent of the farmland in 1988, and had actually expanded modestly 
in the 1984—88 period. The 50—200 mz. sector, which had 30.1 percent 
of the farmland in 1978, eroded only modestly, dropping to 28.4 percent 
in 1988.
The fact that this interim stratum remained roughly the same size in 
the 1978—88 period does not mean that medium-sized producers were 
completely untouched by the agrarian reform. Indeed, following the pas 
sage of the 1986 agrarian reform law, which allowed the expropriation 
of idle, inefficiently used, or abandoned land regardless of the size of the 
estate, hundreds of medium-sized properties were also expropriated. Ac 
cording to case-by-case data compiled by the Direccion de Tenencia de la
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Tierra of mid in r a  (1987), properties expropriated in 1986 ranged in size 
from 1.5 to 7,159 mz. Seventy-nine percent of the 357 expropriated proper 
ties analyzed in that document were smaller than 500 mz. In that year, for 
example, 37 percent of the properties expropriated were smaller than 100 
mz. and 55 percent were smaller than 200 mz.40 As data in Table 3.3 dem 
onstrate, the average size of the properties expropriated in the 1985-88 
period was 442 mz., down from 776 mz. in the 1982-84 phase.
The agricultural elites in Nicaragua often owned several properties; 
these properties were sometimes in different parts of the country. Expro 
priation of one property generally left others intact. Some of the large 
property owners, therefore, dropped into the middle-sized bracket follow 
ing an expropriation but continued to live and work in Nicaragua on the 
reduced properties that they retained. One large coffee producer, for ex 
ample, lost a mountainous, underdeveloped woodland but held on to all 
of the land he had planted in coffee trees. Another lost the plots he and 
his family had historically allocated to peasants who participated in his 
cotton harvest but retained the larger portion that he managed directly. 
The relatively stable percent of the nation's farmland found in the middle 
strata is due, therefore, not simply to the infrequency of expropriations in 
that category but also to the shifting of some large property owners into 
the middle-sized category following land sales or expropriations.
Nonetheless, a much smaller portion of medium-sized property owners 
underwent expropriation than those who held more extensive proper 
ties. According to Baumeister (1988, 29), even after size restrictions were 
eliminated in the 1986 agrarian reform law, only 8 percent of the land 
redistributed in the 1986-87 period came from private estates that were 
smaller than 500 mz.41 This suggests that the regime tried to avoid under 
mining the middle-sized producers that it wanted to include as part of 
its base.
Domestic Market versus Agroexport Producers
The government also pursued a less confrontational relationship with 
sectors of the bourgeoisie who produced basic staples for domestic con 
sumption (Spoor and Mendoza 1988; Utting 1991). The Sandinistas' com 
mitment to improve the urban diet by subsidizing prices for staples had 
quickly led to increased food demands. As the per capita consumption 
of rice, vegetable oil, chicken, pork, and eggs rose sharply following the 
revolution (Utting 1991, 45), pressure built for increased domestic produc 
tion. Unable, at least in the short run, to fulfill this increased demand on
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state farms, the regime was forced to rely on private producers, including 
even large-scale capitalist producers of these strategic products. To secure 
increased production of basic products, the government developed a series 
of supports and incentives targeted toward producers in the Pacific region, 
particularly rice and sorghum producers, but benefiting large-scale maize 
and even cotton producers (who provided raw ingredients for cottonseed 
oil) as well.
After the revolution, almost half of domestic rice production was sup 
plied by a small number of large-scale private rice producers (c ie r a  1989, 
9:92). Developmental support from the Somoza regime had allowed these 
large producers to install irrigation systems and achieve relatively high 
levels of production. With the national rice consumption now substan 
tially dependent on the continued production of this sector, private rice 
producers were able to acquire a series of special concessions from the 
state. The guaranteed price paid to rice producers, for example, rose rapidly 
in the 1979-80 to 1981-82 period, more than tripling in two years.42 
More importantly, the regime used international financing from Western 
European governments in 1982 to purchase harvesters and other essen 
tial agricultural machinery, which it allocated to large rice growers on 
highly concessionary terms (interview, Mario Hanon, president of a n a r , 
August 23,1986).
Nor was this sector targeted for expropriation, even though most of 
the private rice growers held large properties. According to the president 
of a n a r  for this whole period, not a single a n a r  member was expro 
priated (interview, Mario Hanon, May 3, 1990).43 Although this sector 
faced numerous problems (erratic electricity disrupted the irrigation sys 
tems and burned out pumps, inadequate storage systems caused spoilage, 
etc.), private producers were able to increase their production through 
1982-83. According to official government statistics, even as late as 1987- 
88 private rice producers had production levels that were as good as or 
only slightly below the levels that they had obtained in 1980-81 (c ie r a  
1989, 9:92). This output stability in large-scale private rice production was 
achieved at a time when private production levels of many other crops 
had plummeted. It facilitated major increases in total rice production in 
the 1979-80 to 1983-84 period.44 (See Appendix 2, Table A.i.)
Other large growers producing for the domestic market also received 
favorable treatment. The animal feed industry grew rapidly as the San 
dinista government attempted to increase consumption of protein-rich 
foods like eggs and chicken. This feed expansion boosted sorghum pro 
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duction and favored the generally large- and medium-sized producers who 
cultivated this crop. As with other crops, the government's price-fixing 
policy guaranteed producers a price that would cover costs plus provide a 
profit margin that was negotiated annually, mid in r a 's cost assessments 
generally assumed that producers used an intermediate level of tech 
nology. For producers who had access to modern technology and whose 
yields were higher than average, as was the case for most larger sorghum 
producers, costs were lower than those used in mid in r a  calculations, and 
the return was substantially higher (Spoor and Mendoza 1988, 30-31,.45 
For this stratum, the government's guaranteed price and guaranteed mar 
ket eliminated two of the chronic problems that had traditionally plagued 
the animal feed sector.
The same was true for many large-scale, modernized maize producers. 
For peasant producers, prices of manufactured goods rose more rapidly 
in the first half of the decade than guaranteed maize prices, leading to 
production disincentives and a decline in marketed output. For larger, 
better-capitalized producers, however, production costs were much lower 
and the guaranteed prices provided a substantial return. Utting's (1991, 28) 
index of maize production costs for 1983-84 found that for highly mecha 
nized maize producers, the production costs per qt. were only 57 percent 
of the producer price. For peasant producers using traditional technolo 
gies, on the other hand, production costs surpassed producer prices by 18 
percent, leading to net losses.
Large-scale staples producers benefited from subsidized credit, cheap 
electricity for irrigation and energy supplies, low cost inputs, and in some 
cases, access to inexpensive agricultural machinery. Perhaps even more 
than peasant producers, agrarian capitalists producing for the domestic 
market were able to take advantage of the supports provided for staples 
production.46
Chapiolla versus Comprador Bourgeoisie
The categories used to differentiate among sectors of the bourgeoisie 
were not all economic. A final distinction made by the regime focused 
on political and cultural differences found within the elite. In an effort to 
make inroads into the medium- and large-sized producers' strata, u n a g , 
the Sandinista-sponsored producer association, attempted to differentiate 
between a homegrown and an urban-based, internationally linked bour 
geoisie. u n a g  leaders posited the existence of a distinctively Nicaraguan, 
newly emergent bourgeoisie that could accommodate itself to the revo 
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lution. This sector, colloquially labeled the burguesia chapiolla, was de 
fended as a legitimate participant in the revolutionary process and was 
actively courted by the regime.47
u n a g  was initially designed in 1981 as an organization of prorevo 
lutionary peasant producers who had already formed, or could be shep 
herded into, cooperatives. In 1984 this association began to undergo a 
transformation and gradual reorganization, signaled by the selection of 
new u n a g  national president Daniel Nunez.48 At the u n a g  national as 
sembly meeting in which Nunez was selected, a number of large- and 
medium-sized private producers were highly visible participants and drew 
praise from the new leadership 49 Under Nunez's direction, larger-scale 
producers were actively recruited through the recognition of preexisting 
local producer associations and the creation of new specialized commis 
sions. By 1986-87, for example, u n a g  reported that 151 organizations of 
private producers had been incorporated into its network (Luciak forth 
coming, 62; see also Luciak 1988, 9-10). In 1987 the number of these asso 
ciate members claimed by u n a g  climbed to 2,807, and members who had 
joined as individuals totaled 26,618. (See Appendix 2, Table A.2.) These 
figures represented 24 percent of the total u n a g  membership. Looser 
forms of affiliation that allowed local autonomy, along with un a g 's  grow 
ing commitment to the protection of property rights, made u n a g  more 
attractive to agrarian elites.
In the search for large- and medium-sized members, u n a g  leaders dif 
ferentiated between "unpatriotic producers affiliated with c o s e p," who 
for political and cultural reasons were outside the pale, and "patriotic pro 
ducers," who were actively courted. The former were not just politically 
objectionable,- they also were characterized by a style of life that sepa 
rated them from the u n a g  mainstream. These included large producers 
who "run their farms from afar. They are people who live in the cities. 
They have managers on the farms, but they only go on weekends or every 
two weeks." These producers had little direct involvement in the produc 
tion process. From the standpoint of u n a g  organizers, these producers 
functioned much like absentee landowners whose social and economic 
contribution to society was suspect. According to Nunez, "These people 
who live in Managua had more access to culture, to society, to the clubs, 
to all the comforts or deformations that life carries with it" (Nunez 1985a, 
367-68).
In addition to their objectionable lifestyle, these sectors were more 
closely tied to the international market. They were more fully involved
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in the processing and marketing activities where exorbitant profits were 
concentrated. In Nunez's words, "They used to own slaughterhouses; they 
had everything. They used to buy coffee. They used to buy cattle. They 
used to buy everything to export. They themselves were the exporters of 
what the peasantry produced in this country." This cosmopolitan bour 
geoisie, "who traveled outside the country and who received a different 
education" (Nunez 1985a, 369, 368) formed the core of the c o s e p organi 
zations and was seen as closely tied to the U.S. Embassy and the counter 
revolutionary war. To effectively challenge the old power structure and 
batter down the forces of imperialism, this elite had to be displaced.
"Patriotic producers," on the other hand, were more fully rooted in rural 
life and were more directly involved in the productive process. According 
to Nunez, even though some of these producers were large landowners, 
"their dynamic of work in the countryside makes them rich peasants. 
That is to say, they have not become declassed [sic], separated from pro 
duction, by moving to the cities" (Nunez 1985a, 367). This chapiollo sector 
was composed of medium- and large-sized producers who were of "peas 
ant origin" (Baumeister 1988, 31). They were "normally a first generation 
bourgeoisie that opened space for itself by challenging the power of the 
large landowners" (Ortega and Marchetti 1986, 26).
The u n a g  strategy of courting these medium- and large-sized pro 
ducers who might be more susceptible to the appeals of the revolution 
was difficult and controversial. Ortega and Marchetti (1986, 38-39), for 
example, equated this sector with a "kulak" class and argued that the 
u n a g 's  efforts on its behalf reaffirmed the old power structure of the ham 
let (comar ca) and "weakened the poorest of the poor." Concerns about 
this new direction led to conflict with segments of the f s l n  (Haugaard 
1991, 22), as some revolutionaries decried the enbourgeoisment of their 
rural affiliate. Nonetheless, u n a g  continued its recruitment campaign 
and found many of its most active regional and national leaders within 
this sector of the bourgeoisie.
Conclusions
The relationship between the Sandinista regime and the national bour 
geoisie during the first seven years of the revolution was fraught with 
tension. Departing from pro-statist assumptions that rippled between 
populist and socialist poles, the Sandinista leadership adopted an atti 
tude toward the private producers that generally shifted between hostility
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and neglect. Not only was the bourgeoisie's behavior in the early years 
of the revolution found to be counterproductive to economic recovery 
and the political consolidation of the new regime, but its activities in 
the decades prior to 1979 were judged to be nondevelopmental and con 
trary to national interests. Its claim to resources and legitimacy, conse 
quently, was found to be feeble. In the new development model embraced 
by the revolutionary government, traditional economic elites were dis 
placed from the economic center,- the state assumed direct responsibility 
for the transformation of the Nicaraguan social and economic order.
In practice, however, the regime moved quickly to pragmatic adapta 
tions. An ever-shifting concept of national unity pushed the government 
to identify sectors and subsectors of the traditional elite with which to 
seek an accommodation. Even under the most optimistic projections, the 
state could hardly hope to replace the extensive private sector that re 
mained after 1979, and speedy reactivation of production required the 
participation of a wide swath of producers. The inclusion of private elites 
in the new model was also a response to geopolitical objectives; charges 
of Marxist-Leninism and communism could be held at bay and the Cold 
War rhetoric more successfully challenged if a substantial private sector 
was retained. Finally, the personal linkages between revolutionaries and 
local capitalists, forged by family ties, school experiences, or shared risk 
during the insurrection made mutual vilification more difficult. In this 
small, fractured society, class-based labels did not stick.
The regime began to differentiate among strata and sectors within 
the traditional elite. Those who were able to maintain or even increase 
their production were to be preferred over those whose production eroded 
rapidly,- the middle-sized bourgeoisie was to be protected even as the 
large-scale elite was targeted for extinction; those who contributed to 
increased domestic consumption and improvements in the national diet 
were to be favored over the traditional agroexport elite,- the homegrown, 
provincial bourgeoisie that was rooted in the land was to be preferred over 
denationalized, cosmopolitan capitalists who had suspiciously warm ties 
to the United States.
These distinctions gave shape to the Sandinista variant of the mixed 
economy. Each of these divisions gave rise to some controversy within 
the f s l n , and commitments made to favored groups were not always 
honored. Further complicating the debate about alliances was the fact that 
sectors that were favored according to one criterion were sometimes out 
of favor according to another. Some very large landowners, for example,
96 Revolutionary Transition
were also highly productive; some important staples producers were also 
those cosmopolitan elites that u n a g  derided. On the other hand, some 
mid-sized grains producers experienced declining productivity and de 
capitalized briskly, hardly meriting their privileged status. Complications 
arising from this intricate categorization scheme made the development 
of consistent policies very difficult. As a result, conflicting signals were 
sent even to potential allies. The consolidation of a new relationship 
was elusive, even as tactical understandings emerged between individual 
political and economic elites.
chapter
The Recrudescence of the Economic 
Elite (1987-1990)
I take off my hat to the private producers who stayed in Nicaragua. In 
spite of all the problems, they continued to produce. . . . The bourgeoi 
sie that stayed was the most progressive in Central America.
—Former Sandinista secretary of programming 
and the budget, August 1991
The Revolution ended some time ago.
—Economic adviser to the Sandinista 
government, August 1989
B
r o k e , battered, and under pressure from foreign enemies and allies 
alike, the Sandinistas moved, toward the end of the decade, to pro 
mote a fuller economic alliance with the local bourgeoisie. Leadership 
of the government's economic team changed, and U.S.-trained economist 
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca was named to head the s pp. According to 
Martinez Cuenca (1990,137), the new economic program "was not a pro 
gram to realize some economic doctrine, but simply a practical response 
to a no-win situation (situation sin salida}”
Situacitin sin Salida
Revolutionary regimes often follow an established economic pattern. 
After an initial downturn when the regime comes to power, the new gov 
ernment consolidates itself and some economic reactivation occurs. This 
surge is followed by an economic falloff as the regime attempts to push 
through structural changes. Economic contraction strains the cohesion 
of the revolution, erodes its base of political support, and contributes to 
further polarization. Internal and external pressures mount. The revolu 
tionary regime then typically either moderates its course, as in the case 
of Peru, or is ousted, as in the Chilean case. Nicaragua was no exception 
to this general pattern.
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In Nicaragua, the economic nosedive associated with the insurrection 
was followed in 1980 and 1981 by a brief period of economic reactivation. 
(See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) Sustained economic recovery proved elusive, 
however, and by 1984 a long economic,slide began. According to c e pa l  
data, Nicaragua's GDP declined 9.6 percent in the 1981-89 period, com 
pared with the regional total for that time period, which rose n .7 percent. 
On a per capita basis, the contraction was even worse: whereas the re 
gional GDP per capita dropped 8.3 percent between 1981 and 1989, that 
for Nicaragua plummeted 33 percent (c e pa l  1989, 18, 19). Nicaragua's 
GDP per capita, which had fallen to 1950s levels during the 1978-79 in 
surrection (Gibson 1987, 24), continued its descent under the Sandinistas 
to levels of the 1940s. By 1990, the GDP per capita was only 42 percent of 
what it had been in the 1975-1979 period (Gibson 1991, 25).
Because the revolutionary transition in Nicaragua involved the mili 
tary defeat of Somoza's national guard and the creation of a new, guerrilla- 
based military, economic decline did not immediately threaten the sur 
vival of the regime. Unlike the Chilean experience, or even the plight of 
the Christian Democratic government in El Salvador, the reforms intro 
duced by the Sandinista regime were forcefully defended by its armed 
forces.
The ensuing contra war, however, took a tremendous economic toll and 
set in motion forces that would later lead to electoral defeat. According to 
calculations by the Sandinista government, the war costs for the 1980-88 
period totaled $17.8 billion (Wheelock Roman 1990,126). Economic costs 
included losses associated with the direct destruction of infrastructure 
and production, the loss of international credits, the costs linked to the 
U.S. economic embargo launched in 1985, and the budgetary distortions 
caused by increased defense spending. By 1987 the costs of the war soared 
to 62 percent of the government's budget, or 30 percent of GDP (Conroy 
1990,16).
The state-led development model the Sandinistas had adopted was slow 
to generate production increases and probably contributed, at least in the 
short run, to the production decline. The twenty investment projects in 
the agricultural sector that had been approved and launched by 1985 had 
an average lead time of four years before they were expected to be com 
pleted, and some, such as the Victoria de Julio sugar mill and the African 
palm development projects were expected to take yet longer (six and nine 
years, respectively) (Arguello Huper and Kleiterp 1985, 83). Poor planning, 
financing shortages, and an inadequate supply of trained administrators,
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skilled workers, and construction materials meant continual cost over 
runs and operational delays. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on the 
rapid expansion of these agroindustrial projects robbed other sectors of 
needed resources. As Arguello Huper and Kleiterp (1985, 60) concluded, 
"This form of investment supports a structural change in the Nicaraguan 
economy, but the rhythm of its implementation, in view of the scarce 
resources that the country has, is detrimental to the productive sectors 
(state, private and cooperative that have installed capacity and mainte 
nance and modernization needs), draining them of the minimal resources 
needed for their on-going production."1
The resulting economic slowdown generated two major deficits in the 
national economy. The first gap was in the internal government accounts. 
Initially, tax pressure was increased by the Sandinista government to help 
provide resources needed to finance the transformations it envisioned.2 
Even when the tax pressure was rising, however, the fiscal deficit reached 
destabilizing levels. In 1983 the fiscal deficit equaled 49 percent of govern 
ment expenditures and 30 percent of GDP. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) 
The rising costs of defense, combined with the political inability of the 
government to cut social and economic projects deemed integral to the 
revolution, triggered a growing gap in the government accounts. This gap 
was covered by inorganic emissions from the central bank that generated 
inflationary pressures.
Other government policies also contributed to a soaring inflation rate. 
The use of multiple exchange rates to make essential imports available 
at low cost led to massive exchange rate losses that were covered by the 
central bank.3 According to Arana Sevilla (1990, 46), exchange rate losses 
equaled 9.5 percent of GDP in 1986. Bank losses from heavily subsidized 
credit were also monetized by the central bank. These losses became even 
more significant after inflation accelerated and the government failed to 
index interest rates. According to calculations by Spoor (1989, n-12), 
the banks recovered only 8 percent of the real value of the loans they 
issued in 1987, given the low, fixed interest rate and the soaring infla 
tion levels. The combination of a large fiscal deficit, extensive exchange 
rate losses, and massive credit subsidies, all of which were covered by 
inorganic emissions, fueled an inflationary spiral (Taylor et al. 1989, 17; 
Gutierrez 1989, 167). The inflation rate became a major problem by 1985 
and then skyrocketed, reaching record levels of over 33,000 percent in 
1988. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
These economic imbalances contributed to the second gap, that in the
ioo The Recrudescence of the Economic Elite
external sector. Throughout the period of the revolution, Nicaragua ran 
a negative trade balance. International prices declined for several of the 
country's traditional exports, and production levels tended to sag. Har 
vested area for agroexport products, which had averaged 455,000 mz. in 
the 1974-78 period, declined to an average of 361,000 mz. in the 1980- 
84 period and fell further to 268,000 mz. in the 1985-88 period (c ie r a  
1989, 9:73). In 1987-88, cotton production was only 27 percent what it had 
been in 1974-78, having fallen off sharply following a brief recovery. (See 
Appendix 2, Table A.i.) Coffee production also began to fall after 1982- 
83, reaching only 75 percent of its 1974-78 average in 1987-88. The drop 
in agroexport production contributed to a collapse in export earnings. The 
value of exported goods, which totaled $646 million in 1978, had fallen 
to only $290 million in 1989. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
The overvalued cordoba and restrictions on foreign exchange created 
an "anti-export bias" (Mayorga 1991, 35) in economic policy that deterred 
private investments in agroexport production. Ad hoc efforts to stimu 
late increased export production through the proliferation of multiple 
exchange rates for different categories of exports and through the use of 
subsidies were "too little, too late, and unevenly applied" (Gibson 1991, 
29). Even when producers wanted to increase production, other problems 
emerged, such as an inadequate harvest labor supply or delays in the de 
livery of fertilizers and pesticides (Enriquez 1991b). For some coffee pro 
ducers and cattle ranchers, the spread of the contra war into their zones 
further impeded production. These difficulties led to an erosion of export 
earnings.
Import levels, on the other hand, rose rapidly after the revolution and 
continued to be high throughout the decade. For most years, the value 
of imports was more than double export earnings. Nicaragua was able to 
continue acquiring essential imports even as its economy ground down.4 
It did so through foreign borrowing, with loans increasingly coming from 
socialist countries responding to appeals for socialist solidarity or to the 
Cold War overtones of the U.S.-backed attack.5 Nicaragua's foreign debt 
rose from US$1.6 billion in 1980 to an extraordinary $9.7 billion in 1989. 
(See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
As export earnings declined and foreign borrowing increased, Nicara 
gua's ability to meet its external obligations diminished. In a region and 
an era afflicted with debt crisis, Nicaragua's situation was unparalleled. 
By 1990 the total foreign debt was five times the nation's GDP (Gibson 
1991, 28). Whereas the interest payment on the foreign debt as a percent
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of exports for Latin America as a region was 29 percent in 1989, the ratio 
for Nicaragua was 61 percent. As a consequence of this extraordinary 
indebtedness, Nicaraguan external debt paper traded on the secondary 
market at 1 percent of face value by the end of 1989 (c e pa l  1990a, 34, 35).
By 1988, economic contraction, now in its fifth year, deepened sharply, 
and the economy spun out of control. Although the revolutionary govern 
ment, in a military sense, had turned the corner in the contra war, it was 
losing the economic war. Uncontrollable budgets, rampaging inflation, 
soaring foreign debt, and declining production created an untenable situa 
tion. On almost every economic indicator, Nicaragua's problems were un 
paralleled in Latin America. No other revolutionary regime had survived 
as long in the face of such sweeping economic collapse.
The Push for Economic Reform
As economic imbalances became apparent in the mid-1980s, some sec 
tors within the government began pushing to reorient economic policy. 
A tense competition to define the national economic direction flared. 
Moderates like Martinez Cuenca conflicted with those whose views 
were more fully Marxist, like Minister of Planning Henry Ruiz.6 Others, 
loosely labeled as monetarists, clashed with ambitious developmentalists 
in mid in r a  (Biondi-Morra 1990, 299-306). The result was a series of fal 
tering economic adjustment programs. The first, in early 1985, included 
a devaluation, new production incentives, and an effort to trim the fiscal 
deficit. It was a halfhearted measure, however, and it produced minimal 
results. Economic imbalances worsened.7
As the economic crisis deepened and the contra war waned, a policy 
shuffle in the government again focused on these problems. Between Feb 
ruary 1988 and January 1989 the government lurched through three eco 
nomic adjustment programs that were designed to stabilize the economy. 
Though the initial reforms had several "heterodox" features (Conroy 1990, 
20), the adjustments became progressively more "orthodox" over time 
(Gibson 1991; Stahler-Sholk, 1990). By the end, the Sandinista government 
had moved forcefully toward a more conventional economic approach.
The first round of attack, announced February 14,1988, included a com 
plete remonetization. The government introduced a new cordoba equal to 
1,000 of the old units, unified the exchange rates, and executed a major de 
valuation, with the official value of the cordoba relative to the U.S. dollar 
dropping from 70 to 10,000 in the old currency. These financial adjust 
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ments were accompanied with a downsizing (compactacion) of the state 
through the reorganization of more than forty government agencies, a io 
percent cut in the government budget, and a layoff of more than 8,000 
state workers (c ie r a  1988; Gibson 1991; Conroy 1990).
To offset the burden these reforms would place on the low-income 
groups, two unorthodox provisions were included in the first round of 
adjustments. Minimum wages were to be increased an average of 225 
percent, and price controls were to be retained on forty-six basic prod 
ucts.8 Four months later, however, most of these palliatives were removed. 
In spite of price increases associated with a new round of devaluations, 
most of the remaining subsidies were eliminated, and price controls were 
lifted.9 Galloping inflation eroded wage increases,- wages continued their 
precipitous descent.
Recognizing problems with the political palatability of the new pro 
gram, government officials pointed to the features that would boost the 
earnings of low-income groups (Martinez Cuenca 1988, 19-23,- Conroy 
1990, 22). The removal of price controls on basic food products, for ex 
ample, was expected to benefit peasant producers who, because they used 
traditional technologies, were not expected to be negatively affected by 
the reintroduction of "real" prices for capital goods, electricity, petroleum, 
fertilizer, and other commodities.10 Deregulation of wages was also ex 
pected to produce wage increases among more productive workers.11 Most 
wage workers suffered a continual, catastrophic erosion in their earnings, 
however, making on average in 1988 only 3.7 percent what they had in 
1980 (Arana Sevilla 1990, 48).
Natural disaster, so common in Nicaragua, compounded the problem. 
The cleanup and rebuilding efforts after hurricane Joan imposed an unex 
pected financial burden on the government at the end of 1988. In spite of 
the 1988 reforms, the fiscal deficit soared again to 26.6 percent of GDP. 
(See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) Inflation now reached astronomical propor 
tions; even sharper adjustment was attempted. The third round of adjust 
ments, launched in January 1989, included more drastic budget cuts and 
massive layoffs of state workers, now affecting even troops. This compac 
tacion resulted in the dismissal of 8,314 civil servants and a reduction of 
13,000 army troops (b c n  1990, 5). Even though the government failed to 
raise the tax pressure, the fiscal deficit was now slashed to 6.7 percent of 
GDP in 1989, suggesting the depth of the spending cuts.
These measures were presented and defended by the newly named min 
ister of the s pp, Martinez Cuenca. A moderate insider who, as minister
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of foreign trade, had criticized the statist direction in economic planning, 
Martinez Cuenca now became the government's economic point man.
Models and Alternatives Reconsidered
In attempting to restructure its development model, the Sandinista state 
had three basic options. It could push ahead with the emphasis on state- 
centered development, expanding the scope of state control. Alternatively, 
it could abandon the statist model and make a fuller commitment to the 
radical redistribution of resources, including those held by the state, with 
the creation of a new form of grassroots socialism. Finally, it could mend 
the fences with the private sector elite and attempt to restart the national 
economy by triggering private entrepreneurial investment.
The first of these approaches continued to have defenders, even through 
the end of the revolutionary period. According to Martinez Cuenca (1990, 
139), the debate within the f s l n  national directorate about the 1989 round 
of adjustments lasted for a full month, including weekends. One proposal 
still on the table was to abandon the mixed economy model and assume 
direct state control of the economy.
In the end, that route was not taken. Critics charged that many care 
fully forged external alliances would be lost if the regime were to move 
against the private sector. The government would forfeit not only crucial 
assistance from Western Europe but even support from the socialist states 
that were struggling through their own identity crises. The changing char 
acter of world politics ran counter to a state socialism option. Nicaragua's 
small, poor, and trade dependent economy made regime leaders reluctant 
to ponder the acute isolation that would result. Instead of embracing fuller 
state control, investment in state enterprises was finally slowed, and the 
state sector began a grinding shift toward stricter financial accountability. 
The 1988 reorganization of the state sector into a series of corporations 
attempted to put a pp operations on a profit footing. Market forces were 
making headway.
The second argument, which favored a more radical redistribution of 
resources, including resources of the state, had been forcefully made by 
campesinistas since the early years of the revolution. Represented by 
c ie r a  and the ih c a , this group criticized the state-centered model. Some 
campesinista arguments implied that the mid in r a  development model 
and the methods used to advance it in the countryside were philosophi 
cally and economically akin to the Stalinist forced collectivization experi 
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ence (Marchetti 1989, 35-45). This group called for more attention to the 
peasantry, initially emphasizing those who were organized into collective 
cooperatives, but coming over time to a more sweeping pro-peasant posi 
tion. Campesinistas favored not only a more extensive agrarian reform 
program that would incorporate the perhaps 50,000 peasants who still 
remained landless at the end of the revolution, but also give more atten 
tion to the needs of small-scale producers and land reform beneficiaries. 
Instead of channeling millions of dollars into large-scale investments and 
assigning the best-prepared technicians to the a pp sector, the government 
was called to invest in the development and dissemination of small-scale 
technologies that would raise peasant production.12
After 1985, as the contra war heated up and the evidence of economic 
difficulties began to mount, the campesinistas did win some ground. The 
pace of land reform accelerated, individual peasant land claimants were 
responded to more favorably,13 and agroindustrial development projects 
were modified to integrate cooperatives more fully into their production 
process.14 Still, although the government attempted to redress the imbal 
ances that had resulted in few gains for the peasantry, it was unwilling to 
pursue a radically pro-peasant course. The historically low levels of pro 
ductivity of the Nicaraguan peasantry and the recurring need to pardon 
its unpaid bank loans, combined with the modernizing, high-tech predi 
lections of much of the mid in r a  leadership, militated against any such 
departure. Instead, the government began to reconsider its relationship 
with the bourgeoisie.
With the state sector being slow to take off and the peasant sector 
plagued by low production levels, the bourgeoisie was regarded as the last 
remaining option. The economic behavior of this sector was also prob 
lematic, but its performance in the first years of the revolution made 
some analysts optimistic that its productivity levels could be restored at 
relatively low cost. Furthermore, strengthening this sector would address 
the concerns and perhaps win the approval of foreign donors in capitalist 
countries.
The redefinition of the role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution in 
volved a conceptual sleight of hand. Whereas in the previous period the 
government had taken pains to differentiate between sectors and strata of 
the bourgeoisie, these distinctions now became muted. The old distinc 
tions between the "sellout" and "patriotic" bourgeoisie or the medium- 
and large-sized producers, for example, became less acute. Prominent eco 
nomic policymakers like s pp head Martinez Cuenca began to insist that
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the producers who had stayed in the country during these long years of 
war and decline all deserved to be participants in the new economy (inter 
view, Martinez Cuenca, August 16,1991). The terratenientes and financial 
speculators were gone now; those who remained were the patriots.
This transition was based in part on real changes in the capitalist class. 
Many of the leading economic elites who were most opposed to the revo 
lution had indeed left the country; others who stayed had gone through a 
hard process of learning to accept the revolution and even embracing some 
of its objectives. Yet some of those now being courted by the regime had 
been the objects of its scorn during the opening years of the revolution. 
To pursue an alliance with this group, the f s l n  had to reconceptualize its 
development model.
After years of continuing economic crisis, and almost a decade of politi 
cal control, the Sandinista leadership began to actively court the bour 
geoisie. This transition did not materialize out of the blue. As we have 
seen in Chapter 3, the Sandinista government had already moved to iden 
tify specific fragments of the elite as potential alliance partners. Build 
ing on relationships established with those elite fragments previously 
identified as patriotic, and on interpersonal connections with strategi 
cally located businesspeople developed before or during the revolution, 
the Sandinistas now pursued a fuller rapprochement with the bourgeoi 
sie. Although laboring under the burden of the economic adjustment, the 
traditional bourgeoisie generally regarded these overtures with approval.15
State-Elite Rapprochement
By 1988 the government had moved to give higher priority to private pro 
ducers. In addition to the reestablishment of most market forces, realistic 
prices, very low wages, and reduced regulations, the regime responded to 
private sector complaints about the lack of security and the poor invest 
ment climate. It began to channel more resources to this sector and to 
reopen the formal communication channels with this group. 
Rechanneling Economic Resources
Perhaps the most sensitive issue dividing the bourgeoisie and the gov 
ernment was the question of land ownership. The vulnerability of pro 
ducers to expropriation on any of a series of often ill-defined charges led 
even those who had been favored by the regime to be wary of its leaders. At 
the end of the 1980s, however, the pace of expropriation dropped sharply.
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Table 4.1
Sectoral Distribution of Long-Term Agricultural Credit, 1983-1988 
(Percent)
Sector 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Medium and large producers 26 24 27 26 31 70
State farms 48 38 27 11 16 10
Small individual producers
and cooperatives 26 38 46 63 53 20
Source: c ie r a  (1989,1:319).
In 1988 only 30 properties were expropriated, down from 449 in 1986.16 
(See Table 3.3.) Only three cases occurred in 1989.17
The general pattern of declining expropriations suggests the increased 
willingness of the regime to accept established land tenure arrangements, 
which favored current owners over the landless and the state farm sector. 
The changing patterns of credit allocation reinforce this assessment. After 
years of playing the third and last role in the credit system, the medium- 
and large-sized private producers now moved center stage. Whereas from 
1981 to 1984 the portion of agricultural bank credit for these producers de 
clined from 43 percent to 26 percent, by 1985 the pattern began to reverse 
slowly. In 1988 economic elites received 47 percent of all agricultural 
bank credit, compared with 26 percent for the state sector and 27 percent 
for coops and small producers (c ie r a  1989,1:318).
The new ascendance was even more marked in long-term agricultural 
investment credits. After declining in 1984 to the point where it received 
only 24 percent of long-term credit, compared with 38 percent for the state 
farms and 38 percent for the peasant sector, the private enterprise sec 
tor suddenly regained much of its historic control over investment credit. 
(See Table 4.1.) According to c ie r a  data, in 1988 a remarkable 70 percent 
of all long-term agricultural credit went to medium- and large-sized pro 
ducers, up from 31 percent the year before. The a pp now absorbed only 
10 percent of this credit, and the rural credit program for coops and small 
producers received only 20 percent of the total, falling from 63 percent 
two years before. The bank system was undergoing a full restructuring 
along more conventional, less revolutionary, lines.
The shift in credit clients was the product of a new emphasis on bank 
solvency adopted in 1988. As the bank sought clients with demonstrated
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ability to repay their loans, it also inaugurated a new program that would 
index the cost of that credit, pegging it to the rate of inflation. In fact, 
however, the monthly increases in the interest rates still fell behind the 
galloping inflation rate, and even the revised program continued to provide 
subsidies to borrowers (Spoor 1989). Now those borrowers were heavily 
concentrated in the private elite.
New Organizational Openings
One way in which economic elites gain power is by having easy ac 
cess to political leaders. The existence of regular channels of formal and 
informal communication allows business leaders to keep their needs and 
wants highly visible to policymakers and to monitor closely the state re 
sponse. When business elites themselves rotate in and out of public office 
or when close family ties link the political and economic leaderships, this 
kind of access is most complete. Even without that personal or familial 
identification, however, friendship and school networks can still facilitate 
the development of communication channels that enhance the political 
position of the wealthy class.
In Nicaragua, as the expropriations decreased, the number of formal 
and informal contacts between top government officials and private pro 
ducers increased. The government initiated a new round of consultations 
that culminated in the creation of new policymaking boards. It also 
launched a concertacion process that blunted private sector opposition 
to the regime and heightened the internal political division of the bour 
geoisie.
The Breakdown of Communication: 1979-1986. In the early years of the 
revolution, the private sector's access to the political power centers was 
restricted. Communication between traditional elites and the Sandinista 
state became erratic and highly charged. The government wanted private 
producers to learn to produce without making demands about "extrane 
ous" matters like the content of the national ideology, the educational 
system, press freedom, or election procedures.
In its effort to redefine the political roles of the private sector and avoid 
confrontations, the government adopted a series of strategies. One was 
to divide the private sector by level, deflecting attention from the top 
umbrella organizations like c o s e p and u pa n ic  and focusing instead on 
gremio or sectoral organizations. Instead of meeting with u pa n ic  leaders, 
who focused on the need for systemic change, for example, the govern 
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ment representatives met with rice or cotton growers about technical 
issues such as access to inputs or marginal price increases.
During this phase, the main channel of communication with the bour 
geoisie was a network of consultative commissions. These commissions 
had been created by decree in February 1980 and placed under the aus 
pices of the then Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario.18 They brought 
together producers and labor representatives with officials from govern 
ment ministries involved in production and distribution. Their work 
focused on technical production issues including labor rates, technologi 
cal packages, bank credit, costs of inputs, and final prices.19 The creation 
of these committees allowed government agencies to work with actual 
producers on a narrow, predefined agenda rather than meet with the politi 
cally ambitious leaders of the national private sector organizations.
Even for these production-oriented groups, however, the top f s l n  
leadership was inaccessible. Requests for meetings with key ministers 
were often denied or, more routinely, not answered. Representatives of the 
sorghum producers, for example, reported waiting for over a year during 
this period for an audience with mid in r a  minister Jaime Wheelock (inter 
view, a n pr o s o r , August 22, 1986). One leader of c a d in  reported that 
friends in the government would meet him now only as a private citizen 
and requested that he not use official c a d in  stationary in his correspon 
dence with them (interview, c a d in , August n, 1987). The f s l n , to one 
prominent cattle breeder, was a "masonic group . . . like the mafia. Those 
who didn't belong to it were outside" (interview, a c b n , June 28,1990).
This separation was particularly important in the Nicaraguan context. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the personalism of the Somoza dictatorship and 
the weakness of the legal system had produced a process in which business 
leaders were required to negotiate arrangements with political leaders 
on almost a case-by-case basis. These clientelistic negotiations were rou 
tinely done through face-to-face communication in which personal bonds 
carried great weight. Key business and public policy discussions took 
place in the homes of the elite, over drinks, in a convivial atmosphere. 
Friendships, often laced around extended family ties, sealed deals. Little 
information was publicly available about such matters as trade negotia 
tions, investment opportunities, contracts, and bids. The country had no 
stock market, nor did it require public reporting of corporate earnings. 
The few corporations that issued stock generally sold it to a handful of in 
siders, often of an extended family. The system revolved around personal 
contacts.
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After 1979 the old system was collapsing, and the new institutions 
were relatively inaccessible to the bourgeoisie. Comparing the Somoza 
and Sandinista eras, one large sorghum producer explained, "Somoza and 
his ministers would at least talk to us. They might tell us 'no' but at 
least they would talk" (interview, a n pr o s o r , August 22,1986). Although 
some economic elites had family ties to Sandinista leaders, particularly 
Luis Carrion Cruz and Jaime Wheelock, personal connections at that level 
were infrequent and often strained.20
This distance from the bourgeoisie buffered Sandinista leaders from 
private sector demands and allowed them to focus on their priority con 
stituencies. But it had a political and, ultimately, economic cost. The 
sudden ostracism, combined with several spates of antibourgeois rheto 
ric, pushed many of these producers further into the opposition. Even 
gremio leaders began to suspend their attendance at consultative commis 
sion meetings. Arguing that they were only tokens at meetings otherwise 
stacked by pro-Sandinista representatives, these gremio representatives 
boycotted meetings or were suddenly unavailable for appointments with 
state bureaucrats.21 Following the 1985 expropriation of s a ims a , the large 
corporation managed and largely owned by c o s e p president Enrique Bola 
nos, u pa n ic  affiliates formally renounced any further participation in 
these or any other gatherings called by the government (u pa n ic  1985).
Renewal of Communication: 1987-1988. Beginning in 1987 a new phase 
in state-capital relations got under way.22 After two years of very lim 
ited contact with private producers, mid in r a  minister Jaime Wheelock 
moved to break the ice. mid in r a  now called a series of direct, large-scale 
meetings that Wheelock himself presided over. An acrimonious meet 
ing with cattle ranchers, in which government programs were roundly 
criticized by representatives of both f a g a n  ic and u n a g , was followed 
by meetings with dairy farmers in f o n d il a c  and rice growers in a n a r  
(c o s e p 1987a). As continuing complaints were lodged by cotton and coffee 
producers, the government moved to formalize high-level communication 
with those producers as well.
In April 1988 four national agricultural commissions were created.23 
These organizations became high-profile policy boards that replaced the 
defunct consultative commissions. The presidents of the new commis 
sions approached their task as "ambassadors," representing the govern 
ment but with greater attention to the views and beliefs of those private 
producers in whose terrain they tread.24 The attendance of u pa n ic  rep 
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resentatives at meetings soon normalized. Ironically, after years of verbal 
sparring, u pa n ic  leaders now found common cause with u n a g  represen 
tatives who took an increasingly entrepreneurial line on issues of property 
and prices.
Concertacion: 1989. Throughout much of Latin America the economic 
crisis of the 1980s prompted governments to seek a new social pact with 
business and labor. A search began for new forms of agreement about how 
the economic costs of recovery would be allocated and what the future 
rules governing economic negotiations would be. This search typically 
brought together an array of established adversaries for tough negotia 
tions about the economic model that would be adopted. Concertacion, or 
the process of striking a new social contract, required competing parties 
to make a series of calculations estimating short-term losses and long 
term gains under different scenarios (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 45- 
47).25 Knotty topics that had often divided business and labor, including 
ownership, wages, profits, strikes, subsidies, taxes, trade priorities, and 
regulation, were back on the agenda.
Drawing on imperfect information, areas of mutual benefit or inverse 
gain had to be reassessed throughout the region, now under the pall 
of economic decline. Workers, themselves often stratified and disorga 
nized, struggled to determine how best to reduce their losses and increase 
their opportunities in the face of economic collapse. Labor representa 
tives weighed the costs of accepting current wage reductions or job loss 
against the uncertain prospects of future benefit following from a round 
of increased investments. Employers, often torn between their desire for 
state support and the appeal of the market, maneuvered to maximize their 
access to resources. They faced complex pressures for the return of flight 
capital and increased investment in a risky environment in return for the 
prospect of enhanced social legitimacy and possible future gain. The state, 
now shorn of the financial resources that fueled state activism in prior 
decades, struggled to retain essential powers even as it underwent deep 
retrenchment. The political leadership was forced to search for new meth 
ods to secure growth and promote national development. For all parties, 
the way in which the society's resources were to be divided was at stake.
Plagued by deeper economic crisis and social division than most, the 
Nicaraguan government opened a highly publicized economic concerta 
cion process in 1989. The Nicaraguan variant of concertacion focused on 
the relationship between the state and private producers. Representatives
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of labor either did not participate in Sandinista concertacion consulta 
tions or had only a minor presence. Consequently, concertacion under 
this kind of government had a lopsided quality due to the absorption of 
much of organized labor under the Sandinista banner. Unionization had 
been extremely limited under the Somoza government; most labor orga 
nizations in Nicaragua emerged under the protection of the revolutionary 
regime.26 The political and ideological dependence of organized labor on 
the Sandinista regime made it difficult for unions to exercise an indepen 
dent voice.
Beginning in January 1989 intense meetings were held by top govern 
ment officials with a small group of the country's most important cotton 
producers and processors to discuss the needs of that crucial sector.27 In 
the weeks that followed, various u pa n ic  leaders were consulted about the 
1989 economic adjustment plan before the measures were announced.28 
In April 1989 the government called for a fuller, open consultation with 
private producers in a two-day meeting. This Proceso de Concertacion 
Nacional brought together Daniel Ortega, all of the leading economic 
ministers, and over 600 private producers in an event monitored by the 
diplomatic community.29
Including representatives from both u n a g  and u pa n ic , this session 
formally committed the regime to providing more resources for private 
producers. In a desperate move to restart the production process, mul 
tiple concessions were made.30 The government agreed to reduce and fix 
the interest rates (at no more than 20 percent monthly rates for regu 
lar agricultural loans); reduce import taxes and port charges,- lower other 
taxes by 50 percent for producers making investments to benefit their 
workers (better housing, potable water, etc.),- extend the grace period for 
loan repayment for coffee producers and cattle ranchers,- offer special price 
incentives for coffee producers who exceeded by 25 percent their produc 
tion levels for the last three years,- reduce long-term interest rates for the 
cattle sector,- and forgive 50 percent of unpaid loans of irrigated rice, sor 
ghum, basic grains, perishables, and sesame growers and restructure the 
remaining 50 percent. A special subsidy program was created for cotton 
producers, reducing costs, increasing the price, and suspending/renego 
tiating past debts on soft terms (five-year repayment period, one year of 
grace, 5 percent monthly interest) for those who agreed to plant again in 
the coming year.31
Perhaps most important was the government's renewed affirmation of 
established property rights. When Daniel Ortega presented the 1989 eco 
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nomic plan to the national assembly and called for a beginning of the 
concertacion, he noted that there were still landless peasants in Nicaragua 
whose demands for land were just. Their demands would be met, however, 
by reassigning land held in those cooperatives with large, unused tracts 
of land. Private sector participants in the concertacion process need not 
fear further expropriations (Barricada, January 31,1989). Five weeks later, 
Wheelock announced that the government was preparing draft legislation 
to halt any future land expropriations (Chicago Tribune, March 6,1989).
Respect for property rights was again affirmed in the April concertacion 
meeting.32 Concerning past expropriations, the government responded 
to producers' hostility to the highly politicized Tribunal Agrario, which 
decided legal appeals of expropriation decisions. Ortega proposed that 
the tribunal be placed under the jurisdiction of the Nicaraguan Supreme 
Court, which had, in previous years, periodically reviewed expropriation 
cases and found against the government (Nuevo Diario, April 21, 1989). 
In the words of u pa n ic  leader Ramiro Gurdian, the government was now 
using a "new language" in its conversations with the private sector (Nuevo 
Diario, April 22,1989).
The following month, Ortega invited prominent private sector rep 
resentatives to accompany government officials on their approaching 
sojourn to Stockholm, Sweden. The May 1989 Stockholm meeting was to 
allow the new economic officials in Nicaragua to meet with representa 
tives of sixteen countries and three international organizations that were 
potential foreign donors. The government representatives, supported, it 
was hoped, by private producers, would describe the economic adjust 
ments already under way and seek new foreign loans with which to 
finance economic reactivation and stabilization of the economy. Although 
most private sector leaders declined, several accepted the invitation, in 
cluding two who held leadership positions in u pa n ic .33
Deepening Fragmentation: A Cunning Invitation to Division
The concertacion process was denounced in the opposition newspaper, La 
Prensa, as a "cunning invitation to division."34 For private sector elites, 
the regime's newfound support for local capitalists muddied the politi 
cal waters. Entrenched opponents remained skeptical, fearing a cynical 
plot. More moderate elements, however, moved to seize the opportuni 
ties opened by the negotiation process and to abandon the confrontational 
c o s e p stance. A handful of private sector leaders were even drawn into the
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f s l n  camp and came to serve as its close allies. The fragmentation process 
initiated in the 1979-86 period now intensified as both the government 
and the private sector wearied of prolonged conflict.
Entrenched Opposition
For those who continued their strident opposition to the regime, the 
reforms of 1988-89 fell short of the mark. Although some of their eco 
nomic concerns were being addressed, their behavior was never based 
solely on calculations of profits and growth. The bourgeoisie was not just 
an economic class,- it was also a social elite. As Conaghan (1988) argues 
in her study of the Ecuadorean elite, interpretations of the behavior of 
the bourgeoisie that fail to consider the "moral culture" of the class may 
produce seriously misguided analysis. Just as Scott (1976) advanced the 
understanding of peasant behavior with an inquiry into their moral vision, 
so too must the analysis of the bourgeoisie be alert to the conception of a 
morally correct social order that pervades this class.
From the standpoint of economic elites, the Sandinista revolution had 
not only reduced their ability to accumulate but also undercut their social 
status and the respect with which they were viewed in their community. 
The trappings of wealth and bourgeois tastes, such as luxury cars or suits 
and ties, were now regarded with derision in the state-controlled mass 
media. Throughout the country, the private clubs, which had anchored the 
bourgeoisie as a social class, had been turned into public "cultural cen 
ters" and meeting places for the revolutionary government. Newspapers 
no longer carried a society section. Not only did formal titles like Licen- 
ciado and Ingeniero cease to be used, but even honorifics such as Don 
and Dona became less common. Workers sent former patrones into fits of 
apoplexy by using the informal form of address with them. The respect 
ful, even affectionate attitude employers had taken for granted in their 
employees was replaced with detachment and hostility. Many employers 
now feared their workers. Several younger producers I interviewed in 1990 
described the outrage and indignation these changing social relations had 
sparked in their fathers7 generation. Some who had come of age in the 
prerevolutionary period now hesitated to visit their own farms and firms 
because of concern about a possible confrontation; many of them turned 
direct management of their enterprises over to their offspring.
Opponents also blamed the government for the dissolution of their 
families. Fearful of the regime's ideological appeals to their children and 
the impact of revolutionary propaganda on the beliefs their children would
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adopt, many of those with economic resources sent their children to live 
abroad.35 The military draft provided another reason for sending their sons 
out of the country 36 The diaspora of the new generation contributed to the 
further denationalization of the Nicaraguan elite as well as its brooding 
resentment against a government that would make family dislocations 
necessary. These and other objections to the Sandinista revolution were 
hardly dissolved by a few economic guarantees. Even if the Sandinistas 
responded positively to the bourgeoisie's economic demands for market 
prices and property assurances, the hostility of many was unwavering.
Furthermore, the emerging political aspirations of the economic elite 
were frustrated by the sweeping dominance of the f s l n . Elections were 
initially postponed until 1984 and then were won overwhelmingly by the 
f s l n . For private producers from the old Conservative party aristocracy in 
Granada, whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers had been presidents 
and ministers in the pre-Somoza era, or from the pl i, the oppositional 
offshoot of the Somoza family's party whose members viewed themselves 
as Somoza's rightful heirs, the prospects of realizing established political 
ambitions were made more remote by the consolidation of the Sandi 
nista revolution in 1984. For other producers, who had not previously had 
political ambitions, the experiences of the revolution and their roles as 
leaders of the private sector organizations created aspirations that were 
steadily frustrated, c o s e p and u pa n ic  leaders who carried the banners of 
the opposition for almost a decade and who became the political counter 
point to the government began to see themselves as natural successors to 
the Sandinista regime.
Inconsistency in actual government behavior only deepened this 
group's skepticism. Although the number of expropriations declined in 
1988 and 1989, those that occurred were among the most highly publi 
cized and politically controversial of the decade. In 1988, for example, the 
Sandinistas expropriated the is a , historically Central America's largest 
sugar mill, from the powerful Pellas family37 The three expropriations 
that took place in 1989 involved the takeover of properties of some of 
the regime's most vociferous critics. These three producers were not only 
prominent figures in u pa n ic  and leaders of their respective coffee pro 
ducer associations; they were also prominent members of the right-wing 
opposition party, the pl c  38
The regime made hurried efforts to control the damage done by these 
expropriations. For example, it succeeded in converting the is a  expropria 
tion into a purchase after some months of negotiations 39 It also attempted
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to return the three coffee estates expropriated in 1989 and offered compen 
sation for the owners' losses.40 This pattern of inconsistent signaling, how 
ever, undermined the Sandinista government's coalition-building efforts. 
The inability of the government to develop consistent policy hinted at 
the internal tensions at play within the regime. Disbelief and skepticism 
on the part of bourgeois opponents about the depth and durability of the 
new line were a natural result.
Private Sector Conciliators
For some private sector leaders, however, the general package of re 
forms and concessions made by the regime suggested that it was pursuing 
a new direction. This sense of possibility appealed to these entrepreneurs, 
and two new cleavages emerged. The first was a deepening fissure within 
c o s e p itself. The second was the creation of a new organization that 
offered an alternative to cosEP-style confrontation.
First, schismatic tendencies erupted in u pa n ic . c o s e p had ruled 
against the participation of its members in the private sector delegation 
to the May 1989 Donors' Conference in Stockholm, c o s e p leaders argued 
that this delegation would serve the partisan purposes of the Sandinista 
regime by helping it secure foreign financing. When one of the members 
of u pa n ic 's directorate, Juan Diego Lopez, president of f o n d il a c , de 
cided to join the delegation in spite of this admonition, u pa n ic  president 
Ramiro Gurdian publicly urged his ouster, f o n d il a c 's officers rejected 
the move and reaffirmed their leader's status as president [Barricada, 
May 12, 1989; Nuevo Diario, May 13, 1989) 41 This episode highlighted 
the division within the organization between the central core and its af 
filiate associations. Whereas the c o s e p/u pa n ic  leadership emphasized 
confrontational tactics and a desire to centralize decision making, some 
of the affiliate associations preferred to negotiate.
u pa n ic  affiliates also split over continued participation in the national 
agricultural commissions after the expropriation of the three coffee 
leaders. In spite of the national coffee leadership's call for producers to 
withdraw from the commissions, regional leaders in the affiliate in Jino 
tega, the country's most important coffee growing region, refused to co 
operate.42 u pa n ic  representatives on other commissions also rejected the 
boycott.43 Again, u pa n ic  representatives and affiliates were unwilling to 
follow the lead of their more confrontational leaders when they judged 
their group interests to be better furthered through cooperation.
At the same time, cos e p's  ideological and tactical leadership was being
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challenged by the creation of a new private sector think tank. As part of 
the process of dialogue, eight of Nicaragua's top business leaders and aca 
demics formed a new organization, c o r d e n ic . c o r d e n ic  was the brain 
child of two of the Nicaraguan representatives on the Comision Interna- 
cional para la Recuperacion y el Desarrollo de Centroamerica, colloquially 
known as the Sanford Commission after commission founder U.S. Sena 
tor Terry Sanford. Five months after the Sanford Commission initiated its 
operations, former c o s e p president Enrique Dreyfus and in c a e  econo 
mist Francisco Mayorga brought together six other moderate leaders of 
the Nicaraguan business community to form a local spinoff.
The Sanford Commission was an international, privately funded task 
force established in the wake of the Esquipulas II peace accords to promote 
reconciliation and development in Central America.44 It was composed 
of forty-seven members from twenty different countries, including four 
from Nicaragua.45 This commission sponsored twenty-five meetings be 
tween 1987 and 1989 to promote dialogue among key representatives in 
different camps. Emphasis was placed on addressing the urgent problems 
of those displaced by war and suffering extreme poverty, but the long-term 
analysis focused on development needs and democratization processes.46
Inspired by the Sanford Commission model, Dreyfus and Mayorga 
pulled together a committee of private sector leaders to break through the 
polarization that had characterized political and economic discussion in 
Nicaragua.47 c o r d e n ic  emphasized the need for open dialogue and nego 
tiation instead of isolation and confrontation and called for a change of 
style in state-private sector communication. New "attitudes of coopera 
tion" had to be cultivated "in all sectors of the community" (c o r d e n ic  
1988). To this end, it organized a series of dialogues in which previously 
antagonistic groups, such as competing unions or the wide spectrum of 
political party leaders, were brought together to discuss common prob 
lems (c o r d e n ic  1990). Although c o r d e n ic  seminars were wryly criti 
cized by the newly established weekly newspaper La Cronica (August 24- 
30, 1989) as a "dialogue of the deaf," they did foster the first of a series of 
exchanges among divergent, antagonistic groups.
Since it was not a mass-based organization, c o r d e n ic  did not compete 
directly with c o s e p. Many c o s e p leaders, however, saw it as an implicit 
critic and rival.48 Instead of the stale condemnations laced with Cold War 
rhetoric that characterized much of cos e p's  communication, c o r d e n ic  
used a reformist rhetoric that even included positive references to the 
revolution. "The task is not to find who is guilty," concluded c o r d e n ic
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member Antonio Lacayo at a fractious session in December 1988. Instead, 
he urged the country to "relaunch the Revolution" (Barricada, Decem 
ber 14, 1988).
coRDENic represented a stratum of Nicaragua's urban-based, mana 
gerial bourgeoisie. This group of entrepreneurs was distinctly non-San- 
dinista. Two had been jailed by the Sandinistas, and one member's firm 
had been expropriated. They did, however, have various complex links 
to the revolution. Among them were two entrepreneurs who had partici 
pated in joint business ventures with the Sandinista state, one who had 
been given a lucrative import monopoly by the government, and one who 
had been a consultant in the Ministry of Planning for three years during 
the revolution. Another member had even held a leadership position in 
the f s l n  during the 1970s. Generally young, with strong academic prepa 
ration, continued links to Nicaraguan universities, and diversified entre 
preneurial investments that extended to other Central American nations, 
these private producers responded less personally to the government's at 
tack on the bourgeoisie.49 Their pattern of interaction with the Sandinistas 
separated this moderate, entrepreneurial cluster from the mainstream of 
c o s e p leadership. Unlike c o s e p leaders, c o r d e n ic  members accepted 
the Sandinista revolution as an established fact.
c o r d e n ic 's development in 1988 began to fill a gap in the spectrum 
of views and tactics that had polarized during the 1979-85 period. As 
the Esquipulas peace process brought Sandinista and contra leaders to the 
conference table and the prospects for peace increased, a new round of 
discussions about the definition and future of the revolution became pos 
sible. Some segments of the bourgeoisie, less inclined to ideological purity 
and more willing to accept the social goals of the revolution, now began to 
enter into that discussion. Weary of war and economic erosion and backed 
by the reform initiatives of the Sanford Commission, this group looked 
for compromise.
As a result of these developments, new forms of communication were 
opened between sectors of the elite and the regime. Social networks, 
underdeveloped and brittle during the earlier phase of the revolution, were 
now cultivated by some participants on both sides. Pivotal figures, like 
f o n d il a c  president Lopez, worked to bridge the gap, bringing together 
some intrepid business colleagues and top f s l n  leaders for social en 
gagements. A handful of family or school connections between economic 
elites and government officials, most of which had ruptured during pre 
vious years, were now tentatively reestablished. Given the traditional
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importance, in a small society, of face-to-face interactions and social con 
tact to sediment relationships, these developments were symbolically and 
psychologically important.50
The 1990 Elections and the Search for New Allies
The 1990 elections would determine the fate of the revolution. Under 
the terms of the 1987 constitution, officials at all levels of government 
were to be selected simultaneously. The presidency and vice-presidency, 
all national assembly seats, and all municipal/regional council slots were 
to be contested on February 25,1990.
The elections of 1984 had given the f s l n  sweeping control over the 
government, in spite of cosEP-led opposition efforts.51 Against six party 
competitors from the left and the right, the Sandinistas won handily in 
what were generally judged by observers to be relatively fair elections.52 
With 67 percent of the valid vote, Daniel Ortega was chosen to be presi 
dent, and the Sandinista legislative bench (composed of Sandinista party 
members along with a number of close sympathizers) won sixty-one of 
the ninety-six seats in the national assembly.
As the 1990 election approached, the Sandinistas worked hard to con 
vey the electoral message that they had won the war and were now ready, 
with the help of the private sector and foreign allies, to rebuild the econ 
omy. With parts of the country still an armed camp and the economy badly 
tattered, however, it was difficult in 1990 for the Sandinistas to convince 
the war-torn nation. Furthermore, unlike in the elections in 1984, the 
opposition to the Sandinistas was now both committed to participating in 
the election and largely united in its effort. The Group of 14, composed of 
fourteen political parties that opposed the f s l n , successfully negotiated 
a series of agreements with the government over campaign rules, media 
access, advertising, financing, and international observation. This group 
formed a coalition called u n o  to challenge the regime.
Ranging from parties generally associated with the left, like the Partido 
Socialista Nicaragiiense, and parties on the right, like the pl c , this coali 
tion was fraught with tensions. The weak miniparties that made up the 
bulk of the coalition could not produce strong contenders for the execu 
tive positions; the business leadership again stepped in. In the first major 
decision made by the u n o  coalition, the selection of presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates, the two leading factions of the bourgeoisie 
battled for ascendance.
On one hand, Enrique Bolanos, former president of c o s e p who had led
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the charge against the Sandinistas for years and whose property had been 
expropriated in 1985, was supported by conservative elements who wanted 
a full confrontation with the regime. On the other, Violeta Barrios de Cha 
morro, as the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and former member of 
the jg r n  in its first year of operation, was regarded as less antagonistic to 
the reform process and more committed to national reconciliation. After 
two days of repeated balloting, Chamorro narrowly defeated Bolanos in 
the closed selection process through which the candidate was chosen. She 
headed a ticket that included Virgilio Godoy, longtime leader of the pl i, 
as the vice-presidential nominee.53
Although she was relatively inexperienced politically, Chamorro had 
a series of assets that made her an attractive candidate. The sentimental 
appeal of her late husband, her commitment to the revolution in the early 
years when it was most widely supported, her prominent opposition after 
ward through La Prensa, and the inclusion in her family of members who 
were in opposing political camps made her appear less objectionable to 
those who had earlier supported the revolution but now wanted a change. 
Bolanos, on other hand, suffered both the stigma of wealth and the repu 
tation of uncompromising hostility to the revolution. Chamorro seemed 
more electable; her relative lack of experience may have made her seem 
more malleable to others who hoped to influence her future development. 
Once nominated, she named her son-in-law, c o r d e n ic  member Antonio 
Lacayo, to head her campaign.54
The f s l n  labored hard to win, using sophisticated campaign tactics, 
massive campaign spending, and the powers of incumbency to appeal to 
voters. Recognizing that the economy was its Achilles' heel, the govern 
ment held down prices for basic public services, such as gas and water, 
and tried to convey the image that they had now won the confidence of 
business leaders and local producers. The idea that the Sandinistas were 
rebuilding their relationship with the private sector was conveyed in three 
ways. First, producers were included prominently as candidates on the 
f s l n  slate. Second, the government offered a blizzard of new concessions 
to traditional elites. Third, the government staged a series of last-minute 
meetings with producers to demonstrate the access and ongoing dialogue 
that now marked their interactions.
The f s l n  as a political party began to undergo a redefinition during the 
campaign. As the Central American peace process produced results and 
the contra war abated, the f s l n  began to shift away from the "vanguard" 
structure to seek broader representativeness. Apparently recognizing that 
their core support group had thinned over the years, the leadership sought
120 The Recrudescence of the Economic Elite
to build linkages with outside groups by including the leaders of those 
groups on the f s l n  slate of candidates. According to then vice-president 
Sergio Ramirez, the f s l n  consciously adopted the strategy of recruiting 
representatives of an array of large social groups, even if those representa 
tives were not closely aligned with or ideologically linked to the f s l n .55 
The f s l n  leaders decided to accept wide diversity within the party bench 
in order to maximize their chance to win the election.
One group courted by the party, somewhat incongruously, was the 
business sector. Several prominent business leaders and agricultural pro 
ducers were included on the slate of candidates to be ratified at the party 
convention, and others were added from the convention floor.56 The f s l n  
publicized prominently, in full-page newspaper ads, a list of twenty-four 
producers who were legislative candidates on the f s l n  slate.57 It built on 
the division that had emerged in the u pa n ic  leadership and successfully 
recruited the president of f o n d il a c  to run on the f s l n  ticket. Other 
prominent business leaders, like Andres Franceries, owner of Sandy's, a 
popular fast-food restaurant, joined the Managua municipal-level ticket 
and became outspoken campaigners.
At the same time, the regime announced a series of policy changes 
that further responded to private sector demands. Private non-somocista 
stockholders in companies that had been partially owned by Somoza allies 
and, therefore, confiscated under Decrees #3 and #38 had, in most cases, 
continued to hold their stock in these companies but were unable to exer 
cise voting rights and received no dividends. Beginning in 1988 the reorga 
nization of coiP, the state holding company that administered more than 
eighty of these industrial firms, allowed private stockholders to resume 
participation in the administration of these companies (Pasos 1990,• Barri 
cada, February 7,1990,• see also Fonseca 1989). The government expressed 
a willingness to take on private sector partners in selected state firms, 
and some state enterprises were reportedly offered for privatization.58 The 
government attempted to rescind selected expropriations, including those 
of the three coffee-producing political leaders who lost their property in 
June 1989.59 The unpopular reliquidation program, under which coffee 
producers were paid for their crops in a series of installments spread over 
the year instead of receiving the full amount at the time of the sale, was 
suspended [Barricada, August 10, 1989).60 In meetings with private pro 
ducers in December 1989, Wheelock reportedly proclaimed the failure of 
the Sandinista economic model and asked these elites to help the San 
dinistas formulate a new economic strategy (interviews, a n a r , June 23, 
July 14,1990). Just weeks before the election, Wheelock again proclaimed
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an end to expropriations, announcing, "As of 1990, there will no longer be 
confiscations or expropriations" [Barricada, February 14,1990).
Finally, Sandinista leaders had a series of public and private meetings 
with agricultural producers in the final weeks of the campaign. New con 
cessions were offered and public pledges made, including the prospect 
of producer participation in the administration of state trade monopolies 
(Barricada, February 16,1990). Long interviews with national and regional 
leaders of c o s e p and its affiliates were a staple of Sandinista media cov 
erage in the days before the vote, u pa n ic  president Ramiro Gurdian was 
now quoted in Barricada (February 19,1990) as saying, "There's space for 
us to work together." Barricada headlines blazed: "Mutual Confidence 
between Government and Producers" (February 16,1990).
The f s l n  strategists probably did not expect to win over many private 
elites with these tactics. Indeed, according to one study, only 10 percent of 
those who classified themselves as owners and proprietors voted in favor 
of the f s l n  in 1990 (Oquist 1992, 14). The f s l n 's goals were more vital. 
Rather than persuading the small number of private elites in the country 
to vote for the f s l n , the government hoped to persuade the large num 
bers of peasants, workers, and unemployed Nicaraguans that the economy 
could be reactivated under their leadership through a renewal of private 
sector investment. Demonstrating the private elite's willingness to co 
operate with the f s l n , it was hoped, would restore the confidence of the 
larger population.
In fact, for a series of different reasons, this approach failed. The heavy 
emphasis on an alliance with private producers may have even undercut 
support from the f s l n 's  social base. The f s l n 's  newfound affinity for the 
bourgeoisie surely perplexed and antagonized some former supporters.61 
The Sandinistas lost the election, gaining only 41 percent of the presi 
dential vote to u n o 's 55 percent. They lost not only the executive branch 
but at every level of the election. At the assembly level, u n o  received 54 
percent of the vote and won 51 seats, whereas the f s l n  got 41 percent of 
the vote and won 39 seats.62 u n o  also swept the municipal council races, 
winning a majority of the seats in 99 of 131 municipalities (see l a s a  1990, 
34-39). The Sandinista era had now passed.
Conclusions
Like revolutions elsewhere, the Nicaraguan revolution went first through 
an ambitious phase, in which important structural transformations were 
attempted, and then followed with a more difficult phase of retrenchment,
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as international pressure and domestic problems mounted. In the Nicara 
guan case, this second phase entailed repeated overtures to local business 
elites. The early economic model, which incorporated selected, strategic 
sectors of the bourgeoisie, was now revised to admit business as a whole. 
Jinotega coffee growers and f o n d il a c  officers now being approached by 
the regime were hardly the medium-sized or chapiollo producers identi 
fied as potential allies in the earlier phase. Indeed, c o r d e n ic  members 
were among the most wealthy and prominent business leaders in the 
country. Convinced that the bourgeoisie that remained in Nicaragua was 
the most progressive in Central America, and caught in a no-win situation, 
the regime reconceptualized the role of private elites in the revolution, 
now in a more favorable light.
As foreign loans dried up and state development projects continued to 
absorb rather than generate resources, local capital from the private sector 
was thought to provide the only remaining hope for economic revitaliza 
tion, both as a source of investment and a force that could mobilize new 
foreign support. Some in the elite, convinced that the Sandinistas had per 
manently altered the nature of their society, accepted negotiations with 
the regime. This approach succeeded in further fragmenting the Nicara 
guan private sector into entrenched opponents and those who were open 
to dialogue. It failed, however, to renew economic growth or persuade 
the Nicaraguan population that the country was on the road to economic 
recovery. Ultimately, the Sandinistas were expelled from office.
Debate continues about the wisdom of this strategy. For some, this shift 
to the right undermined the Sandinistas' popular base (ih c a  1988c, 1989). 
For others, the overtures to the bourgeoisie revealed a fundamental, long 
term interpenetration of the Sandinista leadership and old-line economic 
elites, particularly from the Granadan oligarchical families (Vilas 1992). 
Certainly the return to market principles during the economic restruc 
turing and the indiscriminate courtship of the bourgeoisie challenged the 
Sandinistas' alliance with the Nicaraguan poor.
But the range of options available to the f s l n  leadership contracted 
sharply with the economic crisis. Unwilling, because of geopolitical rea 
sons and their own understanding of Nicaragua's needs, to tread new 
ground and radically redistribute the nation's wealth, the f s l n  went a 
more conventional route. This strategy, in turn, helped f s l n  leaders build 
a relationship with the segment of the reform bourgeoisie that succeeded 
them, laying the groundwork for a postrevolution negotiation process in 
which they could preserve some of their interests and some of their re 
forms.
chapter
A Profile of the Elite Leadership
The Sandinistas were enriching themselves. They were not Marxist- 
Leninists; they were just grabbing up things. They were giving Marx a 
bad name. They never had a firm ideology.
—u n c a f e n ic  leader, July 23,1990
The Sandinistas did an important thing teaching workers their rights, 
teaching people how to read. ... The Sandinistas were able to raise, 
in a way that could be felt, the people’s sense of worth. In this sense, 
Nicaragua has a better future than Guatemala, which has a very high 
level of inequality.
—a n a r  leader, June 23,1990
The Political Segmentation of the Economic Elite
To go beyond structural analysis and glimpse the inner workings of the 
economic elite, we must consult the bourgeoisie itself. This chapter draws 
on almost two hundred interviews conducted with leaders of the Nica 
raguan private sector between 1982 and 1991. It focuses on 143 semi 
structured interviews with 91 private sector leaders that were conducted 
between January 1990 and August 1991. These respondents were chosen 
from a targeted group of business elites who played leadership roles during 
the f s l n  era. Participants in this study were selected using a positional/ 
reputational methodology. (See the discussion of methodology in Appen 
dix 1.) Interviews were conducted with top-ranking officials of the major 
private sector organizations, private sector representatives on national 
boards and commissions, and others that respondents in the first two 
groups specifically recommended for inclusion in the study based on their 
informal leadership roles.
Politically, these respondents can be divided into five groups: (1) the 
moral-political opponents who waged ideological warfare against the San 
dinistas; (2) the technical opponents who focused more narrowly and 
less rancorously on the pragmatic failings of the Sandinista government; 
(3) those in the middle, for whom the accomplishments and gains of the 
period were balanced against the problems and losses; (4) advocates of the
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Sandinista reforms who tempered their support for the revolution with a 
critical assessment of specific policies or leaders; and (5) enthusiasts who 
took on the role of regime defenders.1
The first sector, composed of the moral-political opposition, was locked 
in a fundamental conflict with the Sandinista government. Actions of 
the regime that purportedly served the national interest or the concerns 
of the poor were interpreted as a cynical ruse designed to cover up the 
self-serving ambitions of the political leaders. For example, agrarian re 
form was understood not as an effort to empower the landless or increase 
resources available for national development but simply as a device to 
extend the dominance of the f s l n  in the countryside and to centralize 
power and wealth in the hands of Sandinista leaders.
Although some of those most opposed to the f s l n  saw the Sandinistas 
as diehard, orthodox Marxist-Leninists who were out to eliminate any 
vestige of private ownership, others did not credit them with any ideo 
logical convictions. "They weren't ideologues, they were bandits," said 
one adversary. "They didn't have consciences,- they were prepared to kill," 
said another. Moral-ideological opponents frequently drew comparisons 
between the Sandinistas and the Somoza government. For this group, the 
Sandinistas represented a deteriorated variant of somocismo. "Both were 
dictatorships," said one interviewee, "but the Sandinistas were more re 
pressive." Another alleged, "Somoza never robbed like the Sandinistas."
For this group, the losses of the era were not narrowly economic but 
also social and moral. Several respondents focused on the destruction of 
basic social institutions, like the family, and on the loss of traditional 
religious and cultural values. "Sandinista policy was bad in all senses. It 
divided the family, delinked the society," said one man who had moved his 
whole family to Guatemala in 1986. Traditional respect for older people, 
religious leaders, and employers was said to be gone, replaced by "shame 
lessness," "militarism," and "admiration for those who could steal the 
most." One leader of the u pa n ic  sorghum growers association concluded, 
"Sandinista policy was not bad, it was nefarious." Bitterness about this 
assault on the traditional social order gave this group's denunciations a 
strong emotional twist. In several cases, this hostility was deepened by 
the grueling experience of having been detained or imprisoned on various 
security charges by the Sandinista regime.
For this group, the policy shifts that took place at the end of the decade 
did not reflect any substantive adjustment on the part of the regime. As 
one large coffee producer said, "If you think that the Sandinistas moder-
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ated their course after 1988, you are mistaken. Any apparent change they 
made was just a tactic to get Western aid." The Sandinistas' belated com 
mitment to end land expropriation also lacked credibility for this group. 
Several Masatepe coffee producers claimed in 1990, for example, that the 
Sandinista government had simply suspended these takeovers for electoral 
purposes and had targeted their lands for immediate expropriation right 
after the February 1990 election. A Matagalpan coffee producer echoed the 
charge: "If they had won in February [1990], they would have eliminated 
the rest of the bourgeoisie. The Sandinistas became the new bourgeoisie, 
and they wanted to take what remained from the old bourgeoisie."
There was a strong tendency in this group to assign responsibility for 
all of Nicaragua's problems, even those that predated the revolution, to 
the Sandinista government. The contra war as well was regarded purely 
as the product of Sandinista aggression. Some of these opponents con 
cluded that the Sandinistas actively sought the conflict. As one sorghum 
producer put it, "The Sandinistas wanted the contra rebels, the war. They 
were begging on their knees for the U.S. to invade. That was the way to 
get more foreign assistance."
While the moral-political opponents had a prominent place in the oppo 
sition, a second voice was also heard. Leaders of the private sector who 
opposed the regime did not all concur on the nature of the problem or 
the best approach to take in interactions with the government. A second 
group, composed of technical-policy opponents, offered a more moderate 
critique. They too opposed the government but did not argue that the 
revolution was fundamentally corrupt, socially deviant, or driven by mali 
cious intent. Rather, this group emphasized that the Sandinistas' vision 
was "impractical" and their programs "badly run" and "mismanaged." The 
emphasis here was on concrete policies, particularly those directed toward 
the business sector. For example, technical-policy opponents objected to 
land expropriations, not by arguing that private property was sacred, but 
by claiming that many of those expropriated were productive and that 
their expropriation was a violation of the Sandinistas' own agrarian reform 
policies. When asked to describe the main problems they had during the 
Sandinista era, these respondents focused on technical issues like prices, 
the poor quality of inputs, delays in the dispersal of credit and supplies, 
an insufficient or poorly trained labor force, and excessive bureaucracy. 
These critics argued that prices paid by the regime were too low to cover 
production costs. Producers were surviving, one coffee grower claimed, 
"by eating up their capital."
As with the first group, these producers were also unwilling to read 
Sandinista policy in a positive way. Even policies that favored private 
producers, like subsidized interest rates, were interpreted as miscalcula 
tions made by incompetent government officials rather than conscious 
efforts to stimulate production. Price supports and other nonmarket fea 
tures adopted by the government to stabilize production and woo pro 
ducer endorsement were not well regarded by this group, which favored 
a market-based approach. One of the nation's largest cotton growers, for 
example, derided the "artificial economy" and "fictitious currency" of the 
era. "Everything here was subsidized. That's the reason for the economic 
failure," said a former supporter turned opponent. A leader of a n a r  con 
cluded, "In the Sandinista period, we didn't have to work very hard. We 
knew we'd always get by. But I was pulled down by gravity. I've been 
deteriorating."
Accustomed to market forces, and skeptical of any other model, these 
private sector leaders viewed the unorthodox features of the Sandinista 
model with disdain. The government was viewed by these opponents as a 
"nine-headed monster" whose collective leadership style under the nine- 
member national directorate was found to create inconsistent or con 
stantly changing policy. A medium-sized rice grower concluded, "Every 
thing was the reverse of what an economy should be. Expensive things 
were cheap. Plans changed every day. . . . [The Sandinistas] said there 
would be no more confiscations, then they did it again the next day. Things 
that were 'good' one day were prohibited the next. . . . This showed the 
immaturity of the system, the lack of seriousness. You could only work 
for today, never make plans for tomorrow."
Unlike their more extreme counterparts, the second group did not re 
gard the government as a diabolical force with which they refused to 
consort. Members of this group were relatively open to dialogue with 
government officials. For them, these interactions at least provided the 
opportunity to continually put forward an alternative program and "make 
some noise" (hacer la bulla}. One large finotega coffee producer explained: 
"I'm one of those who believes that the fight is made within, that if you 
stay on the outside, you don't have any influence." This group gener 
ally responded more favorably to the post-1987 reforms, seeing them as a 
genuine move in the right direction.
Nicaraguan society became highly polarized during the revolution, and 
few private producers took the middle ground. A third group of mixed 
mediators did, however, detach themselves somewhat from the political
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debate and pointedly pursue a careful balancing act. One cotton grower 
concluded, "It's like you're standing in a rocking boat. Not too much to 
this side; not too much to that. ... We must be moderate. There are two 
sides in the country. Neither can do away with the other." When asked 
about their opinion of the Sandinista government, favored descriptions 
in this small group included "I'm of the intermediate line, without poli 
tics" and "I'm of the center, unaligned." One prominent producer, whose 
family included both Sandinistas and their opponents, concluded that "in 
politics, one must be ambiguous. . . . Ideology makes everything fail. You 
have to be pragmatic."
Weary of acrimony and war, those in this middle group sometimes tried 
to function as mediators. They would describe achievements or positive 
aspirations of the revolution, such as agrarian reform or labor union nego 
tiation, but they followed quickly with criticisms of the expropriations of 
non-somocistas or misuse of government power. Several members of this 
group saw the f s l n  both as a victim of an aggressive U.S. foreign policy 
and as a provocateur, actively baiting the Reagan-Bush administration in 
self-defeating ways.
Perhaps most intriguing were those in the fourth and fifth groups: 
private sector leaders who supported the revolution. These leaders were 
anomalous, since they acted in ways that were not consistent with most 
standard theories of elite behavior. New approaches to social theory, how 
ever, sketch a conceptual model that may be of use here. Traditional expla 
nations of economic and, indeed, even political behavior generally draw 
on a "rational actor" model that assumes that behavior is a calculated re 
sponse to perceptions of self-interest, narrowly construed.2 Some recent 
theory, however, rejects these assumptions and argues that "pro-social 
motivations" such as duty, love, and malevolence (Mansbridge 1990, ix) 
or sympathy and commitment (Sen 1990, 31) also shape political and eco 
nomic choices. Decisions of economic elites to refrain from opposition 
to a revolutionary movement and, indeed, even provide political support, 
may respond to more complex motivations than those conventionally 
employed.3
Most members of the elite who came to support the revolution linked 
up with the f s l n  during the period of the insurrection, when they were 
deeply frustrated by the abuses associated with the Somoza dynasty. Sev 
eral of those who stayed with the revolution had been colab or adores histo- 
ricos, directly involved in supporting the military effort of the f s l n  in 
1978—79. Unlike other private sector leaders, their opposition to Somoza
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included a fuller critique of the prerevolutionary social order and its 
underlying development model. They focused on the resources siphoned 
off not only by Somoza but by the "collateral economic structures—cot 
ton gins, pesticide manufacturers, export houses," the "big ranchers who 
owned the slaughterhouses," or the animal feed industry.
This resentment was not limited to those who monopolized economic 
power; arrogant denizens of the Somoza-era social hierarchy also drew 
criticism. Those who were not admitted into social clubs dominated by 
the upper elite were sometimes embittered by their exclusion. Even some 
members of the elite who were admitted into these chambers responded 
negatively to the social arrogance of their peers. The concentration of 
wealth and social power in the hands of agroindustrialists or local oli 
garchs was a source of dissatisfaction for many producers who looked to 
the revolution for an alternative.
A range of forces served as catalysts to link these producers to the San 
dinista cause, including religious conviction, intellectual persuasion, and 
family tragedy. Several mentioned the powerful pull of liberation theology 
espoused by radical teachers at prestigious prep schools, like the Colegio 
Centroamerica, that were favored by this class. The humiliating taunt by 
classmates at a U.S. university that his nation was a banana republic under 
Somoza led another into the protest movement. Age-old feuds going back 
generations between their families and that of Somoza propelled some 
into the opposition. In several cases, the loss of a beloved child to a ram 
paging national guard led elite leaders to repudiate the regime. The pro 
found failures of the Somoza regime drew even economic elites into the 
making of the revolution.4 Some subsequently dropped away, but those 
who took on leadership roles in the insurrection generally developed a 
long-term commitment to the cause.
Support for the Sandinista government required more than just a re 
pudiation of Somoza-era institutions. Regime supporters shared a belief 
that "an active state role in the economy was necessary in developing 
countries." One supporter concluded, "The mixed economy is valid. State 
enterprises should exist in order to promote development, as an axis of 
development to generate resources that can be used for the whole society. 
They can help provide technical assistance to private producers and im 
prove social conditions for workers." A common view in this segment of 
the bourgeoisie was that production, in the long run, must be built on a 
corporatist-style acceptance of the rights of workers. "Workers," said one
The Elite Leadership 129
former u pa n ic  leader, "are an integral part of production." Marginalized, 
illiterate, and abused workers would impede the collective development 
of the nation; literate and well-cared-for workers would advance its long 
term development.
A few of the regime supporters entered the movement only after the 
Sandinistas came to power. For them, the contra war and the prominent 
role played in it by the United States often served as a catalyst. Said one, 
"My sympathy for the Sandinistas accelerated with the war. I am proud 
of Nicaragua; I didn't want it pressured from the outside." Ironically, a 
war that the Reagan administration defended as necessary to impede the 
advance of communism led some Nicaraguan business leaders to befriend 
the Sandinista regime.
Although the bourgeoisie as a class experienced a sharp economic ero 
sion during the revolution, two considerations weighed against uniform 
elite opposition. First, ideology is not purely a reflection of objective ma 
terial calculations. Even among elites, ideology is a refraction of various 
forces, including social ideals, a sense of historical junctures, and previ 
ous political frustrations. Second, although the bourgeoisie as a class lost 
resources under the Sandinistas, not all lost equally. Some lost massively; 
others actually gained. Interclass hostilities and the prospect of personal 
economic gain also helped to elicit the support of some prorevolution 
elites.
Not all of those who supported the regime were equally enthusias 
tic about the government, however; many had reservations. Supporters 
tended to divide into two groups: one that endorsed the regime, but with 
significant reservations, and another that identified more completely with 
the f s l n . The moderate reformers who had some reservations constitute 
the fourth group in this study; regime apologists were the fifth and final 
segment.
Several developments prompted most moderate reformers to retain a 
certain critical independence from the regime. In spite of the regime's 
affirmation of the "patriotic" producers, the Sandinista leadership's dis 
course against the bourgeoisie as a class and the waves of expropriation 
that occurred presented a major challenge to private sector supporters. As 
a result, many producers who endorsed the revolution had reservations 
about some of its central programs. One coffee producer who became an 
f s l n  assembly candidate explained: "I am a private producer, and I repre 
sent private producers. I can't go along with the expropriation of other
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private producers." A dairy and rice producer explained his decision to 
run on the f s l n  ticket as an effort to "moderate the f s l n " and weigh in 
against the "extremists."
Some large producers who supported the revolution noted that they 
were viewed with suspicion by regime leaders because of their "white 
skin" or "style of dress" and were often not consulted even in their 
areas of expertise. This contributed to mistaken economic measures. One 
problem described by many elites was what they called yoquepierdismo 
("Me, what-do-I-lose-ism"), that is, a loss of personal incentive among 
producers.
Unlike regime apologists, moderate reformers included f s l n  policy 
mistakes and excessive state control in their explanations of the crisis 
that engulfed their country. The support these producers gave to the f s l n  
in spite of these reservations was linked both to their ability to interpret 
their interests in a way that was consistent with a rising standard of living 
for the majority and to the revolution's own porousness and policy vacil 
lation. The increasing pluralism of the f s l n , especially toward the end of 
the decade, allowed the regime to pull in and retain reformist elements 
of the bourgeoisie who found enough similarity between their own views 
and the diffuse goals of the revolution to warrant their participation. For 
those in this group, their relative position in society was less central than 
the prospect of collective advancement.
The fifth and final group of private sector leaders was composed of those 
who remained unambiguous regime apologists to the end. For members of 
this group, the problems faced by the Sandinista government were wholly 
rooted in the U.S.-backed contra war. When asked to list the factors that 
caused the economic crisis in Nicaragua, these leaders focused solely on 
"the war," "the economic blockade," and "North American imperialism." 
Much like the Sandinista leadership during this period, these private sec 
tor defenders were slow to reflect on any responsibility the government 
itself might have for the problems it faced. They took a fundamentally 
uncritical position on f s l n  government decisions, including even those 
that were widely unpopular and contributed in 1990 to the electoral de 
feat. Arguing, for example, that the military draft policy was necessary, 
one coffee producer concluded, "If the government had done away with 
the draft, the president of Nicaragua in 1990 would not have been Violeta 
Barrios [de Chamorro] but [the former national guard colonel and general 
commander of the Nicaraguan resistance] Enrique Bermudez." The deci 
sions and policies of the government were presented as uniformly correct
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in the context of the times. One defining trait of this group was its failure 
to identify any negative characteristics of the Sandinista government.
As with the moral-political opponents to the regime, the regime apolo 
gists were often disconnected from their roots as producers. Although 
occupying positions as leaders of private sector organizations, many of 
those respondents in the first and fifth categories were defined primarily 
by their political roles and less by their activities in direct agricultural 
production. In some cases, those in the last group had left production and 
spent years working in high-level government positions, only returning 
to agricultural production in the final years of the Sandinista government. 
Although still serving as spokespersons for private producers in their asso 
ciations and in the press, their direct connection with the production 
process had been weakened.
Most of those interviewed in this study were opponents of the regime. 
It is not possible to say with precision how representative they are of the 
bourgeoisie as a whole since no comparable study of a random sample 
of private producers has been done. As leaders of organizations, they are 
likely to be more politicized than those who have not been placed in 
leadership positions,- this study may also contain a larger percent of sup 
porters than was found generally in this class.5 These respondents did, 
however, represent the bourgeoisie in the sense that they were the pri 
mary elected, appointed, or nominated spokespeople for the main private 
sector organizations during the Sandinista decade. The purposive nature 
of the selection process used here resulted in the inclusion of most of the 
top private sector leaders at the national level and those who were most 
prominent in the five regions included in this study (Regions II, III, IV, V, 
and VI). Respondents included, for example, seventeen (61 percent) mem 
bers of u pa n ic 's  twenty-eight-person diiectorio from the 1988-89 period. 
In all, a considerable portion of the universe of private sector leaders par 
ticipated in this study, particularly at the national level, making the issue 
of the randomness of the sample less relevant.6
When given the opportunity to provide their own evaluation and assess 
ment of the Sandinistas, 38 percent of the participants in this particular 
study were moral-political opponents whose statements will be catego 
rized in the following tables as reflecting strong opposition. Thirty-three 
percent of the respondents were technical-policy opponents who gave a 
more muted critique of the f s l n  and are classified here as expressing mod 
erate opposition. A third, small group, composed of 8 percent of the re 
spondents, offered a mixed assessment of the f s l n  government. Balancing
132 The Elite Leadership
criticism of the regime against positive observations, these producers have 
been placed in the mixed category. A fourth group composed of moder 
ate reformers, representing n percent of the respondents, provided what 
will be labeled moderate support for the Sandinista government. Finally, 
regime apologists who, when asked about the failures of the government, 
found none, composed io percent of the respondents. Their responses will 
fall under the label of strong support in this study.
If private sector leaders were not uniform in their condemnation of the 
Sandinista government, how might we explain the range of variation in 
their views? In particular, two patterns of attitudinal variation are rele 
vant. The first is the differences in degrees of opposition between those 
registering strong opposition to the regime and those expressing moder 
ate opposition. Why did some producers adopt an adamantly ideological 
position that admitted no negotiations or compromise with the regime, 
whereas others who opposed the regime adopted a more flexible approach 
that was more attuned to shifts in the behavior of the government? The 
latter group is especially interesting in a political sense because of its 
capacity to enter negotiation about the reform process instead of simply 
rejecting dialogue out of hand.
The second pattern focuses more generally on the differentiation be 
tween those who opposed the regime and those who supported it. Why, 
when most of the bourgeoisie was opposed to the Sandinistas, did some 
come to support the regime and even, in some cases, to become candidates 
for political office on the Sandinista ticket?7 What sectors of elite society 
were most likely to lend support to a revolutionary regime? Which were 
its most likely opponents?
To explain these variations, several factors are worth exploring, in 
cluding (i) differences in the economic and social characteristics of these 
elites, (2) the kind of organizational nexus in which they were embedded, 
and (3) the type of concrete experiences that they had with the reforms 
of the revolution. These issues will be analyzed in turn in the next three 
sections of this chapter. The final section explores the implications of 
this attitudinal variation for the elite's production behavior.
Wealth, Social Authority, and Politics
As the opening chapter of this book demonstrates, the bourgeoisie is not 
a uniform, homogeneous entity. It is often riven by subclass tensions and 
rivalries as elites compete fiercely among themselves. Some of the prop-
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ertied are more prosperous than others and may be highly protective of 
their privileged position. Some enjoy tremendous social prestige among 
their peers and use this power to check the social advance of potential 
challengers. Some have wealth that was inherited and may be in decline; 
others have only recently obtained these resources and are in economic 
ascent. These variations in economic and social characteristics may con 
tribute to differences in political orientation and behavior within the elite.
In an attempt to understand the political segmentation of the bourgeoi 
sie, several hypotheses about the impact of economic and social variations 
might be offered. One might expect the most privileged members of the 
society, who have the most to lose from redistributive social policy, for ex 
ample, to be most resistant to revolutionary change. This study explores 
the political consequences of two dimensions of class: access to economic 
resources, like land, and access to prestigious social goods, like advanced 
education.
Economic Resources and Political Views
In the agricultural sector, capitalists who are large landowners might be 
expected to be more hostile to revolution than their medium- and small 
sized counterparts, particularly a revolution that is centered on agrarian 
reform. Members of the economic elite who have access to scarce social 
goods such as prestige educations obtained in institutions that confer 
social status on their graduates might also be expected to resent the level 
ing, or at least reshuffling, impact of revolution. We might hypothesize, 
therefore, that land size and educational attainments would be related to 
bourgeois leaders' views on the Sandinista government.
In the Nicaraguan case, views on the government did vary modestly 
with property size. The agricultural leaders with the largest landholdings 
and production levels at the end of the 1970s were indeed among the 
most vociferous opponents to the regime. In this study, 42 percent of the 
leaders who were large producers in their activity in the period before 
1979 were among the most intense, ideological critics of the revolution 
and were classified as registering strong opposition.8 (See Table 5.1.) A 
slightly smaller proportion of the leaders with medium-sized holdings (37 
percent) were in this extreme category. A sharper difference yet was found 
with the few leaders who had been small producers before the revolution. 
Among this handful of private sector leaders, only 20 percent registered 
strong opposition to the Sandinistas at the end.
The Sandinistas' thesis that small- and medium-sized producers had
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Strong opposition 20 37 42 39
Moderate opposition 40 32 32 32
Mixed — 10 7 7
Moderate support 20 16 10 12
Strong support 20 5 10 10
a protected place within the revolution was designed to drive a wedge 
between those groups and the large producers. This study suggests that 
this strategy had a modest effect, most visibly with leaders who had been 
small producers. Overall, the more privileged among the private sector 
leaders were the more adamant in their opposition to the regime. This 
superelite's opposition may have deepened, both to protect its extensive 
resources and as a response to Sandinista hostility. If they were not oppo 
nents of the regime at the outset, years of hostile Sandinista discourse 
against the terratenientes and an agrarian reform program that targeted 
large landowners tended to elicit that opposition over time. Conversely, 
among the handful of private sector leaders who had been small producers 
in the late 1970s, 40 percent endorsed the revolution, either moderately 
or strongly. (See Table 5.1.) Not targeted for special repudiation, the latter 
were less fully drawn into the opposition.
The relationship between prior landholdings and subsequent political 
views was, however, far from absolute.9 Even those leaders who had been 
small producers tended overall to oppose the regime. A full 60 percent 
registered some degree of opposition, suggesting that this group shared 
the general disgruntlement of its class. Moreover, 20 percent of those who 
had been large producers before the revolution actually offered a positive 
evaluation of the f s l n  government. These large landowners were equally 
divided between those who expressed moderate support for the regime 
(10 percent) and unmitigated enthusiasts who expressed strong support 
(10 percent). Most of those in the latter category had taken positions in 
the Sandinista government, in some cases as vice-ministers, and became 
fully identified with the regime. The ambiguous character of the revolu 
tion allowed for the incorporation of a sector of even highly privileged
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members of the society into its ranks; the participation of these elites 
in the revolution in turn muted its class content and, over time, moder 
ated its course. The failure of the revolution to crystallize its class base 
contributed to the somewhat amorphous relationships found in Table 5.1. 
Social Class and Political Views
Class is not just an economic category. This concept also has a social 
dimension involving issues like status, influence, and authority. Although 
there is obviously an interrelationship between the economic and social 
aspects of the concept, each has its own distinctive features. Access to 
property or high production levels provides elites with wealth and eco 
nomic clout as employers or generators of growth; social status confers 
respectability and authority, allowing elites to exercise influence over 
others and assert a form of cultural hegemony.
Social status in Nicaragua was not just the product of individual hold 
ings but was also linked to the kind of familial and social networks in 
which elites were enmeshed. For example, a small subset of the elite from 
prominent families, like the Chamorros and Cuadras, whose ancestors 
had held or vied for political power in the previous century, was the bed 
rock of the vaunted aristocracy of Granada, Nicaragua's premier social 
class (Stone 1990; Vilas 1992). Living in prescribed neighborhoods or even 
on certain streets, like Calle Atravesada in Granada, gave their residents 
a social patina much cherished by the elite. A network of society heavy 
weights controlled admission to prestigious clubs that anchored elite 
social life in Nicaragua's larger cities.
The social hierarchy in Nicaragua was not, however, entirely static. 
The elite structure had been particularly receptive to entrepreneurial for 
eigners during the Somoza years. Among the private sector leaders in 
this study, for example, 22 percent mentioned having either parents or 
grandparents who were immigrants. Some immigrants had scampered 
quickly up the economic and social ladders. Beginning typically in some 
commercial activity, these entrepreneurs soon joined other elites in the 
acquisition of land and became agricultural producers and ranchers. Those 
respondents with immigrant backgrounds were even more likely than 
those from nonimmigrant families to be strongly opposed to the San 
dinista regime.10 This increased opposition may be linked to their rela 
tively greater prosperity before the revolution or to the greater importance 
they gave to the social prominence that their families had only recently 
achieved.
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Strong opposition 27 36 41 38
Moderate opposition 18 28 38 33
Mixed 9 8 7 8
Moderate support 18 16 7 11
Strong support 27 12 6 10
Mobility within the elite was influenced by education, and Nicaragua's 
economic leadership had acquired considerable educational credentials. 
Eighty-eight percent of the respondents in this study had gone beyond the 
secondary school level, and 77 percent had at least begun university train 
ing. A full 60 percent of the respondents had completed their university 
degrees or gone beyond.
In general, those who had the privilege of pursuing an education tended 
to be more opposed to the Sandinista regime than their less privileged 
counterparts in this study. Forty-one percent of those who had completed 
their university degrees were strongly opposed to the regime, serving as 
moral-political opponents. (See Table 5.2.) On the other hand, only 27 
percent of those who had completed secondary school or less were so 
forcefully opposed to the regime. Indeed, the strongest support levels for 
the Sandinista government were found among those in this elite who had 
lower educational attainments. Whereas only 6 percent of those with uni 
versity degrees offered strong support for the regime, a full 27 percent of 
those who completed only high school or less were in this category.
The greater opposition to the regime on the part of the more highly 
educated private sector leaders may be partly the result of the more rigor 
ous intellectual training they received. A university education may bol 
ster mainstream (nonrevolutionary) ideologies and provide the intellec 
tual self-confidence needed to resist popular pressure. At the same time, 
the preexisting social class characteristics of better-educated individuals 
almost certainly had an impact on their views. In a society in which over
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Strong opposition 30 54 41
Moderate opposition 48 27 38
Mixed 11 4 7
Moderate support 7 8 7
Strong support 4 8 6
half of the adult population was illiterate, this credential conferred con 
siderable social status on the graduates. Having farther to fall and less to 
receive from the revolution, this privileged sector tended to move force 
fully into the opposition.
Social prestige in Nicaragua was enhanced by receiving an education 
abroad.11 For many Nicaraguan elites, local universities did not offer either 
the technical sophistication or the social prominence that accompanied a 
foreign degree. As one social analyst who moved in and out of elite circles 
wryly observed, "If you were educated abroad, spoke another language flu 
ently, and knew how to dress and eat well, then the elite families would 
accept you." One suggestion of the allure of a foreign education is found 
in the educational experiences of the elite. A full forty percent of the par 
ticipants in this study completed their educations outside Nicaragua; half 
of them did so in the United States.12
The experience of living abroad, and particularly being educated there, 
apparently had political repercussions.13 Among the respondents in this 
study, those who received a prestigious, foreign education were more 
likely to oppose the Sandinista regime virulently. If we control for varia 
tion in educational levels and look just at those who completed a univer 
sity degree, 54 percent of respondents educated abroad registered strong 
opposition to the regime. (See Table 5.3.) Only 30 percent of the university 
graduates who were educated in Nicaragua were so profoundly opposed 
to the regime. For the latter group, the most common position was one of 
moderate opposition, a response that permitted ongoing negotiation with 
the Sandinista government.
The reasons for the association between a foreign education and in 
creased political opposition are probably complex. Acquiring a university
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degree in a foreign country had several implications. Producers educated 
in the United States, for example, were among the larger landowners, and 
their opposition to the Sandinistas was probably influenced by their rela 
tively privileged economic status.14 In addition, the formal and informal 
content of a university education in the United States or in Franco's Spain 
may also have had an independent impact through the transmission of an 
anticommunist, promarket ideology that clashed sharply with the San 
dinista model.15 Certainly one of the lobbying strategies used to support 
U.S. educational exchange programs during the Cold War era was to em 
phasize how foreign participants would then come to affirm the American 
way of life. Evidence from this study suggests that this connection may 
have been made.
Conversely, the formal and informal content of a Nicaraguan educa 
tion may also have played a role in reducing the extent of opposition 
to the revolution among those who remained at home. The argument 
that the Sandinistas were controlled by the Soviets, for example, may 
have held less sway among those who attended the Jesuit-run Universidad 
Centroamerica or the public university in UNAN-Leon. These Nicaraguan 
universities were hotbeds of student radicalism and f s l n  organizational 
activities in the 1970s. Attendance at these institutions gave their alumni 
a relatively fuller familiarity with the actors and issues that shaped the 
f s l n . This exposure probably helped to clarify the domestic roots of the 
revolution for this subset of the elite and may have reduced their propen 
sity to adopt the most extreme forms of opposition.
The relationship between educational privilege and regime opposition 
should not, however, be overstated.16 Regardless of where they were edu 
cated, most university graduates in this study were opposed to the regime. 
Although there were differences in the level of opposition, 78 percent of 
private sector leaders who graduated from Nicaraguan universities regis 
tered some degree of opposition, compared to a very similar 81 percent of 
those who were foreign graduates. (See Table 5.3.) Furthermore, graduates 
of Nicaraguan universities were no more likely than those who graduated 
abroad to register support for the revolution. Indeed, among the small 
number of university graduates who supported the regime, the percent 
educated in universities abroad was slightly higher than the percent who 
graduated from Nicaraguan universities. The small number of respondents 
in this category makes it impossible to generalize, but these data again 
illustrate the ambiguities in the subclass base for regime support.
In all, data in this study suggest a modest relationship between the
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economic and social class characteristics of these private sector leaders 
and their views of the revolution. The association, however, between large 
landholdings or university education and extreme political opposition, on 
the one hand, or between small landholdings or high school education and 
strong political support, on the other, was far from uniform. The presence 
of subclass mavericks in the opposing camps weakened the statistical re 
lationship between these variables and hinted at the often complex class 
alliances that characterized the Nicaraguan revolution.
The Organizational Nexus and Politics
In contrast to the measures of class, the relationship between organiza 
tional affiliation and political attitudes in the Nicaraguan private sector 
leadership was quite sharp. The findings in this section suggest the utility 
of separating the analysis of organizational characteristics from the dis 
cussion of class background. Class and subclass tendencies get filtered 
through organizations, which may then add their own distinctive influ 
ence to the formation of political ideology.
The two major private sector organizations in Nicaragua, c o s e p and 
u n a g , supported markedly different political orientations and were em 
broiled in tense rivalry.17 The political views of private sector leaders 
varied sharply depending on the association with which they were af 
filiated. In this case, the differences in views were absolute, not simply 
relative variations. In all, 91 percent of those who were affiliated with 
c o s e p's  agricultural branch, u pa n ic , registered either strong or moderate 
opposition to the regime. In contrast, 75 percent of those who were u n a g  
affiliates expressed either strong or moderate support for the Sandinista 
government. Those who were independent divided roughly in the middle, 
with a total of 37.5 percent expressing some degree of opposition and an 
equal percent indicating some degree of support. (See Table 5.4.)18
The highly politicized and polarized orientations of both organizations 
reduced the possibility for free-ranging pluralism within their leadership. 
u pa n ic  had made an effort in the early years of the revolution to expand 
its base, recognizing the limitations confronting an elite organization 
in a society undergoing social revolution, u pa n ic 's attempt to recruit 
small producers, particularly among cafetaleros in the Matagalpa region, 
however, disintegrated when u pa n ic  leader Jorge Salazar was killed in 
T98o. The effort of a d a c h , the uPANic-affiliated cotton growers' asso 
ciation in Chinandega, to recruit a large number of small- and medium-
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Strong opposition 49 25 — 38
Moderate opposition 42 12.5 6 33
Mixed 3 25 19 8
Moderate support 5 25 31 11
Strong support 2 12.5 44 10
sized members also ended disastrously, from its leaders' point of view. 
The newcomers soon denounced the u pa n ic  orientation, and a reform 
leadership took control, splitting a d a c h  in two in 1984. This division dis 
suaded u pa n ic  leaders from further recruitment of political unknowns 
and potential defectors (interview, former president of a d a c h -u n a g , 
July 4,1990; interview, former president of a d a c h -u pa n ic , May 28,1990; 
"Algodoneros de Chinandega censuran actitud de u pa n ic ," Barricada, 
July 16, 1984). By 1984 the traditional elite circled in and abandoned its 
expansion effort.19
The few u pa n ic  leaders who were not anti-Sandinista, such as 
u pa n ic 's first president, soon withdrew from the association. Growing 
tensions between the government and c o s e p after 1980-81 made it dif 
ficult for producer-revolutionaries to comfortably remain active in that 
association. Furthermore, several of these leaders took positions in the 
government and turned their properties over to the state. Since they were 
no longer actively involved in production, their participation in these 
associations ceased. Purged of their participation, u pa n ic  became vocif 
erously anti-Sandinista.
u n a g , meanwhile, recruited vigorously. Following a major reorgani 
zation in 1984, this association "widened what had been up to then a 
small opening" and began to recruit even large producers (Nunez 1985a, 
369). As u n a g  moved into the organizational terrain traditionally held by 
u pa n ic  groups, middle-sized producers especially were pulled between 
the two. Even some prominent producers with elite family backgrounds 
left u pa n ic  affiliates and came to serve as u n a g  leaders and spokes 
people.20
u n a g 's  history as an FSLN-sponsored mass organization and its leader 
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ship by f s l n  militants, even under its new president, Daniel Nunez, 
bound it closely to the cause of the revolution. Until the organization's 
dramatic embrace of demobilized contras in the post-1990 period, the 
range of views reflected by its leadership was also limited, u n a g  leaders 
did become more independent of the f s l n  over time (Haugaard 1991 ■ 
Luciak forthcoming), but always remained prorevolution.
To some degree, the differences in the political orientations of u pa n ic  
and u n a g  reflect variations in the class fragment from which these leaders 
were derived. Although both organizations had leaders who were quite 
prosperous, large landowners were more likely to affiliate with u pa n ic . 
Among those interviewed in this study, 76 percent of the u pa n ic  leaders 
who were landowners in the late 1970s were large producers during that 
era; in contrast, only 43 percent of the u n a g  leaders fell into this cate 
gory. The bulk of the u n a g  leaders interviewed (57 percent) who owned 
property during that time were medium or small producers in the 1970s; 
only 24 percent of the u pa n ic  leaders were from these strata.
Not only did u n a g  leaders tend to own less property, they were also 
less likely to be among the social elite of the country. Unlike their u pa n ic  
counterparts, 47 percent of whom had lived in the United States at some 
point, only 25 percent of the u n a g  leaders had this kind of experience.21 
The u n a g  leaders were also less likely to have completed a college educa 
tion (25 percent vs. 70 percent for u pa n ic  leaders), and only 12.5 percent 
of the u n a g  leaders had been educated abroad (vs. 45 percent for u pa n ic  
leaders).
Among private sector leaders, therefore, those in u n a g  were substan 
tially less prosperous and socially prominent than those of u pa n ic . u n a g  
leaders matched more closely the chapiolla bourgeoisie concept devel 
oped by ci e r a 's theoreticians to differentiate the locally grounded pro 
ducers from those with strong international connections (Nunez 1985a, 
367-69; Baumeister and Neira Cuadra 1986, 181-82). Lacking the social 
cachet to, in some cases, even be admitted to elitist producer associations 
in their hometowns, these highly motivated leaders rose quickly within 
the ranks of u n a g  soon after the new organization was founded.22
These organizations did not just reflect differences in the perspectives 
that their members brought into the associations. Both c o s e p and u n a g  
made a concerted effort to disseminate a political viewpoint within the 
organization's circle of influence. For the c o s e p national organization, 
oppositional politics was its raison d'etre. Using periodic speaking tours, 
generous access to the pages of the anti-Sandinista daily La Prensa and,
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when La Prensa was closed by Sandinista censors, its own Memorandum 
de la Presidencia, c o s e p leaders conveyed their views and positions to 
their constituents, u n a g  leaders also attempted to forge a certain men 
tality among their affiliates, using inserts in the Sandinista newspaper 
Barricada and their own magazine, Productores, for these purposes. These 
efforts did not always succeed.23 This practice suggests, however, that 
the organizational affiliation of bourgeois leaders may have had its own, 
additional impact on their views, reinforcing or deepening the political 
tendencies that they and other members already had.
National versus Regional Leaders
Of course, not all leaders of these associations were equally committed 
to their organization's political line. As Table 5.4 indicates, there was 
some range of variation in the leaders' perspectives in both organizations. 
Differences between national leaders and those at the sectoral or regional 
level of their organizations, for example, were striking. Among u pa n ic  
affiliates, 63 percent of the respondents at the national level expressed 
strong opposition to the f s l n  government, denouncing it on moral and 
ideological grounds. (See Table 5.5.) In contrast, only 41 percent of the 
regional level leaders registered this kind of strong opposition. The latter 
group was somewhat more inclined to express moderate opposition, criti 
cizing the regime on more narrow, technical grounds (46 percent vs. 33 
percent for national leaders).
These differences in outlook penetrated to the level of economic phi 
losophy. When asked to describe the economic model they most preferred 
for their country, 50 percent of u pa n ic 's  national-level leaders affirmed a 
commitment to pure market capitalism, whereas only 29 percent of those 
at the regional level took that position. The majority (53 percent) of the 
regional leaders preferred moderate capitalism, with some regulation of 
the market, whereas only 31 percent of u pa n ic  national leaders preferred 
that model. Indeed, some regional u pa n ic  affiliates actually came to sup 
port the Sandinista regime, even running as f s l n  candidates in the 199° 
election.24
To some degree, differences in political behavior among c o s e p leaders 
reflect a tactical decision to recruit strong, ideological opponents into the 
national leadership, where they would repeatedly confront the f s l n  on 
political grounds, and to leave the sectoral and local leadership in a rela 
tively protected position, where the emphasis in the discussion would be 
more technical, u pa n ic  national leaders, then, would routinely denounce
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Strong opposition 63 41 — —
Moderate opposition 33 46 — 10
Mixed — 5 14 30
Moderate support — 8 29 30
Strong support 4 — 57 30
f s l n  transgressions and reject any attempt at dialogue, while leaders of 
sectoral associations like that for rice growers (a n a r ) or regional organi 
zations like that for Leon cotton growers (a d a l ) would continue to meet 
with mid in r a  personnel to press for improved prices or easier access to 
productive inputs.
These differences were not, however, simply tactical. They also re 
flected variations in the social backgrounds that prevailed at these two 
levels. Regional and sectoral leaders of u pa n ic  tended to be drawn from a 
more modest background than their national counterparts. For example, 
78 percent of the u pa n ic  national leaders had completed a university edu 
cation,- only 60 percent of the regional and sectoral leaders had done so. 
National leaders were almost twice as likely to have been educated abroad 
(59 percent vs. 32 percent for regional leaders) and had more commonly 
been large producers in the 1970s (81 percent vs. 72 percent).
Parallel divisions were found among u n a g leaders, although the 
smaller number of respondents involved makes it more difficult to draw 
clear conclusions. In this study, 57 percent of the national-level leaders in 
u n a g  expressed strong support for the Sandinista government, whereas 
only 30 percent of the regional leaders were as enthusiastic. (See Table 5.5.) 
In contrast, 40 percent of the regional leaders offered either a mixed 
appraisal or indicated moderate opposition to the regime. None of the 
national leaders indicated opposition to the regime, and only 14 percent 
offered a mixed evaluation.25
Whereas the top leadership of u n a g  was composed of members of the 
f s l n  or those who were very closely identified with the cause, the re 
gional u n a g  leaders were more diverse. Most u n a g  regional leaders were
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not overtly partisan, and several were quite critical of the Sandinista gov 
ernment. One was even a party activist in the opposition pl i and a close 
relative of a Somoza-era puppet president. These regional leaders endorsed 
social change in Nicaragua, but they were less willing to serve as political 
mobilizers for the f s l n . They explained their association with u n a g  in 
a variety of other ways: as a rejection of the hyperpoliticized hostility of 
the u pa n ic  associations, a response to the insularity and snootiness of a 
closed local elite, a nationalistic response to the contra war, or a response 
to economic opportunities that u n a g  offered agricultural producers.
Often operating in regions where the contra forces were strong and 
the f s l n 's popularity was low (Boaco, Chontales, Matagalpa, Jinotega), 
these local leaders generally played down their links with the Sandinista 
government. As the president of the Boaco u n a g  association explained, 
"Producers here won't even talk to you if they think you're from the 
Frente Sandinista. Leaders of producers here can't have political lives." 
These leaders attempted to build their organizations by emphasizing the 
openness of meetings to anyone who wanted to participate; their ability to 
bring in technical assistance and financing, particularly from Scandina 
vian countries; and their effectiveness in navigating a complex and some 
times menacing government bureaucracy. Recognizing that many u n a g  
members joined for instrumental reasons rather than from revolutionary 
conviction, these local leaders attempted to respond to concrete needs.26
As with u pa n ic , the political differentiation within u n a g  was asso 
ciated with subclass variation among its leaders. In contrast with u pa n ic , 
u n a g 's national leaders tended to have less extensive landholdings and 
lower educational attainments. Whereas only 33 percent of u n a g 's  
national leadership was among the large producers in the 1970s, 56 per 
cent of the regional leaders interviewed were in this category. The percent 
of regional u n a g  private sector leaders with university degrees was 30 
percent, more than twice the 14 percent found among the national leader 
ship. For both u pa n ic  and u n a g , therefore, the positions taken by the 
national leadership differed measurably from the preferences and views 
of mid-level leaders. These differences suggest both the polarizing quality 
of the national debate, which divided its participants more emphatically 
than did deliberations at the regional and sectoral level, and the varia 
tion in subclass composition of the leadership in different levels of these 
powerful organizations.
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Experiential Factors and Political Views
The Sandinista government expected that the concrete experiences dif 
ferent producers had with government policies would also influence the 
ways in which those producers responded to the regime. Although some 
benefits and burdens were generalized, many government actions and 
policies tended to favor one set of producers over others. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, the f s l n  government initially adopted a segmented view of 
the bourgeoisie. During the period in which this model prevailed, the gov 
ernment attempted to devise policy that favored those who fit into the 
revolutionary model while draining resources from those who did not.
Two kinds of experiences with the regime might be expected to have 
a pronounced impact. The first is whether or not the producer underwent 
land expropriation by the Sandinista government. The second experience 
concerns the principal crop the producer cultivated and the priority it was 
given in the national economic policy. Being allowed to retain ownership 
rights and being given subsidies and financial supports should logically 
encourage producers to adopt a less oppositional view of the state; pro 
ducers in low priority areas who underwent expropriation, on the other 
hand, should be good candidates for the opposition.
Expropriation and Political Views
Agrarian reform legislation under the Sandinistas authorized the ex 
propriation of land that was not being used productively. This frame 
work gave mid in r a  officials considerable latitude for action. Stipula 
tions against decapitalization, for example, could refer to a wide range of 
common practices, in a country where wartime dislocations and gener 
alized economic decline led to low investment levels and deterioration 
of infrastructure. Regulations governing expropriations were not applied 
uniformly throughout the country. A deteriorated farm in one part of the 
country might be expropriated, while a similar property in another part 
might be passed over. Much depended on the land pressure in the re 
gion, development projects on nearby state farms, the status of the war, 
and the convictions of local authorities. This variation, along with the 
much-publicized expropriations of top c o s e p officials, led to the percep 
tion among producers that expropriation was a political tool used by the 
Sandinistas against their enemies. To a degree, this view was accurate.
Over one-third (36 percent) of the private sector leaders interviewed had 
experienced one or more expropriations. (See Table 5.6.) As expected, the
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Strong opposition 47 47 33 38
Moderate opposition 41 27 32 33
Mixed 6 — 10.5 8
Moderate support — 13 14 11
Strong support 6 13 10.5 10
experience of being expropriated was associated with a negative evalua 
tion of the regime. The link was particularly pronounced for those who 
underwent a "hard expropriation," in which they received little or no 
compensation. For that group, 47 percent of the respondents provided a 
strongly opposed assessment of the regime, and another 41 percent of that 
group was moderately opposed. In all, 88 percent of those who underwent 
a full-scale expropriation wound up the decade with a negative view of 
the regime.
Almost half of those who were expropriated experienced what might 
be labeled a soft expropriation, in which they were subsequently able to 
recover some property.27 Some of those in this group eventually had the 
most valuable part of their property returned; others received comparable 
property in a land or machinery swap (permuta}. Those who underwent 
a soft expropriation also registered substantial opposition to the regime 
(also 47 percent strongly opposed), suggesting that expropriation triggered 
moral outrage and fierce hostility, even when it was subsequently soft 
ened by retraction or compensation. Overall, however, those who under 
went a soft expropriation were slightly less hostile than those in the first 
category (74 percent expressing some form of opposition, vs. 88 percent). 
Indeed, over a quarter (26 percent) of those in this group offered a positive 
evaluation of the regime.
Most of those whose holdings were not expropriated were opposed to 
the regime as well. Almost two-thirds (65 percent) of those who had es 
caped expropriation were nonetheless opponents of the regime. This find 
ing suggests that personal experiences with expropriation may have had 
less impact on the political views of private sector leaders than the San 
dinista government expected. Indeed, in discussing expropriation, many
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private sector leaders noted that although they had not been expropriated 
themselves, close relatives or neighbors had been. One popular refrain 
in these interviews ran, "Every pig has its Saturday [market day)." Many 
of those not expropriated labored under the expectation that their turn 
would come, sooner or later. The fact that they had not yet undergone this 
experience provided little sense of permanent security or protection for 
this group. Their opposition may be explained, therefore, as an anticipa 
tory or affiliational response.
The level of opposition for this third group was, however, somewhat 
lower than that for those who were personally expropriated. Sixty-five 
percent of those in this group registered some degree of opposition, for ex 
ample, versus 88 percent for those who underwent a hard expropriation. 
Again, and less surprisingly, a segment (25 percent) of those in this group 
expressed some degree of support for the Sandinista government. The fact 
that they themselves did not lose land in this fashion probably contrib 
uted to their lessened hostility to the regime. Although the government's 
expectation that those who were not expropriated would respond posi 
tively was naive, some modest differences in the degree of opposition may 
be associated with this experience.28 The breadth of the opposition re 
gardless of personal expropriation, however, suggests that this particular 
experience was generally not a crucial determinant of the political views 
of private sector elites.29
Sectoral Favoritism and Political Views
For some producers, Sandinista production and price policy actually 
brought economic benefits. Not only did they escape expropriation, they 
received hefty subsidies and ready access to production inputs. Theoreti 
cally, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3, Sandinista production policy in 
the early years was designed to favor those producing for the domestic 
market and to extract the surplus from the previously favored agroexport 
elite. This approach was roughly analogous to the strategy adopted else 
where in Latin America by populist regimes (Cardoso 1972; Conaghan 
1988). Those strategies emphasized the formation of an alliance between 
the state and the segment of the bourgeoisie that produced for the local 
market and would benefit from an improvement in the purchasing power 
of labor. Elsewhere in Latin America, this approach had elicited the sup 
port of local industrialists in the state's confrontation with traditional 
agrarian oligarchs or export-oriented industrialists whose prosperity was 
dependent on low labor costs and foreign sales.
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In theory, the early redistribution of resources in Nicaragua and the 
increase in food consumption, combined with staples subsidies, could 
have consolidated a link between staples producers and the revolutionary 
state. In practice, although these producers did respond by decreasing pro 
duction less than others, their leaders did not typically become political 
allies of the regime. In fact, of the private sector leaders interviewed in 
this study, staples producers overwhelmingly registered strong opposition 
to the regime, more so than any other single sector. Fifty-four percent of 
private sector leaders whose primary activity was staples production (rice, 
sorghum, and maize) were strongly opposed to the Sandinista regime. In 
contrast, only 18 percent of cotton growers, 29 percent of those in live 
stock (cattle and dairy), and 46 percent of coffee producers registered such 
extreme opposition. Unlike what the theory would predict, government 
policy did not succeed in generating a show of support among staples 
sector leaders in Nicaragua. This may be because policy was so inconsis 
tently applied and signals were so confused, or because other policies at 
the end of the era were so counterproductive that early positive results 
were undermined.30
On the other hand, some government programs probably did elicit elite 
support. Perhaps the clearest example of government favoritism that may 
have diluted opposition was found in the cotton sector. As a major export 
crop, cotton should not have been particularly benefited by a pro-food 
policy. Since cottonseed oil was a staple in the Nicaraguan diet, however, 
this crop crossed the boundaries between export and domestic market, 
suggesting the porousness of these conceptual categories. Cotton produc 
tion also dominated the regional economy of northwestern Nicaragua and 
was the main source of employment for that region. For several reasons, 
therefore, the Sandinista government worked to salvage cotton produc 
tion, at least on the most productive lands. One independent study of the 
Nicaraguan cotton sector indicated that both the profits and the costs of 
production were financed by a transfer of resources from the state through 
inorganic emissions from the b c n  (Evans 1987, 19). Although interna 
tional prices were tumbling and cotton producers elsewhere in Central 
America were shifting out of production during the 1980s, cotton produc 
tion fell less sharply in Nicaragua.
Cotton growers did not always perceive that they were being subsi 
dized by the state. The welter of controls and artificial prices set by the 
government made such calculations extremely difficult. But many algo- 
doneros did observe that cotton production in neighboring Guatemala had
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declined sharply due to falling international prices, while the decline in 
Nicaragua had been arrested by government production policy. Recogni 
tion that the Sandinistas' cotton policy had preserved the cotton sector in 
Nicaragua led several cotton association leaders to offer positive assess 
ments of Sandinista production policy. Indeed, 30 percent of the cotton 
producers expressed some level of support for the regime, surpassing the 
support levels in any other sector.31 Cotton growers were, therefore, much 
less likely to join the moral-political opposition to the regime than were 
those whose livelihoods centered on livestock, coffee, or basic grains.
These observations suggest that the Sandinista government was able, 
to some degree, to adjust the level and location of bourgeois opposition 
through its own sectoral development programs. Elite opposition was not 
simply a given, uniformly preordained by the revolution. Private sector 
perspectives were probably influenced by at least some concrete state 
actions. To the extent that the revolution could identify and cushion pro 
ducers in strategic subsectors, like cotton producers, it could blunt elite 
opposition. Lower priority sectors or those that were dealt with in an in 
consistent manner, in contrast, were more likely to become centers of 
opposition politics.
The government's power to orchestrate elite responses was limited, 
however, because private elites were not just affected by their particu 
lar production experiences. They also responded to the general social and 
economic climate and to the experiences of others in their class. Even if 
they were not personally targeted for hostile action or unfavorable poli 
cies, they often responded as if they had been. Furthermore, one response 
of producers to the uncertainties of the 1980s was to diversify production. 
Policies that favored them in one area might have negative consequences 
for them in their other activities. These considerations made the impact 
of government policy on elite perspectives less straightforward than it 
might have been. Finally, as state resources dried up, the regime's ability 
to provide selected supports to favored fragments of the elite was steadily 
reduced. By the end of the era, it had little room in which to maneuver for 
political favor.
So What? Politics, Production, and Investment
It is not theoretically adventurous to note that political perceptions af 
fect economic behavior. Political views, of course, are not the sole de 
terminant of economic decisions. Projections of probable costs, potential
markets, expected competition, and, ultimately, future returns are obvi 
ously crucial variables. In bad economic times, such as those prevailing 
in Nicaragua (and indeed much of Latin America) during the 1980s, one 
would expect production and investment to decline generally, regardless 
of political perceptions. But acrimonious interactions and hostile politi 
cal evaluations might logically be expected to provoke further economic 
withdrawal on the part of the economic elite.
When producers are convinced that the government under which they 
operate is corrupt or led by moral degenerates and ideological fanatics 
who intend to destroy them, this perception obviously takes a toll on 
their willingness to engage in entrepreneurial activities. On the other 
hand, if producers believe that the government is visionary, committed to 
national development, and principled, then this belief may inspire them 
to participate in the emerging economy in spite of the risks.
In the Nicaraguan case, the interview data suggest a clear, statisti 
cally significant association between the political views of private sector 
leaders and their economic behaviors. The concluding section of this chap 
ter looks at two ways in which political views and economic behavior 
were connected. The first explores the link between political appraisals 
and investment behavior. The second focuses on the relationship between 
assessments of the regime and production outcomes.
Political Views and Investment
Private sector leaders in this study who evaluated the regime positively 
were much more likely than opponents to have made major investments 
in their operations during the decade. Whereas 58 percent of supporters 
indicated that they had made major investments,32 only 29 percent of the 
opponents had done so. (See Table 5.7.) More telling, 43 percent of those 
opposed to the regime indicated that they had made no new investments 
in production during this period. In contrast, only 16 percent of those who 
supported the regime reported no new investments, and those were pro 
ducers whose political and bureaucratic workload had drawn them away 
from their agricultural activities.33
Of various kinds of major investments, the most significant was the 
acquisition of land. Surprisingly, in an era of large-scale land expropria 
tion, some elites did buy land. Since land purchases in Nicaragua were 
not financed by the bank (either before or after the revolution), these in 
vestments required the buyer to risk his or her own capital—in spite of 
the possibility of subsequent expropriation.34 Offsetting this risk was the
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Table 5.7










Major investment 29 29 58 35
Minor investment 29 57 26 30
No investment 43 14 16 35
lure of very low land prices. The price of land was severely depressed 
due to expropriations and general economic conditions. Many landowners 
were willing to sell cheaply as they prepared to emigrate.35 For those who 
were bold enough to take the risk of acquiring new land, the Sandinista 
era provided a golden opportunity. One large cattle rancher affiliated with 
f a g a n ic  reported buying seven farms during this period, acquiring land 
biannually between 1982 and 1986 and annually between 1987 and 1990. 
His landholdings swelled from 8,000 mz. in 1977 to 18,000 mz. in 1990, 
making him one of the country's larger landowners.
Although a handful of producers who were adamantly opposed to the 
regime took the risk of buying land, supporters were more likely to engage 
in this behavior, particularly in the turbulent 1982-88 period. Overall, 37 
percent of supporters bought land during this period, and a full 50 percent 
of the moderate supporters did so.36 Of opponents, only 17 percent took 
that risk.37
Some producers went beyond land purchases to make investments in 
agroindustrial operations, g r a c s a , Nicaragua's largest oilseed production 
facility, provides a notable example. At the recommendation of General 
Manager Antonio Lacayo, the majority shareholding group of g r a c s a  
established a series of spinoff corporations (Spalding 1991). Most remark 
ably, this group's investment rose briskly even during a long period (1982- 
88) when g r a c s a  was "intervened" by the Sandinista government. To 
bolster its legal appeal challenging this takeover and to take advantage 
of investment opportunities, this group founded seven new corporations 
during the six year period when the company was intervened. As its stock 
holders awaited the (successful) outcome of their appeal to the Nicara 
guan Supreme Court, this group linked both forward and backward from 
g r a c s a 's  initial operations.38 g r a c s a 's  owners continued making invest 
ments in the years that followed, founding three new enterprises in 1989
alone. One of the most entrepreneurial investment groups in the coun 
try, the g r a c s a  group not only launched spinoff corporations,- it also 
entered into joint ventures with the government for the development of 
nontraditional products and the introduction of new technologies.39
Business leaders who bought land, took on new investments, partici 
pated in government development projects, or joined joint ventures were 
generally less vehemently opposed to the regime than those who did not. 
They were not necessarily supporters of the revolution; as we have seen, 
even opponents undertook major investments in some cases. However, 
a less oppositional perspective facilitated negotiations in the complex 
political and economic environment that prevailed during the Sandinista 
period.
Political Views and Production
Like investment decisions, production levels depend on many factors, 
including the expansion or contraction of the market, the availability 
of inexpensive inputs, the labor supply, climate, and expropriation ex 
periences. In addition to these economic variables, however, producers' 
perceptions of the regime can also have an impact. Political support can 
animate the production process by encouraging producers to take bold ini 
tiatives, make long-term investments, and plan for the future. A negative 
assessment, on the other hand, makes long-range thinking more difficult 
and can undermine the producers' contribution to national growth. In a 
revolutionary setting, in which the economy is highly politicized, politi 
cal attitudes may have a particularly important impact on production.
Evidence from this study suggests a close relationship between politi 
cal views and production levels in the Nicaraguan case. Overall produc 
tion levels during the revolution fell disastrously, but the pattern again 
varied across producers. Over two-thirds (69 percent) of those opposed 
to the regime reported a decrease in production between the late 1970s 
and the late 1980s.40 (See Table 5.8.) In contrast, a relatively modest 37 
percent of the supporters had this experience, and many in this group 
reduced production voluntarily as the result of donating properties to 
the state or devoting attention to their government jobs instead of their 
estates.41 Among private sector leaders interviewed in this study, those 
who viewed the regime positively reported more success in maintaining 
or even increasing their production levels. Thirty-seven percent of those 
who favored the regime reported an increase in production. In contrast, 
only 10 percent of those registering opposition expanded at that rate.
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Table 5.8










Decrease 69 43 37 60
Stable 21 43 26 24
Increase 10 14 37 16
Assessing the link between politics and production is particularly dif 
ficult, however, because of the complex interrelationships among these 
variables. Political attitudes may shape production behavior, but the 
causal relationship may also operate in the opposite direction: changing 
production outcomes may influence political views. A sharp decrease in 
production, for example, could trigger political opposition if the decline 
was attributed to unfavorable regime decisions (price policy, expropria 
tion, supply breakdowns) rather than neutral or uncontrollable forces. 
Political opposition could then in turn feed further economic withdrawal. 
Without more detailed information on production and attitude shifts bro 
ken down over time, the exact sequence of these connections cannot be 
clearly unraveled.
Conclusions
In this chapter, various factors shaping the political views of Nicaraguan 
economic elites come into focus. The bourgeoisie, which had been his 
torically fragmented and lacking in political authority in the prerevolu 
tionary period, continued to suffer from these characteristics under the 
Sandinistas. Although this factionalism was reduced when the Somoza 
dynasty collapsed and the Sandinista revolution presented a broad threat 
to the economic elite, divisions remained. The increasing amorphousness 
of the Sandinista model, the regime's policy inconsistency, and the San 
dinistas' own "divide and rule" strategy all helped to further fragment the 
bourgeoisie.
Interview data suggest that the views of leaders of producer associa 
tions in the agricultural sector were divided by subclass strata. Those who 
were large producers in the period before the revolution were dispropor 
tionately among the virulent opponents to the regime. Furthermore, those
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with greater access to education, particularly prestige educations obtained 
abroad, were also more likely to strongly oppose the Sandinistas than 
were those less privileged. Opposition among leaders who were medium- 
and small-sized producers, less well educated, and educated at home was 
generally less pronounced.
This link, however, was weakened by the presence of some large-sized, 
foreign-educated business leaders among the regime supporters and by 
the fierce opposition to the regime manifested by some private sector 
leaders who were less privileged (small- and medium-sized producers, 
those who completed only high school). As a result of these anomalous 
cases, the association between subclass characteristics of elite leaders and 
their political views was not strong enough to demonstrate a clear, con 
sistent relationship. This information points, instead, to the somewhat 
amorphous class alliances of the Nicaraguan revolution.
Other factors, such as the organizational affiliations of these leaders, 
were more closely linked with their political views. Divisions within 
the elite were reinforced by the organizational segmentation of the Nica 
raguan private sector. Involvement in competing associations tended to 
further polarize these producers, particularly those who operated at the 
national level, u pa n ic  functioned as a rallying point for those agricul 
tural producers who launched a moral-political critique of the regime. 
u n a g , on the other hand, clustered together private sector defenders of 
the revolution. Even within these organizations, however, some varia 
tion in political ideology was found, particularly between those leaders at 
the national and the sectoral/regional levels. National leaders tended to 
adopt more extreme positions (either strong opposition or strong support) 
whereas those at the sectoral or regional level had more moderate views.
The producers' concrete experiences and interactions with government 
officials during the revolution probably also had some impact on their 
views, though less than the Sandinista leadership expected. The experi 
ence of having land expropriated did prove politically alienating. But oppo 
sition was generalized even among those leaders whose landholdings were 
not expropriated, suggesting that individual experiences may have been 
less important in forming elite views than their assessments of overall 
class relations.
On the other hand, opposition was apparently blunted when the regime 
buffered producers in particular subsectors, such as cotton, from inter 
national downturns. In some instances, the regime may have been able 
to elicit an element of elite support through particularly favorable treat-
The Elite Leadership 155
ment. In general, however, private sector opposition was not closely tied 
to government actions.
Interview data compiled for this study indicate that the elites7 political 
views had marked consequences for their economic behavior. Investment 
and production patterns varied sharply with the level of political opposi 
tion or support expressed by these leaders. Regime supporters were more 
inclined to take on new investments, buy land and machinery, expand 
housing for their workers, and try out new technologies. They were also 
more likely to keep their production levels stable or even increase their 
output during this period. Opponents, on the other hand, were more re 
luctant to buy new land, even though prices were rock-bottom, or to 
undertake extensive new investments, even when credit was available. 
Over time, their production levels dropped, in many cases by over half.
In conclusion, information from these interviews suggests consider 
able variation among the private sector leaders in Nicaragua on a series of 
issues. This kind of fragmentation prevented the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie 
from functioning as a united bloc or pursuing a clear, common agenda. For 
many reasons, including its own internal cleavages, the bourgeoisie con 
tinued to have difficulty asserting political authority. It did not, as in the 
Chilean case under the Allende government, convoke a series of general 
strikes that ground the economy to a halt. Nor did it, as in the Salvadoran 
case, mobilize a paramilitary force to terrorize opponents. It could not 
form a strong political party of its own or orchestrate a mass movement 
that could divide the Sandinista military and drive the f s l n  from power.
On the other hand, this elite did tilt heavily into the opposition. The 
Sandinistas failed to restructure the private producers into a patriotic 
bourgeoisie. Even after the regime's multiple concessions in the post-1987 
era, its toehold in the bourgeoisie remained modest. The regime never 
won enough support to counter the economic impact of the contra war 
and its own problematic policy choices. Having concentrated too heavily 
on the development of state enterprises, failed to win a large enough seg 
ment of the bourgeoisie to the cause of moderate reform, and given too 
little attention to the sustained organization and training of small pro 
ducers and cooperatives, the regime was unable to create a solid economic 
base on which to consolidate the revolution.
chapter
From Revolution to Neoliberalism 
Private Sector Ambivalence in 
Postrevolutionary Nicaragua 
(1990-1993)
We will give back to the producer what he should have: the right to 
make the decisions and take the risks.
—Silvio de Franco, minister of economy 
and development, May 19,1990
Neoliberalism? Fine, let it come. We accept neoliberalism as long as the 
economy is democratized.
—Jaime Wheelock Roman, National 
Directorate, f s l n , June 27,1992
Last year [1991], we prepared the terrain to wage economic battle. . . . 
We confronted the traditional bourgeoisie in [agroindustry, commerce, 
and banking], as well as the Sandinistas. They’re definitely the same 
thing but with different ideological colors.
—Sinforiano Caceres, vice-president 
of FENACOOP-UNAG
I
n  Apr il  1990 Violeta Barrios de Chamorro was inaugurated as presi 
dent of Nicaragua, and the f s l n  leadership relinquished official power. 
Given the close ties between Chamorro's electoral coalition and the 
United States, it was widely assumed that the new government would at 
tempt to undo the revolution and move the country in a classically liberal 
direction.1
The dynamics of economic change are complex, however, and the con 
figuration of political forces weighs heavily in this process. The intricacies 
of political negotiation are even more delicate for a government coming 
out of a revolutionary experience than for one attempting economic tran 
sition in less turbulent times. A revolution, if it merits the name, should 
reweave the nation's social fabric in a way that leaves a long-term trace.
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It should restructure options, forge durable new alliances, mobilize pre 
viously powerless groups, and create a new political panorama. Social 
revolution should build strong buffers against the neoliberal tide.
The next three sections of this chapter explore (1) the configuration 
of forces that generally supports the adoption of a neoliberal economic 
model, (2) the actors and processes that emerged in the postrevolution 
ary period in Nicaragua, and (3) the brisk move toward neoliberalism that 
ensued in Nicaragua in 1990-92. The Nicaraguan transition, however, 
varied in notable respects from the more classical shift toward neoliber 
alism. These crucial differences are described in section four. The fifth 
section analyzes the reaction to this amalgam by four different sectors 
of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. As it had in prior periods, the Nicara 
guan elite responded in varied ways, ranging from sharp rejection to eager 
participation.
The Politics of Neoliberal Economics
Comparative research on structural adjustment and the transition toward 
a neoliberal economic model suggests that the successful implementation 
of the model depends on a series of propitious conditions (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1992a; Nelson 1990). Key elements include (1) strong backing 
from international financial actors, (2) the development of a technocratic 
policy team to oversee the program, (3) forceful executive support, (4) the 
debility and/or cooptation of popular sectors, and (5) the active coopera 
tion of an influential sector of the local elite.
Although an analysis that presents neoliberal reform solely as the prod 
uct of imf  or U.S. government intrusion ignores the complex dynamics 
of economic change, international financial actors typically play a pivotal 
role in the process. The imf  and the World Bank facilitate the movement 
toward economic reform both by disseminating the classical liberal ideol 
ogy and by providing partial financing of the structural adjustment process 
(Stallings 1992). The U.S. government directly supports this transition 
through u s a id  programs and the zealous promotion of free trade.2 Using 
billions of dollars' worth of targeted assistance, the imf  stabilization and 
adjustment programs and the Bush administration's Enterprise for the 
Americas had an unprecedented impact on regional economic policy in 
the 1980s and early 1990s.
But the U.S. government and international financial institutions can 
not simply dictate policy reform. A crucial mechanism through which
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external actors wield influence is the training of a domestic technocratic 
elite that links local and international economic actors (Nelson 1990, 330- 
31; Kahler 1992, 124-27). This insular elite, labeled the "reformist cadre" 
by Haggard and Kaufman (1992a, 13) and the "change team" by Waterbury 
(1992,191), mediates the transfer of the economic ideology and associated 
policy prescriptions as it oversees the local initiation and implementation 
of the policy reform.
To implement its neoliberal program, for example, the Belaunde gov 
ernment in Peru reabsorbed Peruvian technocrats who had been dispersed 
abroad in international lending institutions and who had few ties to local 
politics (Conaghan et al. 1990,15). The infamous "Chicago boys" who de 
veloped Chile's new economic program during the military dictatorship 
(Foxley 1986), and officials from the s pp and the Banco de Mexico who led 
the move toward a free trade regime in Mexico in the 1980s (Heredia 1991), 
were foreign-trained technocrats distinctly separated from the bargain 
ing process of party politics. International linkages and local detachment 
allowed them to pursue a radically new economic model that redefined 
the role of the state in the economic order.
To succeed in this effort, the economic team needs firm support from 
the president and a political system weighted heavily toward executive 
control. If the executive branch is too weak, the dispersal of power through 
a series of institutions that compete for control can give opponents of 
the neoliberal project an instrument through which to block the reform. 
When the legislature serves as an effective check on presidential domi 
nance, powerful groups may succeed in diverting the economic program 
by riddling it with exemptions and loopholes, if not derailing the project 
altogether. Centralization of political authority in the hands of the execu 
tive, on the other hand, allows a president committed to the new agenda 
to pursue it with fewer impediments. The ability of the president to rule 
in effect by decree, in spite of any formal divisions of power or constitu 
tional constraints, fosters the implementation of economic restructuring. 
Neoliberal reform is also promoted when executive power extends deep 
into the bureaucracy, which otherwise could undermine the effort.3
Various groups in civil society, including both popular sectors and 
privileged elites, will have reason to object to the new economic model. 
The immediate, and often longer-term, impact of the neoliberal project is 
the withdrawal of economic supports that have buffered important seg 
ments of the popular classes. Subsidies on basic goods and services are
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terminated, causing price hikes; wage indexation is eliminated, allowing 
real wages to tumble; agrarian reform land may be returned to former 
owners or made available for sale, fostering reconcentration of the land; 
public sector employment is cut, leading to a ripple of job loss in adjacent 
sectors; and import competition increases, resulting in a loss of industrial 
jobs. There is a strong tendency for popular groups to resist paying the 
high social costs of the transition to free market capitalism.4
Neoliberal reform can be implemented in spite of these social costs if 
mass organizations are weak and the antistatist ideology is successfully 
disseminated. For much of the region, the long experience of authoritarian 
rule followed by a decade of debt-induced economic crisis left unions and 
mass organizations weakened and unable to challenge the new economic 
orientation effectively (Buchanan and Putnam 1992). The repression of 
politics in Chile and its circumscription in Mexico, for example, allowed 
these governments to proceed with the neoliberal approach without sus 
tained popular upheaval.5
In the long run, however, the consolidation of the new model requires 
the construction of a support network that endorses the reform. Antistat- 
ism triggered by many years of authoritarian government, combined with 
a rejection of the e c l a  development model following a decade of eco 
nomic crisis, may create an environment in which the neoliberal ideology 
can take root. But the cultivation of durable support, particularly in the 
strategic sectors of the business elite who must back the new project with 
their own investments, poses a challenge.
Not only the popular sectors but important segments of the local eco 
nomic elite are negatively affected by the neoliberal reform. When much 
of the local elite is "historically wedded to an intricate scheme of rent- 
seeking behavior" (Glade 1991, 8), the transition from a development 
model in which the state plays a central role to one in which its in 
volvement is relatively modest can undercut the position of traditional 
powerholders. Evidence from the Chilean case suggests that small- and 
medium-sized business operations, which were not bolstered by ties to 
international capital or the major financial groups, were disproportion 
ately injured by the withdrawal of state supports after 1973.6 In Peru, in 
dustrialists, shaken by the infusion of foreign imports when tariff barriers 
were reduced, and nontraditional exporters, who lost export subsidies, be 
came major opponents of the Belaunde reforms (Conaghan et al. 1990,19). 
Credit restrictions and increased foreign competition drew industrialists,
agroindustrialists, and exporters into the opposition in Bolivia during the 
economic shock treatment of the Victor Paz Estenssoro administration 
(Conaghan et al. 1990, 20).
When the "change team" is effectively insulated from even business 
pressure, neoliberal reforms may be imposed in spite of business oppo 
sition. Effective consolidation of the new model, however, requires the 
construction of a new state-capital alliance around the emerging accumu 
lation pattern. Efforts by the Pinochet regime to reinforce linkages with 
the reconstituted agroexport elite, for example, helped to stabilize the 
Chilean transition to neoliberalism in the 1980s (Stallings 1989,190-93). 
Without the cooperation of strategic producers, the regime will be unable 
to generate the investment needed to refound the national economy.
Many elements supporting neoliberal reform were present in Nica 
ragua following the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas. Extensive sup 
port for transition was provided by the Bush administration and inter 
national financial institutions. U.S.-trained technocrats were prominent 
in the economic team, and political power was concentrated in the ex 
ecutive branch. There were, however, several important obstacles to re 
form. Prominent among them was the counterforce of relatively mobi 
lized popular sectors. The factionalized politics of the bourgeoisie also 
made it difficult to line up private sector support for the neoliberal 
package, although pockets of support emerged (ironically including even 
Sandinistas-cum-entrepreneurs). The result was a modification in the 
model that reflected the political conjuncture of the postrevolutionary 
moment.
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The Framework for Neoliberal Politics in 
Postrevolutionary Nicaragua
Years of economic crisis had already prompted the Sandinista govern 
ment to begin the shift away from a state-centered development strategy; 
electoral defeat of the f s l n  now catapulted Nicaragua into the neoliberal 
camp. International financial organizations and the U.S. government re 
sponded heartily to the new government. For the Bush administration, 
the election of Violeta Chamorro represented the successful conclusion 
of the divisive contra aid policy and a hallmark of the U.S. commitment 
to democratization of the region. The White House maneuvered a foreign 
aid package through Congress that supported neoliberal reform, restoring
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trade and the sugar quota that had been terminated by the Reagan admin 
istration and forgiving bilateral loans lingering from the Somoza era.7
The u s a id  mission in Nicaragua was a central agent in this pro 
cess (Saldomando 1992). Of the $614 million in the u s a id  program for 
Nicaragua in the 1990-92 period, two-thirds was assigned for balance of 
payments support to maintain the flow of imports like petroleum and 
food staples. The local currency generated by the sale of this foreign ex 
change provided the Nicaraguan government with funds to cover its defi 
cits and support its programs, u s a id  funds allowed the government to 
cover bank losses associated with the March 1991 devaluation of the cur 
rency, the deficits of state enterprises such as the sugar trade monopoly 
c o n a z u c a r  that was being prepared for privatization, severance pay for 
state workers taking early retirement, the government's failed plan to 
resuscitate the cotton sector, and the clearing of the arrears with the 
World Bank and the id b . Smaller amounts of u s a id  support covered the 
costs of setting up the new superintendency of banks, which monitored 
the state bank system and oversaw the creation of private banks; of de 
signing a privatization program; of creating an export promotion center,- 
and of covering the operating expenses of private sector organizations 
like c o s e p, u pa n ic , and the newly formed association of producers of 
nontraditional exports, a pe n n  (u s a id  1992; interview, Janet Ballantyne, 
director, usAiD-Nicaragua, July 1,1992).
With U.S. backing, the Chamorro government was able to swing foreign 
loans and donations amounting to a total of US$356 million in 1990, $1.3 
billion in 1991, and another $800 million programmed for 1992 (Ministe 
rio de Cooperacion Externa 1992; Larson with Nitlapan-ucA 1993, 7, 9)-8 
By 1991 crucial support for economic reform was being provided by the 
multilateral lenders. Reforms launched in March 1991, which eliminated 
domestic financing of the government deficit, were designed with staff 
support from the imf , the World Bank and the id b  (Stahler-Sholk 1992, 
26). The World Bank subsequently approved a structural adjustment loan, 
and in September 1991 the imf  issued its first standby loan for Nicaragua 
since 1979. By 1992 the Nicaraguan government had normalized its re 
lationship with these multilateral lenders and had secured new loans from 
the imf , World Bank, and id b  totaling US$450 million through 1994 (U.S. 
g a o  1992, 3). Multilateral sources were expected to provide a growing 
portion of Nicaragua's foreign loans.9
External support, however, was both politically and economically con-
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ditioned, most visibly on the part of the U.S. government. The pace of the 
Chamorro government's land devolution and its refusal to remove San 
dinista leaders from key posts raised eyebrows in conservative quarters 
of the U.S. Congress. In June 1992, U.S. aid flows of $104 million were 
temporarily halted by Congress when Republican Senator Jesse Helms, 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Democratic Rep 
resentative David Obey, chair of the House Appropriations subcommittee 
on foreign operations, requested the suspension pending a review of aid 
policy.10 After several months of negotiation, the Nicaraguan government 
responded with a shake-up in the police force and a series of presidential 
decrees renewing the regime's policy on property claims and establishing 
indemnization procedures.11 Aid was eventually released following the 
electoral defeat of President Bush, but was temporarily suspended again in 
mid-1993 pending investigation of Nicaraguan linkages with international 
"terrorist" groups.12
Powerful as these external forces were, they would have been unable 
to reconstruct the Nicaraguan economy without the active cooperation 
of local actors. In Nicaragua the team of advisers brought in to guide 
the economic policy of the rookie politician who formally headed the 
u n o  government was drawn heavily from three sectors: c o r d e n ic , a 
business-academic coordinating body,- in c a e , the Harvard-affiliated busi 
ness school; and returning expatriates who had acquired technical train 
ing abroad. Most significant were the members of c o r d e n ic , the moder 
ate economic think tank inspired by the Sanford Commission. Four mem 
bers of the new cabinet were drawn from its ranks. Foremost among them 
was Antonio Lacayo, the president's son-in-law and campaign director, 
who became the minister of the presidency.13
c o r d e n ic  members were joined by a network of academics from 
in c a e , the Central American business school on the outskirts of Mana 
gua.14 The initial ministers of finance and of economy and development 
hailed from in c a e , as did a series of vice-ministers, program directors, 
and consultants. According to a U.S. g a o  report (1991, 21) 16 top tech 
nical advisers in the b c n , the newly formed Ministry of Economy and 
Development (me d e ), and other economic agencies were drawn from this 
institute. With $3.3 million in contracts from u s a id , in c a e  provided 28 
consultants for government and private sector groups and organized 80 
seminars for 3,000 public and private sector participants by April 1993 
(u s a id  1993, 2).
Finally, these two sectors were joined by a network of "Miami boys," as
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they were colloquially known. These former expatriates, some of whom 
had worked in the f s l n  government during the early, more optimistic 
years, had subsequently left the country and taken up residence in the 
United States, where they continued their educations and began new 
careers. A handful of these returnees had affiliated themselves with vari 
ous contra organizations during the 1980s.15 Others held business or aca 
demic positions. Miami boys now returned to staff the Chamorro govern 
ment's major economic ministries.
These three groups formed the core advisory network that represented 
the Chamorro administration. Notable for their absence in administrative 
positions were the leaders of the political parties that made up the u n o  
coalition and c o s e p leaders. The transition teams appointed immediately 
after the February election by Chamorro to suggest nominees for cabinet 
positions systematically included figures from both the political parties 
and c o s e p. When final appointments were made, however, few were ex 
tended beyond the inner circle of Chamorro advisers. What effort there 
was to include prominent c o s e p leaders ultimately backfired. Two c o s e p 
leaders, the organization's President Gilberto Cuadra and Matagalpan cof 
fee association leader Jaime Cuadra, were named to the first cabinet but 
resigned immediately when Chamorro announced that Sandinista defense 
minister General Humberto Ortega would be retained as the head of the 
armed forces.16
Compared with other top political actors, the economic team that took 
over from the Sandinistas was relatively removed from the local political 
context and had a strong commitment to market criteria. The economic 
cabinet members were trained, with few exceptions, in the United States 
and in technical fields like economics and engineering. Several had spent 
much of the Sandinista era outside Nicaragua removed from the debates 
and daily conflicts of the period. Supported intellectually by the business 
program at in c a e , these professionals moved quickly toward a neoliberal 
formula.17
At the outset, the commitment of the new president and her coalition 
to an orthodox, neoliberal program was not entirely clear. In selecting 
Chamorro over c o s e p leader Enrique Bolanos and incorporating only a 
modified version of Bolanos's plan of action into the u n o  platform, the 
u n o  coalition eschewed a clear embrace of classical liberalism.18 The plat 
form's commitment to a "social market" economy, for example, split the 
difference between those who favored the restoration of the market and 
those who endorsed a model that was attentive to the needs of the poor.
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Land policy was also contradictory, embracing, on one hand, the norm of 
returning expropriated properties and, on the other, the consolidation of 
the cooperatives and land grants issued under the Sandinista regime (u n o  
1989). Recognizing the broad-based popularity of the revolution in its early 
days, and sharing some of its social goals, the Chamorro government was 
unwilling to discard all aspects of the Sandinista economic model.
On the other hand, the years of expropriations, press censorship, war, 
and state controls fed an antistatist sentiment that was quite widespread 
in the society. The move toward the market was in part a rebellion against 
the expanded state controls of the 1980s and a bid to close the breach 
that had been opened between Nicaragua and its traditional regional allies 
in the United States and Central America. These considerations, com 
bined with the general enthusiasm for private enterprise in the economic 
"change team" members like b c n  president Francisco Mayorga,19 drew 
the new government toward a neoliberal formula.
In addition to foreign economic support and the backing of a techno 
cratic elite, structural characteristics of the executive branch also bol 
stered economic reform in Nicaragua. As a legacy of both the Somoza and 
the Sandinista eras, political power in Nicaragua was quite concentrated 
in the presidency. The legislature, which had been fully dominated by 
Somoza and his allies in the prerevolutionary era, was generally compli 
ant in the Sandinista era as well.20 The Chamorro government inherited a 
strong executive branch and a weak legislative tradition.
Initially, Chamorro's administration secured a foothold in the legis 
lature by having erstwhile ally Alfredo Cesar elected president of the 
national assembly through a path-breaking coalition of moderates in the 
u n o  ranks and f s l n  supporters. When Cesar later defected from the ranks 
of the moderates and threw his weight behind the more conservative sec 
tors, Chamorro maneuvered around him, often by securing f s l n  votes 
to get her proposals approved. When necessary, she used veto powers to 
prevent the legislature from circumventing executive initiatives. Faced 
over time with a deepening schism in the u n o  ranks and boycotts of the 
legislature by both the f s l n  and u n o  groups, Chamorro used executive 
powers to bypass the assembly and governed frequently by decree.21
The extensive centralization of political authority in Nicaragua allowed 
the president considerable institutional leeway in charting the nation's 
economic course. But she faced a notable challenge from the popular sec 
tors that had been mobilized by the f s l n  during the insurrection and early
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Sandinista period. Organizations like the c s t  and the a t c  were poised to 
impede the restoration of the status quo ante.
These organizations had not, historically, been highly autonomous 
entities or been forcefully directed from their base. Instead, they had been 
closely tied to the institutional interests of the f s l n  and often served to 
advance the cause of the revolution over their particular sectoral inter 
ests.22 Once the f s l n  was defeated and forced to hand over government 
power, however, the relationship became much more complex. When the 
f s l n  leadership attempted to restrain labor activism as part of ongoing 
negotiations with the Chamorro government, Sandinista mass organiza 
tions began to resist control and assert a growing degree of autonomy. To 
prevent the full erosion of their base and collapse of their organizations, 
union and mass organization leaders now had to commit themselves 
more fully to protecting the specific material interests of their mem 
bers. Although still linked ideologically to the f s l n  and attentive to its 
preferences, mass organizations emerged as an increasingly independent 
impediment to the full implementation of a neoliberal model (Stahler- 
Sholk 1992). Sandinista leaders now awkwardly scrambled to position 
themselves at the helm of wildcat labor movements or, in some cases, to 
appeal to workers to desist in confrontational mobilizations. Unlike many 
other cases in Latin America, where the neoliberal model was imposed in 
the wake of a long authoritarian period in which unions were suppressed 
or coopted, the introduction of neoliberalism in the Nicaraguan case oc 
curred when mass organizations were still relatively mobilized and as 
they were beginning to free themselves from the constraints imposed by 
the revolutionary government.
The Chamorro government faced not just political opposition from 
f s l n  organizations but from local business elites as well. The govern 
ment was unable to secure the endorsement of traditional elites, in spite 
of the personal and organizational connections that existed between key 
ministers and the major private sector associations.23 Nicaragua's fac- 
tionalized, fragmented bourgeoisie was incapable of rallying behind any 
program. Most economic elites backed the u n o  coalition during the elec 
tion, but many were simultaneously wary of the new government that 
they themselves had promoted24 This issue will be discussed more fully 
below, but in general both c o s e p leaders and many individual producers 
who were negatively affected by neoliberal policies quickly moved into 
the opposition. The government did have important allies in the bour-
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geoisie, including both entrepreneurial producers who had weathered the 
Sandinista era and some prominent business leaders who had returned 
from exile. But the Chamorro government failed to win the full backing 
of the private sector in spite of the generally antistatist, promarket thrust 
of its economic policy.
Implementing the Model
Between 1990 and 1992 the Chamorro government gradually introduced 
a series of changes that dramatically altered the economic course of the 
nation. According to the Government of Nicaragua's (1992, 1) 1992-96 
development plan,
The Government's medium-term development strategy . . . implies 
moving away from dependence on a paternalistic, all-powerful State 
to self-reliance and spontaneous forms of solidarity; from pervasive 
Government control and intervention in economic activity to a free 
market economy; from rent-seeking behaviour at all levels of society 
to productive hard work; from a high degree of conflict and militari 
zation to a peaceful civil society; from large, inefficient public sector 
bureaucracies to smaller, more efficient organizations focused on 
those few areas where the role of Government is indispensable; and 
from inflationary monetary and credit policies to a solid monetary 
stability that encourages long-term saving and financial planning.
The government moved quickly to begin (1) the return of expropriated 
property held by the state, leading to a large-scale privatization process;
(2) a reduction in the numbers of both military and civilian personnel;
(3) deregulation of the economy, ceding control of foreign trade and bank 
ing to the private sector; (4) trade liberalization; and (5) fiscal and mone 
tary reform.
One of the government's first acts (Decree #11-90) was to set up a 
formal appeal and review process under which expropriated land would 
be legally returned to former owners. In theory, land that had been titled 
to cooperatives would not be returned; claimants would instead receive 
some other form of compensation. In practice, however, the new land 
policy put pressure on cooperatives as well, since the Sandinista govern 
ment had been slow to provide final legal title to many of the cooperatives 
it established.25 Without legal, registered titles, or with titles handed out 
under controversial circumstances during the sixty-day lame duck period
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at the end of the f s l n  era,26 these cooperatives were vulnerable to having 
the land they occupied classified as state lands and returned to former 
owners.
In all, 5,384 claimants reportedly filed for the return of over 15,000 
expropriated urban and rural properties (Roberto Larios, "Devuelven 50 
propiedades a confiscados," Barricada, February 12,1993, interview with 
Uriel Soto, Procurador de la Propiedad). Approximately 1,000 certificates 
of devolution were issued in the first year by the five-person review com 
mission chaired by the procurador general before the review process was 
suspended amid charges of mismanagement and corruption [La Prensa, 
April 30,1991)27 A new Comision Nacional de Revision de Confiscaciones 
was named in October 1992 to renew the property return/compensation 
process. Although problems continued for economic elites when workers 
occupied enterprises that had legally been returned to former owners, 
the u n o  regime's commitment to privatization was clear. "We've made 
a 100 percent shift away from statism," proclaimed Antonio Lacayo to an 
assembled group of private producers [Barricada, June 27,1991).
Not only were former owners regaining their properties but the re 
maining state enterprises that had been confiscated from Somoza allies 
or built by the Sandinista regime were also being privatized. State sec 
tor operations were reorganized under c o r n a p, which pulled together 
an array of farms, agroindustries, factories, and commercial, transporta 
tion, and tourist facilities that had become state property during the f s l n  
era. When it was formed in May 1990, c o r n a p controlled 351 companies 
that were responsible for 31 percent of national production and employed 
78,000 workers, or 9 percent of the workforce (c o r n a p 1991, 6). The new 
regime moved quickly to divest itself of these operations, returning sugar 
mills like the is a  to the Pellas family, slaughterhouses like San Martin 
to former stockholders, and s a ims  a  to former c o s e p president Enrique 
Bolanos. By March 1993 c o r n a p had released 237 of these companies (68 
percent of the total) with 158 of them either being returned to former 
owners or sold (or, in a few cases, rented) to new private owners.28 (See 
Table 6.1.) Procedures initiating the privatization of the remainder were 
to have begun by the end of 1993. Even operations that had often escaped 
the privatization ax elsewhere, such as gold mines, were put up for sale. 
Although some of the firms transferred out of c o r n a p's control were 
handed on to other state agencies, the total participation of state enter 
prises in the economy was targeted to fall to less than 10 percent of GDP 
when the privatization process was completed (U.S. g a o  1992, 22).
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Table 6.1
Privatization of State Enterprises, May 1990-March 1993
Total number of state enterprises
State enterprises privatized
State farm enterprises returned/sold 
Other enterprises returned 
Other enterprises sold/rented 












Source: c o r n a p.
Unlike the Mexican case, where the antinationalist sting of privatiza 
tion could be assuaged by the promise that new revenues coming in would 
support social programs (Dresser 1991), the Nicaraguan government did 
not expect to generate much revenue from privatization. Deteriorated 
machinery and antiquated technologies made most of these operations 
unattractive, as did their sometimes truculent workforce and the weak 
internal market. According to Minister of Finance Emilio Pereira, the gov 
ernment hoped only to recover enough from their sale to pay off their past 
bank debts and cover unpaid taxes (interview published in ih c a  199id, 
23). The gain in privatization, from the state's point of view, would be that 
the facility would be in the hands of private entrepreneurs, who would 
then be responsible for reactivating production. The rapid pace of priva 
tization would also, presumably, persuade foreign creditors and investors 
of the seriousness of the government's commitment to a market-based 
economic model and encourage new investment.
To restart the economy on a neoliberal foundation, the size and realm 
of the state needed to be reduced. Of particular concern to the Chamo 
rro government was the size of the public sector workforce. The armed 
forces, already reduced following the approval of the Esquipulas accords 
from 96,000 in July 1989 to 40,000 at the time of the 1990 election, were 
targeted for further reductions. By the end of 1990 only 28,000 troops 
and officers remained. This number was lowered further to 15,250 by 
early 1993.29
In addition to the reduction in the size and budget of the armed forces, 
the government cut the number of its civilian employees. State workers
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were offered a series of financial inducements to leave public service. Ac 
cording to u s a id , 28,000 state workers left the public sector under this 
agreement, including both those directly employed in the central govern 
ment and workers in the state enterprises undergoing privatization (u s a id  
1993, i).30 This represented approximately 19 percent of the civilian, pub 
lic sector workforce 31
Those state workers who remained were put on a more market-based 
footing. Key government services, such as education and health programs, 
which had been free during the Sandinista era, now began to employ user's 
fees. Other services, such as water, light, electricity, public transporta 
tion, and telephones, which had been heavily subsidized, now began to 
charge market rates.
At the same time, the government deregulated whole sectors of the 
national economy and eliminated the government monopoly over key eco 
nomic activities. In 1991, for example, new banking legislation allowed 
the return of private banks,- by 1993 seven private banks had been autho 
rized. These banks opened with limited capital and few branch offices, 
but they had captured approximately 32 percent of all bank deposits by 
September 1992 (u s a id  1993, 2,- u n a g  n.d., 4).32
Private firms also returned in the export sector. Initially there were 
delays in allowing the reestablishment of private intermediaries due to 
competing interpretations of constitutional provisions designating ex 
ports as a state monopoly and as a result of prior contracts signed by state 
firms for the advance sale of the 1990-91 harvest (Pryor 1991, 105-6). 
These constraints slowly dissolved. By the end of 1991 105 export firms 
had received five-year licenses from the government (E. Perez 1992, 4). 
Old distributors like Calley Dagnall and c is a  renewed their operations, 
and new marketing links were started by organizations like e c o d e pa , 
the farmer's store affiliate of u n a g . The state export firms retreated, be 
coming purchasing agents for marginal producers (ih c a  i992d, 33).
In foreign trade, the government moved forcefully toward liberaliza 
tion. Maximum import duties, which had been 350 percent for some 
low-priority items at the end of the Sandinista period (b c n , Nicaragua 
Economic Report, November-December 1991, 7), were reduced to 10- 
60 percent in November 1991 and dropped further to 10-40 percent in 
April 1992. The government's goal was to reduce the maximum import 
duty to 10—20 percent by 1993, at which time all import tariffs within 
the newly established Central America Free Trade Area would be elimi 
nated (Government of Nicaragua 1992, 10—11). Under the terms of the
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Export Promotion Law, exports were to be promoted through a series of 
incentives, including a ioo percent exemption on import tariffs for export 
producers and an initial 80 percent income tax reduction for exporters of 
non traditional products.33 The return of flight capital and an increase in 
foreign investment were to be promoted under a new foreign investment 
law that allowed ioo percent profit remittances, capital remittances after 
three years, and a three- to five-year tax holiday 34
Finally, after years of battling inflation, monetary stability was 
achieved. The elimination of multiple exchange rates and the establish 
ment of free convertibility of the new cordoba, followed by a 400 percent 
devaluation in March 1991, did away with exchange rate losses that had 
plagued the Sandinista financial system. The b c n  also cut off the credit 
valve to the state banking system and issued a requirement that new 
credit authorizations be based on deposits and the recovery of past loans. 
The result was a credit squeeze that dramatically curtailed state bank 
activities.
The 1991-92 transition was marked by a sharp reduction in govern 
ment spending. The fiscal deficit, which had widened to 19.7 percent of 
GDP in 1990 as a result of the electoral campaign and the public sector 
strikes following the transition, began to close in 1991, when it declined 
to 8.0 percent of GDP. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) Under the new mone 
tary policy, the deficit could no longer be covered by central bank emis 
sions. The relatively modest deficit that remained was covered by U.S. 
donations, and the inflation rate fell sharply in 1991, with almost all of 
the increase coming in the first three months of the year. In the twelve 
months between October 1991 and October 1992 the inflation rate fell to 
2.2 percent, a level not seen in Nicaragua since before 1978. The fiscal 
deficit was reduced in spite of the introduction of a tax reform package in 
February 1992 that continued the general downward trend in tax rates.35 
The government's revenues were now drawn heavily from indirect taxes 
(76 percent of the total in 1992), particularly from excise taxes on the "fis 
cal industries"—beer, rum, soft drinks, and cigarettes—that tend to have 
a regressive impact.36
In all, there was a notable shift away from the development model of 
the Sandinista era, even the modified one of the 1988-90 era, and an em 
phatic commitment to the neoliberal guidelines. The shift, however, was 
not absolute; the revolutionary era had a continuing influence.
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Postrevolutionary Political Bargaining
Polarized politics and unstable governing coalitions are significant ob 
stacles to the consolidation of neoliberalism, tending instead to support 
the adoption of populism (Kaufman and Stallings 1991; Haggard and Kauf 
man 1992b). Sharp divisions in Nicaraguan society and government, there 
fore, served to undermine the neoliberal shift. The Chamorro government, 
in spite of its impressive political victory, had a weak political base. It had 
no strong links to a powerful political party or to mass organizations,- even 
its ties to elite associations were weak. Only a thin thread connected the 
new government to the social order it presided over. The f s l n , still reel 
ing over its electoral defeat, mobilized for multiple confrontations with 
the regime in the early months of the transition.
Repeated batterings in the May-August 1990 period, complete with 
two major national strikes, lockouts of top ministers, land and industry 
takeovers, and episodes of spontaneous civilian violence, pushed the gov 
ernment to search for new forms of dialogue and consultation. The Cha 
morro administration, which had campaigned on a platform of national 
reconciliation, looked for ways to avoid a showdown with the still- 
powerful f s l n  and to restart an economy anchored on a new national 
consensus.
Twice in 1990-91 the government called the warring parties to the 
table for a socioeconomic concertacion process. The locus of economic 
deliberation was shifted from the weak, fractious legislature and handed 
to direct economic actors. The assembly, filled with erstwhile allies and 
intractable foes often representing newborn miniparties, lacked the politi 
cal authority to legislate definitively in the area of economic policy. To put 
together a meaningful accord, the government needed to get the principal 
actors themselves to agree about the rules of the game. Tough discussions 
were opened about fundamental economic and social issues, including 
property rights, resource distribution, and investment and economic pri 
orities.
Building on the concertacion process the Sandinista government had 
initiated in 1989, but now with a fuller range of issues in play, the Cha 
morro government opened the first round of negotiations from Septem 
ber 20 to October 26,1990. The government called together the representa 
tives of thirty-five organizations divided between employers and workers. 
Eighteen producer associations, including affiliates of both c o s e p and 
u n a g , met with representatives of seventeen employee associations that
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included both organizations like the c s t  and the a t c , which had been 
linked historically to the f s l n , and unions like the Confederacion de 
Union Sindical and Central de Accion de Unidad Sindical, which were 
allied with the u n o  coalition.37 After fifteen full days of discussions that 
were broadcast almost nonstop on the nation's one major TV channel, 
and periodic walkouts on both sides, an accord was finalized (Republica 
de Nicaragua, 1990a).
The agreement gave something to everyone and extracted some con 
cessions all around. After initially encountering forceful opposition, em 
ployers got Sandinista unions on record accepting the return of or com 
pensation for expropriated properties.38 Workers also were persuaded to 
accept the return of private enterprises in the banking and export sectors. 
In turn, labor succeeded in inserting statements calling on employers to 
increase investment, moderate profit levels, generate new employment, 
and maintain labor protections established under the f s l n  government. 
Employee representatives also got the government to agree to establish 
reduced tariffs on basic services for low-income groups and maintain at 
least the prevailing spending levels for health and education.
The government, in turn, got an agreement that the fiscal deficit had to 
be reduced through a decrease in military spending and the rationalization 
of public expenditures. Making a case for a reduction in the size of the 
state apparatus, the government presented its early retirement program 
for state workers. Although at the final moment the representatives of 
cosEP-affiliated organizations refused to sign the document, this pact ini 
tiated an unprecedented form of dialogue between political and economic 
adversaries.
Formal acceptance of general principles did not, however, translate into 
agreement about specific cases. Whereas Sandinista labor organizations 
signed off on provisions for the return of expropriated land, for example, 
a t c  leaders often organized standoffs and lockouts of former owners at 
tempting to enter their properties. The a t c  not only took over properties 
of those attempting to reclaim their estates, it also launched invasions of 
the properties of unrelated private producers. This new form of triangu- 
larized bargaining attempted to pressure powerful private producers, who 
presumably had privileged access to the new government, to use their 
influence with the government to avert the full privatization of state- 
owned farms.
The concertacion efforts might have gone further toward reestablishing 
a social agreement if the economic crisis had been less severe. In peri 
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ods of growth, when all parties can simultaneously receive some benefits, 
the costs of adjustment are easier to bear. In a zero-sum context, on the 
other hand, increased resources for capitalists mean reduced resources 
for their workers. After a long, lagging decade of decline, the continued 
economic erosion of labor's resources in Nicaragua triggered combustible 
confrontations.
In a postrevolutionary setting, where consensus on fundamental issues 
was missing and the society's resources were up for grabs, parties on all 
sides insisted, along with Hobbes, that clubs were trumps. The renewed 
fall in the standard of living of the majority after the March 1991 de 
valuation fed deepening unrest and periodic outbursts of violence. Terms 
of the initial pacts were not fulfilled; crucial issues like worker owner 
ship had not been addressed precisely. Obfuscation had allowed all parties 
to claim victory at first, but tensions soon flared. In the hope of build 
ing a new social consensus, the government called for a second round of 
concertacion discussions.
Concertacion II ran intermittently from May to August 1991, bringing 
together much the same lineup of employer and labor groups in a more 
sluggish consultation. Discussion again focused on the pivotal question 
of property ownership and how the resources of the society would be div 
vied up. Workers in state enterprises wanted to protect their quota of state 
resources, arguing that it was their labor that kept these operations afloat 
during the hard days of economic embargo and war. c o s e p representa 
tives, on the other hand, wanted to minimize worker ownership in order 
to give maximum latitude to prospective buyers. In the end, Concerta 
cion II concluded with an agreement that workers in state firms would 
be allowed to acquire 25 percent of the stock in the operations being 
transferred to the private sector.39
This combination of agreements, while failing to provide workers with 
other supports such as job protection, guarantees about retraining, or any 
minority veto power in managerial decisions, did parcel out some of the 
resources of the state to workers. The government was able to come to this 
decision in part because there had been no rush of private investors will 
ing to snatch up these state resources. State properties, therefore, were 
available for use in responding to popular pressures. The weak response 
of capital to the first phase of transition fostered further deviations from 
the neoliberal model.
The concertacion process reduced, but did not eliminate, social ten 
sion.40 Strikes continued throughout 1991 and reached significant pro 
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portions in the banking, health, education, sugar processing, port, air 
port, customs, hotel, and mining sectors.41 With the active support of top 
f s l n  leaders, however, there were no major uprisings, even in the face 
of ongoing economic restructuring. This relative political containment 
suggests a certain success in the concertacion process.
The Nicaraguan economic reform was not, however, simply a conven 
tional neoliberal package. Although much of the public rhetoric on the left 
would characterize it in these terms, the economic program that emerged 
contained several unconventional features. Compared with neoliberal ex 
periences elsewhere in the region, the Nicaraguan variant differed in sev 
eral notable respects.
Neoliberalism with a Twist
The neoliberal model entails more than just a checklist of discreet eco 
nomic policy reforms. It also involves a restructuring of the sociopolitical 
arena. Although central economic policies were altered in postrevolution 
ary Nicaragua, the social and political configuration proved more resistant 
to change. The broader contours of the neoliberal shift were subject to 
tough negotiation. As a result of this complex and ongoing political bar 
gaining, the neoliberal formula was modified in the Nicaraguan case in 
four interrelated areas.42 These areas were (i) worker ownership, (2) re 
straints on the forces of repression, (3) eased contraction of the public 
sector workforce, and (4) ongoing consultation and conciliation with the 
political opposition.
Worker Ownership
The Nicaraguan version of privatization had several distinctive fea 
tures. Soon after the first concertacion accord, the government set up a 
special commission to oversee the privatization of the state farm system. 
This commission finished its work quickly. By mid-1991, the Chamorro 
government had disposed of most of its agricultural property, divesting 
itself of HATONic, the state cattle corporation that owned almost one- 
third of the state farmland, as well as the cotton corporation a g r o e x c o  
and the coffee corporation c a f e n ic , which together administered the 
most valuable state-owned land and most advanced processing facilities.
In privatizing these properties, the state attempted to respond to mul 
tiple demands, including those of workers. Pulling together the claims 
filed by former owners, the demands made by the a t c , and the promises
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Table 6.2
State Farm Land Distribution Program, 1991
Area
Mz. %
Cattle Sector (h a t o n ic )
Returned to former owners 80,455 26
Cattle sector farmworkers 99,319 32
Discharged from armed forces 59,034 19
Demobilized resistance 70,619 23
Total 309,427 100
Cotton Sector (a g r o e x c o )
Returned to former owners 17,221 49
Cotton sector farmworkers 11,396 32
Discharged from armed forces 4,482 13
Demobilized resistance 2,299 6
Total 35,398 100
Coffee Sector (c a f e n ic )
Returned to former owners 26,890 35
Coffee sector farmworkers 24,942 33
Discharged from armed forces 10,250 13
Demobilized resistance 14,542 19
Total 76,624 100
Total state farm land distribution
Returned to former owners 124,566 30
State farmworkers 135,657 32
Discharged from armed forces 73,766 17
Demobilized resistance 87,460 21
Total 421,449 100
Source: c o r n a p.
the government made to demobilized contra and e ps  forces, the govern 
ment divided up resources among these four competitors. The former 
owners reacquired 49 percent of the state cotton land, 26 percent of the 
state ranch land, and 35 percent of the state coffee territory. (See Table 6.2.) 
But the group receiving the largest portion of this land was made up of 
former state farmworkers, which secured the right to acquire 32-33 per 
cent of the area of each of these corporations. Once the properties to be
17 6 Postrevolutionary Nicaragua
returned to former owners were identified, agricultural workers were con 
sulted by the a t c  leadership about which of the remaining properties 
should be claimed for the workers. By December 1992,17,148 workers be 
came stockholders (socios) in 131 agricultural enterprises (f id e g  1993, 23).
The remainder of this land was divided between discharged soldiers and 
demobilized contra troops. Contra soldiers received somewhat more of 
the ranch and coffee land in the mountainous interior, where these forces 
had been concentrated. On the other hand, the e ps  soldiers received some 
what more of the cotton land on the Pacific side of the country than their 
resistance counterparts. Overall, discharged soldiers received 17 percent 
of the divested land, and demobilized rebels received 21 percent.
This agrarian privatization process was followed by divestment in the 
industrial sector. According to the terms of the second concertacion 
agreement, state workers in the industrial sector were to receive 25 per 
cent participation in these better-capitalized and technologically complex 
operations. Negotiations about how the allocation of these shares was to 
proceed were more difficult and time consuming than negotiations about 
agricultural properties. In some cases, the enterprise was not financially 
viable, and workers did not want to assume responsibility for its debts. 
In others, the former owners insisted on complete control and refused to 
sell partial ownership to the workers. So complex was the situation that 
negotiations proceeded sector by sector and even company by company. In 
February 1993 the government announced an agreement with c s t  under 
which nine state enterprises were to be sold in their entirety to workers, 
partial control was accepted in another eighteen, and three were to be 
returned in their entirety to former owners (Gobierno de Nicaragua-c s t , 
Acuerdo, February 2,1993).43
The redistributive impact of this privatization process had several limi 
tations. The workers' ability to acquire these resources was reduced by the 
requirement that they purchase their shares rather than receiving them 
outright, c o r n a p's  policy of giving concessionary terms (access to credit, 
low interest rates, grace periods) to "social groups" that acquired state 
property was expected to allow workers to participate in the process.44 In 
all probability, however, at least some of these new owners will be unable 
to complete these payments, and the whole negotiation process will enter 
another phase after the grace period elapses. If the power configuration in 
Nicaragua shifts, workers and former combatants could wind up losing 
the properties they obtained during the opening phase of the privatization 
process.
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Furthermore, formal ownership does not automatically mean worker 
empowerment and administrative control. In order to preserve as much of 
the a pp framework as possible and to reduce divisive tendencies among 
the workers, former state farmworkers were encouraged by Sandinista 
leaders to form holding companies run by professional administrators, 
some of whom had played similar roles during the Sandinista govern 
ment. If the old patterns of top-down management continue unabated, 
the workers7 formal ownership of these enterprises may not, therefore, 
give them meaningful control over their property. Finally, these new prop 
erty arrangements divide the working class by differentiating those state 
workers who can buy into their firms from those who do not have this 
opportunity.
On the other hand, these kinds of privatization arrangements, which 
fostered worker participation and decentralized ownership, highlight the 
sustained political capacity of groups mobilized by the f s l n  and the in 
clusionary efforts of the postrevolutionary government. In this sense, 
privatization in Nicaragua represents a third alternative to privatization 
efforts in Czechoslovakia or Poland, where the process was linked to a de 
centralized "citizen capitalism," and such efforts in Mexico or Argentina, 
where the divestiture process catered to a relatively small number of elite 
economic groups.
Restraints on Repression
The regime also differentiated itself from other neoliberal regimes in 
Latin America, particularly the military version in Chile and Argentina 
in the 1970s, by forgoing an extensive capability for mass repression. By 
allowing the leadership of the military and police force to remain in the 
hands of those who held these posts during the f s l n  era, the Chamorro 
government obtained the cooperation and even loyalty of these organiza 
tions. But it did so by accepting a policy of exceptional restraint in the 
face of mass mobilizations.
In the July 1990 general strike, for example, soldiers and police did not 
take forceful action against protesters who closed the capital for over a 
week by breaking up the streets to build barricades. Recurring strikes in 
the public sector in 1990 and 1991 were rarely confronted by the police or 
armed forces. The periodic takeover of private farms during crucial mo 
ments in the agricultural cycles in 1990 and 1991 was not effectively chal 
lenged by the authorities. In these kinds of events, strikers and protesters 
would typically disperse when the police or soldiers approached but re-
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turn as soon as the police departed. Both protesters and troops shared 
a mutual commitment to avoiding outright confrontation. This relative 
softening of the forces of repression in the Nicaraguan case gave freer 
reign to regime opponents. It also reduced the gap between the Chamorro 
government and the f s l n , facilitating more extensive consultation and 
agreement.
The September 1992 replacement of Sandinista police chief Rene Vivas 
following the suspension of U.S. aid, and Chamorro's announcement in 
September 1993, following another aid suspension, that Humberto Ortega 
would be retired in 1994, could begin to alter this pattern. Since this 
shake-up was presumably insisted upon with an eye to reducing f s l n  
power and increasing protection of property claims, the remodeled mili 
tary forces may become more confrontational with strikers or those in 
volved in land invasions. They are unlikely to undergo a full metamor 
phosis, however, since Sandinista stalwarts in the leadership of both the 
police and the military are several layers thick. Replacement at the top 
only leads to the promotion of other Sandinista affiliates who move up 
from the lower ranks. The kind of repression that accompanied the neo 
liberal transformation in Chile is unlikely to be replayed in Nicaragua, at 
least during this phase of the transition.
Eased Public Sector Contraction
Recognizing the political and economic difficulty of laying off thou 
sands of public sector employees, many of whom were diehard f s l n  sup 
porters, the government devised an "occupational conversion" plan that 
cushioned this process. Voluntary retirement from the government pay 
rolls would earn state workers a bonus of up to 10,000 cordobas oro 
($2,000), with which they could make the transition to the private sector. 
The initial program, designed for those employed directly by the central 
government, was expanded to include workers laid off due to liquida 
tions or transfers of parastate companies. Financed by the u s a id  mission, 
this early retirement program reportedly cost $47.5 million by mid-1992 
(u s a id  1992, 1).
The payments failed by much to cover the costs of moving into the 
private sector, and with the enduring economic crisis the program has 
worsened the glut of unemployed professionals. However, the vast ma 
jority of state workers were retained, leaving much of the public sector 
with proreform sentiments, however tinged they may be by weariness and 
disillusion. Unlike in other postrevolutionary settings, where state cut-
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backs were accompanied with political purges or abrupt amputations of 
ministries, Nicaraguan functionaries were generally allowed to choose be 
tween retirement with a substantial severance allowance or remaining in 
public employ. This approach buffered the transition of public employees 
into the private sector and allowed the regime to avoid a fierce political 
backlash.
Consultation with the Opposition
President Chamorro noted repeatedly in 1990, "We won an election, 
not a war." Her political adversaries were not required to sign an uncon 
ditional surrender. Quite to the contrary, the new regime was willing to 
extend protections and resources to the f s l n . Beginning with the Proto 
col of Transition prior to the inauguration of the Chamorro government, 
the new regime made a series of agreements with the f s l n  in the name of 
stability and reconciliation. Because of its own precarious political posi 
tion presiding over a fractious and quickly disintegrating coalition, the 
Chamorro government made repeated overtures to the f s l n  in the 1990- 
93 period. The regime resisted recurring internal pressures to divest f s l n  
leaders of the residential properties they had acquired during the era of 
their control; it was desultory in reviewing the land and property titles 
that had been extended during the pinata, preferring that the f s l n  police 
itself and sanction members who had illicitly grabbed state resources; it 
allowed the military high command to use its own criteria in reducing 
the size of the officer corp instead of forcing a political purge; and except 
in top positions, it did not force f s l n  party members to surrender their 
government offices.
The regime participated in regular consultations with top f s l n  leaders, 
informing them of pending economic moves and involving them in inter 
national campaigns for foreign financing (interviews, Luis Carrion Cruz, 
March 20,1991; Daniel Ortega, June 29,1992).45 This process both damp 
ened the neoliberal character of the regime's economic policy and co 
opted key elements of the f s l n 's leadership. Unable to devise a clear 
economic alternative, and having moved, in the 1988-90 period, down 
the road toward the restoration of the market principles, the f s l n  was 
hard-pressed to resist the Chamorro government's overtures, f s l n  leaders 
and the Chamorro government officials now collectively and publicly em 
braced a modified version of the neoliberal model that buffered key con 
stituents of the f s l n . In early 1993 this cooperation even brought several 
prominent Sandinista party members back into government in second tier
ministerial positions, raising the charge of co-gobierno (cogovernment) 
between the Chamorro administration and the f s l n .
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The Bourgeoisie’s Responses to the New Economic Direction
As had been the case, to a greater or lesser degree, throughout the revo 
lutionary period, the Nicaraguan private elite remained divided. To the 
established fissures were added new divisions, as emerging and return 
ing elites took their place in the bourgeoisie. Within two years of the 
postrevolutionary transition, the economic elite arguably was arrayed in 
four clusters. Although there was some overlap among these groups, they 
differed from each other in the way they combined their political styles, 
investment strategies, and alliance tendencies. At the apex of the eco 
nomic elite stood two groups: the antirevolutionary politicos, who force 
fully criticized the Chamorro government, and the hegemonic returnees, 
who generally preferred quiet negotiation and tacit support. Beneath these 
leading groups were two other business sectors: the disoriented agricul 
tural elites, who foundered economically during the economic reform and 
became politically disaffected, and the new entrepreneurs, who moved 
quickly to identify emerging opportunities.
Antirevolutionary Politicos
Antirevolutionary politicos continued to dominate the c o s e p and 
u pa n ic  national leadership in the postrevolutionary period. By this point, 
the political orientation of c o s e p had taken on a life of its own. The pri 
mary goal of these leaders had never been to determine what views and 
opinions prevailed among private producers and to reflect those views. 
Instead, leaders were chosen by a small group of insiders who elevated 
to power the most articulate defenders of the organization's preestab 
lished position.46 Those who were most drawn to c o s e p and who tended 
to rise within the organization were those who found its strident hos 
tility to the Sandinistas to be most congenial. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, 
national-level leaders of c o s e p and u pa n ic  were drawn heavily from the 
moral-political opponents of the regime.
After 1990 the ranks of these organizations were resupplied by a net 
work of new volunteers who were perhaps even more stridently anti- 
Sandinista than those they replaced. To the old core of leaders were now 
added several expatriates who returned to Nicaragua to reclaim their ex 
propriated properties. The inability or unwillingness of the Chamorro gov-
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ernment to dispose quickly of their claims, to halt ongoing land invasions, 
and to restore the traditional social relations to the countryside led many 
c o s e p and u pa n ic  leaders to sharply criticize the new government.47
The resignations of two c o s e p leaders from the Chamorro govern 
ment on the day it was inaugurated, the refusal of c o s e p representatives 
to sign either of the two concertacion agreements, c o s e p's support for 
the new Association of the Expropriateds (Asociaciones de Confiscados), 
and the links between the u pa n ic  leadership and the right-wing pl c  re 
flected the enduring alienation of this elite sector from the government, 
in spite of the adoption of the neoliberal reforms by the Chamorro govern 
ment.48 The stridency of the c o s e p opposition, in view of the adoption 
of these reforms, suggests that the political culture of the organization 
had been frozen in place. Organizations have stylistic propensities that 
are forged during defining periods and subsequently become difficult to 
change, c o s e p's  formative experiences during the hard, early years of the 
Sandinista government had inclined it toward confrontational politics. 
That style, which had, in some ways, served the broad political interests 
of c o s e p leaders, became an organizational trademark that it could not 
surrender.
Hegemonic Returnees
Because of its long history leading the opposition to the f s l n  gov 
ernment, c o s e p was widely regarded as the primary political agent of 
the bourgeoisie. Its preeminence, however, was not universally accepted. 
One important challenger was drawn from the elite families that histori 
cally headed the major economic groups in the prerevolutionary period. 
Many members of the hegemonic families of the pre-1979 era fled the 
country in 1978 as the insurrection heated up. They generally took up 
residence abroad, typically in the United States. A handful of these elites 
had accumulated extensive additional resources during the period of their 
self-exile; others had survived and prospered after making a tough ad 
justment. Drawn back to Nicaragua once the Sandinistas were ousted, 
members of this group and their descendants now began to reestablish 
their dominance over core activities like banking and export trade.
Unlike c o s e p leaders, members of these prerevolutionary elite fami 
lies were more likely to make investments and start new projects during 
this transition period. Three of the new banks were established by old, 
elite families, who could draw on foreign financing and international con 
nections. Eduardo Montealegre, son of the founder and long-term presi-
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dent of b a n ic , returned as cofounder and manager of the Banco de Cre- 
dito Centroamericano in 1991,• his cousin Haroldo Montealegre became 
a founder and the general manager of the Banco Mercantil; Carlos Pellas, 
son of Alfredo Pellas of the b a n a me r  group, negotiated both the return of 
the is a  and the creation of the Banco de America Central, a third private 
bank.49 Unlike c o s e p, which was locked into a confrontational stance, 
several members of this group of hegemonic returnees tended to adopt a 
low political profile, in some ways similar to the one their families em 
ployed during the Somoza regime. When they did surface politically, they 
generally adopted a conciliatory approach toward the government.50 Less 
overtly ideological and more concerned about practical consequences, less 
inclined to scrappy political infighting and more skilled at negotiation, 
less mired in old battles and more willing to start afresh, this prime elite 
differentiated itself from the c o s e p leadership.
c o s e p leaders, many of whom had logged years in hard political 
struggle and had experienced tremendous economic decline during the 
Sandinista period, resented the return of a relatively unscathed traditional 
elite. These competitors came back with extensive international connec 
tions and investment skills that those who remained in Nicaragua "fight 
ing the good fight" had not acquired. Those who stayed were dependent 
on antiquated and deteriorated technologies in an era of FAXes and con 
ference calls. As returning elites reasserted their positions in banking and 
export trade, those who had remained behind found their own ambitions 
frustrated. The unwillingness of prerevolutionary leaders to toe the c o s e p 
political line challenged the latter's political prominence and deepened 
the elite divide.
Disoriented Agricultural Elite
Producers at the local and regional level who had risen to prominence 
in the prerevolutionary period as agroexporters and large-scale staples 
producers, and who had generally stayed in Nicaragua during the San 
dinista era, emerged in the neoliberal economy as victims of economic 
displacement. Cotton producers who expected a return to the heady days 
of the 1970s were confronted with tremendously increased costs and de 
clining real prices for cotton. Stimulated by temporary access to state 
bank credit in 1990 and generous restructuring arrangements for the un 
paid loans in 1991, cotton production in 1991 increased 21 percent over 
1990 (c e pa l  1992b, 28). But Nicaraguan cotton, heavily dependent on 
multiple pesticide applications, had ceased being profitable at world mar-
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ket prices (c a r a n a  Corporation and Sparks Companies 1991, 79-84). By 
1992, production plummeted and the value of cotton exports declined a 
reported 41 percent between 1991 and 1992 (f id e g , Observador econo 
mico 12 [December 1992]: 14). Although cotton growers particularly had 
been favored in the first years, ultimately their loss of competitiveness 
and the pesticide contamination of their soils spelled disaster.
Other producers of traditional crops had similar problems. Coffee pro 
ducers faced a return to the market just as the international coffee orga 
nization collapsed; prices in 1992 for Central America's mild Arabica 
coffee were at their lowest point in 17 years.51 Sorghum producers, accus 
tomed to price supports from the Empresa Nicaragiiense de Alimentos 
Basicos (e n a b a s ), were now hit with reduced internal demand and heavy 
competition from more efficient regional competitors. Cotton and coffee 
producers faced financial ruin; cattle breeders resisted the importation of 
competing breeds; industrialists feared the onslaught of cheap imports 
(author's observation of meetings of Asociacion de Caficultores de Mana 
gua, May 16, 1990, and a c b n , August 6,1991; La Prensa, August 8,1991; 
ih c a  i992d, 36; interview, c a d in , June 26,1992).
The combined loss of subsidies and increased international compe 
tition spelled rising economic difficulties and political disaffection for 
much of the business elite. The traditional vagaries, such as drought, 
merged with new policy constraints, like more restrictive bank credit, 
to make economic life difficult for this sector. The new government's 
efforts to cut taxes, stabilize the currency, and provide moral support did 
not replace the guaranteed profits and hefty subsidies that many tradi 
tional producers had become accustomed to during the f s l n  period. Low 
prices, a credit squeeze, and production problems meant declining export 
earnings; average earnings for traditional agricultural exports fell 23 per 
cent between 1990 and 1991. The drop was most acute for coffee and beef 
producers, whose export earnings declined 47.9 percent and 52.7 percent, 
respectively, during that period (c e pa l  1992b, 36).
As in other Latin American countries that had undertaken neoliberal 
reforms, substantial sectors of the local bourgeoisie were actually hurt 
by the policy, even when they had been adamant proponents of market 
reforms. They became disoriented by the changes, unsure of how to pro 
ceed, averse to new beginnings, and disillusioned with political outcomes 
they themselves had supported. Surveys completed by 413 producers dur 
ing five daylong seminars organized by c o s e p, me d e , and in c a e  in May 
and June 1992 suggested the pessimism and disaffection that prevailed
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among those respondents. Fifty-eight percent of these producers classified 
the government's treatment of producers as negative; 42 percent indicated 
that they were pessimistic about the future (c o s e p et al. 1992, 78,125)52 
Although some policies were evaluated more positively than others,53 only 
7 percent indicated that they would vote for either Violeta Chamorro or 
Antonio Lacayo for president.54
Given the stresses of economic and political transition, some even re 
membered the Sandinista era with nostalgia. As a former president of the 
sorghum association a n pr o s o r  explained,
[Then b c n  president] Mayorga says that Nicaraguan producers are 
going to be paid the price prevailing in Central America. But I say 
back to him, when I'm watching him on TV, the prices may be Cen 
tral American prices but the costs here are higher than they are 
[elsewhere] in Central America. . . . Under the Sandinistas, we had a 
guaranteed profit margin. We would propose to them that the profit 
margin be 50 percent and they gave us that. We earned much more 
then than now. . . . We should have a guaranteed price, not supply and 
demand. (Interview, October 18,1990)
New Entrepreneurs
In the period following the Sandinista defeat, a small but important 
segment of producers continued the search for new economic opportu 
nities. Less preoccupied with the political debate or more satisfied with 
the postrevolutionary outcomes, and more agile in their response to eco 
nomic crisis, these elites emerged as the new entrepreneurs. They in 
cluded sectors as varied as irrigated rice producers interested in nontradi 
tional exports, large-scale industrialists exploring new capital ventures, 
u n a g  leaders attempting to link forward from the production process, 
and former state functionaries from the Sandinista government eager to 
prosper under the new rules.
One key area for development was nontraditional agricultural exports. 
Most of the Central American countries had moved forcefully in this 
direction in the 1980s. Nicaragua, under the Sandinistas, had been the 
regional laggard. As U.S.-Nicaraguan relations normalized, the opportu 
nities provided by the Caribbean Basin Initiative were now available to 
Nicaraguan producers and served as a stimulus to production changes. 
Only weeks after the Chamorro government was elected, a group of agri 
cultural producers who had begun to experiment on a small scale with 
nontraditional crops met to discuss new opportunities for export to the
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United States. At the close of this session, the group formed a new orga 
nization, a pe n n .55 Not affiliated formally with any other private sector 
organization, the association pulled together a small group of relatively 
elite producers, primarily from u pa n ic , who were willing to undertake 
some state-supported experimentation, a pe n n  cultivated linkages with 
U.S. suppliers and distributors. Financial support from u s a id , which 
covered a pe n n 's  operating expenses, allowed the organization to develop 
technical and informational services and increase its membership.56 Funds 
channeled through the state investment fund, f n i, provided start-up capi 
tal at low interest rates, and the Export Promotion Law provided massive 
tax reductions on nontraditional export earnings.
With this kind of institutional support, nontraditional exports like 
honeydew melons began to compete for entry into the U.S. market. Melon 
production more than doubled between 1990-91 and 1991-92, and export 
earnings rose from $1.6 to $7.4 million (interview, James Johnson, a pe n n , 
Departamento de Transferencia de Tecnologia, June 24, 1992). Although 
far behind the other Central American countries, and faced with massive 
problems (erratic electricity, a deteriorated and war-damaged transporta 
tion system, clogged international telecommunications), a small network 
of Nicaraguan entrepreneurs now moved to catch up.
A second group that displayed a willingness to take on new invest 
ments was found among u n a g  leaders. Unlike some business elites who 
seemed immobilized as they awaited the return of the prerevolutionary 
era, u n a g  leaders were eager to work within the social and political 
framework that emerged from the revolution. Building on their relatively 
positive relations with labor, their funding ties to past benefactors like the 
Scandinavian countries, and their easy access to the consultants among 
unemployed Sandinista technocrats,57 these producers sought new oppor 
tunities.
Evaluations were made of investments in processing facilities, export 
trade, and banking. Taking advantage of the new opening for private ex 
porters, u n a g 's  supply and distribution affiliate, e c o d e pa , set up its own 
coffee-processing and marketing facilities in Regions IV and VI. Building 
on a solidarity network that sold Nicaraguan coffee in European markets 
during the economic embargo imposed by the Reagan administration, 
e c o d e pa  marketed 15 percent of Nicaragua's coffee exports in 1991-92.58 
u n a g  leaders also figured prominently in the plan to privatize c a r n ic , 
a Managua slaughterhouse that had been confiscated from the Somoza 
family. Under the c a r n ic  privatization agreement, the slaughterhouse
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was to be jointly acquired by its workers and a group of cattle ranchers, 
with u n a g  leader Juan Tijerino serving as president of the newly re 
organized corporation (interviews, Ivan Saballos, c o r n a p, June 24, 1992; 
Bayardo Matamoros, Secretaria de Finanzas, Cooperativa Nuevo c a r n ic , 
R.L., June 24,1992; u n a g  1993,18). Finally, u n a g  moved gradually toward 
the creation of its own bank, the Banco del Campo, to circumvent the 
credit crunch that emerged in the postrevolutionary period.59
A third group of new entrepreneurs was composed of Sandinistas-cum- 
businesspeople. This sector included ex-officials in the Sandinista govern 
ment who now directly entered the economic competition as private pro 
ducers. Some of these Sandinista entrepreneurs had been wealthy prior to 
the revolution and now reclaimed old properties that they had neglected 
or tendered to the state during the 1980s. Others acquired properties in 
the final stages of the revolution in the period of the pinata. Some drew 
on professional and managerial skills acquired in government to set up 
new business operations. Unlike much of the traditional economic elite, 
the Sandinista bourgeoisie moved rapidly to launch new ventures and ex 
pand their activities. The presence of these elites in private businesses 
deepened the confusion about what businesses were owned and operated 
by the f s l n  as a party and what operations were owned and managed 
by individuals who had been prominent government officials during the 
f s l n  era.60
The high profile of many of these new enterprises, in an economy that 
was badly depressed, also exacerbated tensions within the f s l n . Party 
members and supporters who were slipping into deeper economic decline 
resented more prosperous members (derisively labeled the nueva bur- 
guesia sandinista or n b s ) who were expanding their economic activities; 
Sandinistas who now managed their own business operations ran into 
conflict with workers who threatened strikes or land invasions. Defenders 
of the "revolutionary bourgeoisie," however, argued that Sandinista busi 
ness leaders were becoming the "patriotic producers" that the revolution 
had so long mythologized. This revolutionary elite, it was hoped, would 
continue the breakup of an anachronistic social order in the fields and fac 
tories, contribute to the modernization of production, and exert pressure 
on the Chamorro government to moderate the neoliberal formula. Indeed, 
the participation of the Sandinista elite in the private sector even won 
approval in some corners of the government and the business elite. One 
c a d in  leader observed, "It is better to have them on the inside, dealing 
with the problems that we face in business, than to have them on the 
outside causing trouble" (interview, c a d in , June 26,1992,.
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In sum, not all producers were equally cautious about the new eco 
nomic and political configuration.61 During the 1990-93 transition, a di 
verse collection of private sector elites began to explore new activities. 
Investment in nontraditional production, export marketing, and the finan 
cial sector suggested various areas for economic expansion. This invest 
ment trend was modest. It fell far short of providing a foundation for a 
new economic strategy; it could not even generate short-term economic 
growth. The "new entrepreneurs" did, however, begin to hint at some of 
the possible features of postrevolutionary development.
Conclusions
In spite of some positive trends, the obstacles to economic reactivation 
and restructuring in Nicaragua remained massive. An unfavorable inter 
national market for traditional products, entrenched local hostilities, and 
the elusiveness of a new social and economic consensus all impeded eco 
nomic renewal. Even after three years only a small portion of the capital 
flight of the 1970s and 1980s had been reversed, and a large portion of the 
new investment going on was centered around short-term commercial ac 
tivities. The pervasiveness of grinding poverty and a brutally low standard 
of living for the majority provided a weak foundation on which to restart 
the economy.62 The push for nontraditional exports brought its own set of 
problems and seemed unlikely to offer any quick or clear remedy.63 The 
inability of the postrevolutionary state to play a catalytic role impeded 
corrective action. Even the f s l n , which had directed a decade-long social 
revolution, was unable to articulate any alternative. Nicaragua became 
mired in the economic quagmire, with economic production continuing 
to decline in the period following the revolution.
But the Sandinista period had introduced notable changes in the Nica 
raguan social order. First, the revolution deeply politicized the bourgeoi 
sie. Economic elites who, for decades, had remained politically passive 
and had consigned the political world to the Somoza family were drawn 
into the political wranglings of the times. Business leaders emerged as 
central political figures in the 1980s and 1990s. Among c o s e p leaders, 
a common refrain ran, "As the Sandinistas put the government into the 
economy, so the private producers were pushed to enter into politics." 
One result has been a hyperpoliticized business leadership dominating 
the major national business association.
Second, the Sandinista era reshuffled the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. The 
traditional economic groups that had been so prominent in the prerevolu 
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tionary period were broken apart during the revolution. The departure of 
central figures in the old elite families created space for the rise of a new 
set of economic heavyweights. The experience of revolution, then, set the 
groundwork for even more decentralization of the economic elite than 
had prevailed in the Somoza era. Instead of the three economic groups 
that predominated in the prerevolutionary era, five or six may emerge in 
the postrevolutionary period, including some involving u n a g  leaders or 
Sandinista producers, who were not previously part of these networks.
The decentralization of elite resources is, of course, quite different 
from a full redistribution of national wealth or the significant inclusion of 
the peasantry in an integrated development model—the purported goals 
of the revolution. The rise of some and the fall of others does, however, 
reflect a certain democratization of the bourgeoisie.
Third, the revolution dispersed the economic elite internationally, as 
private producers sent their children abroad, attempting to shield them 
from the violence and ideological shake-up that was taking place in their 
country. Whereas many of the parents had gone abroad for a few years as 
young adults to complete their educations, their children were dispersed 
through the United States and Latin America at younger ages and for 
much longer periods of time. Even after the f s l n 's  electoral defeat, many 
did not return. Those who did return had extensive linkages to other re 
gions, setting the groundwork for a less distinctively Nicaraguan, more 
internationalized elite culture.
Finally, some elements of the Nicaraguan elite became less antagonis 
tic to discussions of workers' rights and the needs of the nation's poor. 
Not only did a significant group of elites come to align itself with the 
revolution, but others who remained opposed came to accept some of 
the revolution's social goals. After decades under the Somoza dynasty, 
in which unions and mass organizations hardly existed, many Nicara 
guan producers were forced to the bargaining table with their workers. In 
the process, many elites became accustomed to this form of interaction; 
some came to regard it as constructive. After years of agrarian reform and 
debate about property rights, many economic elites began to accept the 
idea of worker ownership of state properties and shareholding in privately 
owned businesses. These transformations would not have come easily out 
of Somoza's Nicaragua. For many Nicaraguan elites who lived through 
the Sandinista era, an improved capacity for dialogue with workers and 
peasants may constitute part of the lingering legacy of revolution.
chapter
The Nicaraguan Revolution in 
Comparative Perspective
W
hen  revolutionary regimes leave the local economic elite in place, 
they run inevitable risks. If the regime pushes forcefully for struc 
tural change, the business sector can use its considerable resources to 
retaliate. Broadly disseminated denunciations, brisk capital flight, and 
coup plotting can undercut the revolution and lead to its reversal. On the 
other hand, if the regime attempts to assuage business fears by responding 
favorably to their concerns and incorporating their leaders, the revolution 
can be coopted. Unable to push for structural transformation, the revolu 
tion loses momentum and fails. The bourgeoisie question—that is, how 
to negotiate capital's accommodation to change—is one of the central 
dilemmas of social revolution.
In Latin America, regimes committed to structural change have not 
been highly successful at achieving their goals. Various forces impede 
transition; the resistance of the local bourgeoisie is a crucial element. Not 
all business elites are identical, however, and some revolutionary regimes 
have maneuvered for their cooperation more successfully than others. 
This book explores that variation by analyzing four historical cases and 
the recent Nicaraguan experience. These cases point to five factors that 
shape state-capital relations. (See Table 7.1.)
The first component focuses on inherited oligarchical tendencies in 
the bourgeoisie. If the elite evolved from an oligarchical family network 
without a fundamental rupture in the general historical pattern of domi 
nance, then it is more likely to maintain its unity and be propelled force 
fully into combat. Conversely, a more fragmented bourgeoisie is likely to 
emerge when there is no segment that, for reasons of tradition and eco 
nomic domination, can exercise a hegemonic function and provide politi 
cal leadership for the class as a whole. A weak oligarchical profile is more 
probable when the economy is diversified, with multiple, competing eco-
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Table 7.1
Configuration of State-Capital Characteristics and Bargaining 
Tendencies
Confrontation Accommodation
Hegemonic force of traditional
oligarchy high low
Business organizational autonomy high low
Perception of class threat high low
Institutionalized political
capacity of the regime low high
Economic viability of the
regime low high
nomic groups vying for resources and crisscrossed with strong regional 
traditions and hostilities. Conversely, oligarchical control is more likely 
when the economy is centered on agroexport production and economic 
diversification is less pronounced.
The unity or the fragmentation of the elite is further conditioned by 
its organizational characteristics. The capacity to organize autonomously 
without extensive control on the part of the state facilitates the coordina 
tion of a common elite strategy. If business organizations expand laterally, 
to absorb much of the private sector, and vertically, to create a powerful 
peak association, then they can become formidable opponents of a reform 
regime. On the other hand, if private sector organizations are sparse and 
frail, leaving much of the elite unorganized, or if they depend heavily 
on the state for financing and legal recognition, then they may be more 
susceptible to control by the regime.
The third factor that shapes the interaction is the degree to which 
the elite perceives the regime as a threat to its fundamental interests. 
When capitalists of all sizes come to believe that private accumulation 
and social stratification themselves are in jeopardy and that the risks of 
loss are ubiquitous, elite fusion and confrontation with the regime are 
highly likely. Conversely, if these elites regard the risks as problematic 
for only a discrete subset of the capitalist class, and particularly an issue 
for foreign as opposed to domestic firms, then highly divergent responses, 
including strategic accommodation, may follow.
Fourth, the degree to which the revolution achieves political institu 
tionalization is also critical. If the state is too fragile, internally divided,
The Nicaraguan Revolution in Perspective 191
or fails to mobilize a broad popular base, then economic elites will have 
little incentive to enter a bargaining process with political leaders. They 
may instead, often in coalition with powerful external actors, push to 
have the regime ousted, clearing the way for counterrevolution. However, 
if the regime succeeds in institutionalizing the reform by consolidating 
its political resources and embedding these changes in a new legal order, 
then it becomes a worthy foe. Without the easy option of eliminating the 
regime, private elites may be drawn into negotiations.
Finally, the state must not only display notable political capabilities but 
it must also resolve the complex problem of constructing an alternative 
economic model. If the state lacks the economic resources to carry out 
reform, or depends exclusively on the private sector for their generation, 
then private elites are empowered to collectively undermine the revolu 
tion. Sharp patterns of economic decline coupled with hyperinflation are 
particularly likely to elicit private sector hostility, in turn accelerating 
economic deterioration. In contrast, if the regime can design an economic 
model that carries the promise of future return and general growth, then 
the elites may succumb to the inevitability of the transition and begin 
looking for their niche in the new order.
In sum, certain combinations of characteristics (weak oligarchical con 
trol, an organizational void in the private sector, relatively low threat 
perceptions among local propertied classes, firm political consolidation of 
the regime, and sustained economic growth) make it easier for the regime 
to negotiate with economic elites, even as it pursues redistributive re 
form. On the other hand, the converse conditions (continued oligarchical 
hegemony, broad and autonomous private sector organization, a relatively 
acute perception of threat to local property owners, weak political institu 
tionalization, and marked economic instability) foster a harsh and unified 
elite response that can produce a forceful counterrevolutionary backlash.
This chapter focuses on these five issues in terms of the four historical 
cases analyzed in Chapter 1 and the more recent Nicaraguan case. Each 
section first explores the conditions that favor elite unity and confronta 
tion with the revolutionary state, and then turns to an analysis of those 
that foster business fragmentation and accommodation with the regime. 
The concluding part of each section places the Nicaraguan case into this 
general framework.
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Oligarchichal Tendencies
The Persistence of Oligarchy and the Habit of Command
If a relatively small cluster of notable families traditionally dominated 
the central core of the economy and key institutions of government, 
and its dominance was not broken by the rise of competing working- or 
middle-class actors, then the bourgeoisie may still be characterized by 
what Conaghan (1991, 37) calls a "seignorial cultural style," or what I have 
called here the "habit of command." This tradition may give the dominant 
core of the elite both the perceived moral authority and the predilection 
to speak on behalf of the whole private sector. To the extent that this 
tradition is historically and culturally sanctified, political power may be 
heavily concentrated in the oligarchical segment of the private sector.
Historically, this elite's authority was related to its considerable con 
trol over land. To survive deep into the twentieth century, however, a 
traditional elite must fan out from its original core activities. The exten 
sion of the coffee elite of El Salvador from coffee production into coffee 
processing, banking, cotton production, and, finally, industry illustrates 
the process. An overlapping, interpenetrated ownership pattern tended to 
bind different sectors of the traditional elite together and produce a com 
mon bargaining strategy within the Salvadoran bourgeoisie. Thus land 
reform or bank nationalizations that affected large landowners or bank 
stockholders triggered broader elite opposition, even among commercial 
leaders and industrialists who were not specifically affected by the re 
forms.
Because of the extensive resources dominated by this land-based elite, 
private producers that emerge subsequently tend to develop as subordinate 
actors. They depend on the dominant group for financing, subcontracts, or 
political protection, and they too benefit from a system that the oligarchs 
can take responsibility for creating. These characteristics serve to fore 
stall the development of an alternative, independent perspective in the 
nonhegemonic elite. Again, the Salvadoran case is instructive. Not only 
were a n e p leaders successful in preventing any subsector of their associa 
tion from sustaining serious negotiations with the Christian Democratic 
government; they were also successful in organizing a sweeping bour 
geois coalition against the reform. The Alianza Productiva included even 
small business associations and professional/managerial organizations; it 
became an important electoral force opposing the reform regime.
The power of a traditional economic elite is generally diminished by
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political emancipation and mass mobilization. In several Latin American 
cases, however, the process of democratization did not extend very far. 
The franchise was effectively denied to a significant portion of the popula 
tion (such as illiterates in Ecuador); unions and other mass organizations 
remained small and weak; political parties functioned only intermittently 
or only in the urban areas,- and electoral results that threatened the estab 
lished order were nullified or altered (Malloy and Seligson 1987; Booth 
and Seligson 1989).
Under these circumstances an oligarchical elite has fewer problems 
preserving a relatively high level of unity. It need not seek out nonelite 
coalition partners or accept extensive compromises. The cultural style 
and views of the traditional elite continue to frame the discourse of the 
political leadership. Issues like land reform can be kept off the political 
agenda in spite of the continued importance of the land question to the 
bulk of the population.
In these cases, even relatively mild or carefully delimited reform pro 
posals can be met with harsh resistance. Processes that are commonly 
associated with modern capitalism, such as unionization, profit sharing, 
or income taxes, may be viewed with extreme alarm by elites for whom 
these ideas are an unthinkable violation of a long-established social order. 
Moderate reformers from center or center-left political parties or even 
officials from conservative U.S. administrations like the Reagan adminis 
tration may, as in El Salvador, be regarded by prominent sectors of the local 
elite as harboring secret sympathies for socialism or local revolutionaries 
because they support agrarian reform.
Where the traditional elite's assumptions about its rights and privileges 
have never been seriously challenged, the bourgeoisie will tend to respond 
in a forceful, unified way, even to relatively modest efforts to alter the 
social order. It may even, as in Salvador in 1988, retain enough resources 
(social authority, control over the media, economic leverage, capacity for 
violence) to reaffirm its political prominence through electoral politics.
The Absence of Hegemony and Elite Porousness
In contrast, sectors of the bourgeoisie are more likely to pursue con 
ciliation with the revolutionary state when traditional oligarchical net 
works have been fractured. The bourgeoisie is then more readily divided 
into disconnected, even competing, segments that may be played against 
each other by revolutionary leaders.
Various processes have undermined oligarchical power in Latin
America. In both Mexico and Peru, revolutions led to a disintegration 
and displacement of the traditional oligarchy. In neither case were landed 
elites and their descendants entirely stripped of their assets; these elites 
did, however, experience a major erosion in their wealth, a collapse of 
their social status, and a revocation of their political authority. Indus 
trialization, particularly that promoted by recent immigrants, may also 
increase the complexity and sectoral differentiation of the bourgeoisie and 
further undermine the preeminence of any one group, making oligarchical 
hegemony more difficult.
When the oligarchy disintegrates, other business elites, who are less 
accustomed to playing a direct political role, may not be prepared to 
unite into a cohesive front. Without a clear internal leadership norm, the 
bourgeoisie more readily fragments into a series of competing groups and 
sectors. Even family ties or shared class interests may not be sufficiently 
strong to forge full unity during periods of transition and change. The 
factionalization of the elite makes it possible for sectors to emerge who 
weigh their interests differently and make divergent strategic choices.
The particular sectors that were most likely to negotiate with state 
reformers varied from country to country. In Velasco's Peru as well as 
Jamaica during the first Manley government, exporters who were just 
emerging depended heavily on the state for financial support and assis 
tance in opening markets and establishing trade connections. In these 
two cases, the exporters' associations a d  e x  and j e a  tended to have more 
positive relations with the Velasco and Manley governments, respectively, 
than did most other associations of private producers.
In some countries, small industrialists became regime allies; in others, 
stronger ties were forged with larger industrialists. In Mexico, for ex 
ample, small industrialists were singled out for special support during the 
Cardenas era; their state-sponsored association, c a n a c in t r a , became a 
progovernment stalwart in the years that followed. In other countries, 
like Peru, larger industrialists, many of whom were also interested in ex 
port promotion, had more cordial ties with the government, and small- 
and medium-sized industrialists were more antagonistic to the Velasco 
regime. Under the latter's leadership, the industrialists' association s n i 
became the leading private sector critic of the Velasco government—a 
stance for which the organization paid dearly. In Chile as well, small- and 
medium-sized business owners became vociferous critics of the Allende 
regime and provided the public leadership of the bourgeois opposition. 
This occurred in spite of the government's official commitment to a sup 
portive alliance with this nonhegemonic elite.
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In contrast to theories suggesting that smaller industrialists producing 
for domestic consumption might be more supportive of a developmen- 
talist and redistributive state, the case studies analyzed here demonstrate 
more varied alliance patterns. Much depends on the particular dynamics 
of the case, such as the previous experiences of various sectors with state 
intervention, the particular programs and policies adopted by the revolu 
tionary state, the foreign exchange and financial constraints faced by the 
government, and the skill of state leaders in cultivating connections with 
different groups. This variation suggests that the characteristics and deci 
sions of the state leadership play a crucial role in determining the degree 
to which an alliance with the bourgeoisie is formed, a point to which we 
will return below.
The Failure of Ontological Givens: Class Division in Nicaragua
Nicaragua lacked a national oligarchy capable of providing hegemonic 
leadership for the bourgeoisie. The country was strewn with deep re 
gional divisions,- oligarchs, such as they were, tended to be local in nature 
and fiercely competitive among themselves. No one production sector or 
social group emerged to dominate the nation. Elites in Granada hewing 
to the Conservative banner vied with elites from Leon who endorsed the 
Liberal cause. Nineteenth-century wars between these groups spilled over 
into the twentieth century. Enmity was suppressed but not eradicated by 
the long dictatorship of the Somoza family. With the banking system and 
much of foreign trade under the control of foreigners or the Somoza dy 
nasty, no one sector of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was able to consolidate 
economic power by diversifying into these strategic enterprises. With the 
political system controlled first by the U.S. occupation and later by the 
Somoza family, economic elites also had little opportunity to experience 
direct political control.
Although the Nicaraguan business sector began to move into banking 
and foreign trade and to coalesce into economic groups in the 1950s, this 
process was quite limited. The key economic groups remained competi 
tive among themselves,- none provided a political challenge to the Somoza 
regime. Lacking a hegemonic center, the Nicaraguan private sector in 
the prerevolutionary period tended to be known for its regionalism, frag 
mentation, and, aside from the political escapades of a handful of Young 
Turks, political passivity. The small size of the country and of the wealthy 
class in Nicaragua meant that many in the elite knew each other per 
sonally; important segments were bound by friendship and marriage ties. 
In spite of this, no sector of this group was capable of exercising class
hegemony. Continued regional and economic competition, political acqui 
escence to the regime, and the inability to project broad social authority 
in the society spelled political debility for the elite.
With the insurrection, much of the top business elite fled the country. 
The takeover of the collapsed banking system and export trade by the f s l n  
government effectively decapitated the disintegrating Nicaraguan bour 
geoisie; the remainder of the class was even less cohesive. Several leading 
business figures joined the revolution; others moved increasingly into the 
opposition. Without a long history of collective action and political con 
vergence, the Nicaraguan elite was unable to construct and maintain a 
common front under the Sandinistas. Within u pa n ic , for example, divi 
sions soon surfaced. A harsh, ideological critique of the government was 
launched by larger producers from more prestigious social backgrounds 
who commanded the national c o s e p/u pa n ic  front. Regional leaders, 
with generally less prestigious school ties and more modest holdings, on 
the other hand, offered a more modulated critique and were more will 
ing to negotiate with the regime. Other producers, generally still lower 
on the social hierarchy, even joined the rival association, u n a g , and tied 
themselves organizationally to the revolution.
The Nicaraguan case differs significantly from that of its regional 
neighbor, El Salvador, where a much more moderate reform regime was 
confronted with a much more fully united and fiercely opposed national 
elite. In this area, the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie may have more in com 
mon with that found in the reformist era in Peru, where the elite failed to 
form a united front. As in that case, the absence of a powerful oligarchical 
elite after the revolution left a segmented private sector that responded 
in divergent ways to the regime.
Organizational Characteristics
Private Sector Organizational Autonomy from the State
The private sector is more likely to confront the regime if its orga 
nizations have emerged as authentic representatives responding to ini 
tiatives of the elite itself. If the juridical protections provided for these 
groups are strong enough so that the state cannot easily dissolve them, 
and their financial base is independent of the regime, then these organi 
zations should be less vulnerable to state pressure. Generally these con 
ditions prevail when the organizations are created through autonomous 
interactions rather than state decree and where participation is voluntary 
rather than mandated by the state.1
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Business associations are likely to be stronger if they emerge in every 
major sector of the economy, thus filling the available space for elite orga 
nization and preempting state-sponsored competitors, rather than being 
spottily organized in a few sectors or regions of the country. The forma 
tion of a peak association that brings together business representatives 
from across the nation also fosters intra-elite cohesion and cooperation. 
Finally, organizational autonomy allows the elite to develop its own, in 
dependent means of communication, including newspapers and radio or 
television stations, that can extend the reach of the elite into other social 
sectors. This power, defended in the name of political pluralism, can help 
the elite to check the organizational efforts of nonelites and extend its 
power beyond its class base.
Of the cases we have explored, Chile had the most autonomous and 
durable form of private sector organization. Four powerful associations 
date back to the 1800s. The six most prominent associations had formed 
one of the region's oldest peak associations, c o pr o c o , in 1935. Even 
small- and medium-sized businesses had a firm set of associations estab 
lished decades before the democratic socialist transition was attempted.2 
Business groups had privileged access to state policymaking boards, but 
their associations remained relatively free of government controls. Sev 
eral of these organizations had thick links to right-wing political parties. 
Partisan connections intensified their resistance to government appeals 
when the government was in the hands of political opponents.
Whereas the more overtly authoritarian Velasco regime was able to 
simply dissolve, restructure, and rename private sector organizations, the 
reform regimes of Allende, Duarte, and Manley, which emerged in more 
pluralistic settings, could not. Leaders of s o f o f a , a n e p, and the Jamai 
can Chamber of Commerce proved skillful and adaptable opponents. In 
Chile, El Salvador, and Jamaica, where the media remained a branch of pri 
vate enterprise and the government was obligated to give it free rein, the 
fiercely antirevolutionary major daily newspapers [El Mercurio, the Diario 
de Hoy, and the Daily Gleaner, respectively) led a steady, hyperbolic, and 
often hysterical attack on the regime. The norms of press freedom and 
political pluralism gave private sector leaders mouthpieces with which to 
exert broad influence over public political discussion, uniting opponents, 
persuading doubters, and subverting the revolution. If the revolutionary 
regime is not capable of circumscribing business's organizational power 
or stimulating the rapid growth of popular sector alternatives to counter 
balance it, then the autonomy of elite organizations may lead to effective 
oppositional collaboration and the defeat of revolution.
Independence from the regime should not be equated with indifference 
to all external influence. Indeed, several private sector organizations that 
were institutionally autonomous vis-a-vis the state were openly influ 
enced by their connections to foreign actors. CIA funding for the bosses' 
strike in Chile in 1972, for example, encouraged the consolidation of the 
Chilean bourgeoisie, imf  pressure for economic policy changes bolstered 
the internal critics who were hostile to the reformers in Peru and Jamaica. 
Powerful external actors like the U.S. government or the imf , therefore, 
can serve as an alternative reference point, encouraging the local bour 
geoisie to fuse and reject the options offered to it by state reformers.3
Controlled Organization and Muted Responses
It is difficult for the state to establish institutional and organizational 
controls over the business sector the way it sometimes has over labor 
and peasant associations. By definition, economic elites have resources 
(wealth, social status, influence over their workers, technical knowledge, 
control over investment, international connections) that make it hard for 
the state to control their activities. The state, however, can exercise in 
fluence and promote accommodation, particularly when private sector 
organizations are not fully developed. When there are few strong business 
groups, or their membership is very restricted, the state can sponsor the 
creation of new organizations that incorporate those elites who have been 
historically excluded.
This process was, of course, relatively easy for the Mexican government 
when it created the Confederations of the Chambers of Industry and of 
Commerce in 1917 in the wake of the revolution and before such organi 
zations had emerged spontaneously from within the private sector. When 
a segment of the business elite later moved to create its own organization, 
c o pa r me x , the Mexican regime responded by fusing its two confedera 
tions into one organization and mandating the participation of all (except 
very small firms) in the state-sponsored association. A few years later, 
the Mexican state divided the industrial and commercial chambers again, 
to prevent them from becoming too powerful, and created an additional 
organization, c a n a c in t r a , that steadily backed regime initiatives. State 
intervention in Mexico produced a controlled fragmentation of business 
organizations that delimited their bargaining capabilities.
The process was more complex in Peru, where the organizational ter 
rain of the private sector was relatively full by the time of the revolu 
tion in the late 1960s. In that case as well, however, the regime was able
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to affect the setting by dissolving the agricultural association (s n a ) and 
withdrawing legal recognition from the industrialists' association (s n i), 
while simultaneously approving legal status for the more accommodating 
exporters' association (a d e x ). In this way the regime could fill the orga 
nizational landscape with less oppositional associations. A revolutionary 
regime may be more successful at deflecting bourgeois opposition if it 
mobilizes private producers who have not been previously organized and 
establishes quasi-corporatist links with business associations.
A similar logic applies to the media. In the Mexican case, the govern 
ment had a series of tools with which to influence the media, including 
control over newsprint, advertising, and the ability to restrict access to 
political leaders and to periodically reshuffle owners and editors. In Peru, 
the 1974 press law expropriated daily newspapers and turned them over to 
selected social actors. As a result, in these two cases the private sector's 
ability to undercut the government through its control over the media was 
limited. Without a media mechanism to disseminate its views, the busi 
ness elite finds it more difficult to enforce unanimity within the private 
sector and build a mass base for its position.
The Mix of Autonomy and Dependence in 
Revolutionary Nicaragua
The Nicaraguan private sector associations never achieved the extraor 
dinary political autonomy found historically in Chile or El Salvador. They 
were, however, somewhat more independent of the regime than core busi 
ness groups operating in Mexico in the 1930s and 1940s. The closest paral 
lel for the Nicaraguan case may be found in Peru, where some established 
organizations had relatively autonomous histories but other organizations 
were more dependent on the regime.
Several factors contributed to the organizational weaknesses of the 
Nicaraguan elite. First, even in important economic sectors like coffee 
cultivation, Nicaraguan elite organizations tended to be both regional and 
ephemeral. Those that became a permanent part of the political landscape 
were generally heavily influenced by the government either through quasi- 
corporatist linkages with government boards, the direct participation of 
Somoza family members in their administration, or a dense network of 
clientelism. In their dealings with the Somoza regime, private elites re 
sorted heavily to particularistic bargaining to advance their individual 
claims. As a result, they lacked a solid institutional legacy that might 
have strengthened their hand in dealing with the Sandinista regime.
Private sector organizations did, rather belatedly, gather momentum 
and turn hostile to the Somoza dynasty. Goaded by urban elites affili 
ated with a USAID-funded in d e , Nicaraguan business finally founded a 
peak association (c o s ip, later c o s e p) in 1972.This national organization 
pulled together business leaders from an array of sectors to challenge the 
corruption and weak developmentalism of the dynasty. However, com 
pared with that in Chile or even regional rival El Salvador, private sector 
coalescence was late and frail in Nicaragua.
The 1970s mobilizations did provide the elite with some training in 
political confrontation and autonomy from the regime. The revolutionary 
era began with the lateral proliferation of private sector organizations and 
the vertical consolidation of the peak association, c o s e p soon became 
a potent opposition force, complete with a media arm [La Prensa). For 
political reasons the Sandinista regime was unable to destroy c o s e p, even 
though the government never granted it a legal charter and did censor and 
periodically close La Prensa. In some ways the existence of c o s e p served 
the interests of the f s l n . c o s e p's continued strident opposition demon 
strated how the regime kept faith with its commitment to pluralism, even 
when provoked. A steady diet of vituperation from an organization of 
the wealthy also helped to validate the regime's credentials as a defender 
of the poor. Nonetheless, the internal denunciations and external lobby 
ing of c o s e p did pose a challenge to the regime. Instead of eliminating 
this opposition group, the Sandinistas attempted to curb its influence by 
periodic harassment and, later, cooptation.
Much like the Peruvian and Mexican cases, the Nicaraguan govern 
ment also moved to create an alternative organizational pole for economic 
elites. By 1984 u n a g  had metamorphosed into a broad producer associa 
tion that welcomed even medium- and large-sized producers. This state- 
sponsored association was closely linked to and dependent on the regime. 
A full quarter of its budget came from the f s l n ; one of its most effective 
recruiting ploys was the implicit pledge to intervene on behalf of members 
in the event of expropriation,- and many of its top leaders were prominent 
members of the f s l n . Although u n a g  became more critical of the San 
dinista government performance over time, it remained a close ally and 
supporter of the revolution.
The Sandinista regime was unable to redesign the organizational infra 
structure of business in Nicaragua. It did, however, alter this terrain by 
interposing an organization of its creation and cultivating regional and 
sectoral organizations that were less ideologically hostile to the revolu-
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tion.4 Political parallels may be drawn with Peru, where adversarial elite 
organizations from the prerevolutionary era were forced to make room for 
some newer, supportive organizations that emerged in the wake of that 
revolution. On the other hand, Nicaragua's peak association remained as 
stridently antiregime, as did the parallel organizations in Chile or Salva 
dor. Like them, it drew on a powerful oppositional newspaper to challenge 
the revolution.
Perception of Threat
Classwide Threats and Elite Fusion
In none of the cases examined in this book was the existence of the pri 
vate sector threatened. In each case, there was space, both in the general 
conceptual model that guided the restructuring and in actual practice, 
for continued private ownership and private accumulation, at least for 
the bulk of the private sector. But the perception of a classwide threat 
of annihilation became pervasive in several cases. The Chilean case is 
instructive.
Although some elements of the Chilean private sector panicked when 
Allende was elected and began organizing in opposition, others initially 
searched for some accommodation with the regime and expressed a tenta 
tive willingness to cooperate. The bourgeoisie swung en masse into the 
opposition only after the u p government began a campaign of expropria 
tions and interventions that seemed ill defined and uncontrolled. The u p 
government provided no meaningful guarantees to private producers as 
it lurched from intervention to intervention. Perhaps most important, 
expropriation was directed against local capitalists as well as foreigners.
Although direct comparisons are difficult, expropriation of local capi 
talists was probably more extensive in Chile than in Mexico or Peru. The 
agrarian reform program affected approximately the same proportion of 
agricultural land in Chile as in Mexico and Peru (McClintock 1981, 61), 
but state expropriations in the urban, industrial sector were more exten 
sive. Whereas state expansion in the Mexican and Peruvian cases tended 
to occur through the creation of new industries that would presumably 
benefit even private producers or through benign takeovers of bankrupt 
private firms, state expansion in the Allende period tended to rely on the 
forced transfer of existing resources from the private to the public sectors.
Family networks that extended across key sectors in the top stratum of 
the elite, such as those identified by Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988, in Chile and
by Colindres (1977) in El Salvador, facilitated a unified hostile response. 
The crucial blow came in the Chilean case, however, when even producers 
outside those top networks—the small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs, 
shopkeepers, the self-employed, and neighborhood businesses—moved 
forcefully into the opposition. Movements to expand the state-controlled 
"social area" on multiple fronts (banking, agriculture, extraction, manu 
facturing), to expropriate small and medium enterprises as well as large, 
and to take over local as well as foreign operations proved too sweeping 
and indiscriminate for the Chilean private sector.
From the perspective of the Chilean elites, two conclusions about the 
expropriation pattern were possible. Either the governing coalition had 
lost control of the state and state erosion of the private sector was proceed 
ing according to some unofficial agenda controlled by extremist sectors 
outside the formal government, or the government remained in charge but 
was duplicitous about its actual intentions since it continued to violate 
its own commitments to protect the small- and medium-sized producers. 
In either case, formal guarantees provided by the government carried little 
weight for these groups. Even regulatory actions that were consistent 
with modern capitalism were seen as a prelude to further erosion of pri 
vate ownership. Because the u p's  efforts to restructure the economy were 
judged to follow a class logic, rather than a more inclusive national one, 
the private sector overcame its segmental tendencies, and a palpable class 
identity emerged.
The ideological ascendance of socialist theory in Chile was much 
sharper than in the other cases. Decades of intense ideological discus 
sion within the parties of the left in Chile produced a clearer repudiation 
of capitalist principles there, and the forceful involvement of unions and 
popular organizations made it harder for the u p government to diverge 
from more radical prescriptions. The political base of the Chilean regime, 
therefore, pushed the state to expand the socialized sector more quickly 
by expropriating more heavily. Fears of full-scale state control, fanned by 
El Mercurio, affected even elites not specifically targeted.
Even in cases where the regime is not formed by theoretically sophis 
ticated leftist parties and militant labor, the private sector can still panic. 
Reform moves in El Salvador, for example, triggered extreme fears in the 
Salvadoran bourgeoisie in spite of the reformers' moderate views and poor 
mobilizational skills. The simultaneous targeting of three key economic 
sectors (agriculture, banking, and export), the emphasis on expropriation 
of local rather than foreign firms, and the sharp discontinuity between the
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impunity enjoyed by the elite before and its circumscription after 1980 all 
fed a sweeping and intense elite opposition that seemed out of proportion 
with the objective threat that it faced.5 As in the Chilean case, this factor 
deepened the state-capital divide and fueled sharp retaliation.
Moderate Threats and Class Division
If the state is seen as ultimately developmentalist and committed to 
national advancement rather than fundamentally anticapitalist, then class 
loyalties and fears will not be invoked as fully. Some elite sectors may 
be open to the idea of a tactical alliance. This pattern is more likely to 
occur when expropriation focuses on foreign-owned operations and local 
businesses are largely exempt. Selective expropriation of foreign firms 
can build a national consensus, whereas extensive and indiscriminate 
takeovers of local firms feed bourgeois panic and retaliation.
To avoid arousing generalized elite hostility, any expropriations of local 
capital should be carefully targeted with a clear set of rules guiding the 
process. Of course, discretionary expropriation, where takeovers are more 
random and individual bargaining occurs, may draw more producers into 
the negotiation process as each one individually attempts to bargain to 
retain property. This style of expropriation, however, breeds deeper re 
sentment, since no business owner has an enduring protection from an 
arbitrary state. In the long run, overly discretionary expropriations seem 
likely to generate more hostility than accommodation.
In the Mexican and Peruvian cases, emphasis was placed on the ex 
propriation of foreign rather than domestic capital; even foreign holdings 
were expropriated only selectively. In Mexico, Peru, Jamaica, and even 
Chile, the state takeover of foreign corporations did not alienate local 
business elites, and in several cases it was actually applauded. Outside 
the agricultural sector, expropriation of local capital in Mexico and Peru 
tended to be quite restricted. When it occurred, it was often prompted 
by the bankruptcy of a local firm rather than state targeting. The pace of 
state expansion was relatively slow, and small- and medium-sized firms 
were largely exempt. Indeed, in Mexico these enterprises became favored 
allies during the 1930s and 1940s.
In their study of democratic socialism, Stephens and Stephens (1986) 
suggest that the state sector should be formed essentially through the 
construction of new enterprises rather than through the expropriation of 
existing ones. Space should be carved out for those elements of the pri 
vate sector that can contribute to the new model, and their medium- and
even long-term existence needs to be guaranteed. The state must dem 
onstrate through its actions that important portions of the private sector 
will be respected. This kind of carefully delimited revolutionary vision 
may foster accommodation on the part of strategic economic elites.
Symbolic communication may also assuage elite fears. Like most politi 
cal communication, the interaction between political and economic elites 
draws on coded messages and signals. Cardenas's decision to reenact the 
confrontational speech to the Monterrey business elite three years later in 
Saltillo, this time with an emphasis on the constructive role that business 
can play, served as an important signal to the disaffected bourgeoisie.6The 
use of interlocutors who elicit trust at both ends, such as Central Bank 
president Montes de Oca during the revolutionary transition in Mexico 
(Hamilton 1982,130-31) or the former president of the Chamber of Com 
merce in Velasco's Peru (Bamat 1978, 216), also facilitates communication 
and successful negotiation. The creation of privileged communication 
channels for top business leaders or for leaders of priority economic sec 
tors, such as c a n a c in t r a  in Mexico or a d e x  in Peru, conveys a capacity 
for inclusiveness that could bring economic elites to vie for these oppor 
tunities. Such gestures lower the perception of generalized threat and tend 
to divide entrepreneurs into competitive factions seeking access to these 
resources.
Threat Perception and Expropriation Policy in Nicaragua
Although the f s l n  was viewed with suspicion by some private elites 
during the insurrection, those who stayed generally made common cause 
with the revolutionaries to oust the Somoza regime. Business leaders 
were wary, but most did not regard the f s l n  as an intolerable menace 
at that point. Nor were the initial expropriations cause for alarm. Early 
confiscations in Nicaragua focused on the properties of somocistas and 
the bankrupt banking system. These opening confiscations were clearly 
circumscribed and directed against political outsiders. As such, they were 
accepted consensually by the rest of the elite.
The Sandinistas did not target foreign enterprises for takeover. Indeed, 
the Nicaraguan revolution was quite extraordinary in its careful avoid 
ance of the expropriation of multinational corporations. Coming to power 
at the end of the 1970s, when the era of such expropriation had passed 
and the belief that foreign investment was destructive had waned, and 
unwilling to rouse further the hostility of foreign governments, the f s l n
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left foreign holdings largely untouched. In any case, foreign ownership 
was modest in Nicaragua and would have provided limited resources. Not 
taking the route of foreign expropriation, the Sandinistas turned more 
toward their own domestic elite.
When new rounds of expropriation began in 1981 that affected the prop 
erties of non-somocistas, elite fears surged. Although initially targeting 
large estates that were underutilized or decapitalized, the agrarian reform 
process occasionally entailed the takeover of medium and small prop 
erties that bordered on state farms. Medium-sized farms lost any legal 
protection with the 1986 reform of the agrarian reform law. Even highly 
productive estates could be taken on the imprecisely defined grounds of 
social utility. Hundreds of influential producers lost properties between 
1981 and 1989.
Although expropriation policy focused heavily on the agrarian sector, 
industries and commercial establishments like s a ims a  and is a  were also 
taken. During the period of most extreme control, even small producers 
and petty traders faced the loss of their inventory when they attempted to 
transport food across regional lines.
The Sandinista government tried to mute private sector opposition 
with a sectoralized approach that separated the "patriotic" from the "un 
patriotic" bourgeoisie. They publicly favored productive elites over unpro 
ductive ones, small- and medium-sized producers over large producers, 
staples producers over agroexporters, and the chapiolla bourgeoisie over 
those who were more internationalized. These distinctions attempted to 
differentiate between those who would be incorporated into the revolu 
tionary model and those who would not. Private elites had a number of 
mechanisms they could use to buffer themselves against expropriation, 
including downsizing, intensifying production, changing crops, manipu 
lating family or friendship ties, joining u n a g , and improving relations 
with workers. But the generally negative image of the bourgeoisie that 
prevailed in the early years and the latitude for expropriation allowed in 
the law were sweeping enough to generate widespread fear in the Nicara 
guan elite.
This concern was attenuated somewhat after the 1988 reforms. The big- 
splash introduction of a concertacion process, the elevation of moderate 
Martinez Cuenca to the s pp, and the creation of a series of national agri 
cultural commissions with the prominent participation of leading private 
producers all signaled a reorientation of the economic model. Informal
socializing between top comandantes like mid in r a  chief Jaime Whee 
lock and private sector leaders altered the nature of the communication 
process, thereby reducing tensions.
In spite of these adjustments, the prior experience with expropriation 
and extensive controls, combined with erratic takeovers even into 1989, 
made much of the private sector distrustful of the regime. Egged on by 
antirevolutionary media sources like La Prensa and Radio Catolica, and 
having dispersed their children abroad to prevent them from being con 
verted to the cause or seized in the draft, many elites regarded the regime 
as a threat to the survival of their way of life. In this sense, elite threat 
perceptions in Nicaragua were probably more like those found in Chile or 
El Salvador than those that prevailed in Mexico or Peru. Alarmed and on 
guard, much of the elite rallied, implicitly or explicitly, to the opposition.
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Political Institutionalization
Weak Political Capacity and the State-Capital Standoff
Two aspects of institutionalization are important for this analysis. The 
first concerns the political capacity of the state, that is, the internal cohe 
sion of the state itself and the consolidation of its mass base. The second 
focuses on the economic capacity of the regime, that is, the ability of the 
regime to generate a viable economic model through which growth can 
be maintained.7
One key indicator of low political institutionalization is chronic divi 
sion and infighting in the upper echelons of the state apparatus. The fail 
ure to consolidate the state leadership leaves the regime open to ready 
challenge by economic elites. The division of the state into competing 
camps makes it easy for business opponents to identify prospective gov 
ernment allies and to penetrate the sectors of the state under their control.
Linkages can then be struck between economic elites and internal 
state dissidents. Two examples illustrate the point. In both Chile and 
El Salvador, the reform regimes were unable to assert control over their 
militaries. This dissonance in the state structure allowed conservative 
business groups to cultivate an alliance with right-wing military officers 
in opposition to the reform. Overtly, through a military coup in Chile, 
or covertly, through violence and terror in Salvador, the military upended 
the reform process. Another institution that may run counter to reform 
is the court system, particularly those judicial appointees from a prior 
era. The ability of coffee elites to get the constitutionality of in c a f e  re-
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jected by the Salvadoran courts, for example, shows how fissures in the 
state apparatus may encourage continued, multiple challenges by private 
elites.8
Institutionalization of the new order can also be limited if the revolu 
tionary government is perched precariously on a slim plurality of support, 
if its alternative ideology fails to make inroads into a densely organized 
oppositional terrain, or if the revolutionary state fails to create a broad, 
durable mass base. Again, in both Chile and El Salvador, the electoral 
weakness of the reform regime invited continued business opposition. 
The Allende government was gaining momentum, with its electoral base 
expanding from 36.2 percent in the 1970 national election to 48.6 percent 
in the 1971 municipal elections (Valenzuela 1978, 40, 54). But even at its 
peak it still appealed to far less than the sweeping majorities that might 
have quieted elite opposition. Likewise in El Salvador, the reformers had 
great difficulty securing broad electoral support, losing the constituent 
assembly contest in 1982 and winning the presidency in 1984 only with 
massive financial backing and campaign support from the United States.
Curiously, revolutionary regimes can have problems establishing a 
solid political base even among beneficiaries. Land reform beneficiaries 
in Chile during the Allende period, for example, remained supportive of 
the oppositional Christian Democrats who had authored the agrarian re 
form law, even when they received land through the efforts of the u p 
government (de Vylder 1976, 204-6). The failure to consolidate a solid 
mass base and to mobilize a stable constituency for the revolution allows 
political opponents and economic elites to invade that terrain and attempt 
to recruit support, a r e n a , for example, campaigned heavily among low- 
income groups, using electoral propaganda that blamed grinding poverty 
in El Salvador on the failures not of the traditional elite but of the short 
lived Christian Democratic government. Since the Christian Democrats 
had not developed a solid political base among the low-income sectors, 
a r e n a  was able to make inroads into that population. Without electoral 
support from this sector of society, the right-wing would not have been 
able to win in the 1988-89 elections.
When the regime fails to institutionalize politically, it leaves itself vul 
nerable to electoral or military reversals. Recognizing their power under 
these conditions, private elites are less likely to enter into serious negotia 
tion with the regime. In El Salvador, for example, the low level of institu 
tionalization of the reform regime (the absence of hegemonic acceptance 
of the regime by either the left or the right, the executive's inability to
control the military or the courts, weakness of electoral institutions and 
fragility of electoral victories) made it an unattractive ally. Any private 
sector organizations or leaders that aligned with it stood to gain very little 
and to lose heavily when the government collapsed. Under these circum 
stances, the state would have great difficulty building support anywhere, 
but particularly with the economic elite.
The Institutionalized State and Worthy Foes
Conversely, a state that has achieved a high degree of institutionaliza 
tion through internal coherence and the consolidation of a strong mass 
base is more likely to secure compliance from the private sector. If eco 
nomic elites do not emigrate, they will be pressured to cooperate.
To minimize infighting and internal cleavages, revolutionaries must 
develop a framework that brings them together while imposing order on 
their interactions. This involves tough decisions about how to dispose of 
disagreements within the political leadership without provoking defec 
tions, and how to solve the succession problem through a leadership selec 
tion system. The clockworklike change in the occupant of the Mexican 
presidency, for example, has contributed significantly to the coherence of 
the Mexican political elite (Smith 1979,159-87).
Congruence between the military and the reformers, or at least in 
stitutional subordination, is necessary to undercut counterrevolutionary 
pressures from a military-private elite alliance. The Peruvian model, in 
which the military itself initiated the reform process, can assure at least 
some degree of institutional coherence. Even then, the divisions within 
the military between "bourgeois liberals," "progressives," and "the Mis 
sion" (McClintock 1981) undercut state unity and ultimately contributed 
to the Morales Bermudez countercoup.
Successful negotiation with economic elites is promoted when the 
state is backed by a broad mass base. Positions proposed by the regime 
then seem less the whimsical propositions of today's officials and more an 
evolving social consensus about the new rules of the game. Ironically, eco 
nomic elites may be more drawn to negotiation with a powerful adversary, 
where their success is not assured and serious negotiation is necessary, 
than with a weak, ephemeral one. Ideally, this mass support should not 
be overly effervescent; it should be channeled through some durable in 
stitutions and organizations. Again, the creation of a dominant party in 
Mexico and its successful incorporation of mass organizations during the 
Cardenas era is instructive.
208 The Nicaraguan Revolution in Perspective
The Nicaraguan Revolution in Perspective 209
Mass mobilization and sweeping popular indulgence may be easier to 
obtain when the state leadership emerges from a national, revolutionary 
struggle against a repressive regime as in Mexico and, as we shall see, 
Nicaragua. Emerging victorious from a revolution confers immense legiti 
macy on the winners as well as providing a powerful set of symbols to use 
in appealing for continued support. This kind of durable popular base may 
be harder to extract from conventional politics, such as elections or mili 
tary coups, where victory is tied to the electoral clock or the population 
is less mobilized.
Political Capacity in Revolutionary Nicaragua
The Sandinista government developed a high degree of political insti 
tutionalization during its decade in power. Although the original jg r n  
represented a compromise and included non-Sandinista members, a politi 
cal shake-up in December 1979 gave the major cabinet positions to San 
dinista stalwarts and consolidated f s l n  control. Not only did the f s l n  
dominate the executive by controlling three of five junta positions and 
the cabinet, it controlled the military and the police, a clear majority in 
the Consejo de Estado, the banks, the courts, and a substantial part of the 
media. The remarkable internal cohesion of the f s l n  national directorate 
and the institutional sweep of government positions by f s l n  affiliates 
meant that this revolutionary government was able to govern without the 
division and infighting that plagued most transformation efforts.
The Nicaraguan regime was also successful in cultivating a broad mass 
following. Before the insurrection reached its final months, the f s l n  
was actively mobilizing mass organizations. Associations of workers, 
peasants, agricultural laborers, women, young people, and neighborhood 
groups gave the government a broad national support base (T. Walker 
1985; Ruchwarger 1987). This wide support allowed the f s l n  to go into 
the 1984 elections with strong backing and emerge with an impressive 
67 percent endorsement of its presidential candidate (l a s a  1984). The new 
national assembly, with 64 percent of the seats held by the Sandinista 
camp, drafted a constitution that further sedimented the institutions of 
the Sandinista era.
The major challenge to the regime's political authority during this era 
was the contra war. In the 1984—86 period, when the war heated up, the 
government felt the challenge and intensified controls (censorship, stra 
tegic relocations, expropriations, harassment) to counter this pressure. By 
1987, however, the f s l n  military victory seemed assured. Even contra-
backers among the private elite now resigned themselves to the inevitable. 
This perception of inevitability drew the private sector leadership into 
increasing dialogue in 1988 and 1989.
There was, as we now know, a silent erosion of the f s l n 's political 
strength during 1985-89 (Oquist 1992). Several mass organizations were 
crumbling, and the political base of the revolution was shrinking. By 
1990, the Sandinistas won the endorsement of only 41 percent of the 
electorate and lost the election. Even if they had been elected with that 
plurality, that level of support would have encouraged elite opposition by 
raising the prospect of a political knockout in the 1996 elections. In spite 
of this erosion of their popular base, however, the f s l n  still had a large 
and powerful constituency. Only the masterful incorporation of almost all 
opponents into the fourteen-party u n o  coalition made the Sandinistas' 
electoral defeat possible.
Compared with several other revolutions considered here, therefore, 
the Sandinista variant was relatively successful in institutionalizing a 
political base. Unlike military reformers in Peru and Ecuador, where 
countercoups were soon followed by disabling elections, or Chile, where 
the electoral process that allowed a left-wing victory was quickly abol 
ished and followed by long-term military rule, the Sandinista revolution 
persisted for a full decade and left a strong political party and several 
important mass organizations. Although not as durable as the Mexican 
regime, whose hold on political power is virtually unsurpassed in the 
modern world, the f s l n  may prove to have a long-term presence in Nica 
raguan politics.
Economic Viability
Economic Failure and Elite Hostility
In most reform efforts, the creation of a viable economic model is an 
elusive goal. The financial costs of building a new government appara 
tus, creating a state sector to supplant or complement the private sector, 
and promoting the social objectives of the revolution are generally high; 
sources of financial support are limited. To cover the costs of its pro 
grams, the regime typically runs up mounting deficits that are financed 
through internal and, increasingly, external borrowing. This gap deepens 
the economic crisis by fueling inflation, and the economic climate be 
comes increasingly unstable.
In anticipation of, or in response to, economic uncertainty, local and
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foreign capitalists typically begin to withhold investment and engage in 
capital flight. Disinvestment becomes a virtual rule of revolution. As the 
economy begins to contract, a zero-sum game begins. When scarce re 
sources like foreign exchange or bank credit are channeled into the state's 
priority programs, the private sector often finds its access to resources 
declining. New taxes or mandated wage increases erode profits, raising 
fears about the long-run future of private accumulation. Even if property 
and profits are not affected, restrictions on access to imported luxuries 
or limits on access to hard currency for travel abroad may provoke sharp 
hostility from those who are accustomed to these privileges (Stephens 
and Stephens 1986, 118-24). Certainly the sharp, immediate economic 
downturn following the introduction of reform in El Salvador and the un 
leashing of hyperinflation in Chile undercut the new regimes' ability to 
present themselves as credible alternatives.
The precariousness of the economy increases the regime's vulnerability 
to pressure from local elites and outside creditors. This weakness allows 
external actors like the U.S. government or the imf , with the endorse 
ment of domestic business organizations, to move against the heterodox 
features of the revolutionary economic model.
Because of the revolutionary state's frequent failure to institutional 
ize a new economic order, the private sector is little drawn to negotiate 
with or make concessions to the new regime. Why enter negotiations with 
regime leaders if the fiscal viability of the state itself is in question? Why 
slug through tough transactions if state collapse may be imminent? If the 
state lacks the kind of durable structure that would make it a worthy 
bargaining partner, then economic elites will be less committed to seri 
ous consultation and alliances. Some will confront the regime directly on 
these issues,- others may use the traditional tactics of weaker parties in 
negotiations—foot dragging, delays, attempts to circumvent new require 
ments—in the hope that the regime will soon collapse and the rules will 
be reversed.9
Economic Success and Durable Bargaining
To bargain effectively with the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary state 
needs to achieve some economic success, even in the face of declining 
private sector investment. A temporary bubble of growth triggered by 
state-decreed wage increases, as we found in the Chilean case, will prob 
ably not inspire private sector confidence. If profit increases are quickly 
offset by wage increases, that moment of growth will soon subside. How 
ever, when the revolutionary state can create a new source of growth and 
wealth, from which even segments of the local private sector can hope 
to derive some benefits, then the state may be able to secure grudging 
complicity from local capitalists.
One way for the state to stimulate growth is by rechaneling foreign- 
owned resources. In Mexico, the requirement that insurance companies 
invest their reserve within the country caused foreign agencies to re 
treat; this created ample space for the expansion of both state-owned and 
privately owned local firms. The "bonanza development" (Becker 1983) 
strategy of Peru and the petroleum boom in Ecuador allowed state leaders 
to envision no-cost development financed from abroad through export 
earnings. The unilateral increase in the bauxite levy in Jamaica also ex 
panded state resources temporarily and eased access to foreign exchange 
for the local private sector.10 In the end, of course, most of these bonanza 
schemes failed to stimulate long-term growth, for a variety of reasons. To 
the extent that a new development strategy succeeds, however, it can play 
an important role in drawing in private sector collaborators. If the state 
experiences some economic success in the first few years, then the ideas 
enshrined in its development plan may appear more viable to economic 
elites, and private sector withdrawal may be attenuated.
If the economy is stimulated and grows, then a positive-sum game can 
emerge. Gains for the state and its working class/peasant allies will not 
mean inevitable losses for the bourgeoisie. It will be possible also to pro 
vide credit, concessions, or exemptions to private producers involved in 
innovation and development. The inevitable tensions that emerge with 
expropriation can be assuaged through adequate compensation. As private 
producers in priority sectors sense that they too can win under the new 
rules, they may be less inclined to repudiate the process and instead begin 
searching for ways to insert themselves into the development model.
In the end, dialogue and negotiation may be enhanced when there is 
some rough balance in the resources held by the state and the bourgeoisie. 
If the state is too weak relative to the economic elite, due to a failure to 
institutionalize or to its feeble grip on the national economy, and depends 
too directly on the private sector to finance its reform agenda, the bour 
geoisie will find it easy to withdraw resources and reverse the revolution. 
In this sense, it can be constructive if the state has some assets of its own 
through the control of profitable state enterprises and ready access to for 
eign financing. By acquiring its own resource base, the state reduces its
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dependence on local capitalists and improves its capacity to engage them 
in tough bargaining.
At the same time, the state should not be so strong relative to the 
local bourgeoisie that it devalues the capacity of the private sector to 
contribute to the nation's future. If the local bourgeoisie is too weak, in 
competent, and inefficient, then the state will find little reason to provide 
it with resources. Revolutionaries may be tempted toward a statist model 
in which the private sector is marginalized or even, in the most extreme 
case, eliminated.
Economic Crisis and Elite Resistance in Nicaragua
In the area of economic consolidation, the Nicaraguan revolution 
failed. Although some economic reactivation was achieved in the three 
years following the ouster of Somoza, the economy never regained its pre 
revolutionary production levels and, after years of steady decline, had a 
GDP equivalent to that found in the 1940s at the end of the Sandinista 
era. With inflation rates that reached world records, the economic crisis 
in Nicaragua made setbacks in the rest of the region look minor. Even 
Allende's economic problems in 1973 appear modest by comparison.
The Sandinistas faced an exceptional obstacle: war. Only reformers in 
El Salvador shared this difficulty, and even there it was not accompanied 
with trade displacement, economic embargo, and foreign aid problems. 
The war took a major toll, estimated by Sandinista government sources at 
US$17.8 billion in an economy that produced at its peak only US$2 billion 
a year (Wheelock Roman 1990, 126). The war distorted the government 
budget, caused shortages of supplies and labor, destroyed production and 
processing facilities, damaged transportation and communication infra 
structure, and was responsible for output losses in much of the country. 
Compared with the credit freezes or low-level sabotage imposed by the 
United States on other revolutionary regimes, the costs of foreign pressure 
in Nicaragua were extraordinary.
Economic problems associated with war were exacerbated by the devel 
opment model the Sandinistas endorsed. Fundamentally a state-centered 
approach, it depended heavily on the success of large-scale and long-term 
development projects like the t ima l  sugar mill or the Chiltepe livestock 
project. Focusing so strongly on long-term projects, the regime was un 
able to counter the economic downturn with measures that would stabi 
lize production. In the end, the grandes proyectos proved so difficult to
realize that most were suspended before completion, producing no eco 
nomic boost.
Economic duress in the late 1980s made the regime look more warmly 
at its own private sector. Private producers who were ideologically suspect 
in the early years were redefined as patriots for remaining in Nicaragua 
in spite of the problems. But that same economic decline further under 
mined the tolerance of many business elites. Private producers, who were 
faced with bottlenecks in the distribution system and who had problems, 
at times, getting long-term credit for their own projects, were increasingly 
skeptical of a regime that could not deliver. Even those who did not op 
pose the regime on moral or ideological grounds often did so on technical 
grounds, concluding that the government officials were so incompetent 
and ill prepared that they could not effectively guide the nation. Elites 
who might have been willing to accommodate the regime had the econ 
omy not contracted so rapidly were hard pressed to accept a continuation 
of the regime in the midst of a full-blown collapse.
In this area, therefore, Nicaragua is more like El Salvador, where eco 
nomic decline exacerbated elite opposition, than Mexico, where the econ 
omy continued to grow, creating opportunities for prioritized sectors. The 
ubiquitous deterioration in Nicaragua meant there were few who pros 
pered. Even the Sandinistas concluded that the model they employed was 
not viable and began to reverse course by the end of the decade.
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Conclusions
In moments of crisis and change, it may not be obvious to local entre 
preneurs whether their interests are best served by accommodation to 
revolution or by headlong confrontation. Should elites take advantage of 
the moment of uncertainty to invest heavily in enterprises that can be 
unloaded for a profit in more normal times? Or should they exit and safe 
guard their capital abroad? Should they dig in their heels and place the 
private sector organizations in the front line of the onslaught against ob 
jectionable revolutionaries? Or should they proclaim themselves patriotic 
producers who can accommodate the new rules, even as they attempt to 
moderate them? Should they reject the revolution because it undermines 
their social position, even if they are prospering? Should they accept it in 
spite of their declining income because it fosters national development 
and the prospects for future gain? The answers are not always obvious.
In general, the Nicaraguan elite adopted a posture of opposition. Of the
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five factors considered in this chapter, two pulled the Nicaraguan state- 
elite relationship toward confrontation. (See Table 7.1.) The perception 
of a classwide threat was high, and the economic viability of the regime 
was low. An additional factor—business organizational autonomy—was 
mixed. Although some associations were closely linked to the regime, 
others were highly autonomous and became stridently adversarial.
Unlike several reformist regimes in the region, the Sandinista govern 
ment did not target foreign corporations for expropriation. Instead, they 
concentrated on local estates and businesses, including large-, medium-, 
and in some cases small-sized producers who were deemed inefficient or 
obstreperous. This contributed to a wide perception of threat and undercut 
elite acquiescence.
Sustained economic decline also alienated business. The inability of 
the new government to stabilize the economy or generate new growth 
areas in which private elites might participate fed the generalized dis 
affection and encouraged capitalists7 convictions that they, unhampered, 
could do much better. Unable, under the rules of political pluralism to 
which the Sandinistas had a public commitment, to dissolve opposition 
groups or effectively counter the opposition press, the regime had diffi 
culty deflecting its opponents' attack.
The Sandinista regime did, however, secure cooperation from sectors 
of the private elite—more perhaps than might be expected looking at the 
sweep of the economic changes made and much of the political rheto 
ric about the revolution. Two of the five factors examined in this chapter 
pushed the state-elite relationship toward accommodation. (See Table 7.1.) 
The hegemonic force of a traditional oligarchy was low, and the institu 
tionalized political capacity of the regime was high. Again, the organiza 
tional autonomy of the business sector was mixed, but several features 
favored accommodation. The regime proved adept at spinning off alterna 
tive private sector organizations and, in the end, constructing a political 
network that drew in strategic private sector allies.
Lacking a powerful traditional oligarchical leadership with the social 
authority to direct a coordinated elite response, the Nicaraguan elite 
began the revolutionary era with a fractured foundation. In contrast, the 
Sandinista regime moved quickly to consolidate its base. Building on the 
momentum provided by a popular insurrection to oust a despised dictator 
ship, the Sandinista leadership created a strong political organization that 
dominated the state, most mass groups, and the 1984 elections. Unable 
to effectively challenge this monolith, many economic elites sought a
private accommodation. While not necessarily backing the regime, many 
rejected the role of public opponent.
The government developed a client organization for agricultural pro 
ducers, u n a g , that recruited among sectors of the bourgeoisie. This orga 
nization-building effort succeeded in deepening some fissures in the elite 
and mobilizing some producers who had not been previously incorpo 
rated into the opposition. By providing resources and support for elites in 
strategic sectors, the regime cultivated private sector toleration of reform 
and even selective participation in development initiatives. By the end of 
the era, the symbolic communication between the regime and the elite 
fostered fuller interaction and cooperation as the revolution deradicalized 
and elites began coming to terms with reform.
The result of these competing dynamics was a mixed relationship be 
tween the state and the private elite in Nicaragua. Without either the 
stable accommodation and mutual understanding achieved in the Mexi 
can case, or the unanimity of opposition achieved in the Chilean, a highly 
politicized and fragmented bourgeoisie entered the fray with the Sandi 
nistas.
These complex interrelationships continue as Nicaragua enters the 
postrevolutionary era. Without enough elite cooperation to consolidate a 
new economic base and stabilize production until the war could be won, 
the Sandinistas lost power in 1990. But the patterns of dialogue and link 
ages with local capitalists established during the decade of revolution 
provided a foundation for continued interaction with the reform-oriented 
bourgeoisie in the postrevolutionary era. Sandinista reformers were never 
as isolated and overpowered after their fall as was, for example, Allende's 
coalition. The relatively complex patterns of confrontation and accom 
modation that characterized state-capitalist relations in Nicaragua con 
tributed to both a deradicalization of the Sandinista revolution in its final 
stages and greater continuity of the Sandinista reforms in the postrevolu 
tionary setting.
Much of the literature on social revolution assumes that the bourgeoi 
sie must be definitively defeated in order for meaningful social change to 
occur. In my judgment, however, the elimination of this class is hardly a 
realistic or desirable objective. Not only would that transformation tend 
to concentrate too much power in the hands of the state, it would also 
deprive the society of the skills and resources of private elites and bring, 
at best, international isolation. What is needed are better ways to expand 
property ownership and provide the fuller inclusion of marginal sectors
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into the national economy. This complex and delicate work can be fos 
tered by looking back at a range of cases to identify those circumstances 
that were most propitious. This study of elite political segmentation and 
state-elite bargaining suggests that variations in the inherited character 
istics of the bourgeoisie and the dynamics of the bargaining process may 
produce markedly differing alliance patterns. Structuralist assumptions 
about elite opposition to reform require further refinement, as we work 




In 1990-91, as the Sandinista period came to a close, I conducted a series of 
semistructured interviews with 91 leading private agricultural producers. The 
agricultural sector was targeted because of its central role in the Nicaraguan 
economy. However, respondents were commonly involved in nonagricultural 
activities as well (professions, commerce, industry, etc.).
Interviewees were selected using the positional/reputational method. Ini 
tial interviews were arranged with the presidents of the major agricultural 
organizations at the national level and with their largest sectoral and regional 
affiliates. Association presidents were then asked to recommend others who 
had been particularly active and influential private sector leaders. Of the 91 
producers interviewed, 72 were current or recent officers in their producer 
associations. Most of the remainder were or had been representatives of the 
producers on government commissions or boards.
Within the framework of the positional/reputational methodology, an 
effort was made to target respondents across organizations, products, and re 
gions. Because of its relatively long, central role in organizing the medium - 
and large-sized producers, approximately three-fourths (74 percent) of those 
interviewed were affiliated with u pa n ic . Most of the remainder (18 percent) 
were affiliated with the Sandinista-sponsored (though increasingly indepen 
dent) organization, u n a g . A relatively small group (9 percent) were not affili 
ated with any organization or were leaders of associations that had chosen not 
to affiliate with any national organization. Interviews were also conducted 
with three members of the agrarian bourgeoisie who had been prominent 
private sector spokespeople before moving into high-level positions in the 
Sandinista government.
Respondents were distributed among four key sectors: 21 percent primarily 
in cotton production, 26 percent primarily in coffee, 31 percent primarily in 
livestock, and 14 percent primarily in basic grains (rice, sorghum, or maize). 
(The remaining 8 percent were primarily in banana or sugar production or had 
ceased production following expropriation.) With few exceptions, participants 
were medium- or large-sized landowners.
A total of 143 interviews was conducted with 91 producers. Sixty producers 
(66 percent) were interviewed only once, 24 (26 percent) were interviewed
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more than once, and 7 (8 percent) were interviewed three or more times. 
Those who were approached for and agreed to multiple interviews contrib 
uted more in-depth information about the social and political construction of 
the Nicaraguan elite.
Because of the political and economic dominance of Managua and the 
small size of the country, much of the economic elite maintains a residence 
in the capital. Forty-five percent of the interviews took place in Managua. In 
an effort to tap the experiences of those living outside Managua and operat 
ing exclusively at the regional level, interviews were conducted in ten other 
municipalities (Masaya, Masatepe, Jinotega, Granada, Juigalpa, Boaco, Mata 
galpa, Jinotega, Chinandega, and Leon). Five different regions of the country 
(Regions II, III, IV, V, and VI) were represented in this study.
Almost half (45 percent) of the interviews were conducted in the respon 
dents' homes. Of the remainder, 34 percent were held in their association 
headquarters, 16 percent in private offices outside their homes, and the re 
maining 5 percent in other settings (restaurants, bank offices, etc.). On average, 
the interview time per producer was 2 hours and 45 minutes, but the total 
amount of time ranged at the extremes from 1 to 18 hours. In approximately 
20 percent of the cases, prior interviews had been conducted with the pro 
ducer between 1982 and 1987, so a basis for frank discussion was already well 
established, and interview data could be compared across time.
The respondents in this study cannot be taken as typical of the Nicaraguan 
bourgeoisie, since they were by definition those most actively involved in the 
organizational leadership of their class. Demographic surveys and censuses 
needed to draw a fuller picture of the Nicaraguan elite do not exist, so I cannot 
say exactly how these respondents compare with the rest of their social class. 
However, since these individuals have, in one form or another, been selected 
by their peers as leaders and representatives, their responses and positions 
should have special significance for the Nicaraguan private sector.
Respondents were asked a series of open- and close-ended questions con 
cerning their demographic background, family economic history, personal 
production history, production resources, the problems and opportunities they 
encountered during the 1979-90 period, investment and expropriation experi 
ences, political views and activities, organizational involvement, economic 
philosophy, and policy recommendations.
Findings presented in Chapter 5 should be regarded as exploratory. There 
is no well-established model of elite attitudes and behavior during revolu 
tionary transitions, nor has there been much effort among social scientists to 
explore political divisions within the elite using individual-level data. This 







Agricultural Production by Crop, 1974/75-1987/88
Year Cotton3 Coffee 3 Rice3 Sorghum b
1974-75 7,998,400 890,800 1,733,500 1,127,600
1975-76 7,282,800 1,068,200 1,268,900 1,336,400
1976-77 8,159,900 1,102,500 838,100 2,113,700
1977-78 9,152,500 1,251,200 1,030,600 930,000
1978-79 8,152,400 1,263,100 1,175,000 1,356,200
1979-80 1,244,700 1,228,100 1,359,000 1,379,500
1980-81 4,878,590 1,284,934 1,376,800 1,939,519
1981-82 4,080,999 1,327,969 1,947,000 1,951,400
1982-83 5,070,136 1,568,375 2,134,000 1,150,588
1983-84 5,690,739 1,069,694 2,233,033 2,224,200
1984-85 4,608,645 1,115,000 1,942,900 2,354,400
1985-86 3,349,900 768,700 1,773,700 3,346,300
1986-87 3,289,037 942,000 1,725,000 3,769,200
1987-88 2,200,000 839,667 1,502,400 2,408,046





u n a g  Membership Data, 1987
Members of Cooperatives3
Regions/





Region I 8,070 11,856 330 333 _ 2,834 23,423
Region II 4,293 9,789 396 1,013 96 3,310 18,897
Region III 2,250 2,272 — 800 — 943 6,265
Region IV 5,364 5,939 — 499 2,207 1,947 15,956
Region V 2,559 927 — — — 11,491 14,977
Region VI 4,114 22,251 1,489 — 504 4,768 33,126
Zone I 298 1,586 — 202 — 565 2,651
Zone II 1,082 1,109 — 515 — — 2,706
Zone III 1,092 398 — 255 — 760 2,505
Nation 29,122 56,127 2,215 3,617 2,807 26,618 120,506
Source: Luciak (forthcoming).
Acronyms: c a s Sandinista Production Cooperative
CCS Credit and Service Cooperative
CSM Dead Fence Cooperative
CT Work Collective
aMembers of the various cooperative organizations are affiliated with u n a g  through 
their base structures and as individuals.
bAssociate members are affiliated with u n a g  as members of their coffee and cattle 
associations.
individual members affiliate with u n a g  but do not belong to any base structure.
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Nicaragua Economic Indicators, 1978-1992
Table A.3
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
g d p growth rate (%) -7.2 -26.4 4.6 5.4 -0.8 4.6
Per capita g d p growth rate (%) -10.0 -28.4 1.6 1.9 -4.0 1.2
Tax revenues/GDP (%) — — 18.4 18.7 20.3 25.9
Fiscal deficit/
government expenditures (%) 50.7 36.5 30.3 36.0 34.8 49.1
Fiscal deficit/GDP (%) — 13.5 9.2 12.4 13.6 30.0
Inflation rateb (%) 4.3 70.3 24.8 23.2 22.2 32.9
Exports (goods, f o b ) (millions $) 646 616 451 500 408 429
Imports (goods, FOB) (millions $) 553 389 803 922 723 819
Trade balance (millions $) + 93 + 227 -352 -422 -315 -390
Foreign debt (public) (millions $) 961 1,131 1,579 2,163 3,139 3,789
Interest due/exports
(goods and services) (%) 14.3 8.9 24.3 37.4 41.8 43.5
apreliminary
^consumer prices, December-December variation 1978-91; October-October variation 1992. 
Sources:
g d p and per cap. g d p growth 
rates
Tax revenues/GDP







1978 (CEPAL 1984, 2); 1979-82 (CEPAL 1985, 2); 1983-84 
(CEPAL 1990a, 25); 1985-92 (c e pa l  1992a, 42-43).
1980-87 (Arana Sevilla 1990, 42-43); 1988-91 
(c e pa l  1992b, 46).
1978 (c e pa l  1984, 2); 1979-84 (c e pa l  1986, 2): 1986-87 
(Neira Cuadra and Acevedo 1992,107); 1988-92 
(c e pa l  1992b, 25, 46; c e pa l  1992a, 48).
1978-83 (c e pa l  1987,17); 1984-92 (c e pa l  1992a, 45).
1978-82 (c e pa l  1984, 33); 1983-84 (c e pa l  1986, 26); 1985-86
(c e pa l  1987, 21); 1987 (c e pa l  1989, 24); 1988 (c e pa l  1990b); 
1989 (c e pa l  1992b, 36, 38); 1990-92 (c e pa l  1992a, 55).
1978-81 (c e pa l  1984, 2); 1982-84 (c e pa l  1987, 23); 1985 
(c e pa l  1992b, 25); 1986-1992 (c e pa l  1992a, 59).
1978-79 (c e pa l  1984, 35); 1980-83 (c e pa l  1990a, 34); 1984-92 
(c e pa l  1992a, 60).
Appendix 2 225
Table A.3 (continued)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992a
-1.6 -4.1 -1.0 -0.7 -12.1 -1.9 -0.7 -0.5 0.5
-4.8 -6.7 -3.5 -3.0 -14.2 -4.5 -3.7 -4.0 -3.4
30.7 27.8 27.7 24.6 19.2 21.7 17.7 19.8 —
41.4 41.9 35.3 37.2 55.7 22.2 56.5 24.1 _
24.8 23.4 18.0 16.4 26.6 6.7 19.7 8.0 7.3
47.3 334.3 747.4 1,347.2 33,547.6 1,689.1 13,490.2 775.4 2.2
386 301 243 295 236 290 332 268 235
826 830 836 734 718 615 570 688 730
-440 -529 -593 -439 -482 -325 -238 -420 -495
4,362 4,936 5,760 6,270 7,220 9,741 10,616 10,454 11,200





Basic Grains 0-50 mz. 50-500 mz. 500+ mz.
Coffee 0-15 mz./ 15-65 mz./ 65+ mz./
0-200 qt.a 200-1,000 qt.a 1,000+ qt.a
Cotton 0-50 mz. 50-200 mz. 200+ mz.
Cattle 0-200 mz. 200-1,000 mz. 1,000+ mz.
Source: c ie r a  (1981).
aas modified by Baumeister (1984b).
Table A. 5















Source: Unpublished c o s e p data, 1985.
notes
Preface
i. See Collier and Norden (1992) for an insightful discussion of the strategic 
choice model and a review of recent literature employing this approach. For an 
early illustration of strategic choice analysis developed in the 1960s to explore the 
possibilities for "reformmongering," see Hirschman (1973).
Chapter 1
1. See the discussion of the Chilean Popular Unity strategy below.
2. In a fulsome critique of Eurocommunist theory as developed by the French 
Communist party, Poulantzas concluded that the effort to define the non 
monopoly sector as an "exploited bourgeoisie" under the heel of the monopoly 
sector was fundamentally flawed. The work of imperialism theorists was reviled 
for its fallacious assumption of "a supposed class solidarity between the popu 
lar masses of the dependent countries and their own bourgeoisies ('the exploited 
nations') against the imperialist bourgeoisies" (Poulantzas 1978, 151). Poulantzas 
argued that the monopoly and non-monopoly sectors are bound together in a re 
lationship of "organic interdependence" (Poulantzas 1978, 149). Far from being a 
natural ally of the popular classes, the non-monopoly sector, because of its greater 
competitiveness and lower profit margins, may actually be more directly conflic- 
tual and exploitative in its relations with labor than its monopoly counterpart. 
Although Poulantzas delineates multiple contradictions within and between the 
monopoly and non-monopoly sectors of the bourgeoisie, he concludes emphati 
cally that "the relationship of exploitation is that between the bourgeoisie as a 
whole and the working class and popular masses" (Poulantzas 1978, 151). Inter 
preting Latin American class dynamics, Andre Gunder Frank concluded that the 
internationalization of capital was "driving the entire Latin American bourgeois 
class—including its comprador, bureaucratic and national segments—into ever 
closer economic and political alliance with and dependence on the imperialist 
metropolis" (Frank 1969, 396).
3. Zeitlin and Ratcliff's work raises provocative questions; in attempting to ex 
plain the political behavior of the capitalist class, however, the family-network 
framework suffers from significant limitations. Analysis of only upper echelon 
elites in the largest economic operations neglects the fissure between the domi 
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nant elite and the rest of the capitalist class, whose members do not occupy di 
rectorships of leading national banks or industrial conglomerates. Furthermore, 
the assumption that kinship is the central bond defining social relations may over 
state the cohesiveness of family structures and obscure divisions within those 
units. This formulation may assume too much about the collective economic pur 
posefulness of the extended family and the ability of family brokers to resolve com 
peting interests. Divisions within the top elite may not, in Zeitlin and Ratcliff's 
words, be "ontologically real," but, in moments of crisis and social transformation, 
they may be politically quite real.
4. A third type of outcome, in which a revolutionary socialist regime of the 
Cuban type confronts and eliminates the bourgeoisie, was not included in this 
analysis. Because that type of regime effectively eliminates the bourgeoisie, it pro 
vides little information about the ongoing dynamics and complex negotiations in 
the relationship between a transformative state and the dominant class.
5. My original study of this issue also included an analysis of elite resistance in 
Ecuador during the period of military reform (1972-76) and complex negotiation in 
Jamaica during the first Manley era (1972-80). Those cases have been summarized 
in an abbreviated fashion in notes in this chapter and Chapter 7.
6. Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1986, 333-36) differentiate 
democratic socialism from its more moderate cousin, social democracy, based on 
several criteria. Social democratic governments have tended to emerge in highly in 
dustrialized countries in Western Europe where local capital is relatively dynamic 
and foreign penetration is less intense. Because of these characteristics, income 
redistribution and economic growth can be achieved through tax and regulatory 
policy and social welfare programs, without extensive state control of the local 
economy. In Third World countries, on the other hand, where foreign participation 
in the economy is much deeper and aligns with local capital, they argue that more 
direct state ownership is required to achieve dynamic growth and lower foreign 
dependence. Thus while democratic socialism and social democracy share certain 
general objectives (increased social equality and promotion of political democracy), 
the role of the state and the economic logic of each is found to be distinct.
7. The industrial data are for 1969. According to de Vylder (1976, 136), there 
were an estimated 35,000 industrial firms in Chile at that time.
8. As early as 1940, over one-third of the industrial work force was unionized 
(Valenzuela 1978, 28). As the political contest deepened in the 1960s with the 
extension of the franchise and the election of Eduardo Frei, social organization in 
tensified with the growth of unions, neighborhood groups, and rural organizations.
9. According to Drake (1973, 315), economic and political elites were closely 
linked. Forty percent of the leaders of the Conservative party and 34 percent of the 
Liberal party leaders belonged to the s n a  in 1931-33.
10. The Association of Banks and Financial Institutions was established in 
1943, and the Chamber of Construction was founded in 1951. The National Mining 
Society includes only Chilean mine owners and represents medium-sized mining 
rather than the largest mines, which were foreign-owned prior to 1971.
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11. Bitar (1986, 208—9) notes that s o f o f a  had a membership of only around 
2,200 in the early 1960s. Genaro Arriagada's (1970, 116—71) study of Chilean em 
ployers7 associations identified a series of features, such as the inclusion of non- 
elected officials on the executive councils and low leadership turnover, that tended 
to increase centralized control in these associations and limit internal democracy.
12. The 1967 law allowed landowners to retain a reserva of their choosing 
equivalent to eighty hectares of irrigated land in the Central Valley. Furthermore, 
reformed land was allocated only to those workers currently employed on the 
estate. These measures allowed the landholding elite to retain all capital and con 
siderable land resources and did little to address the serious problems faced by 
landless migrants and minifundistas not employed on the large estates. The u p 
government did, however, accelerate the pace of implementation of that legisla 
tion. Between 1965 and 1973, 5,036 large estates (fundos) were expropriated, 70 
percent of them after 1970. See de Vylder (1976,176-98).
13. According to McClintock (1981, 61), the portion of agricultural land redis 
tributed in Chile between 1967 and May 1973 was comparable (36 percent) to that 
distributed in Mexico and Peru (36 percent in Mexico as of i960, and 35 percent 
in Peru through 1977), but the portion of rural families receiving land was much 
lower 19 percent in Chile versus 25 percent in Mexico and 24 percent in Peru).
14. It took the government almost a full year to specify a concrete expropriation 
plan for that sector. The bill it proposed in October 1971 targeted around 250 of the 
largest private stock companies for expropriation. Private stock companies with 
capital valued over 14 million escudos (then about US$1.4 million) in December 
1969 would either be fully expropriated and transferred to the social property area 
or be partially expropriated and turned into mixed enterprises. Congressional re 
sistance pushed the government to lower the target to around ninety enterprises a 
few months later. In a rare exception to the general pattern, the government was 
actually able to secure support for this proposal from the National Association of 
Small Manufacturers, whose constituents, of course, would not be affected by the 
bill (de Vylder 1976,136-37).
15. Two hundred and forty-eight were under full or partial state ownership 
and 259 were intervened or requisitioned (c o r f o  1989, 226-27, 244). In the final 
months of the Allende government, the number of firms taken over by their 
workers increased rapidly, with the addition of around 50 small- and medium-sized 
firms following an attempted coup in June 1973 (de Vylder 1976,144-45).
16. In February 1972, congress passed an amendment to the constitution that 
in effect precluded further expropriations without congressional authorization. 
Allende vetoed the measure and argued that a congressional override required two- 
thirds approval, something that the opposition could not muster. The opposition 
countered that constitutional reforms passed in 1970 made it possible to amend 
the constitution with only a simple majority vote. Allende proceeded with ex 
propriations as if the constitutional amendment were void, leading some of his 
challengers to allege that his regime operated outside the law and hence deserved 
to be removed by extralegal means. By the time Allende pushed a compromise
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proposal through his fractious coalition (which would give the government legal 
authority to expropriate, with compensation, eighty enterprises, while requiring 
specific authorization from congress for any future nationalizations), the right 
wing of the Christian Democratic party had become dominant, and the Christian 
Democrats refused to back the measure (see Valenzuela 1978, 75-76).
17. Arturo Matte Larrain, head of the prominent Matte family and brother-in- 
law of defeated presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri, was involved in the Inter 
national Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) conspiracy to prevent Allende's inaugu 
ration. His nephew Benjamin Matte Guzman, who headed the s n a , vehemently 
opposed even the Christian Democratic agrarian reform program and became a 
clandestine leader of the far right-wing paramilitary organization Patria y Liber- 
tad. Agustin Edwards Eastman, whose family owned a controlling interest (42.75 
percent) in the Bank of Edwards and 69 percent the conservative newspaper El 
Mercurio, left Chile to become an international vice-president of Pepsi-Cola Cor 
poration in New York. From the United States he lobbied the Nixon administration 
for assistance in blocking the Allende government (see Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988, 
66, 224, 252-57).
18. This percentage decline was not simply a reflection of a rapid increase in 
public investment. Stallings's data (1978, 248) show that real public investment 
did increase modestly in 1973, but real private investment dropped sharply from 
260 million escudos of 1965 in 1970 to approximately 93 million escudos of 1965 
in 1971. This decline appears to be quicker and sharper than that in Peru, where 
the private sector was still responsible for 40.8 percent of gross fixed capital for 
mation in 1974 (though FitzGerald [1976, 84) estimates that only one-third of this 
was from local capitalists).
19. This point is difficult to document, but it is often made in the literature on 
this era. See, for example, de Vylder (1976, 62) and Bitar (1986, 204).
20. Indeed, there was some support for the u p coalition within the privileged 
classes prior to 1970. According to electoral surveys by Eduardo Hamuy in Greater 
Santiago, for example, 20 percent of those classified as in the bourgeoisie voted for 
the Socialist/Communist coalition in 1964. This was slightly higher than the 18 
percent managers/professionals and somewhat below the 27 percent petty bour 
geoisie who voted for the left in that election. These figures are cited in Stallings 
(1978, 244).
21. Although personally committed to restricting expropriations according to 
the original plan, Allende repeatedly gave in to pressures from more radical ele 
ments in order to maintain unity within the coalition and avoid breaking with his 
own political party. Most graphically, in early 1973 he rejected the Millas Project, 
named for the new economic minister Orlando Millas, which would have returned 
fifty small- and medium-sized firms to their former owners. After the workers in 
these firms, encouraged by the Socialist party and Movimiento de Accion Popular 
Unitario, went out on strike, Allende authorized the retention of these firms (de 
Vylder 1976, 239 n. 51). The pace of expropriations, the apparent lack of control 
over the process at the top, and the fundamentally anticapitalist stance of many
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u p leaders fed deep fears within the bourgeoisie. Although few of the 35,000 busi 
nesses and firms in Chile were taken, this violation of prior commitments stirred 
panic throughout the bourgeoisie and brought even nonhegemonic elites into the 
anti-Allende camp. In a self-criticism written following the 1973 coup, former u p 
minister Sergio Bitar condemned the u p for regarding these middle strata as "tem 
porary, tactical allies" rather than a "strategic element" whose interests had to be 
considered seriously and responded to by the government (Bitar 1986, 211).
22. The president of c o pr o c o , the peak association of the old, elite business 
organizations, proclaimed two weeks before the coup, "I don't belong to any party, 
I'm not tied to any important economic group. I'm a commercial and industrial 
businessman of medium importance. . . . Right now the concern of the business 
organizations isn't about how to get more ... but with fighting for liberty, the 
right to work . . . and the right to produce and distribute goods and services under 
a regime that respects the law and individuality" (El Mercurio, September 4,1973, 
as cited in Campero 1984, 86-87).
23. Key economic elites, particularly the powerful Edwards family, were able 
to fan public fears about the loss of freedom and deepen the polarization of the 
society through alarmist news coverage in the powerful right-wing daily El Mer 
curio. Through a combination of pressure on those who wavered and ideological 
leadership, the opposition press mobilized widespread opposition among the privi 
leged sectors. De Vylder (1976, 47) reports that two-thirds of all television, 95 
percent of radio stations, 90 percent of newspaper circulation, and almost 100 per 
cent of weekly magazines were opposed to the government. One of the weekly 
magazines, El Segundo, published the names of businesspeople who agreed to sell 
their holdings to the state, thereby pressuring owners to reject purchase offers and 
making it more difficult for the government to successfully negotiate the takeover 
of private businesses.
24. For a discussion of the evolution of "notable families" in Latin America 
during the 1750-1880 period, see Balmori, Voss, and Wortman (1984).
25. Ecuador may provide another example. Well into the twentieth century, 
Ecuadorean business leaders tended to be well organized and participated in a 
series of private sector organizations that served as social as well as economic net 
works. Powerful camaras de production were set up by the state in the 1930s, and 
private sector membership was legally required. Small- and medium-sized busi 
nesses failed to form their own associations and generally followed the lead of 
the large-scale producers (Hurtado 1980,180). Drawing on a study by the Comite 
Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola, Hurtado (1980, 53) notes that "the board 
of directors of the Chamber of Agriculture of the Sierra between 1937 and 1962 
contained four presidents of the Republic, fifty-one national deputies or senators, 
twenty-one cabinet members, and twenty-nine others who occupied important 
public posts of various types. ... In the presidential elections of 1968, two of the 
five candidates, one Liberal, the other Conservative, had served on the board of 
directors of agrarian associations." Unlike most Latin American bourgeoisies, the 
Ecuadorean elite faced little challenge to its political preeminence, even into the
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1960s, as limits on the franchise excluded roughly half of the adult population 
|Hurtado 1980, 349).
26. The matanza of 1932 wiped out close to 1 percent of the population (Ander 
son 1971,135).
27. One political party, the Partido Accion Renovadora, was officially proscribed 
in the 1960s for including a proposal for the expropriation of private land in its 
platform (Ramirez Arango 1985,102).
28. According to de Sebastian (1986, 34), the Asociacion de Cafetaleros was also 
allowed to control 36 percent of the stock in the Central Reserve Bank when it 
was founded in 1934.
29. A modest process of crop diversification began in the 1940s with the intro 
duction of cotton and later with sugar cane; industrialization was promoted with 
1952 legislation giving tax exemptions for the import of capital goods and with the 
creation of state investment institutes to finance industrial investment (Jimenez 
1986, 13-14). Indeed, the average annual industrial expansion rate (5.7 percent) 
outpaced agricultural growth (4.5 percent) in the 1950-62 period (Bulmer-Thomas 
1987,7).
30. The powerful Asociacion de Cafetaleros de El Salvador was allowed to ac 
quire 40 percent of the stock in this bank, and the Asociacion de Ganaderos de El 
Salvador another 20 percent (Baloyra 1982,13).
31. See also Baloyra (1982, 25); and Dunkerley (1988, 343-49).
32. They were responsible, by one account, for 17 percent of manufacturing, 
26 percent of commerce, and 31 percent of the service sector (Sevilla 1985, 18, 
table 10). Drawing on data for 1978-79, Sevilla (1985, 15) defines medium-sized 
as those operations with an annual production value of 1-5 million colones 
(US$400,000—$2 million at the then prevailing exchange rate) in manufacturing, 
gross earnings between 500,000 and 5 million colones (US$200,ooo-$2 million) in 
services and commerce, or land size between 50 and 100 hectares in agriculture.
33. a n e p was composed of the Coffee Association (which claimed 40,000 mem 
bers in the early 1980s), the Chamber of Commerce, the Salvadoran Industries 
Association, the Banking Association, the Chamber of the Industry of Construc 
tion, the Cotton Producers Cooperative, the Association of Producers of Sugar, the 
Association of Processors and Exporters of Coffee, the Chamber of Tourism, and 
other regional affiliates (Ramirez Arango 1985, 97-98; Crosby 1985, 26). In 1980, 
it claimed 31 affiliates and a membership of over 50,000.
34. The reaction of the landed elite to the agrarian reform proposal of the 
military government in 1976 indicates the breadth of the elite's control and the 
intensity of its resistance to change. Proposed by military president Molina in 
1976, the plan to distribute 59,000 hectares in the eastern cotton-growing region 
to 12,000 peasant families would have provided ample USAID-financed compen 
sation at market prices (Baloyra 1982, 56; Jung 1980, 17). a n e p, representing agri 
cultural producers, industry, and commerce, responded immediately by publicly 
denouncing the measure and mobilizing its membership in opposition. In a series 
of newspaper announcements, a n e p carried on a hot exchange with the Molina
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government, condemning the government's "totalitarian stance" and "absolute in 
transigence" and reminding them of their "obligation to listen." The government, 
in its own newspaper announcements, responded that "the act of listening should 
not be confused with the action of obeying" (Baloyra 1982,57-58). In spite of this 
bravado, within weeks the government began backing away from the plan. To bol 
ster its position, the more extreme right-wing elements in a n e p formed the Frente 
Agrario de la Region Oriental, a militantly violent organization. This revived a 
long tradition of right-wing elites employing violence and financing death squads 
to eliminate those who challenged them.
35. Private sector leaders were not long involved. The first junta included Mario 
Andino, local manager of the Philips Dodge wire company owned by the de Sola 
family. Andino was viewed as an a n e p representative by Christian Democratic 
party leader Jose Napoleon Duarte, who publicly demanded the exclusion of all 
private sector representatives on the junta before the Christian Democrats would 
agree to join the government in January 1980. A second prominent private pro 
ducer, Enrique Alvarez, a large landowner and former minister of agriculture, 
briefly served the new government in 1979 as the minister of agriculture before 
resigning to join the leadership of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario. He was 
subsequently assassinated.
36. This phase authorized the expropriation of properties over 500 hectares and 
the allocation of these estates to the resident labor force in the form of coopera 
tives. As in the agrarian reform program in Mexico, Peru (except in the highland 
and high-jungle region), and Chile, landowners were allowed to retain a substan 
tial reserve—in this case 100-150 hectares, depending on soil quality. Phase I land 
was to be compensated with twenty-year bonds for inventories and land, at 6 per 
cent interest, based on 1976-77 declared tax value. There is evidence to suggest 
that around 10 percent of the affected landowners had overestimated the value of 
their land, presumably to increase their access to bank credit. Many others, how 
ever, had underestimated the land value in order to reduce their property taxes. For 
them, the compensation provided was unacceptably low. The bonds themselves 
were also unattractive and traded at 55-62 percent of their face value. The gov 
ernment's willingness to accept the bonds in lieu of payment for some types of 
taxes, however, did give them a certain worth. In the end, almost half of the Phase 
I estates (238 properties) were acquired at market rates instead of rates based on 
declared tax value (Strasma 1990,10).
37. According to data in Thiesenhusen (1989, 10—11) this would be more land 
to a higher percentage of the rural population than any other land reform pro 
gram in Latin America except that of Bolivia. Thiesenhusen's data indicate that 
the Bolivian agrarian reform program affected 83.4 percent of the agricultural and 
forest land of the country, and benefited 74.5 percent of the "farming families.
38. In its 1990 census, the Proyecto de Evaluacion y Planificacion Agricola of 
the Salvadoran Ministry of Agriculture reported that thirty cooperatives had been 
abandoned. See Strasma (1990, 25).
39. Recognizing this problem, the Duarte government modified the terms of
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repayment for land recipients in 1986, reducing interest rates from 9.5 percent to 
6 percent and extending the repayment period from up to thirty years to up to fifty 
years (Strasma 1990, 5, n-12).
40. Payment for the banks was made in government bonds at 9 percent inter 
est with five-year maturity. Not included in the nationalization were the foreign 
banks, which were now legally prohibited from accepting deposits (though in prac 
tice they continued to do so), savings and loan institutions, and the Banco Hipote- 
cario. In his study of the nationalized banking system, Valdes (1989, 792 n. 3, 806) 
suggests that the latter may have been spared because it is commonly regarded as 
being in the public domain already, though in fact it is still largely owned by the 
coffee and livestock associations, and because of the mediation of its former presi 
dent and, subsequently, Salvador's provisional president, Alvaro Magana. Initially 
the state was to control the nationalized banks, but after some unspecified period 
of time, 49 percent of the stock was to be sold off—20 percent to bank workers 
and 29 percent to other buyers (Valdes 1989, 792). To prevent reconcentration of 
ownership, individuals were allowed to buy no more than 1 percent of the stock 
and could purchase stock in only one bank (Valdes 1989, 806).
41. According to Orellana's (1985,15, table 5) study, for example, shareholders 
in the Banco Salvadoreno, the country's oldest and one of the largest banks, were 
paid 17 percent more than face value per share and 49 percent more than the book 
value established by the evaluation commission. In a few banks, however, ficti 
tious loans that had been authorized to allow for capital flight were deducted from 
the portfolio, and some shares were compensated at 50 percent of face value.
42. Many agrarian reform beneficiaries were still excluded from the banking 
system. In 1984-85, 70 percent of Phase III land recipients received no credit, nor 
did almost a quarter of the Phase I cooperatives (80 of 338) (Valdes 1989, 800-801).
43. Coffee processors, on the other hand, were paid a straight processing fee 
determined by the state, and in some ways may have benefited from the new pro 
gram. On the other hand, processors lost their ability to adjust their charges with 
different clients or to participate directly in the lucrative export trade.
44. On income calculations by efficiency levels, see the discussion of the u s a id  
report "The Coffee Situation," San Salvador, March 8, 1984, in Lopez (1986, 19). 
According to Lopez's (1986, 34) calculations, in 1985, in c a f e  earned the equivalent 
of 350 colones per quintal in its coffee transactions and paid producers only 220 
colones. When international prices soared in 1986, the gap widened still further, 
with the state earning 1,000 colones per quintal and paying producers only 400 
colones.
45. As early as 1984 the Salvadoran Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock esti 
mated that 43 percent of the area planted to coffee had been effectively abandoned 
(meaning literal abandonment or the curtailment of active production labors like 
fertilizing, pruning, etc.), affecting varying amounts of the crop (from 98.7 percent 
of coffee land in Morazan to 20 percent in La Union). In the crucial Santa Ana prov 
ince, 47.6 percent of the coffee cultivation had been abandoned. See discussion in
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Lopez (1986, 25-26). International prices for Central America's "mild" coffee fell 
from $1.35 in 1988 to $.89 in 1990 (c e pa l  1990b, 30, table 12).
46. All of the organizations affiliated with a n e p opposed the reforms. Some 
were, however, more confrontational than others. The Asociacion de Cafetaleros 
(formally known as the Asociacion Salvadorena de Cafe) was probably the most 
ferocious opponent; the Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales, in contrast, main 
tained direct communication with Duarte in private conferences until May 1981, 
when pressure from other business leaders prompted them to suspend the meet 
ings. Duarte attempted to build bridges to a n e p leaders, reportedly offering to 
name one of their leaders as minister of economic affairs in December 1980. In a 
formal, written counterproposal, a n e p leaders refused the offer unless they were 
also given a position on the junta plus the opportunity to select the ministers 
of foreign trade, agriculture, treasury, and labor and the Central Bank president 
(Ramirez Arango 1985,156-58). Duarte declined their request.
47. For example, Dr. Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth, president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, chaired a r e n a 's  advisory council and played a major role as intellec 
tual architect of the a r e n a  program and as a campaign fundraiser. He was named 
minister of the presidency in the Cristiani government but was assassinated soon 
after, on June 8,1989.
48. Recent studies by Paige (1993) and Wolf (1992) indicate shadings of differ 
ence had developed by the end of the 1980s between a r e n a  "hardliners" and 
"softliners." Paige notes that the election of Cristiani represents not simply the 
return to power of the old coffee elite (represented by the Asociacion Salvadorena 
de Cafe) but the ceding of power to the faction of the coffee elite that is most 
tied to processing and industry (represented in the Association of Processors and 
Exporters of Coffee), a newer, more exclusive association founded in 1961. The 
leaders of the latter sector, he argues, have come in recent years to express partial 
support for the concept of democracy. Based on his interviews with elites, however, 
he concluded that neither sector associated democracy with social and economic 
rights, suggesting an important continuity within the elite establishment.
49. The annual per capita GDP decline during the crucial 1980-82 period was 
10.5 percent (1980), 9.2 percent (1981), and 6.6 percent (1982) (c e pa l  1986, 2).
50. As in El Salvador, the reform initiative in Ecuador, which was introduced 
by the military during the 1972-76 oil boom, was largely stillborn. Most of Ecua 
dor's large agricultural producers deftly sidestepped the agrarian reform laws. The 
1973 legislation, which authorized expropriation of estates with less than 80 per 
cent of their land in use, gave owners two years within which to comply. This 
measure only pushed owners to increase the intensity of their land use or divide 
unused lands. According to estimates by Zevallos (1989, 55), estates of more than 
500 hectares occupied roughly 30 percent of agricultural land in the early 1970s 
and continued to occupy 20 percent at the end of the decade. Only 9 percent of 
all agricultural and forest land was affected by the various agrarian reform laws 
issued, and probably only 5—6 percent of all land was actually shifted to new hands
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(as opposed to just titling land to current users), making it one of the least com 
prehensive agrarian reform programs in Latin America (Thiesenhusen 1989, io; 
Zevallos 1989, 50).
The reform military's efforts to trim the power of economic elites by denying 
their traditional voting rights on government economic boards and mandating the 
registration of unincorporated family firms triggered fierce reaction on the part 
of the Ecuadorean private sector. Leading private sector organizations launched 
a forceful campaign of denunciation and opposition to blunt the reformist pro 
gram. A weary and divided military finally called elections. Reformers elected in 
1979 were soon supplanted by a unified right, and business leader Febres Cordero 
won the presidency in 1984. Much as in El Salvador, the Ecuadorean capitalists 
pursued "democratization" as an alternative to reform and succeeded in blunting 
the reform initiative when they returned to power. See Conaghan (1988).
51. Some analysts, such as Gary Wynia (1990), reserve the term "populist" to 
describe the personalistic movements led by Brazilian president Getulio Vargas 
and Argentine president Juan Peron in his early phase. Indeed, Hamilton (1982, 
3:38—39) contends that the postrevolutionary development of Mexico does not fit 
entirely in the populist model because the classical populist experiences of Bra 
zil and Argentina did not mobilize the rural masses or include extensive agrarian 
reform. Yet most analysts of Mexican politics find the populist label appropriate. 
To differentiate between the Mexican and Peruvian forms of populism and their 
more moderate, industrial counterparts in Argentina and Brazil, I shall use the 
term "revolutionary populism" here to describe the former.
52. David W. Walker (1986, 227-28) illustrates the decline, focusing on the 
Martinez del Rio family.
53. General and, subsequently, President Alvaro Obregon's landholdings, for 
example, reportedly expanded from 1.5 to 3,500 hectares after the revolution 
(Hamilton 1982,68). Most postrevolutionary economic elites, however, had already 
acquired some significant assets during the porfiriato, though those resources cer 
tainly declined. As Camp (1989) points out, the best predictor of membership in 
the economic elite after 1917 is membership in that elite prior to the revolution.
54. Cardenas expropriated a total of 811,157 hectares during the 1934-40 period 
compared with only 783,330 in the previous years of the revolution (Wilkie 1970, 
194)-
5 5. Land grants were given in the form of ejidos or communal holdings, based on 
a landholding pattern derived from tenancy practices of indigenous communities.
56. For example, with the reform of Article 78 of the Labor Code, a constitu 
tional provision calling for payment to workers for the seventh day of the week was 
implemented, automatically raising wages approximately 17 percent (Hamilton 
1982, 148).
57. The Mexican regime avoided the standard plague of populist governments: 
large deficits and inflation (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Increased government 
spending to support new social programs and expanded agricultural credit con 
tributed to fiscal deficits, but these were offset somewhat in the Cardenas era by
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declining military outlays. The portion of the government budget spent on agri 
cultural credit soared to 9-5 percent in 1935 and then stabilized at an average of 3.5 
percent for the remainder of the sexenio, whereas the military's portion declined 
from between 30 and 53 percent in the 1920S-1930S to a low of 15.8 percent in 1939 
(Wilkie 1970, 102, 139? 166). A modest deficit did emerge in the government bud 
get in 1936 and became a recurring feature in the decades that followed (n a f in s a  
1981, 304.) The deficit was financed internally by drawing overdrafts at the central 
bank (Medina 1974, 269).
58. Lazaro Cardenas, Los Catorce Puntos de la Politica Obrera Presidential 
(Mexico, D.F.: P[artido] N[acional] R[evolucionario], 1936), 48, as cited in Wilkie 
(1970, 73). See also Martinez Nava (1984, 85).
59. Drawing on data compiled by the Confederation de Camaras de Comercio e 
Industria, Medina (1974, 271) reports that capital flight increased from 46 million 
pesos (US$12.8 million) in 1934 to 250 million pesos (US$69.4 million) in 1937 
before tapering off in 1938. Direct foreign investment from U.S. investors dropped 
over 25 percent during the 1936-40 period (Wilkie 1970, 265).
60. See also Martinez Nava (1984,113).
61. In 1936 new legislation was approved that required all firms worth more 
than 500 pesos (approximately US$143) to participate in trade associations. These 
organizations would be united in a single peak confederation under the jurisdic 
tion of the secretary of the national economy. See Hamilton (1982, 196). In 1941, 
separate chambers of industry and commerce were reestablished.
62. There is some debate about the character of c a n a c in t r a . Analyzing this 
institution in the 1940s, Mosk (1954) presents it as an authentic private sector orga 
nization composed of revolutionary, nationalistic entrepreneurs. Shafer (1973), on 
the other hand, writing in the 1970s sees it essentially as a representative of the 
state in the guise of a private sector organization.
63. See Alcazar (1970, appendix 1,106). By the 1970s, however, as the renewed 
populism of the Echeverria administration triggered greater private sector hos 
tility, c o pa r me x 's  membership increased, rising from 13,000 to 18,000 during the 
decade (Camp 1989, 164). Heredia (1991, 78) found that the number of regional af 
filiates of c o pa r me x  rose from 22 in 1978 to 64 (including 6 in Mexico City) in 
1990. See also Bravo Mena (1987).
64. A 1982 public opinion poll conducted by the pr i concluded that only 17 
percent of industrialists and 22 percent of company presidents professed member 
ship in some political party. In contrast, 30 percent of the general public identified 
themselves as members of a political party. See Camp (1989,139).
65. See the discussion in Camp (1989, 157). Camp acknowledged that it is hard 
to know what representational bias emerged in these business associations, but 
he found frequent allegations in his interviews with business leaders that leader 
ship in these organizations tended to be weighted in favor of representatives of the 
largest firms. Unlike other Latin American countries such as Peru, where leading 
capitalists did not seek leadership positions in large business associations (Durand 
1988b, 274), in Mexico they often did. See also Luna (199:2, 4).
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66. According to Lomnitz and Perez-Lizaur (1987), Pablo Gomez broke with 
family tradition to invite a prominent general to become his daughter's godfather 
in 1939 (p. 39). Political alliances of this type allowed his branch of the family to 
prosper during this era. The two industrial concerns he inherited in 1925 were ex 
panded into a complex of thirty-six factories by the time he died in the early 1960s 
(p. 109) His branch of the family continued to maintain friendships with politi 
cal leaders, establishing social relationships and regular contact with subsequent 
Presidents Aleman, Lopez Mateos, and Diaz Ordaz (pp. 200-201).
67. The Monterrey group emerged under the leadership of Isaac Garza and Fran 
cisco G. Sada. Starting with a brewery founded in 1890, their descendants expanded 
into glass, steel, packing, chemical production, and banking. For a detailed history 
of the Monterrey group from 1890 to 1940, see Saragoza (1988). Periodic tensions 
between this group and the government erupted even though personal friendships 
sometimes emerged, as in the case of Eugenio Garza Sada and Luis Echeverria (see 
Saragoza 1988; Basanez 1990,105).
68. Debate about the role of the bourgeoisie in Peru's revolution has been in 
tense. Some analysts argued that the revolution was directed by the industrial 
bourgeoisie and foreign capital and was designed to serve their interests (Dore and 
Weeks 1977). Others, like FitzGerald (1976, 93-102), interpreted the revolution as 
an exercise in state capitalism in which the state attempted to counter the foreign 
and domestic bourgeoisie by becoming the central national entrepreneur itself. 
Stepan (1978, 290-317) viewed it as a failed effort to institutionalize a relatively 
autonomous state that would promote national development.
69. For nonirrigated land the maximum was set at 300 hectares for the coastal 
region and the amount of land necessary to maintain 5,000 sheep (or their equiva 
lent in other species) in the highland or high-jungle region. See McClintock (1981, 
60 n 34).
70. Thiesenhusen's (1989,10-11) figures differ modestly. He found that 39 per 
cent of the agricultural and forest land was transferred, between 1969 and 1982, to 
30 percent of the farming families.
71. See also Becker's (1983, 187-89) analysis of the directorships of mid-size 
mining operations and their linkages with individuals from the agrarian oligarchy.
72. In a 1968-69 survey of 179 industrialists in medium- and large-sized firms, 
Wils (1975, 148) found 52 percent were descendants of first or second generation 
immigrants. Even in the largest firms, only 31 percent of the owners were from 
oligarchical families (p. 145).
73. According to data obtained by McClintock (1981, 47 n 16), fewer than 5 per 
cent of the bonds were reinvested in this fashion. Bamat (1978,140) points out that 
between 1969 and March 1976, investments approved for finance with the agrarian 
reform bonds amounted to only 4.4 percent of the total value of the bonds, and nine 
of the nineteen projects approved were actually for hotel construction rather than 
industrial activities. The prime beneficiary of this program was the Grupo Romero, 
which lost cultivated land on five large estates but was able to substantially expand 
its industrial and financial holdings. According to Reano and Vasquez Huaman
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(1988, ±01) 61 percent of the funds administered in the Fondo de Financiamiento y 
Promocion de Empresas Industrials went to the Romero group.
74. According to FitzGerald (1976, 87), there were 3,000 state development 
projects under way in 1973; I5° were major, involving programmed investments 
of over 50 million soles.
75. Foreign capital's shares were to be reduced to a maximum of 49 percent by 
1986. Following the August 1975 countercoup of Morales Bermudez, these require 
ments were relaxed. The revised Industrial Communities Law adopted in late 1976 
reduced the portion of the industry to be given to workers to 33 percent and gave 
the shares directly to the individual workers instead of the industrial communi 
ties. Foreign owners were given some options that included the retention of their 
stock if they chose not to participate in the benefits of the Andean market (Stepan 
1978, 276-77). Peru eventually agreed to pay $150 million in compensation for 
U.S. firms that had been expropriated (Stepan 1978, 259).
The Peruvian private sector was also affected by these reforms, but much less 
so. A few local firms were shifted into the state sector, and major daily newspapers 
were turned over to groups representing different social sectors. But in many cases 
these changes were the result of bankruptcy, not expropriation. Only one big local 
capital group, the Prado consortium, lost its assets, and a series of Prado enter 
prises shifted under state control, including the Banco Popular and textile, paper, 
fertilizer, and cement factories (FitzGerald 1976, 33). This group went bankrupt, 
partly as a result of the crash of the fishing industry following overfishing and 
changing ocean currents.
76. Although some foreign firms were expropriated or had losses, others pros 
pered. Becker's (1983, 97-165) account of the Peruvian mining sector, for example, 
contrasts the histories of two major mining companies. Cerro de Pasco was an in 
ternally divided foreign-owned operation that dominated the mining sector. When 
it decided to use Peruvian profits to expand operations in Chile, Peru's traditional 
rival, the company was expropriated. In contrast, Southern Peru Copper devised 
an expansionary investment plan that converged with the state's nationalist de 
velopment program. In the latter case, the state not only refrained from expropria 
tion but supported the negotiation of an international loan package to finance the 
expansion of the company.
77. Becker's (1983) work analyzes the development of a "new bourgeoisie" in 
Peru that supported the new state policy. This reform-oriented bourgeoisie was 
composed of managers and administrative personnel who were "knowledge-based" 
rather than "ownership-based" (p. 238). Becker's study may overemphasize the 
power of a managerial elite, since the lack of ownership limits this sector's ability 
to direct the industry over the long run. This work does, however, highlight pro 
reform commitments even among relatively privileged members of that society.
78. The word national was dropped from its name. Other forms of pressure used 
against the association included forcing the society's stridently oppositional presi 
dent to remain in exile for a year following a trip abroad. See Stepan (1978,12,1)-
79. In 1974 the s n i pushed for the creation of a United Front for the Defense of
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Private Property to coordinate an industrywide response to the nationalization of 
the fishing industry. Fearful of the regime's response, leaders soon backed off, and 
this effort fizzled. Three years later, seven private sector organizations succeeded 
in creating the Union de Empresarios Privados del Peru, but the association lasted 
only six months before it was dissolved (Durand 1991,5-6).
80. According to Durand (1988b, 271-73), at the top of the pyramid are found a 
small number of "family clans" who attained prominence with the destruction of 
the oligarchy and whose position was fortified by the military regime's nationalis 
tic policies. These top economic groups had investments in multiple sectors of the 
economy, including the country's major banks, and generally had some associa 
tive link with foreign capital. Beneath this group was a second layer of large- and 
medium-sized capitalists who, unlike the first group, were generally involved in 
only one or two economic sectors. Since their economic base was narrower, they 
were more vulnerable to shifts in state policy and more hostile to the reforms.
81. The state portion of gross fixed capital formation rose from 30 percent in 
the 1964-68 period to 50 percent in 1974-76 (FitzGerald 1979,150). Private invest 
ment, already low at 10.8 percent of GDP in 1964-68, now dipped to 8 percent 
of GDP in 1969-76, and FitzGerald (1979, 151-52) estimates that foreign capital 
provided two-thirds of that amount.
82. Many of the reforms were substantially reduced in 1976 following the 
Morales Bermudez countercoup in 1975 and ended altogether following the 1980 
election and return to power of President Belaunde Terry.
83. The willingness of the Peruvian bourgeoisie to support unorthodox eco 
nomic measures was demonstrated again during the early years of the Alan Garcia 
presidency (1985-86), when they rallied to his side and supported his economic re 
activation plan. That approval collapsed with the subsequent bank nationalization 
in July 1987 (Durand 1988b).
84. This kind of mutual accommodation is not found exclusively in revolu 
tionary populist regimes. Considerable segmentation and partial accommodation 
of the bourgeoisie were also found in Jamaica during the early years of the first 
Michael Manley government (1972-80). As with the other cases we have explored, 
much of the initial reform in Jamaica was directed against foreign capital. The 
target was the foreign-owned bauxite industry, where a unilateral increase in the 
bauxite levy raised state revenues from bauxite sevenfold. This measure was popu 
lar even with Jamaican capitalists, in part because of the foreign exchange windfall 
it produced (Stephens and Stephens 1986, 79). When expropriation of local elites 
occurred, it was generally in the form of a state takeover of failing businesses, such 
as the collapsing sugar estates and hotel industry. The government was constrained 
in its agrarian reform efforts by a constitutional requirement of full compensation 
at market rates for expropriated landowners. As a consequence, its land reform 
efforts were also modest.
Although the evidence is not conclusive, the Jamaican commercial sector orga 
nized in the Chamber of Commerce, whose economic interests and opportunities
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were most sharply and immediately curtailed by the Manley government's import 
restrictions, may have gone most quickly into the opposition (Keith and Keith 
1985, 94-96; Stephens and Stephens 1986, 98, 350). Exporters affiliated with the 
j e a , on the other hand, were relatively favored by a government that was chroni 
cally strapped for foreign exchange. As in the Peruvian case, this sector tended 
to be more supportive of the new government and at times formally endorsed 
government initiatives (Stephens and Stephens 1986,194).
By 1976, however, the various segments of the private sector were beginning to 
converge in opposition to the regime. A new peak organization, the Private Sector 
Organization of Jamaica, was founded to allow the private sector to confront the 
regime more effectively. Although the state-business relationship deteriorated in 
the final years, established divisions within the Jamaican elite and the Manley gov 
ernment's alliance strategy made the defection of the bourgeoisie a more gradual 
process in Jamaica than it had been in either Chile or El Salvador.
Chapter 2
1. The first law to support coffee cultivation was actually passed in 1835 but was 
not implemented during those turbulent years. Additional legislation was passed 
in 1847 exempting producers with more than 2,000 trees from taxes and both 
owners and workers on coffee estates from being pressed into military service. See 
Burns (1991, 232).
2. This legislation was passed in 1877 but was implemented more vigorously in 
the 1880s and 1890s. Vogl Baldizon (1985,15-19, 355—60) describes how his father, 
a German immigrant who had come to Nicaragua in 1888 to manage a German 
import house, accepted the offer and built a farm in Matagalpa, where he met and 
married his Nicaraguan wife. Vogl reports that around 200 foreigners, mostly of 
German and U.S. origin, settled in the Matagalpa region at this time.
3. The Nicaraguan banking system emerged relatively late, by regional stan 
dards, and was largely foreign controlled. The Banco Nacional de Nicaragua (b n n ) 
was founded by the Nicaraguan government in 1912, but foreign investment 
bankers Brown Bros, and J. and V. Seligman & Co. exercised their option to buy 
51 percent of bank stock during debt negotiations the following year. The bank, 
which functioned as Nicaragua's central bank, was incorporated in the state of 
Connecticut; the majority of the bank's directors were from the United States. 
Control over the bank was not returned to the Nicaraguan government until 1940. 
See Hill (1933); Walter (1993,12—13); and Wheelock Roman (1980b). Coffee export 
was monopolized by the Compania Mercantil de Ultramar, which was jointly held 
by the b n n  and some of its principal stockholders (Paige 1989, 102).
4. Nicaragua remained a poor country, even by regional standards. As late as 
1950, real per capita income in Nicaragua was ranked second-lowest in Latin 
America, with only Haiti falling below it (Bulmer-Thomas 199T 249)• hi terms of 
its GDP, Nicaragua was clearly the regional laggard, steadily falling behind the
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rest of Central America through the 1920-60 period (see Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 
308-9). Only in the 1960s, when the growth rate in Honduras fell behind that of 
Nicaragua, did Nicaragua move out of the region's production basement.
5. The degree of state involvement in the Nicaraguan economy during the 
Somoza period has been a matter of dispute. Some analysts see the Nicaraguan 
state as primarily passive, nondevelopmental, and largely inactive in economic 
management. Gary Wynia's (1972) study of planning policy in the 1950s and 1960s, 
for example, emphasizes the regime's fundamental economic conservatism. Jose 
Luis Medal's (1985) study of central bank policy during this era also adopts this 
interpretation, finding the regime's credit, monetary, and balance of payments 
policies were left in the hands of conservative central bankers. Bill Gibson, ana 
lyzing fiscal and monetary policy during the Somoza era, labels state policies as 
"classically liberal" (1987, 27). According to these analysts, the state generated 
only modest revenues, took on a limited number of development tasks, lacked 
a coherent planning capacity, and largely turned the economy over to the forces 
of the international market. Its passivity was striking even by regional standards 
and won the praise of the most orthodox economic analysts in the international 
lending agencies.
Yet, the Nicaraguan state was not inert during this period, and several analysts 
(Biderman 1982; Walter 1993) have called attention to the regime's strategic inter 
ventions into the economy. These analysts have argued that the regime's economic 
involvement reflected ambitions that extended beyond mere personal enrichment 
and had an impact on the overall direction of national economic development. 
According to Jaime Biderman, by the 1950s the state played an important role 
in escalating the pace of capitalist development in Nicaragua, particularly in the 
cotton, beef, sugar, tobacco, rice, and banana sectors (1982, 80-127). Knut Walter 
(1993) takes this argument a step further, arguing that the capacity and resilience of 
the Somoza state have been seriously underestimated. He claims that, while other 
Central American dictatorships were toppling in the 1940s and 1950s, the Somoza 
dynasty proved politically agile and developmentally competent, consolidating its 
political base while it promoted infrastructural development that fostered rapid 
capitalist development in the subsequent decades.
6. The expansion in cotton land came primarily through the reduction in un 
improved pastureland used for traditional cattle grazing in the Pacific coastal plain 
(Baumeister 1983). In addition, economically and legally vulnerable peasant staples 
producers were displaced from estate lands to which they had traditionally had 
access. With the rising profitability of cotton, owners now put these lands into 
more intensive cultivation. Gould's (1990, 85-181) study of rural mobilization in 
the Chinandega region (1912-79) documents the multiple ways in which peasant 
access to land was reduced.
7. The state supported the takeoff of the cotton sector in other ways as well. In 
the 1950s, these included funding of port facilities in "El Tamarindo" (La Gaceta, 
Decree #154, January 10, 1956); the classification of the vegetable oil industry as 
a "First Category Industry," thereby providing tax and tariff concessions for the
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cottonseed, oil sector (La Gaceta, Decree #16, March 3, 1956); and an increase in 
the exchange rate received by cotton exporters from C$6.6o:$i to C$7:1 as long 
as prices remained below US$31.50 (La Gaceta, Decree #18, November 21,1956). 
See Navas Mendoza et al. (n.d.[a], 4-5).
8. Occupational information about the ninety-four founding members of 
a n s c a , for example, shows that forty of these members (43 percent) listed an 
urban profession (lawyer, industrialist, etc.) as their primary occupation (a n s c a  
n.d., 31-33)-
9. Baumeister (1984b, 8, 32) reports that in El Salvador in the early 1960s 34 
percent of the coffee and 52 percent of the cotton were produced on “large multi 
family estates," whereas in Nicaragua estates of that size were responsible for only 
20 percent and 31 percent, respectively, of production. The percent of cotton land 
held in medium-sized estates in Nicaragua (defined here as 50-500 mz.) surged 
from 26 percent in 1952 to 60 percent in 1963 and remained over 50 percent in the 
early 1970s. See also Bulmer-Thomas (1987, 354 n 18).
10. Whereas coffee yields in El Salvador in 1950 averaged 640 kg./hectare, Nica 
raguan yields averaged 275 kg./hectare (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 154, 156-57). See 
also Warnken (1975,14).
11. Foreign loans for the development of the livestock (beef and milk products) 
sector came primarily from the World Bank and the id b . These loans included 
$3.25 million from the World Bank in the 1950s to purchase agricultural equip 
ment, open new lands, improve pastures, and acquire breeding stock. In the 1960s 
the id b  took over this financing, providing $1.1 million to acquire breeding stock 
and $9.1 million for the expansion of pastureland; the construction of fences, 
wells, troughs, drinking pools, silos, corrals, and dipping facilities; and programs 
to improve livestock health (Williams 1986, 97). Local banks also supported this 
effort. In 1962 the b n n  became a development bank, and its credit gradually began 
to shift toward long-term (more than eighteen months) loans, many of which 
were for cattle development. The bank's first project as a development bank was a 
1965-67 cattle-raising program (Lethander 1968, 358).
12. The cattle sector focused primarily on beef exportation, but a secondary 
interest in milk production developed. A 1959 f a o  study concluded that Nicaragua 
had the greatest capacity in Central America for exporting milk due to the abun 
dance of land in the interior that, for reasons of topography, was ill-suited to other 
crop cultivation (f a g a n ic  1982, 6).To promote this idea, the regime launched Plan 
Camabocho, a three-year campaign to build 450 km. of feeder roads in Matagalpa, 
Boaco, and Chontales. In September 1969 pr o l a c s a , a joint venture between the 
Swiss company Nestle and the Somoza government, was initiated. This firm be 
came a major milk processor and eventually exported powdered milk (f a g a n ic  
1982, 6b).
13. The number of cotton gins increased to twenty-six, and their capacity ex 
panded notably. Secondary industries were created for processing vegetable oil and 
balanced animal feed from cottonseed. New export houses sprang up to channel 
Nicaraguan cotton into the international market. By 1974 seventeen export houses
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purchased Nicaraguan cotton. Fifteen were agents of international cotton firms 
and two were Nicaraguan-based firms (Baumeister 1983, 46-50).
14. Concessions were provided for industrialists on the importation of con 
struction materials, capital goods, energy, maintenance equipment, and raw ma 
terials, and taxes were reduced 50-100 percent. The law developed a priority 
system in which new industries received more concessions than old, and those 
categorized as "fundamental" received more relief than those labeled "useful" 
[convenientes).
15. At the beginning of the 1950s several Central American ministers of econ 
omy approached e c l a  with a request for information about regional integration. 
They were invited by e c l a  to form an economic cooperation committee to study 
the issue. Five meetings were held between 1952 and 1957 to review studies on 
regional integration and draft regional treaties. This work culminated at the end 
of the decade in the approval of the Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Cen 
tral American Economic Integration in 1959. This treaty, approved by all Central 
American countries except Costa Rica, established a list of 200 items to be traded 
without restrictions in the region and set integration goals for the next ten years 
(Wynia 1972, 45-46). These developments laid the foundation for the c a c m. Under 
the rules of the c a c m, import duties were cut sharply to facilitate regional trade. 
Gary Wynia (1972, 89) found that import duties dropped quickly in most of the 
region, declining from 20 percent of import value in i960 to 12 percent in 1966 for 
the region as a whole. Nicaragua's drop was even sharper, falling from 20 percent 
in i960 to 10 percent in 1966.
16. a id , Report to Congress, FY 1965, p. 45, as cited in Dosal (1985, 91). Dis 
appointed by the collapse of cotton and coffee prices in the late 1950s, the regime 
began searching for an alternative economic strategy. The U.S. government agreed 
to finance a study of the economic options Nicaragua might pursue and contracted 
a report from the International Cooperation Administration. This report included 
a number of recommendations that were designed to foster industrial develop 
ment. Perhaps the most important was the proposal that an industrial investment 
corporation be formed to provide long-term loans for industry (Lindeman 1961, 
2-3). Several u s a id  projects also helped provide infrastructure needed for indus 
trialization. For example, u s a id  supported the expansion of e n a l u f  by offering 
financing for U.S.-made generating plants. This program was designed to expand 
access to electrical energy in rural areas, but the growth of e n a l u f  facilitated 
industrial growth as well. The e n a l u f  rate structure favored industrial clients, 
providing them with electricity at less than one-third the rate charged rural resi 
dential customers (Dosal 1985, 85).
17. See also Brundenius (1987, 85-92); Rosenthal (1982, 21-26).
18. The b a n a me r  group grew out of a series of enterprises associated with 
the Ingenio San Antonio, then Central America's largest sugar mill, and its par 
ent company, Nicaragua Sugar Estates, Ltd. The company was founded in 1890 
by Italian merchant F. Alfredo Pellas in conjunction with several elite families 
from Granada and was backed by English investment. Favored with a liquor mo 
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nopoly during the Zelaya presidency, the firm expanded rapidly. See Nicaragua 
Sugar Estates (1953); Gould (1990, 22—45). The bank was founded in 1952 under the 
leadership of Silvio F. Pellas |Strachen 1976, 9-10).
19- b a n ic  was founded in 1953 by a group of Leon and Chinandega investors 
under the leadership of Eduardo Montealegre. To prevent the concentration of re 
sources and control, b a n ic  was designed so that no one investor could hold more 
than 10 percent of the stock. See Strachen (1976,11,16).
20. Strachen s (1976, 27) business respondents identified a total of twenty-one 
firms in the b a n a me r  group and sixteen in the b a n ic  group.
21. For a fuller discussion of Somoza family assets as of 1978, see ih c a  (1978, 
1:319-24).
22. Strachen (1976, 13—14), for example, finds only one prominent entrepre 
neur, Manuel I. Lacayo, involved in business ventures with both b a n ic  and the 
BANAMER group.
23. I would label this system quasi-corporatist because it deviates in several 
respects from the conventional corporatist arrangements. (See Schmitter 1974 on 
the concept of corporatism). For one, the typical tripartite structure was not em 
ployed, since there was no counterpart labor organization; labor representatives 
generally did not participate in these deliberations. Furthermore, because the pri 
vate sector organizations were late to develop and often ephemeral in Nicaragua, 
no one organization emerged with an effective representational monopoly.
24. Three of the fifteen founding members were generals. Walter (1993, 107) 
notes that tensions with cattle ranchers in Chontales and Boaco led Somoza to end 
the subsidy to the association in 1940 and reassign some of its functions to the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
25. Three private sector organizations (a s g a n ic , the Camara Nacional de Co 
mercio e Industria de Managua, and a coffee growers' association, the Asociacion 
Agricola de Nicaragua) were authorized to recommend representatives for the 
seven-person board (La Gaceta, October 29, 1940). Each of these associations was 
entitled to submit a list of seven candidates for its position on the board, and 
Nicaragua's president then made the final selections.
26. The regime's institutional partners in in f o n a c  were vaguely defined, giving 
Somoza Garcia the greatest flexibility in selecting his private sector allies. One 
representative was to be drawn from agricultural and the other from industrial 
activities. Both were to be chosen by the president from a list submitted by "repre 
sentative national associations," or, failing that, at the president's own discretion.
27. Following World War II, during a period in which he was attempting to cling 
to power despite substantial domestic and U.S. opposition, Somoza first cozied up 
with labor, passing progressive labor legislation and cultivating labor support. In 
spite of this, the regime had to resort to massive fraud to win the 1947 election. 
Since the labor strategy had certain costs and limited payoff, Somoza shifted again 
to favor capital by the late 1940s. See Gould (1990, 46-64) for further discussion.
28. Two of the seven representatives were to be chosen from a list drawn up 
by the Asociacion de Industrials de Nicaragua. This association emerged from
246 Notes to Pages 45-47
a 1957 split in the Camara de Comercio de Nicaragua. As momentum began to 
build for industrial expansion in the 1950s, a number of industrialists decided that 
they needed a separate association to address their specific concerns. A group of 
twelve industrialists founded the organization and quickly began to recruit more 
members. In spite of the opposition of the Camara de Comercio, the group had 
secured enough support by the early 1960s so that congress reformed the 1934 Ley 
General de Camaras de Comercio and granted legal status to the new association 
in 1965 (c a d in  1975, 2-3).
29. Torres-Rivas (1989, 9,128) offers this characterization of the Somoza regime, 
sketching parallels between the Somozas and a "grand vizier" who gives resources 
to court favorites in order to solidify their loyalty. Drawing on Max Weber's work, 
Paige (1989, 107) defines this sultanic system as one in which "public authority" 
is construed as "private prerogative."
30. The Somoza family members or the managers of their properties were also 
among the top officials in the Camara Nicaraguense de la Industria Pesquera, the 
Asociacion de Productores de Arroz de Nicaragua, and the Cooperativa Arrocera,
S.A. See in d e  (1975) for a directory of officials in these organizations, and Austin 
(1972, 4:14-20) for a discussion of the rice sector.
31. At the 1959 meeting of the a s g a n ic  general assembly, for example, rep 
resentatives of b n n , b a n ic , b a n a me r , and the Bank of London were present 
(Minutes of the meeting, February 26,1959).
32. The rest of the beef slaughterhouse industry was also largely controlled by 
the Somoza family. By the 1970s three of the other six export quality slaughter 
houses were controlled either by Somoza (through companies such as c a r n ic ) 
or close family members (through Amerrisque, for example, in which his sis 
ter, Lilian Somoza de Sevilla Sacasa was a prominent member) (Ballard 1985, 30,• 
Interview, f a g a n ic , August 14, 1987).
33. In a rare exception to the rule, a coalition of groups across several sectors 
formed the Comite de Accion Civica in 1959 to pressure the government to provide 
an emergency response following a sharp economic downturn. This organizational 
effort was particularly successful in the cotton sector, where meetings drew over 
1,000 planters (Fiallos Oyanguren 1968, 160). In response the regime granted a 
number of concessions to cotton producers, including an eight-year suspension, 
with no interest payments, of their loan obligations (La Gaceta, Decree #440, 
August 28, 1959) and a special C$40 per mz. subsidy. These emergency measures 
prevented the collapse of both cotton production and the Nicaraguan banking 
system.
34. Concerns about their economic erosion, for example, helped to galvanize 
the cotton growers in Leon to form a n s c a  in 1962. This growers' cooperative was 
designed to be an alternative source of agricultural inputs, the preferred processing 
and ginning agent, and the negotiator for the export of the fiber. See a n s c a  (n.d.). 
Cotton growers in other regions soon followed suit, establishing cotton coopera 
tives in Managua, Chinandega, Masaya, and Nueva Segovia.
35. Through the first half of the 1970s the portion of the internal beef price re 
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ceived by producers dropped steadily. By 1975 producers received only 47 percent 
of the final price, whereas processors and intermediaries retained the remainder 
(Ballard 1985, 32).
36. A peak association is a national-level organization, made up of regional and 
sectoral associations, that assumes the role of representing that whole segment of 
society.
37- Acuna (1991) and Weyland (1992), for example, see the size and heteroge 
neity of business as a surmountable barrier if the other conditions are propitious, 
and point to the successful establishment of a peak association in Mexico, where 
the bourgeoisie was highly heterogeneous, to demonstrate the point. It should be 
noted, however, that the Mexican bourgeoisie continued to be highly fragmented 
and politically divided in spite of the creation of a peak organization, the Con 
sejo Coordinador Empresarial, in 1975. See Luna et al. (1987) for discussion of the 
continuing political cleavages in the Mexican elite.
38. According to in d e 's second Informe general de actividades (1966?, 5), 45 
percent of its members were in commerce, 25 percent were in industry, and the 
remaining 30 percent were in financial institutions, services, professions, etc. The 
organization began with forty members in 1963 and grew to seventy-six in 1965 
mainly through personal recruiting by existing members.
39. In the 1972-78 period, in d e  received an average of 60 percent of its funding 
from international donations (calculated from in d e , Informe anual, various years).
40. in d e 's  activities included ideological orientation, promoting education and 
training, conducting planning studies, and lobbying the Nicaraguan government. 
In 1964 it distributed radio and TV programs from other Latin American coun 
tries on the evils of communism. With in d e 's support, in c a e , an affiliate of the 
Harvard Business School, was persuaded to locate its main campus in Nicaragua. 
in d e 's  Fondo de Prestamos para Universitarios provided funds to send Nicaraguan 
students to study at in c a e , the u c a , and the u n a n , as well as to attend confer 
ences abroad. The organization also promoted worker vocational training centers 
and training in "nonpolitical" unionism. Several of these early initiatives were 
later formalized through the creation of special programs under in d e  manage 
ment, including Educredito (founded in 1966), which provided scholarships, and 
the Fundacion Nicaraguense de Desarrollo (founded in 1969), which sponsored 
basic community development projects and rural cooperatives. See in d e  (1965, 
1966?, 1975).
41. in d e  provided a training ground for Nicaragua's future political-economic 
leadership. The Consejos Ejecutivos of in d e  and its affiliates, the Fundacion Nica 
raguense de Desarrollo and Educredito, included representatives who would be 
come prominent political actors in the 1980s. Some became Sandinista officials, 
like Dionisio Marenco, Sandinista minister of s pp, and Pedro Antonio Blandon, 
director of the Fondo Internacional de Reconstruccion. Others, including Alfonso 
Robelo and Adolfo Calero, followed more circuitous routes, first taking positions 
within the Sandinista government and later becoming prominent contra leaders.
42. Affiliated organizations and the number of members in each are as fol 
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lows: a c b n  (140); Asociacion de Distribuidores de Vehiculos Automotores (18); 
a s g a n ic  (500); Asociacion de Instituciones Bancarias de Nicaragua (7); Asocia 
cion de Productores de Arroz de Nicaragua (45); Camara de Comercio (330); c a d in  
(338); Camara Nicaragiiense de la Construccion (76); Camara Nicaragiiense de la 
Industria Pesquera (15); in d e  (89); Sociedad Cooperativa Anonima de Algodoneros 
(226); and Sociedad Cooperativa Anonima de Cafeteros (2,000). See in d e  (1975) 
and c a d in  (1975).
43. In the report on the associations that founded co s ip, three organizations 
(in d e , c a d in , and the Asociacion de Distribuidores de Vehiculos Automotores) 
noted that they had no representation on any government board or agency. In con 
trast, a c b n  and the Camara de Comercio reported having representation in two 
or more government agencies, and a s g a n ic  and the Camara Nicaragiiense de 
la Industria Pesquera reported having general access to government officials. See 
"Directorio del c o s ip," in in d e  (1975,1-20).
44. Until c o s e p's bylaws were modified in 1988, in d e 's president automati 
cally became the president of c o s ip/c o s e p.
45. After years of low prices that caused heavy losses for producers, cotton 
prices began to rise in the early 1970s. Nicaraguan producers were presented with 
offers to buy the 1973-74 harvest at the startling price of US$3O-4O per qt. oro. 
Unaccustomed to such high offers, growers moved quickly to sign futures con 
tracts. In the months that followed, Nicaraguan producers watched while the high 
profits they had anticipated were steadily eroded as many of their costs more than 
doubled. International prices continued to climb far above the prices growers had 
accepted early in 1973, reaching US$80 per qt. oro in September. According to Bau 
meister (1983, 67,, the earnings of a grower with 500 mz. of cotton could vary by 
over US$200,000, depending on the month of 1973-74 in which he or she sold the 
crop. When growers turned to the Somoza government for support in renegotiation 
of the contracts, they were rebuffed,- instead of deciding in favor of Nicaraguan 
producers, Somoza aligned himself with foreign intermediaries. In March 1974 
he issued a decree requiring producers to hand over at least 70 percent of the 
contracted cotton at the contracted price (Cruz and Hoadley 1975).
46. Following protests by independent cattle producers, Somoza finally pushed 
a s g a n ic  to open its membership and revise its statutes. At a dramatic meeting of 
the association's general assembly in 1975 that was attended by its honorary presi 
dent, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a s g a n ic  president and Somoza relative Oscar 
Sevilla Sacasa presided over an internal reorganization of the association (Minutes 
from April 9,1975, meeting). The reorganization expanded the Junta Directiva from 
nine to twelve members, creating three new positions that were filled by reform- 
oriented members. In spite of these changes, a s g a n ic  remained an exclusive, elite 
association.
47. Somoza agreed to send a delegate to participate in this church-mediated dia 
logue, but only if it were postponed until after the local elections in February 1978. 
in d e  leaders accepted this delay, but members of Los Doce rejected the proposal.
48. Los Doce included Emilio Baltodano Pallais (manager of Cafe Soluble,
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Inc.), Fernando Cardenal (Jesuit priest and professor at the u c a ), Ernesto Castillo 
Martinez (lawyer and bookstore owner), Ricardo Coronel Kautz (director of the 
livestock division of the Ingenio San Antonio and agricultural engineer), Arturo 
Cruz (economist with the id b  in Washington, D.C.), Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro 
(lawyer with b a n a me r  and Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, Ltd.), Miguel D'Escoto 
(Maryknoll priest and then communications secretary for the World Council 
of Churches), Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo (dental surgeon), Felipe Mantica Abaunza 
(member of the board of directors of b a n a me r  and manager of a supermarket 
chain, who subsequently withdrew from the group), Sergio Ramirez Mercado 
(prominent writer and f s l n  activist), Casimiro Sotelo F. (architect), and Carlos 
Tunnerman Bernheim (former rector of un a n ).
49. See Edmisten (1990). u d e l  was formed in 1974 by a coalition of parties 
that were boycotting the September elections in which Somoza's presidency was 
renewed for seven more years.
50. The signatories of a February 4, 1978, communique supporting the con 
tinuing strike were in d e ,- c a d in ,- the Camara de Comercio de Nicaragua; the 
Camara Nicaraguense de la Construction,- the Camara de Agentes Aduaneros, 
Almacenadores y Embarcadores de Nicaragua,- the Cooperativa de Algodoneros de 
Managua; the Organization Nicaraguense de Agencias de Publicidad,- the Asocia 
cion de Distribuidores de Vehfculos Automotores; the Asociacion de Ferreteros de 
Nicaragua; the Asociacion Nicaraguense de Ingenieros y Arquitectos; the Socie- 
dad Cooperativa Anonima de Cafetaleros de Nicaragua; the Asociacion Nacional 
de Anunciantes de Nicaragua,- a c b n ; Federation de Sociedades Medicas de Nica 
ragua; Camara de Ingenieros y Arquitectos Consultores; and the Asociacion Nica 
raguense de Distribuidores de Petroleo (in d e  1978).
51. Although the f a o  contained members closely aligned with the f s l n , it gen 
erally represented an establishment reform movement. The twenty-one signatories 
of its founding program included such figures as Rafael Cordova Rivas of u d e l , 
Adolfo Calero Portocarrero of the Partido Conservador Autentico, Sergio Ramirez 
Mercado of Los Doce, and Alfonso Robelo Callejas of the md n . The f a o 's  program 
called for the reorganization of the military; an end to corruption; the termination 
of human rights abuses; the release of political prisoners; freedom of expression 
and organization; profit sharing; agrarian reform; improvements in health care, 
housing, and public transportation,- price controls; the adoption of a literacy plan; 
tax reform,- local government autonomy; and free elections. See f a o , "Programa 
Democratico del Gobierno Nacional del Frente Amplio Opositor," in ih c a  (1978).
52. The three original sectors in u pa n ic  were given the greatest representation, 
but all affiliates secured some voting strength. The u pa n ic  board of directors was 
composed of c a a n  (6 members), f a g a n ic  (6), u n c a f e n ic  (6), a n a r  (2), a n pr o b a  
(2), a n pr o s o r  (2), a s c a n ic  (2), and f o n d il a c  (2) (u pa n ic  n.d.).
53. Two members of the Junta Directiva broke off and formed a new association. 
Headed by Ernesto Salazar, one of the reformers who had joined a s g a n ic  during 
the 1975 reorganization, a new Federacion de Asociaciones de Ganaderos de Nica 
ragua (f a g a n ic ), was established (Minutes of a s g a n ic 's  meeting, May n, 1979)-
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f a g a n ic  was set up by the a c b n , the dissident wing of the a s g a n ic , and regional 
representatives from Boaco, Camoapa, Chontales, Granada, Jinotega, Matagalpa, 
Rivas and Zelaya. See La Gaceta, August 21,1980.
Chapter 3
1. On the argument linking high-ranking Sandinistas to the traditional elite 
families, see Stone (1990, 37-40); Vilas (1992).
2. See also the amplification in Decree #38 issued August 8,1979 (c ie r a  1989, 
8:251-53).
3. State trade monopolies were established for cotton, coffee, sugar, banana, 
beef, and nontraditional exports.
4. See Brinton's (1938) classic work on the stages of revolution and the internal 
divisions that shape the process.
5. In 1975 the f s l n  leaders divided and three factions emerged: the Guerra 
Popular Prolongada tendency, led by Tomas Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Bayardo Arce,- 
the Tendencia Proletaria, led by Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrion, and Carlos Nunez; 
and the Tendencia Insurreccional, or Terceristas, led by Daniel Ortega, Humberto 
Ortega, and Victor Tirado. Each faction inclined toward a different insurrectional 
strategy. The Terceristas, who were most eclectic in their tactics, least ideological 
in their recruiting strategy, and most optimistic about the prospects for immediate 
success, built the largest following drawing on spontaneous support that arose in 
the wake of national guard abuses. The three factions reunited in March 1979. See 
FSLN (1990a).
6. Four of the nine members of the f s l n  national directorate assumed minis 
terial responsibilities: Humberto Ortega was minister of defense; Tomas Borge was 
minister of the interior; Jaime Wheelock added the Ministry of Agriculture to his 
portfolio as director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform; and Henry Ruiz became 
minister of planning. The number of seats in the Consejo de Estado was increased 
from 33 to 47; 12 of the 14 new slots were assigned to pro-FSLN organizations 
(Booth 1985a, 191).
7. The "Analisis de la Coyuntura y Tareas de la Revolucion Popular Sandinista," 
popularly known as the 72-Hour Document, summarized the conclusions of the 
September 21-23, 1979/ meeting by naming the "sell-out bourgeoisie" as "the main 
instrument of the counterrevolution" (f s l n  1990b, 91).
8. On the f s l n  internal structure, see Gilbert (1988, 41-78).
9. Under the leadership of Jorge Salazar, u pa n ic  attempted to recruit among 
small producers, particularly cafetaleros in the Matagalpa region. According to 
records of the Asociacion de Cafetaleros de Matagalpa, this effort raised member 
ship in their association (then named the Cooperativa de Cafetaleros) to over 7,000 
in 1980 (interview, Asociacion de Cafetaleros de Matagalpa, August 16, 1986; see 
also Christian 1986, 202). Following Salazar's death, u pa n ic 's  recruitment efforts 
among small producers fizzled.
10. Expropriated under Decreto #759 were Santa Monica, S.A.; Inversiones
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Comerciales, S.A.; Corporacion Plaza Espana, S.A.; Constructora Habitacional, 
S.A.; Sociedad General de Inversiones Urbanos, S.A.; Promotora Terramica, S.A.; 
Valle Gothel, S.A.; Sociedad General de Turismo, S.A.; Museo y Cultura, S.A.; 
a mc a s a ,- Jaboneria Prego, S.A.,- Fabrica de Productos Lacteos "La Perfecta",- Fabrica 
de Helados "La Perfecta," S.A.,- Industrial Ganadera de Oriente, S.A.,- and Mata 
dero San Martin. This group included two of Managua's most important shopping 
complexes as well as several large family-owned industries.
11. The government agreed to compensate expropriated land with payments in 
bonds based on declared tax value for the last three years. Compensation, however, 
was not required if the land had been abandoned (although in practice compensa 
tion was sometimes provided if the finding in the case was "administrative aban 
donment," i.e., the estate was no longer being administered productively but the 
owner had not departed the country) (interview, Mireya Molina, former director, 
mid in r a , Tenencia de la Tierra, October i, 1990). Land that was sharecropped or 
given out in a service-for-labor arrangement could be expropriated if the estate was 
larger than 50 mz. in the Pacific region or 100 mz. elsewhere. (See c ie r a  1989, 
vol. 8; Deere et al. 1985; Mayorga 1990.)
12. See ih c a  (1981). Some of the signatories who were out of the country or 
who fled into embassies for protection avoided prison sentences, but three were 
convicted and sentenced to 210 days in prison. All were released within four 
months, a concession not granted to leaders of the left-wing Frente Obrero who 
were convicted on a similar charge during this time period.
13. Over time, the campesinistas divided into two camps: those who favored 
collective cooperatives (c a s ) and those who, following the preferences of most 
peasants themselves, endorsed individual land ownership and, at most, the credit 
and service cooperatives (ccs). (See Deere et al. 1985.) As the contra war escalated, 
the latter group gained some political leverage. Programs of land titling, which 
gave legal title to squatters in the agricultural frontier, and for land redistribution 
to individual recipients, which gave land without the requirement that recipients 
participate in cooperatives, increased the number of individuals receiving land and 
other benefits in Nicaragua's agrarian reform program (Mayorga 1990). For much 
of the period, including even the later years, however, the general trend among 
campesinistas and in the distribution of land and credit was to favor the c a s  over 
the ccs and individual claimants.
14. The Cuban government ultimately forgave Nicaraguan debt obligations 
(valued at an estimated $73.8 million) for the construction of the sugar mill, Vic 
toria de Julio. (See Brundenius 1987,103.)
15. Ricardo and Manuel Coronel Kautz, mid in r a  vice-ministers and twin 
brothers who had been educated in agricultural programs in the United States 
and Europe and had spent decades as top administrators at the is a , were ardent 
defenders of the state-centered, high-tech model. See M. Coronel Kautz (1984); 
R. Coronel Kautz (1984); interviews, Ricardo Coronel Kautz, October 30 and 
November 2,1990.
16. These included a rum manufacturing and distribution network, both a
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national (b a n a me r ) and an offshore (b a c  International Credit Corporation, bank, 
a national auto and auto parts distributorship, and a large cattle ranch. Information 
on the Grupo Pellas holdings comes from the mid in r a  cedula de notification 
that accompanied the 1988 expropriation of is a  and its subsidiaries, and from 
interview, Nicaragua Sugar Estates, Ltd., September 21,1990.
17. The state took over 264,448 mz. between October 1981 and December 1982 
but redistributed only 134,234 mz. (Cardenal Downing 1988, 48).
18. For discussion of this issue, see Deere et al. (1985); see also Wheelock's 
speech to 400 directors of a pp operations, reported in Barricada, March 7,1985.
19. Twenty-four percent of the divested land was "idle" or "fallow" land, 19 
percent was forested, 19 percent was unimproved pasture, and 9 percent was land 
designated as inappropriate for agricultural use. See Cardenal Downing (1988,178).
20. Data on land use patterns on a pp farms are consistent with this interpre 
tation. During the period when a pp lands were being transferred, the percent of 
land on a pp farms that was idle dropped from 19 percent in 1981 to 14 percent in 
1986 (c ie r a  1989,1:298).
21. Indeed, studies of sectoral production patterns indicate that the percent of 
national production that came from the state farm sector actually increased mar 
ginally between 1981-82 and 1986-87 from 21 percent of the total to 22 percent, 
even though the percent of the farmland held by this sector was dropping sharply 
(Baumeister 1988, 30; c ie r a  1989,1:332).
22. One of the country's main supporters of the large-scale state projects ex 
plained: "After 1983, our views became the central theme. It was like in an orches 
tra where there are several musical themes being played at the same time but 
there's one central one. That was ours" (interview, November 2,1990).
23. This was the label applied disparagingly by critics like Martinez Cuenca 
(1990) to mid in r a 's  large-scale agroindustrial projects.
24. See the discussion of development and investment planning in Kleiterp 
1988; see also Arguello Huper and Kleiterp 1985.
25. mid in r a 's  Direccion Superior (1984, 23) reported to the jg r n  in early 1984 
that 61 percent of mid in r a 's investment funds had gone to the state farm sec 
tor whereas coops and individuals had received 39 percent. Hard currency capital 
goods imports were even more narrowly targeted to the state sector, c ie r a  direc 
tor Orlando Nunez Soto (1987, 142) found that 89 percent of the foreign exchange 
spent to import capital goods for the agricultural sector in the 1980-84 period 
went to the a pp; 64 percent of these funds went to the sugar sector for the Victoria 
de Julio sugar mill.
26. Note that Baumeister's (1991, 15) estimates about land distribution by sec 
tor for 1988 deviate modestly from that published in c ie r a  (1989,9:115), presented 
here as Table 3.2. The main difference is in the calculation about land held in large, 
private estates, which Baumeister estimates at 13.5 percent of agricultural land in 
1988 instead of 7.5 percent.
27. Data in Table 3.3 cover only land acquired through the application of 
agrarian reform laws and not that obtained through Somoza expropriations, dona 
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tions, or sales. Approximately 62 percent of the reformed land was acquired in 
the early confiscations that centered on the expropriation of the landholdings of 
the Somoza family and its allies. Roughly 31 percent of the reformed land was ac 
quired through the subsequent expropriation of non-somocist# landowners under 
agrarian reform legislation (interview, Mireya Molina Torres, former director of 
mid in r a 's  Tenencia de la Tierra division, October 1,1990).
28. Nunez Soto (1991, 392-402) concludes that this strategy was counterpro 
ductive, especially in the cattle region where muted class divisions made even 
small producers resent expropriations of elites.
29. See Wheelock interview, Barricada, April 25,1986, and mid in r a , Division 
de Comunicaciones (1986, 4). According to Mireya Molina, around 100 of these 
confiscations (roughly 7 percent of the total) were reversed or partially reversed 
under appeal, and around 80,000 mz. were returned to former owners (interview, 
October 1, 1990).
30. See also Luciak (1987) for discussion of this negotiation process and how it 
fit into the agrarian reform initiatives of 1985.
31. The government's response varied from case to case and included increasing 
the payment, suspending the purchase, returning the property, agreeing to only 
lease the land, or declaring the deal closed as it was originally agreed upon. This 
wide variation in government responses contributed to the view among private 
producers that there was no consistent or principled policy being followed, and 
that everything depended on the particularities of the negotiation process (personal 
connections, bribes, political animosities, etc.,.
32. Banks loans increased from C$2,522 million in 1978 to C$4,308 million in 
1981 (c ie r a /pa n /c id a  1984, 41).
33. Medium- and large-sized producers are defined here as those with more than 
50 mz. Land data are from Table 3.2.
34. Data presented in the Arguello Huper and Kleiterp investment study (1985, 
68-69) show that private investment accounted for an average of 61 percent of all 
investment in the 1960-78 period. It dropped, after the revolution, to only 39 per 
cent of the total in 1981-83. An open question here is whether or not the private 
sector, skittish about expropriation, even wanted to undertake serious long-term 
investments. Clearly part of the reduction in investment responded to the pro 
ducers' unwillingness to take on these obligations or design projects that might 
win bank support. As the gap between the interest rates and the rate of inflation 
widened, however, and bank loans became virtual gifts, resistance to borrowing on 
the part of producers dissipated. See the discussion of this issue in the following 
chapter.
35. Credito bancario clients and a pp were charged the highest interest rates on 
their loans. For example, in the 1981-84 period, the standard interest rate charged 
to a pp and medium- and large-sized producers was 17 percent, whereas individual 
peasant producers in the credito rural program paid 13 percent, ccs members paid 
10 percent, and c a s  members were charged a low 8 percent (c ie r a  1989, 1.261). 
Since the inflation rate was much higher than any of these interest rates (ranging
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from 22 to 50 percent during this period), all bank clients received subsidies (c e pa l  
1985,2).
36. According to one rough calculation of the loan recuperation rate, repayment 
in the 1981-84 period averaged 56 percent in the small producer/coop program, 
55 percent in the a pp sector, and 90 percent in the regular bank program for the 
private sector (Enriquez and Spalding 1987,117).
37. In this work, Baumeister defines medium- and large-sized producers as those 
private producers who were enrolled in the regular bank credit program. Large 
producers are those receiving bank credit for the cultivation of more than 100 mz. 
in agricultural products or more than 1,000 mz. for livestock. The remainder are 
classified as medium-sized producers.
38. Middle-sized is defined here as 50-500 mz. for cotton production, 200-1,000 
qt. for coffee, and 200-1,000 mz. for cattle ranches (Baumeister 1984b, 12).
39. Thus Wheelock could describe with enthusiasm the sustained erosion of 
properties larger than 500 mz. In his introduction to c ie r a 's nine-volume sum 
mary work, La reforma agraria en Nicaragua, 1979-1989, Wheelock looks back 
on the decade of reform and observes, “Between the time of the triumph of the 
Revolution and the present, almost all of the agricultural production [units] with 
more than 500 mz., and a considerable portion of the cattle ranches of that size, 
have been expropriated for purposes of agrarian reform." He notes that only in 
Region V, the country's main cattle ranching area, did large properties continue 
to exist. In that region, 18 percent of the land was still held in properties larger 
than 500 mz. In the Pacific region and in the northern interior, however, only 5 
percent and 4 percent, respectively, were still held in these large estates (c ie r a  
1989,1:29-30).
40. More of the estates were expropriated for reasons of abandonment in 1986 
than had been the case previously. In 1981-84, only 20 percent of the cases were 
charged with abandonment; 61 percent of the expropriations resulted from the 
charge that the land was idle or inefficiently used (Cardenal Downing 1988, 46). 
In 35 percent of the 1986 cases, however, abandonment was listed as the sole or 
first cause given for the expropriation. That the land was inefficiently used or idle 
was charged in 27 percent of the cases. In 14 percent of the cases, the owners were 
found to have illegally arranged a sharecropping or labor-for-service agreement 
with local peasants. The remainder of the cases (24 percent) were expropriated for 
reasons of public utility or for use in an agricultural development zone (mid in r a , 
Direccion de Tenencia de la Tierra 1987).
41. According to his calculations, 53 percent of the land that was handed out 
came from state farms, and another 39 percent came from private estates larger 
than 500 mz.
42. The guaranteed price for rice rose from 55 cordobas per qt. (granz) in 1979/ 
80 to 164 cordobas in 1981/82, while that for coffee remained static at 1,000 cor 
dobas per qt. oro and that for cotton rose only from 600 cordobas per qt. oro to 840 
(c ie r a  1989, 1:268).
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43. Reasons for this are complex. Rice production had developed rapidly in the 
1960s and 1970s, and the private producers, some of whom were trained as engi 
neers, had a strong commitment to maximize productivity. These producers tended 
to use their land fully and efficiently, unlike cattle ranchers or coffee producers, 
who often left much of their land idle. Furthermore, the type of soil appropriate 
for rice production was inappropriate for most other crops, so rice tended to be 
produced in regions where peasant land pressure was not high. Finally, this sec 
tor was ably led. Unlike many private sector organizations in Nicaragua, it did 
not adopt a highly confrontational strategy toward the Sandinistas. According to 
a comparative study of private sector organizations in Central America by Julio 
Sergio Ramirez Arango (1985, 364—78), a n a r  adopted a "limited stakes strategy" 
in dealing with the government, taking a low public profile, emphasizing technical 
arguments, and taking a long-term view of the situation. This approach made it 
more effective in its negotiations with the regime than the six other Nicaraguan 
private sector organizations evaluated in that study.
44. Private rice producers affiliated with a n a r  were also able, after some oppo 
sition from the government, to secure long-term investment credits with which 
to finance 50 percent of the costs of building a new rice seed plant. Furthermore, 
the proscriptions on private exporting were lifted for a n a r  affiliates, who were 
allowed to market their own semolina (rice bran) in Costa Rica and retain the 
hard currency earnings thus generated (interviews, Mario Hanon, August 23,1986; 
May 3,1990).
45. Spoor and Mendoza (1988, 31) argue that large sorghum producers often had 
investments in the cattle or poultry sectors and also benefited from being able to 
use unsold portions of the sorghum crop in these related activities.
46. Indeed, even those producing export crops were able to take advantage of 
the government-run pricing system, especially when the export crop was also an 
input for the domestic food system, as in the case of cottonseed. When interna 
tional cotton prices fell in the 1980s, the government provided subsidies that kept 
cotton production alive in Nicaragua. Trevor Evans (1987, 14) found that cotton 
production levels in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1984 were only 43 percent and 
54 percent, respectively, of the production levels obtained in 1974-76. In Nica 
ragua, although cotton output had certainly declined, the 1984 production level 
was noticeably higher, reaching 67 percent of the 1974-76 level. Even when the 
evidence mounted that the cotton subsidies took a toll on the rest of the economy 
(Evans 1987,19), the Sandinista government was slow to suspend them.
47. The term is derived from the verb chapear, meaning to clear or prepare the 
land for use. Baumeister (1988, 31) defines the term as a synonym for plebeian.
48. Nunez was a rough-hewn cattle rancher whose experiences as a revolution 
ary Christian led him into conflict with the Somoza government that resulted 
in his imprisonment and torture. He was released from prison as part of the ex 
change negotiated by the f s l n  following the Christmas kidnapping of a group of 
local notables in 1974. After the revolution, he donated his property to the govern 
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ment and became the mid in r a  regional delegate in the coffee-growing region of 
Matagalpa and Jinotega. In 1984 he formally left the government to take over the 
leadership of u n a g  (interview, Daniel Nunez, May 6,1990).
49. See the full page discussion of the meeting, with special inserts on the role 
of large producers, in the f s l n  newspaper, Barricada, July 9,1984.
Chapter 4
1. Arguello Huper and Kleiterp (1985, 60-65) also found that these projects 
overemphasized agroindustrial investment (especially the cattle sector) relative to 
the rest of the economy, used and produced little that was supplied by or absorbed 
into the rest of the economy, focused too heavily on exports, were launched with 
out feasibility studies, and continued unchanged even after the evidence of their 
negative impact mounted.
2. Tax pressure (tax revenues as a percent of GDP) had risen from n percent 
in 1977 (FitzGerald 1984a, 5) to 18.4 percent in 1980. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) 
With the imposition of new taxes, the tax pressure continued rising to 30.7 percent 
of GDP in 1984 before the soaring inflation rates and delayed tax payments started 
to erode the revenues collected. See Lance Taylor et al. (1989,15) for discussion of 
the "Olivera-Tanzi effect" and its impact in Nicaragua.
3. For example, authorized imports could be acquired in January 1988 for 
an average exchange rate of C$536:US$i whereas exports earned, on average, 
C$6,84o :US$i (Hernandez 1990, 5).
4. According to Arana Sevilla et al. (1987, 49), in 1986 35 percent of imports 
were raw materials and intermediate goods, with petroleum representing another 
17 percent. Consumer goods, which were more restricted, represented 19 per 
cent. Capital goods imports, so emphasized in the development model, composed 
another 20 percent of the total.
5. By 1985 84 percent of official external financing was provided by socialist 
countries (Stahler-Sholk 1987,162).
6. In his 1990 book reflecting on this period, Martinez Cuenca reports repeated 
clashes with both Ruiz and mid in r a  head Jaime Wheelock. He describes what he 
viewed as the "distrust some f s l n  leaders had of me and of the project that we 
pushed for from the Ministry of Foreign Trade" (Martinez Cuenca 1990, 99). In a 
subsequent interview, he described pressures he faced in meetings with members 
of the f s l n  national directorate. After presenting his ideas for budgetary cuts or 
reallocations, he reported that he would be told, "You can proceed with that plan, 
or you can understand that we are at war" (interview, August 16,1991,.
7. For discussion of the 1985 measures, see Pizarro (1987); ih c a  (1986).
8. See c ie r a  (1988, 302-19); ih c a  (1988c, 16); Latin American Economic Re 
port, 88-02 (February 29, 1988), 16.
9. For example, the price of gasoline increased by a factor of twelve and, as a 
result, interurban transportation prices were multiplied by six. See ih c a  (1988c).
10. Indeed, costs did rise more rapidly for producers using "modern" technolo 
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gies than those using traditional approaches. Utting found, for example, that maize 
producers whose production was mechanized had the lowest per-unit production 
costs among the different types of maize producers in 1983-84. Following price 
adjustments in 1988-89, however, this modern group had one of the highest such 
cost ratios. Their production costs in February 1990 surpassed official producer 
prices by 19 percent. Nonetheless, the production costs for maize rose quickly for 
all groups and were higher in February 1990 than official prices regardless of the 
type of technology employed. Of the three major staples analyzed by Utting, only 
beans and traditional (rainfed) rice production were profitable in early 1990 (Utting 
1991, 28-30).
11. In December 1987, prior to the 1988 reforms, the top salary on the officially 
approved salary scale was eight times that at the bottom. Following the February 
1988 reform, the top salary was fifteen times that at the bottom (Gutierrez 1989, 
177; Hernandez 1990, 5).
12. See ih c a  (1988c, 28-42; 1989, 48); Zalkin (1990, 60-61).
13. In 1984 only 16,000 mz. were transferred to individuals under the agrarian 
reform program. In 1985 and 1986 this increased to 143,000 and 138,000 mz., re 
spectively. Although the amount of land transferred to cooperatives continued to 
surpass that transferred to individuals (coops received 180,000 and 199,000 mz., 
respectively, in 1985 and 1986), individual petitioners were less disadvantaged in 
those two years than they were in either the 1980-84 period or afterward in 1987 
(when they received only 6,000 mz. compared with 172,000 mz. for the coopera 
tives). (See Cardenal Downing 1988; Mayorga 1991, 38).
14. For example, in the Valle de Sebaco vegetable processing plant project, co 
operatives were integrated as producers of vegetables for processing, o a s  project 
director Daniel Slutzky reported that eleven of the twenty ongoing projects incor 
porated cooperative production in their plans for 1987. (See discussion in c ie r a  
1989,1:346-47-)
15. See interview with Ramiro Gurdian, Nuevo Diario, June 18,1988, following 
the second round of structural adjustments. Some of the enthusiasm of this sector 
declined a few weeks later when Mario Alegria, director of in ie s e p, c o s e p's  eco 
nomic research arm, was arrested and convicted on charges of selling government 
economic data to the U.S. Embassy in Managua.
16. The data for 1988 do not include the case of the is a , since that expropriation 
was subsequently converted into a sale. See details below.
17. Data for 1989 were provided by the Direccion de Politicas Agrarias, Instituto 
Nicaragiiense de Reforma Agraria, August 1991.
18. See Decreto #333, "Ley Creadora de las Comisiones Consultativas de Poli- 
tica Agropecuaria," approved by the jg r n , February 29,1980, in c ie r a  1989,8.130- 
33. This decree created commissions for producers of cotton, beef, milk, chicken 
and pork, rice, bananas, sugar, coffee, and basic grains. These commissions were 
to be composed of representatives of five government agencies (the Ministry of 
Agricultural Development, the Ministry of Planning, the Agrarian Reform Insti 
tute, either the Foreign Trade Ministry or the Internal Trade Ministry, and the
258 Notes to Pages 108-9
Ministry of Labor) plus a representative from the producers' association affiliated 
with u pa n ic  to speak for large producers, a representative of small producers, a 
representative of the Sandinista-backed a t c  for rural laborers, and a second union 
representative from an unspecified labor organization.
19. See, for example, the minutes of the March 23,1984, meeting of the "Comite 
de Cosecha" for cotton producers in Region II, and the "Convenio Salarial Relativo 
a las Actividades de la Rama del Desmote de Algodon," signed February 1,1984.
20. In my sample, two members of the economic elite who were first cousins of 
Sandinista ministers, for example, noted that they had broken all communication 
with those ministers and refused to attend family functions at which the minis 
ters were present. In the Nicaraguan case, one should not assume automatically 
that family connections imply privileged treatment or political affinity.
21. According to the mid in r a  official responsible for overseeing the commis 
sions, industrialists were less inclined than agricultural producers to reject gov 
ernment attempts at technical consultation. The industrialists' greater experience 
in negotiating with the government for licenses and permits in the prerevolution 
ary period, plus their heavy consumption of imports requiring scarce foreign ex 
change, made them somewhat more accommodating (interview, Mary Jane Mulli 
gan, directora de politicas economicas del mid in r a , August 22, 1986; see also 
Dijkstra 1992).
22. The government did begin, in 1986, to supply some of the u pa n ic  associa 
tions with items needed for production. Since the dues collected by these organi 
zations were often inadequate to meet their rising costs, these associations stayed 
afloat by selling government-supplied production inputs to their members. Curi 
ously, at the time when the government and c o s e p affiliates were most at odds, 
the government distribution policy helped these associations to both cover their 
costs and hold on to their membership. See Spalding (1988).
23. Decreto #347, April 18,1988, reprinted in c ie r a  1989, 8:181-87. Five com 
missions were set up, but the commissions for rice and for sorghum were later 
combined. The composition of the commissions varied slightly, but they all in 
cluded an executive president named by Wheelock and representatives of the b n d , 
the rural labor association a t c , and relevant state corporations (such as the Cor 
poracion Nicaraguense de la Carne and the Corporacion Nicaraguense de la Leche 
in the Livestock Commission). See c n g  (1989). The private sector was represented 
usually by four delegates from u pa n ic  affiliates and four delegates from u n a g , as 
well as relevant private processors (such as the owner of a top private cotton gin in 
the National Cotton Commission). Although Jaime Wheelock ultimately named 
those who would participate in these commissions, most were nominated by their 
respective associations. Even some prominent critics of the regime (like Matagal 
pan cafetalero Jaime Cuadra, who refused to attend the meetings) were named to 
these commissions.
24. Interviews, executive presidents of the National Coffee Commission, 
May 5, 1990; the National Cotton Commission, June 6, 1990; the National Live 
stock Commission, September 10,1990; and the National Rice and Sorghum Com 
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mission, May 7,1990. See also the Foro Socio-Economico section, Barricada, Janu 
ary 15, 1990. Three of the four executive presidents were linked by family ties to 
large cotton families of Leon, helping the government to make connections with 
the agrarian elite.
25. Like most analysts, O'Donnell and Schmitter differentiate between politi 
cal and economic concertacion. Political concertacion or pact making produced 
agreements governing the transition to pluralistic democracy in much of Latin 
America as the military began to withdraw from control over the executive. Social 
and economic concertacion was often also attempted, sometimes as part of the 
drafting of a new constitution. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that the latter was 
more difficult to achieve, given the economic disarray that was often part of the 
military's legacy and the absence of peak associations that could orchestrate the 
construction and enforcement of these pacts (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 45- 
47).
26. Unionization reportedly increased from n percent of the salaried workforce 
in 1979 to 56 percent in 1986 (Stahler-Sholk 1992, 4).
27. Thirty key representatives participated, including Antonio Lacayo, the 
newly restored general manager of g r a c s a , and Carlos Mantica, who managed 
3,500 mz. of family cotton production and was one of the largest producers in the 
country. See Barricada, January 27,1989.
28. See Nuevo Diario, January 26,1989, and Barricada, February 4,1989.
29. The assembly divided producers into eight groups, based on their primary 
product, mid in r a  vice-minister Salvador Mayorga nominated secretaries for each 
of the groups, alternately selecting between u pa n ic  and u n a g  representatives. 
Delegates from u pa n ic  were named to head the cotton, cattle, and rice commit 
tees,- u n a g  delegates were selected for the coffee, basic grains, and sorghum com 
mittees. Each group drafted a series of recommendations and requests, which the 
government responded to on the second day of the conference (Barricada, April 21, 
1989,- interview, Mario Hanon, August 26,1989).
30. According to Vilas (1990), some of the concessions made to cotton producers 
had not even been requested.
31. See "Gobierno responde a los productores," Barricada, April 21, 1989, and 
"Estimulo y garantia: jjjTodos a producir!!!," Nuevo Diario, April 21,1989.
32. Ortega asked private growers to join the state in setting aside land for a 
national land bank for the landless, but this was to be done on a voluntary basis 
(Nuevo Diario, April 21, 1989).
33. See Barricada, May 23, 1989. Most members of the delegation were either 
affiliated with u n a g  or were not affiliated with any organization. Two officials 
from u pa n ic 's dairy association, f o n d il a c , however, accompanied the delega 
tion, including the association's president.
34. See discussion of the media coverage in ih c a  (1989,50).
35. In my sample of ninety-one private sector leaders, forty-six (50.5 percent) 
noted that at least one member of their immediate family (spouse or children) had 
gone abroad to live at some point during the Sandinista period.
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36. By the mid-1980s, a policy of exempting one son from active service for the 
families of medium- and large-sized agricultural producers was formalized, replac 
ing a system of ad-hoc exemptions. The fear that overzealous military recruiters 
might spirit their sons off to war in one of the periodic roundups that occurred, 
however, prompted even many of those eligible for exemptions to send their sons 
out of the country.
37. In contrast with other hegemonic elites from the prerevolutionary period, 
the Pellas family had reached a modus vivendi with the Sandinista government, 
continuing in the early years to make investments and requesting in 1983, in 
correspondence with then U.S. ambassador Anthony Quainton, that the U.S. gov 
ernment's decision to cut off the Nicaraguan sugar quota be reversed. (See Nuevo 
Diario, May 11, 1983.) Although the government claimed that the production 
drop and unstanched decapitalization going on at the mill in 1988 mandated state 
intervention, the perception grew among private elites that the Sandinistas were 
unreliable even in dealings with their friends in the bourgeoisie.
38. This group was composed of Arnoldo Aleman, president of u n c a f e n ic ; 
Nicolas Bolanos, former president of u n c a f e n ic  and brother of former c o s e p 
president Enrique Bolanos; and Jaime Cuadra, long-term president of the Aso 
ciacion de Cafetaleros de Matagalpa. At a public meeting of coffee producers in 
Matagalpa in June 1989, these producers, among others, orchestrated a ringing cri 
tique of the regime and announced the withdrawal of u pa n ic  affiliates from the 
newly created national coffee commission, c o n c a f e . Within days their estates 
were taken over by the regime on the grounds that they had conspired to orga 
nize an act of economic sabotage by urging coffee producers to halt production. 
See "Cafetaleros se retiran de c o n c a f e ," La Prensa, June 19, 1989; "Respuesta a 
saboteadores," Barricada, June 22, 1989.
39. A contract was signed with is a  owners in January 1989 in which the gov 
ernment agreed to pay $637,000 for the land surrounding the mill and $12 million 
for the is a  itself, making payments of $1 million a year for twelve years. The gov 
ernment failed to meet the payment schedule, and the Pellas family challenged 
the contract in 1990 after the u n o  government was elected (interview, Nicaraguan 
Sugar Estates, Ltd., September 21,1990).
40. The three affected producers refused the offer, not wanting to further the 
regime's electoral chances by allowing it to undo the damage it had done. These 
estates were finally returned to their former owners in the period of transition 
after the February 25, 1990, electoral defeat of the Sandinistas and before the 
April 25,1990, inauguration of the u n o  government (interviews, Nicolas Bolanos, 
August 25, 1989, and October 15, 1990; La Prensa, March 23, 1990).
41. By its own regulations, u pa n ic  could not technically expel representatives 
of constituent associations, and f o n d il a c  officers rejected the push to oust Lopez 
from the presidency. Lopez remained a member of the u pa n ic  directorate, but in 
practice his association was subsequently represented by his alternate (interview, 
Juan Diego Lopez, February 20, 1990).
42. See "Ocho gremios se retiran de Comisiones Nacionales," La Prensa,
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June 23, 1989; "Cafetaleros de Jinotega se mantienen en c o n c a f e ," Barricada, 
June 22, 1989.
43. See "Se reintegran a comisiones desobedeciendo al c o s e p," Nuevo Diario, 
July 14, 1989.
44- August 7,1987? the presidents of the Central American countries signed 
the Central American Accord, widely known as Esquipulas II or the Arias Plan. 
This agreement prohibited support for irregular forces attempting to destabilize 
regional governments, called for the restoration of civil and political rights, and 
committed all five governments to democratic electoral processes.
45. Nicaraguan members were Dreyfus and Mayorga along with Orlando 
Nunez, director of c ie r a , and Xabier Gorostiaga, director of c r ie s .
46. The commission recommended a substantially increased flow of develop 
ment assistance: $2.5 billion over a three-year period for the displaced and poor, 
and another $2 billion per year in general financial assistance for the next five years 
(Comision Internacional para la Recuperacion y el Desarrollo de Centroamerica 
1989, 5).
47. See c o r d e n ic  (1988). In addition to Dreyfus and Mayorga, the group in 
cluded business leaders Felipe Mantica, Pablo Ayon, Filadelfo Chamorro, Carlos 
Reynaldo Facayo, Antonio Lacayo, and Jose Francisco Rosales.
48. c o s e p wags promptly labeled c o r d e n ic  "cosEP-Heroes y Martires" (a 
takeoff on the name used by the Sandinista-aligned coNAPRO-Heroes y Martires), 
implying a political affinity between c o r d e n ic  and the f s l n .
49. According to biographical information attached to the c o r d e n ic  mission 
statement and released at the press conference announcing the formation of the 
group, members included graduates of McGill, Georgetown, mit , Harvard, Yale, 
and the Sorbonne. Three were members of university advisory boards in Nicara 
gua, and four had at some point been full- or part-time university professors. They 
owned or were major stockholders in some of the country's largest commercial 
houses, distributorships, import-export businesses, and agroindustrial complexes. 
See c o r d e n ic  (1988, Anexo 1).
50. In interviews in 1990, several of the private sector leaders affiliated with 
u pa n ic  organizations described participating in social gatherings with f s l n  
leaders in the last years of the Sandinista government. These informal interactions 
were generally viewed as a breakthrough that allowed producers to speak honestly 
and reduced their fear of the regime.
51. In 1984 c o s e p leaders had been the prime force behind the creation of 
the anti-Sandinista Coordinadora Democratica, a coalition of c o s e p plus several 
small unions and political parties. After naming their presidential candidate, id b  
functionary Arturo Cruz, and mounting an unofficial campaign, the Coordinadora 
declined to formally register Cruz in the race, claiming that the conditions for a 
free and fair election were missing. According to Cruz, business leaders in c o s e p 
were responsible for the decision to pull him from the contest (interview with 
Arturo Cruz, December 9,1987; see also Gutman 1988).
52. For a fuller discussion of that election, see l a s  a  (1984). Observer teams
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were also sent from the British Houses of Commons and Lords, the Irish Parlia 
ment, the Dutch government, and Socialist International; their conclusions about 
the elections were generally positive. The abstention rate of 25 percent, however, 
suggested that some element of popular dissatisfaction was already present. See 
Oquist (1992).
53. After several rounds of balloting, Chamorro reportedly secured 6 votes from 
the 14 assembled party representatives in the coalition, passing Bolanos and Godoy, 
who received 4 each. In the final round of voting on the first day, Chamorro's vote 
had climbed to 7 but fell short of the required 10 votes for nomination. In the sec 
ond day of meetings, representatives voted on alternative tickets, with Chamorro 
paired with either Bolanos or Godoy, and the second combination secured majority 
support (Taylor 1989).
54. The rift with Bolanos supporters and c o s e p was smoothed over, but not 
eliminated, during the campaign when c o s e p president Gilberto Cuadra was 
named to the inner circle of her personal advisers [La Prensa, November 24,1989).
55. See "Sin Concertacion no habra estabilidad," La Cronica, January 3-10,1990.
56. See Barricada international 9, no. 302 (October 14, 1989), for the report on 
the f s l n  convention.
57. See Barricada, February 20, 1990, for example. The Nicaraguan electoral 
system used a party list system and proportional representation. Parties and coali 
tions presented candidates and alternates ranked in order of priority for each slot 
they contested. Although the inclusion of private producers in the f s l n  list was 
prominently advertised, most of these candidates were alternates (13 of the 24 ad 
vertised in the above ad) or were ranked in the bottom half of their lists. Only 6 of 
these 24 producers on the f s l n  slate were actually elected.
58. According to leaders of f a g a n ic , the Sandinistas committed themselves to 
hand over if a g a n , formerly the largest slaughterhouse in the nation, to f a g a n ic . 
When the Somoza regime was toppled, some of a s g a n ic 's property had been 
transferred to f a g a n ic , but the slaughterhouse had been retained by the state 
(interviews, f a g a n ic , September 18, 1990).
59. In an article titled, "Productores reconocen al f s l n  como unica alterna- 
tiva," Barricada (February n, 1990) reported conversations with a series of other 
producers who had recently had expropriated land returned to them.
60. The reliquidation program had been a source of discontent in the sector. 
The June 1989 meeting at which u pa n ic  coffee leaders declared their withdrawal 
from c o n c a f e  was nominally called to allow a full discussion of this matter.
61. See, for example, Vilas (1990); Petras and Morley (1992, 128-37).
62. Two other, small parties, the Partido Social Cristiano and the Movimiento 
Unido Revolucionario, won one seat each.
Chapter 5
1. Respondents' views were coded on a five-point scale based on their answers 
to three questions: What is your opinion of the Sandinista government? What
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would you say were the most positive aspects of the Sandinista government? What 
would you say were the most negative aspects of the Sandinista government?
2. See Anthony Downs (1957) and Gordon Tullock (1979) for pathbreaking work 
in the rational choice school.
3. Indeed, the motivations of elites in the other categories also reflect consider 
ations beyond simple self-interest as well. Moral-political opponents who baited 
the regime, for example, were sometimes targeted for expropriation and harass 
ment by police and security forces. Self-interest in those cases might call them 
to moderate their critique or adopt a lower profile. They eschewed that approach 
in favor of strident opposition that reflected complex political and philosophical 
commitments.
4. Of the ninety-one elite leaders I interviewed, twenty-four (26 percent) spon 
taneously described ways in which they had contributed to the insurrection and 
the support they had provided to the f s l n  during the late 1970s.
5. Postelection survey findings reported by Paul Oquist (1992,14) estimate that 
only 10 percent of those classified as owners and proprietors voted for the f s l n  
in the 1990 election. If this is taken as a baseline, private sector supporters of 
the f s l n  would then be overrepresented in this study. Oversampling in this case 
may be justified as a way of gathering additional information about a particularly 
complex and anomalous subsector of the leadership population.
6. Because of these considerations, a purely statistical analysis of the data in 
this chapter may be problematic. Participants in this study are not a true random 
sample of the economic elite, but a carefully targeted population of private sec 
tor leaders. The contrasts among them are often subtle, and the numbers found in 
some categories are small. Pearson chi-square statistics are presented here for each 
table, but these figures should be evaluated with these considerations in mind.
7. Twenty of the respondents (22 percent) participated actively in the 1990 f s l n  
campaign. Five were f s l n  candidates in the election, and another fifteen were in 
volved as f s l n  party activists. Reflecting the greater preponderance of opponents 
to the government among the respondents, forty of those interviewed (44 percent) 
became actively involved in the u n o  campaign, six as candidates.
8. There is ongoing debate in Nicaragua about how to define a middle-sized 
and a large-sized producer, and no clear consensus has emerged (Molina and Que 
zada 1990). Ideally, classification schemes should include reference not only to 
the amount of land held but to the size of the workforce, land quality, type of 
technology employed, and other such variables. Unfortunately, in a country where 
there has been no national census for over two decades, such detailed information 
is not available. Even looking at a single criterion—size of landholding there has 
been disagreement about how the parameters should be set.
The most exhaustive work on this topic was done by mid in r a 's  research arm, 
c ie r a  (c ie r a  1981). Recognizing the widely varying levels of return and com 
plexity for different types of subsectors, strata definitions have generally been 
product specific. (See Appendix 2, Table A.4.)
c ie r a  definitions were used as a guide in determining strata classifications
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for the respondents in this survey. In actual practice, however, most of these re 
spondents were engaged in several economic activities simultaneously, making it 
difficult to classify them by size. It was common, for example, for producers to 
combine agricultural production and cattle ranching, or to have an urban profes 
sion as well as an agricultural enterprise. As a result, a producer could be both 
a small coffee producer and a medium-sized rancher, or be a lawyer, a medium 
cotton producer, and a large cattle rancher. These concepts become even more 
problematic when producers had varying levels of participation in several farms. A 
producer might be the sole owner of one farm but one of three partners in another. 
Because of the endless kinds of combinations that emerged in practice, summary 
classifications here represent careful estimates.
9. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.1 is 3.02, and the observed signifi 
cance level is only .93, indicating that the null hypothesis (producer strata and 
views on the f s l n  government are independent) cannot be rejected.
10. Whereas 38 percent of the full sample were strongly opposed to the f s l n  
government, 55 percent of those with an immigrant history fell into that category. 
Sixty-seven percent of the full sample were large producers, whereas 80 percent of 
those who noted a recent immigration experience in their family history were so 
classified.
11. At the secondary level, prestigious Nicaraguan boarding schools such as the 
Jesuit-run Colegio Centroamerica were preferred by the elite, although a handful 
of the most prosperous participants in this study also completed their high school 
education in the United States.
12. The long history of semicolonial status and the trade and aid linkages in 
the Somoza era made economic elites highly attuned to the United States. Other 
countries where several respondents received their final degrees included Mexico, 
Spain, and other Central American nations.
13. In addition to those who received their highest educational degree in the 
United States, many others spent some time studying and working there. In this 
sample, a remarkable 42 percent reported living or studying in the United States at 
some point in their lives. Over one-third lived in the United States for more than a 
year; 18 percent of the respondents lived there for five or more years. In this sense, 
analysts like John Weeks (1987), who allege a strong cultural dependence on the 
United States by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, have some empirical basis for their 
claims.
14. Among university graduates, 100 percent of those educated in the United 
States were large producers at the end of the 1970s, whereas only 61 percent of 
those who graduated from Nicaraguan universities were in that category.
15. There was also a connection between being educated in the United States 
and support for a pure free-market economic model. Whereas only 29 percent of 
those educated in Nicaragua selected a pure-capitalism economic model when 
asked about their philosophical preferences, 42 percent of those educated in the 
United States did so.
16. The Pearson chi-square value for Table s -2 is 7.79, and the significance level
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is only .45. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.3 is 472, with a significance 
level of only .31. In neither case can the null hypothesis be rejected. A purely 
statistical analysis of these data can, however, be problematic, since the measure 
of association depends, to some degree, on how the variables are defined. If the 
statistical analysis in Table 5.3 is confined to only those private sector leaders 
with university educations who were either strongly or moderately opposed to the 
regime, for example, then the contrast between those educated at home and abroad 
appears more sharply. The Pearson chi-square value for this more focused analysis 
is 3.44, with a significance level of .06.
17. u pa n ic  leaders often charged that their affiliate associations were suffer 
ing a conscious erosion at the hands of the f s l n . Indeed, the Sandinista state did 
provide significant support for u n a g  and encouraged producers to choose this 
alternative. Among other forms of state support given to u n a g , Luciak (forthcom 
ing, chap. 3) reports that 25 percent of un a g 's  budget came from f s l n  donations. 
On the other hand, the government also provided some organizational support for 
u pa n ic  affiliates. It channeled goods like tires and special authorizations (asigna- 
ciones] to purchase jeeps or tractors through these groups as well, although not on 
a priority basis. The state trade monopsonies also served as the collection agency 
for membership dues of f a g a n ic  and c a a n , transferring a percentage of their 
members' earnings from the cattle slaughter and cotton export to these associa 
tions.
18. The Pearson chi-square value for this table is 54.09, with a significance level 
of less than .01, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis (producer organi 
zation and views on the f s l n  government are independent) at the 99 percent level 
of confidence.
19. c o s e p reported a relatively modest membership in its agricultural affili 
ate in 1985, with 75 percent of the members in one of two livestock associations 
(f a g a n ic  or f o n d il a c ). (See Appendix 2, Table A.5.) The harsh exchanges be 
tween c o s e p/u pa n ic  leaders and government officials, the general contraction of 
the large producer class, plus the confiscation of the properties of u pa n ic  presi 
dent Ramiro Gurdian and c o s e p president Enrique Bolanos, had a negative effect 
on c o s e p's  ability to recruit and retain members.
20. u n a g 's membership reportedly rose to a total of 120,506 in 1987. (See 
Appendix 2, Table A.2.) Membership figures for both u n a g  and u pa n ic  are sub 
ject to some question, since both organizations may have inflated these numbers 
in order to appear more representative of agricultural producers. Since over one- 
fifth of u n a g 's members in 1987 were individual members who did not belong to 
any base structure, cooperative, or u n a g  association, it is hard to know exactly 
what their affiliation in this organization entailed.
21. The u n a g  leaders who had lived in the United States had also done so for 
a shorter period of time than their u pa n ic  counterparts. Whereas only 25 percent 
of the u n a g  leaders who had lived in the United States had done so for more than 
one year, 94 percent of the u pa n ic  leaders who had lived in the United States had 
spent more than one year there.
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22. Some producers, seeking maximum political advantage, joined both u n a g  
and the local u pa n ic  affiliate. Regional leaders sometimes turned a blind eye to 
the practice, seeing it as necessary in order to survive under the difficult circum 
stances that prevailed during the era. In general, however, such double affiliation 
was frowned upon, both for ideological reasons and because of the dangers of infil 
tration by political opponents (interview, u pa n ic , June 21,1990; interview, u n a g , 
May 6, 1990).
23. In some areas, local u n a g  leaders worked so hard to persuade their mem 
bers to accept their military draft responsibilities, for example, that u n a g  was 
perceived as an extension of the military. This perception contributed to a ten 
dency among producers in these zones to avoid contact with u n a g  (interview, 
UNAG-Matagalpa, June 25,1992).
24. Several members of the UPANic-affiliated a d a l , for example, were support 
ers of the revolution and ran as f s l n  candidates in the 1990 election. One f s l n  
candidate for the Leon municipal slate had been an officer in a d a l  and its rep 
resentative in the u pa n ic  directorate in 1988-89, and two a d a l  members were 
f s l n  candidates for the national assembly, a d a l  was exceptional, however, among 
u pa n ic  regional associations in its relative tolerance for Sandinista supporters in 
its ranks. Leon was one of the few municipalities where f s l n  support continued to 
be strong throughout the decade and where the f s l n  won the 1990 elections. The 
broader base of f s l n  support in Leon and the absence of a war front there fostered 
relative tolerance for those with Sandinista sympathies, even in u pa n ic  affiliates.
25. Although the patterns in Table 5.5 are notable, the contrasts between 
national and regional leaders are not stark or absolute enough to rule out the 
possibility of a random occurrence, especially for the u n a g  leaders. The Pearson 
chi-square value was 7.2 with a significance level of .13 for c o s e p leaders and 1.9 
with a significance level of only .6 for u n a g  leaders.
26. Members of u n a g  received a number of benefits and resources. One u n a g  
leader from Masaya told of a time in 1986 when his land was invaded and he faced 
expropriation. With a letter from the head of his departmental u n a g  office con 
firming his status as a activist in the association, he was able to stave off the 
expropriation bid and reclaim his land, u n a g  also helped its membership to ac 
quire basic agricultural implements (boots, machetes, barbed wire, etc.| at a time 
when these were scarce.
Some of this support, however, was contingent on the f s l n  remaining in power 
and responding to u n a g  requests, u n a g  regional leaders throughout the coun 
try reported, in the months following the inauguration of the u n o  government, a 
sharp drop in membership and activity. Indeed, a u n a g  report on its membership 
in 1993 indicates that the total had fallen from 120,506 in 1987 (see Appendix 2, 
Table A.2) to 101,500 (u n a g  1993, 8). Medium- and large-sized individual pro 
ducers were particularly likely to jump ship, leading one frustrated u n a g  leader 
in Jinotega to conclude that they had only been "glued with spit" to u n a g .
27. This group includes those who appealed the process and eventually received 
some or all of the land back, who were eventually given a permuta or land ex 
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change, or who were never formally expropriated but who lost some land in land 
invasions that were not checked by state action.
28. As with other factors discussed above, expropriation was not an isolated 
variable, unrelated to other considerations. Those who were expropriated were 
more likely, for example, to have been large producers in the late 1970s and to have 
been leaders of u pa n ic  organizations. A full 44 percent of those in this study who 
were large producers in the late 1970s underwent an expropriation, and most of 
these expropriations were hard (26 percent vs. 18 percent soft). For those who were 
medium-sized or small, however, only 16 percent and 20 percent, respectively, 
were expropriated, and all of these were of the soft variety.
Forty percent of the u pa n ic  leaders interviewed in this study were expropri 
ated, and a relatively higher percentage of those expropriations were of the hard 
variety (24 percent hard and 16 percent soft). Only 19 percent of the u n a g  leaders, 
on the other hand, were expropriated, and all of these were of the soft variety, with 
some or all of the land eventually returned or a land swap arranged.
These patterns suggest a complex interaction among the variables, in which the 
growing opposition of the most privileged elites combined with their marginal 
ization from the Sandinista development model and contributed to expropriation 
decisions that in turn deepened their hostility to the regime. Conversely, more co 
operative, "patriotic" producers who had smaller estates or supported u n a g  were 
less likely to fall under the expropriation ax. This relatively favorable treatment in 
turn encouraged them to adopt a less negative appraisal of the regime.
29. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.6 is 6.2, with a significance level of 
only .63, indicating that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis (expropriation 
experience and views on the f s l n  government are independent).
30. See Utting (1991) for a discussion of the sharp price decline experienced 
by Nicaraguan food producers following structural adjustment at the end of the 
f s l n  era. According to Utting, the large producers, who were heavily dependent 
on irrigation and imported machinery, were even more negatively affected by cost 
increases associated with post-1987 adjustment measures than were peasant pro 
ducers. In addition to the problems of rising costs as subsidies were eliminated, 
rice producers complained heartily about Soviet rice donations in 1987 and 1988, 
which undercut prices for domestically produced rice (interviews, July 26, 1989; 
June 23,1990).
31. The percent registering either moderate or strong support for the regime 
was 8 percent for those private sector leaders whose primary product at the end 
of the 1980s was coffee, 23 percent for grains (rice, maize, or sorghum), and 29 
percent for livestock (beef and dairy).
32. Major investments were defined as long-term investments in acquiring 
new land, building new infrastructure (roads, workers' housing, irrigation sys 
tems, etc.,, acquiring purebred cattle for breeding, and making major machinery 
purchases. Minor investments referred to routine investments needed to main 
tain existing production levels (erecting fencing, maintaining terraces, purchasing 
steers for fattening, meeting traditionally established standards for aerial fumiga
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tion or crop fertilization,. "No investments" was reported by those who made no 
long-term investments during the period and whose short-term investments fell 
substantially below their prerevolutionary norms.
33. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.7 is 9.5, with a significance level 
of .05, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis (views on the f s l n  govern 
ment and investment level are independent) with a 95 percent level of confidence.
34. Prospective buyers had to secure permission from mid in r a  to purchase 
land before the sale could be completed. This policy was designed to prevent 
owners who had been informed of a pending expropriation from trying to sell the 
land to unsuspecting buyers. It also allowed the state to monitor and channel land 
acquisition patterns.
35. According to one producer who bought land regularly during this period, 
prices for range land in 1984 were one-tenth what they had been before the revo 
lution or came to be again in 1990.
36. In contrast, strong supporters had a relatively low land purchase rate (only 
23 percent did so,. In most cases their workload in the government or their asso 
ciation left them little time to attend to production on the land they currently 
held; in one case, a strong supporter received land through an agrarian reform land 
grant, making additional land purchases unnecessary.
37. It is, of course, remarkable that any of the opponents acquired additional 
properties. This curious pattern is the result of several forces. For one, land pur 
chase is not always a purely economic calculation. Faced with the prospect that 
family lands would be sold to outsiders following the death or emigration of a rela 
tive, even regime opponents might buy the land in an effort to keep it in the family. 
Furthermore, opposition leaders sometimes bought land in the early years of the 
revolution, before they became as virulently opposed as they were at the end. In 
one case, a private sector opponent bought land and invested heavily in its develop 
ment, anticipating a contra overthrow of the Sandinistas. (In two additional cases 
not included in this calculation, private sector leaders reported purchasing land, 
but in Costa Rica and Venezuela, as these producers prepared for the possibility of 
emigration.,
38. A holding company called pm a  managed the assets of the three major stock 
holders, the two foreign investors who founded g r a c s a  (U.S. textile executive 
Philip Lehner and Salvadoran business leader Mauricio Borgonovo) and the com 
pany's first general manager (Alfonso Robelo). Robelo sold his interest in the com 
pany before leaving the country and joining the leadership of the contra forces, but 
his prior involvement triggered the initial state intervention in g r a c s a  in 1982. 
The company was subsequently retained by the state for reasons of "social utility," 
because of its central role in national oilseed production. After the supreme court 
decided in its favor, ownership of g r a c s a  was returned to pm a  (which had held 
51 percent of the stock, in 1988, and Antonio Lacayo returned as general manager.
39. In all, twelve new companies were added to the g r a c s a  group during 
the 1979-90 period. These included a balanced feed industry, two cattle ranches, 
chicken and pork production facilities, soybean and African palm projects, a
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shrimp farm, a peanut export and processing firm, a transportation firm, a heavy 
construction agency, and a machine maintenance shop (interviews, g r a c s a , Sep 
tember 4, October 3,11, 25, November 1,1990, August 9,1991; Spalding 1991).
40. Respondents were asked to compare their overall production levels in the 
1986-89 period with those of the 1976-79 period. Percentage shifts were calcu 
lated from the data they provided. Changes were classified as an increase when 
production rose by over 25 percent and a decrease when it fell by more than 25 
percent. Production levels were considered stable if they did not change by more 
than 25 percent.
41. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.8 is 10.7 with a significance level 
of .03, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis (views on the f s l n  gov 
ernment and production level change are independent) with a 97 percent level of 
confidence.
Chapter 6
1. The U.S. Congress authorized US$9 million to support a "democratic" elec 
tion in Nicaragua in 1990. Most of these funds went to UNO-allied civic organi 
zations and, indirectly, to the u n o  campaign. See l a s a  (1990); Robinson (1992, 
60-89).
2. On the role of u s a id  in neoliberal restructuring in Costa Rica, see So jo 
(1991,, and in Nicaragua, see Saldomando (1992).
3. The recent shift toward neoliberalism in Latin American nations undergoing 
a process of democratization suggests that the regime need not be formally authori 
tarian to undertake this economic change. Haggard and Kaufman (1992b, 278-80) 
argue, however, that the more fragmented and polarized democratic regimes, in 
which the governing coalition is continually shifting, find it more difficult to 
successfully implement neoliberal reforms.
4. See Przeworski (1991, chap. 4) on the dynamics of economic transition, which 
he argues apply to both the Latin American and the Eastern European reform 
efforts.
5. On the tension between neoliberal politics and democratic politics, see Shea- 
han (1991, 65-72).
6. Campero (1984, 298-320) traces the rise of the Consejo de la Produccion, el 
Transporte, y el Comercio, a new peak association for small- and medium-sized 
businesspeople who were protesting the losses they suffered under the Pinochet 
regime in the early 1980s.
7. After eight years of warfare and general economic decline, the country had 
massive foreign aid needs. For 1991, the government required an infusion of $1 
billion just to meet the arrears on its foreign debt and cover the balance of pay 
ments gap (Enriquez et al. 1991, 20-21). U.S. aid fell far short of what was needed 
to stimulate reactivation.
8. Of the amount programmed for 1992, an estimated $576 million was report 
edly disbursed (Larson with Nitlapan-ucA 1993/ 7, 9)-
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9. Whereas loans from multilateral organizations represented 21 percent of 
the total foreign aid package in 1991, loans from these organizations were ex 
pected to reach 39 percent of the total in 1992 (b c n , Nicaragua Economic Report, 
November-December 1991,15).
10. Helms demanded a series of policy changes by the Nicaraguan government 
including the return of properties to Nicaraguans who had become U.S. citizens, 
the removal of high Sandinista officials from the police and intelligence agencies, 
and judicial reform. See the text of Helms's letter of June 22 to u s a id  Director, 
reprinted in La Prensa, June 27, 1992, and Republican Staff Report (1992). After a 
U.S. g a o  report (1992) sharply questioned the State Department's finding that the 
Chamorro government was making progress in dealing with the property claims 
of 155 U.S. citizens, the State Department reversed its position on aid suspension 
and also began pressuring the Chamorro government for further reforms.
11. The head of the Sandinista police, Rene Vivas, was retired from command 
along with eleven other high-ranking officers. He was replaced by Fernando Cal 
dera, previously a National Police commander and also a Sandinista. Responsi 
bility for the police force was reassigned to a new Vice-Ministry for Citizens' 
Security in the Interior Ministry under civilian appointee and Sandinista critic 
Ronald Aviles. See "Nicaragua Leader Ousts Some Sandinista Police," Chicago Tri 
bune, September 6,1992; Shirley Christian, "Managua Seesaw," New York Times, 
September 8,1992.
In addition to these reforms, the Chamorro government reestablished a program 
to review property claims (Decrees #46-92, #47-92, #48-92, and Presidential Ac 
cord #248-92) and initiated an indemnization process (Decrees #51-92 and #52- 
92) that offered payment in twenty-year bonds at 3 percent interest to those whose 
properties could not be returned. These bonds could also be used to purchase stock 
in profitable state enterprises (the telephone, water, and electric companies, the 
Montelimar resort, etc.) (w o l a  1992, 23-25; Larson with Nitlapan-ucA 1993, 41).
12. U.S. aid was suspended again following the May 1993 discovery of an arms 
cache in Managua that belonged to a supposedly disarmed faction of the Salvadoran 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.
13. In addition to Lacayo, c o r d e n ic  members included Francisco Mayorga, 
who briefly served as president of the b c n ,- Enrique Dreyfus, who served for a 
year and a half as foreign minister; and Francisco Rosales, who became minister 
of labor.
14. in c a e  had been founded in 1964 by Central American business leaders with 
financial support from u s a id  and technical assistance from the Harvard Univer 
sity Business School. By 1990, in c a e 's various Central American campuses had 
graduated 1,432 students with advanced degrees in business administration, had 
2,937 graduates of its four-week training program for business executives, and 
had enrolled 66,333 participants in its executive seminars. See in c a e  (1990?!.
15. This group included Alfredo Cesar, who had joined the Sandinistas in 1977 
while he was general administrator for Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, Inc. Among his 
various posts, Cesar had been president of the b c n  in the early Sandinista period
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before leaving in 1982 for Costa Rica. In 1985 he was one of six founding mem 
bers of the Southern Opposition Bloc, the contra force operating out of Costa Rica. 
He became a director of the Nicaraguan resistance in May 1987 and returned to 
Nicaragua in 1989 to help run the Chamorro presidential campaign.
16. Chamorro took on the title minister of defense herself but allowed Hum 
berto Ortega to remain in charge of the armed forces and, until September 1992, 
Rene Vivas to remain as head of the Sandinista police force.
17. These actors were not entirely isolated from the Nicaraguan political ter 
rain. Several had prior ties to c o s e p affiliates like c a d in . Some had, through 
c o r d e n ic , been involved in orchestrating a national dialogue since April 1988. 
in c a e 's  role in training mid in r a  personnel in management techniques had linked 
much of its staff directly to the policy process for several years. Some cabinet 
members, such as Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo, had gone through 
long years of negotiations with the Sandinista regime (see Chapter 4). The ten 
dency of the new economic team toward insularity, therefore, was reduced by the 
prior involvement of several members in the political bargaining process during 
the Sandinista era. Compared, however, with many other political contenders, 
these actors were relatively removed from the traditional rough and tumble of 
Nicaraguan politics.
18. See ih c a  (1990) for a comparison of the "Azul y Blanco" program advanced 
by Bolanos and the final u n o  program.
19. Mayorga was a Yale-trained economist who had worked at the b c n  in the 
1970s. He participated in the drafting of the Sandinista government's first Pro 
grama de Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional and did consulting work for the 
Ministry of Planning in the early years of the revolution. He left that position in 
1982 and served as director of the Central American Bank of Economic Integration 
until 1985; he subsequently became a professor and administrator at in c a e .
20. In some cases, when the f s l n  bench was not united or when opposition 
parties resisted, the f s l n  government did withdraw or modify a piece of draft 
legislation. In general, however, the f s l n  government either circumvented the 
legislature or relied on its solid legislative majority to assure passage of important 
measures. See Booth (1985b).
21. Early presidential decrees are compiled in Republica de Nicaragua (1990?b). 
On the use of presidential decrees for economic policymaking, see the interview 
with Finance Minister Emilio Pereira (1991, 4). On the conflict between Chamorro 
and Cesar, and the continued use of presidential decrees, see Flakoll Alegria (199T 
4—5Vickers and Spence (1992).
22. Note, for example, the low level of strike activity in the late 1980s, even 
though real wages in 1988 had fallen by one estimate to only 5 percent of what 
they had been in 1980 (Neira Cuadra and Acevedo 1992, 87). See also Luciak (forth 
coming) on the relationship between the a t c  and the f s l n . For a contrasting point 
of view on labor autonomy in the Sandinista era, see Stahler-Sholk (1992.).
25. Foreign Minister Dreyfus was a past president of c o s e p and Minister of the 
Presidency Lacayo had been a member of the board of directors of c a d in . Minis 
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ter of Agriculture Roberto Rondon was one of the country's largest cattle ranchers 
and former president of f a g a n ic . At his first meeting with u pa n ic  members 
after the inauguration, Rondon began his comments by noting that he was still a 
member of the board of directors of u pa n ic  and had been secretary of f a g a n ic  
until only two weeks before (observation of meeting of economic ministers and 
u pa n ic , May io, 1990).
24. Of the forty producers interviewed in my study who were active partici 
pants in the u n o  campaign, fifteen (38 percent) gave mixed or negative evaluations 
of the u n o  government within seven months after the inauguration.
25. According to Wheelock Roman (1991,18), 80 percent of the agrarian reform 
titles extended by the Sandinista government before February 25, 1990, were only 
provisional. See also w o l a  (1992); Enriquez (1991a, 47-48). In my interviews with 
producers, several mentioned returning for visits to their former farms and dis 
cussing the formation of joint ventures with the cooperative members who now 
held title to the land.
26. The Sandinista government reportedly extended 9,404 land titles between 
August 1989 and April 25, 1990, most of which were granted between the time of 
their electoral defeat in February and the inauguration of the u n o  government in 
April. In his response to widespread allegations of corruption and abuse of power 
during the lame duck period, Wheelock Roman (1991, m-12) argues that only 
292 of these titles represented entirely new grants. The rest were characterized as 
titles that had been granted previously but not formally issued, or as previously 
arranged land swaps (permutas) for properties that had been expropriated under 
agrarian reform laws.
The most controversial of the new titles were those for large tracts of land given 
to individuals closely tied to the Sandinista government. According to a Barri 
cada study (Guillermo Cortes, "Resurge el latifundismo," Barricada, July 8, 1991) 
18,000 mz. were titled to five families in the last days of the f s l n  period, includ 
ing two former mid in r a  vice-ministers. Some of the land titled in this fashion 
was area that pro-Sandinista producers had previously donated to the revolution 
and were now reclaiming. In other cases, however, the legal basis of the claim was 
weaker; following a public outcry and f s l n  internal pressure, some of the land 
thus acquired was subsequently handed on to other claimants (interview, Jaime 
Wheelock, June 27,1992,- interview, Ricardo Coronel Kautz, June 30,1992). See also 
Hernandez (1991, 23-24) and "Destapan pinata agraria," La Prensa, June 25, 1991.
27. See also Enriquez (1991a, 48); Barricada, May 15,1991; Cuadra (1992,19-20).
28. c o r n a p uses the term privatization to refer to any action that shifts re 
sponsibility for the firm out of its jurisdiction. The liquidation of fifty-one com 
panies and the transfer of twenty-eight others (such as telecommunications and 
the airport) over to other state agencies are both classified in c o r n a p data as 
privatizations.
29. See Gabriela Selser, "New Reduction for e ps ," Barricada international 10, 
no. 330 (December 1,1990), 14-15; Lt. Col. Oswaldo Lacayo's report to the national 
assembly's budget commission, summarized in Barricada international 13, no. 360
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(April 1993), 7• Among those released in December 1990 were 5,000 officers who 
were granted severance pay equal to six months to one year of salary, urban lots 
for building houses, and access to technical training.
30. In addition to layoffs in the privatized state enterprises, by the end of 1991 
5,700 civilian, central government employees had enrolled in this plan, including 
3,000 from the state banking system and 2,700 from public services like education 
and health (c e pa l  1992b, 22).
31. The total civilian public sector workforce prior to this reduction, includ 
ing the central government (68,390) and public enterprises (78,000), was 146,390 
(Government of Nicaragua 1992,17; c o r n a p 1991, 6).
32. The new banks authorized were the Banco Mercantil, b a n pr o , Banco de 
America Central, the Banco de Credito Centroamericano, the Banco de Prestamos, 
the Banco Intercontinental, and the Banco de la Exportacion (interviews, Alejan 
dro Martinez Cuenca, July 1,1992; Eduardo Montealegre, Gerente General, Banco 
de Credito Centroamericano, June 26, 1992; Haroldo Montealegre, Gerente Gen 
eral, Banco Mercantil, June 22, 1992; Chale Espinoza, Gerente General, Banco de 
la Produccion, June 29,1992,- and Francisco Sanabanda, Gerente General, Banco de 
Prestamos, June 29,1992). See also Saldomando (1992, 82-94).
33. See Decree-Law #37-91, Decreto de Promotion de Exportaciones, issued 
August 21,1991, and the subsequent Reglamento del Decreto de Promotion de Ex 
portaciones, published in La Gaceta, April 2,1992. The income tax exemption for 
nontraditional exporters began at 80 percent in 1992 and was scheduled to gradu 
ally decline to 60 percent in 1997 before ending in 1998. In addition, nontraditional 
exporters were also granted a negotiable and transferable tax benefit certificate for 
a six-year period (interview, Juan Fernando Ramirez, Director, Departamento de 
Promotion de Exportaciones, me d e , July 2,1992; Larios and Cordero 1992).
34. See the Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras, #27, June 19, 1991, and the Regla 
mento de la Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras, Decreto #30-92, June 10, 1992. To 
encourage the repatriation of flight capital, Nicaraguan investors who imported 
capital and registered it with the b c n  received the same benefits as foreign in 
vestors (Government of Nicaragua 1992,14). To encourage investment in offshore 
assembly, the president also issued the Decreto de Zonas Francas Industriales de 
Exportacion on November 13, 1991, followed by its enabling legislation [regla 
mento] on June 10,1992.
35. The maximum income tax rate dropped from 45 percent to 35 percent in 
1991 and then was lowered further to 30 percent in 1992. See b c n , Nicaragua 
Economic Report, November—December 1991,15.The vast majority of Nicaraguan 
workers were not required to pay income taxes since those with annual incomes 
of less than C$25,000 ($5,000) were exempt. This reform, therefore, benefited the 
relatively prosperous. See the detailed analysis of the changes in the tax code in 
Huper (1992, 13—22). In addition to these tax rate reductions, a capital gains tax, a 
wealth transfer tax, and a bequest tax were eliminated (Government of Nicaragua 
1992,12).
36. See f id e g , Observador economico 16 (April 1993): 9; Hiiper (1992,13)- Ac 
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cording to f id  e g , 54 percent of tax revenues were generated from taxes on fiscal 
products in 1991. See Observador economico 8 (August 1992): 6.
37. c o s e p itself was not invited to participate, nominally because the govern 
ment wished to involve direct producers and employers rather than association 
officials. The government may also have feared, correctly, that c o s e p's periodic 
denunciations of the government's performance would make it less open to gov 
ernment sponsored negotiations and less likely to support the final agreement.
38. For statements of the bargaining positions of the government and the f s l n - 
aligned labor groups, see Barricada, October 22,1990.
39. This figure was negotiated in hard bargaining. The representatives of f s l n - 
allied groups called for the distribution to workers of 50 percent of the assets in 
the remaining firms that were undergoing privatization. cosEP-allied employers 
called for a limit of 10 percent worker ownership in these enterprises. The govern 
ment, attempting to strike a balance between the two, called for an arrangement 
in which workers would be given concessionary terms allowing them to acquire 
15-20 percent of the assets of enterprises in their sectors. See Barricada, August 6, 
1991; c ipr e s  (1991).
40. In what was quickly becoming a pattern, c o s e p organizations ultimately 
refused to sign the Concertacion II agreement as well. From the standpoint of 
c o s e p leaders, the second agreement failed to deal adequately with the return of 
property illegally distributed by Sandinista leaders. See c o s e p's  full page ad in La 
Prensa, August 15,1991. This session reopened the issue of urban and rural proper 
ties acquired by Sandinista loyalists during the pinata period between the electoral 
defeat and the inauguration. During this period, urban and rural properties, and 
even office equipment and vehicles in particular ministries, were dispersed among 
political loyalists. Following the Concertacion II agreement, the anti-Sandinista 
majority in the assembly attempted to set up a review and payment requirement 
for these properties, but the combustibility of the issue and commitments made 
to the f s l n  during the preinauguration negotiations led the president to intervene 
and veto the measure.
41. See "Year in Review 1991" in Barricada international 12, no. 345 (January 
1992), 22-24; Stahler-Sholk (1992, 45).
42. Neoliberal regimes typically establish some poverty abatement program 
that, though not entirely consistent with the classical liberal ideology, is designed 
to attenuate economic dislocations and the resulting political opposition. The 
Chamorro regime adopted several such social programs. The government created, 
with u s a id  financing, small employment programs and public aid services for 
low-income urban dwellers (Government of Nicaragua 1992,18-19). The most im 
portant of these programs, the Emergency Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Inver 
siones Sociales de Emergencia, f is e ) was created in November 1990 by presidential 
decree (Ministerio de la Presidencia 1991, 40-41). f is e  was a five-year public works 
program designed to put under- and unemployed people to work in community 
infrastructural development projects. According to the u s a id  program director 
in Nicaragua, Janet Ballantyne, this program had created 35,000 short-term jobs
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by mid-1992 (interview, July 1,1992). Given the extremity of the economic crisis 
in Nicaragua, however, this program had only a marginal impact, f is e  became 
controversial because of allegations that it gave the UNO-dominated municipal 
governments access to patronage positions that could be traded for political sup 
port.
43- In addition to these industries, in the mining sector, workers opted to buy 
100 percent control of four of the mines and form a holding company that all 
interested mineworkers, regardless of the mine they worked in, could buy into. 
Sugar workers negotiated participation ranging from 25 percent to 70 percent in 
four of the mills. Banana workers obtained 25 percent participation in the adminis 
tration and marketing operations of b a n a n ic  (interviews with f n t  legal adviser, 
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, July 1, 1992,- f n t  Secretary General Lucio Jimenez, 
June 23,1992; Ramiro Gurdian, c o s e p president, June 30,1992). See also Barricada, 
June 26, 1992,- Soza (1992, 39); Larson with Nitlapan-ucA (1993, 43).
44. In the cattle sector, for example, those who chose to accept this benefit 
were given ten-year loans at 6 percent interest with one year of grace. In the indus 
trial sector, the government offered similar terms but a two-year grace period 
(interviews, Ricardo Coronel Kautz, former president of h a t o n ic , June 30,1992; 
Ivan Saballos, c o r n a p, June 24, 1992,. See also c o r n a p (1991, 18),• Gobierno de 
Nicaragua-cs t , Acuerdo, February 2,1993.
45. Sergio Ramirez accompanied the Chamorro government delegation to the 
Donors' Conference in Rome in June 1990, and Daniel Ortega accompanied the 
delegation to Washington, D.C., in March 1992 to support the government's bid 
for new foreign assistance.
46. The seven-person Junta Directiva of u pa n ic , for example, was elected bi 
annually by the members of the organization's Directorio. The Directorio in turn 
was composed of twenty-eight representatives of the organizations that made up 
the association, modestly weighted to give more voice to the larger or more eco 
nomically powerful organizations. See Chapter 2, n. 52.
47. u pa n ic  took this opposition furthest when it published a communique en 
dorsing the June 1992 suspension of U.S. aid to Nicaragua. (See its comunicado of 
June 11,1992, published in La Prensa, June 21,1992.) It took this step even though 
u pa n ic 's  own members were to be one of the primary beneficiaries of the funds, 
which included $50 million in medium- and long-term credit for private producers 
in agriculture and industry, c o s e p did not publicly endorse the suspension of the 
aid. It did, however, publicly and privately denounce the government following a 
series of land invasions and transportation stoppages in April 1992. See c o s e p's  
"Comunicado de prensa" of April 30,1992 (c o s e p 1992a), and its unpublished but 
distributed "Posicion de c o s e p ante gobierno," May 4,1992 (c o s e p 1992b).
48. Several prominent u pa n ic  leaders were affiliates of the pl c , including 
former u n c a f e n ic  president and u n o  mayor of Managua, Arnoldo Aleman; 
former president of u n c a f e n ic  and member of the national assembly on the u n o  
slate, Nicolas Bolanos; and Arges Sequeira, former representative to c o s e p for 
u pa n ic  and president of both u pa n ic  and the Asociacion de Confiscados until his
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murder in November 1992. Although a participant in the u n o  coalition, the pl c  
took issue with the Chamorro government on major social and economic issues 
and sought to drive the f s l n  further from power.
49. A fourth bank authorized in 1992, the Banco de la Exportacion, was being 
organized under the leadership of Ernesto Fernandez Holmann, former general 
manager of b a n a me r .
50. Even in this group, however, political accommodation was not uniform. 
Haroldo Montealegre, for example, who played a prominent role in pushing 
through the concertacion accords, drafting the Chamorro government's economic 
policy proposals in late 1990 and 1991, and representing the government in nego 
tiations with the World Bank and the imf  during this period, broke ranks in mid- 
1992 when he launched a campaign against the state bank system. As president 
of one of the fledgling private banks, Montealegre has been particularly vehement 
in his denunciations of the b n d , the state bank competitor. See his article "An 
Economic Policy Nicaraguans Can Bank On," Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1992, 
and an interview with him in Vistazo economico, #481 (June 19, 1992): 1-4.
51. See "U.S. Support Is Sought for Coffee Limits," New York Times, March 26, 
1992. See also the u s a id  consultant's report by c a r a n a  Corporations and Sparks 
Companies (1991, 55—59).
52. Percentages presented here include only those who actually responded to 
the question, in c a e 's  data output from this survey includes only frequencies, and 
so it is not possible to determine which subsectors responded in what way. c o s e p's  
prominent role in organizing these seminars may have attracted more disaffected 
producers and contributed to the widespread negative appraisals of the government 
found in the responses.
53. These producers, over half of whom were in the cattle, coffee, and cotton 
sectors, gave a positive assessment of the exchange rate stability (66 percent posi 
tive), selective tax reductions (52 percent positive on the reduction of the sales 
tax and 42 percent on customs tax reductions), and the Export Promotion Law (56 
percent expected to benefit).
54. Favored responses on the presidential preference question were "There's no 
one to vote for" (27 percent), Arnoldo Aleman (16 percent), Enrique Bolanos (16 
percent), and Alfredo Cesar (9 percent).
55. See a pe n n  (1991, 1-3); La Prensa, May 22, 1990; interviews, Samuel Man 
sell, president of a pe n n , May 6, June 23,1990, and June 24,1992.
56. Membership rose from the initial 40 in May 1990 to 192 in June 1992. 
Although expanding, a pe n n  remained a highly selective organization. Selection 
criteria included the requirement that members have access to irrigation, an agri 
cultural technician on their staff, financial ability to assume the risks, and a record 
of "labor discipline" on their farms (interview, Samuel Mansell, June 24, 1992).
57. These included Miguel Barrios, who had been director of mid in r a  in Re 
gions I, VI, and II before taking over the management of the is a  after its 1988 
expropriation; Pedro Antonio Blandon, who had been director of the Fondo Inter 
nacional para la Reconstruccion and of the Programa Alimentario Nicaraguense;
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and Joaquin Cuadra, former president of the b c n . Barrios became the director of 
ECODEPA; the others served as project consultants for u n a g .
58. See Barrios Johanning I1992); interview, Circles Robinson, consultant, Rela- 
ciones Internacionales y Proyectos, u n a g , Matagalpa, June 25, 1992,- Fernandez 
Ampie (1992).
59. The idea of a u n a g  bank pitted u n a g  members against each other. The 
sharp cutback in state bank credit to small producers and cooperatives made the 
idea attractive to some u n a g  leaders, but the problems of having to restrict u n a g  
bank loans and force repayment by economically precarious members raised prob 
lems that others were reluctant to take on. By 1993, however, u n a g  leaders secured 
international financial backing and began this project. See u n a g  (n.d.).
60. After their electoral defeat, f s l n  leaders established a series of party-owned 
enterprises that were designed to provide employment and revenues for the party 
(La Prensa, July 16, 1990). These operations included several highly visible ven 
tures like a new airline, the Central American Airline. Public outcry about how 
the f s l n  had enriched itself in power, and the stunning failure of the new air 
line, soon precipitated a reconsideration of party-owned enterprises. Although the 
f s l n  did retain a small number of businesses, such as a newspaper and radio sta 
tions, the plan to found a series of prominent enterprises had reportedly been 
largely abandoned by 1991 (interview, Jaime Wheelock, June 27, 1992). In spite of 
this shift, two of the new banks authorized by the Chamorro government, the 
Banco de Prestamos and the Banco Intercontinental, which were partly owned by 
former high-ranking f s l n  government officials or allies, were commonly referred 
to as Sandinista banks, even though they were not actually owned by the f s l n  
party. Likewise, businesses that bought advertising space in Barricada were also 
commonly labeled Sandinista enterprises.
61. In addition to the sectors noted above, several other pockets of investment 
could be found. Some of the producers who flourished during the Sandinista era 
because of the boldness of their investment strategy or the privileges they received 
from the government used their accumulated resources as a springboard for di 
versification and expansion in the 1990s. The o c a l s a  group, for example, moved 
quickly to build a supermarket chain and acquire a fast-food franchise. By mid- 
1991 its investments extended to twenty-five companies in the import-export, 
distribution, and manufacturing sectors (b c n , Nicaragua Economic Report, June 
1991, 3, 6-7).
Another entrepreneurial venture centered around b a n pr o . b a n pr o  was orga 
nized by a politically and economically illustrious list of investors, some of whom 
were linked to Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo. Bank president Pablo 
Ayon Garcia had participated with Lacayo in c o r d e n ic ,- junta member Alfredo 
Marin worked with Lacayo at g r a c s a  and replaced him as g r a c s a  s  general man 
ager when Lacayo resigned to direct the Chamorro campaign. Bank vice-president 
Ernesto Balladares was also vice-president of c o r n a p; junta member Pablo Vijil 
was minister of communication; and junta member Rafael Martinez was executive 
president of the c n g . Two critics of the government, c o s e p president Ramiro Gur
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dian and former c o s e p president Gilberto Cuadra, were also on the Junta Directiva 
of this bank. This broad-based bank marshaled the resources of 105 producer/share 
owners. Recognizing the historical importance of bank ownership to group devel 
opment in Nicaragua, these investors were unwilling to depend on either the banks 
organized by the returning elite, the old state banks, or those being set up with the 
participation of prominent allies of the f s l n . Drawing on relatively modest indi 
vidual investments, this group moved briskly to raise the mandatory $2 million 
required to apply for permission to open a private bank.
62. c e pa l  (1992b, 4) estimates for 1990 classified 75 percent of the Nicaraguan 
population as poor and 42 percent as extremely poor. Un- and underemployment, 
which had risen to 39.9 percent in 1989, continued to climb, reaching 53.5 percent 
in 1991 (c e pa l  1992b, 33).
63. According to a careful study of the nontraditional export strategy in Latin 
America by Barham et al. (1992), common problems include environmental degra 
dation, declining terms of trade for primary products, multinationalization of the 
export sector, and concentration of benefits in the hands of a small group. Ques 
tions have also been raised in the Costa Rican case about whether the amount of 
the subsidies provided to nontraditional exporters by the government exceeds the 
increased economic return they generate.
Chapter 7
1. See Schmitter (1974). It is possible, however, for strong, independent busi 
ness associations to emerge even when they are set up by state decree if the state 
is essentially under the control of the economic elite. In that case, the distinction 
between state-created and elite-created associations is blurred.
2. Ironically, spontaneous organizational forms for the private sector may, on 
one hand, contribute to private sector capacity for confrontation with the state but 
also complicate the process of achieving class unity. In the Chilean case, co pr o  co 
represented the six top private sector organizations, but the small- and medium 
sized producers or those producers in less prominent sectors were excluded from 
this alliance. The sense that the top elite is preoccupied with protecting its own 
privileges, while nonhegemonic capitalists in the rest of the private sector were 
not admitted into those hallowed chambers, could actually contribute to disunity 
in the class. Organizational autonomy that produces rigid divisions by sector, firm 
size, or region may, therefore, undermine private sector cohesion. In this sense, 
state intervention may actually foster class unification, whereas spontaneous orga 
nization may not. Indeed, the 1972-73 fusion of the private sector proved transitory 
in Chile. Disgruntled by the economic hardships they faced under the military dic 
tatorship in Chile relative to the top elites, medium- and small-sized businesses 
split off and formed their own peak association, the Consejo de la Produccion, el 
Transporte, y el Comercio, in 1983. See Campero (1984).
3. The role of outside agents can be overstated. It seems unlikely that the Nixon 
administration's subsidies to El Mercurio or the October 1972 bosses' strike in
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Chile, for example, could have forged a united private sector opposition if the 
domestic capitalist class did not see opposition to be in its interest. The image of 
Latin American bourgeoisie as a dangling puppet responding jerkily to every tug 
from the United States shows little insight into the character of the local elite. 
On the other hand, concerted foreign intervention can help local entrepreneurs to 
coordinate their efforts and sustain their own confrontation with the state. In that 
more limited sense, the U.S. government can help to forge and maintain a business 
consensus, as can the imf  when it adds external validation and the promise of 
resources to local elites' efforts to quash reform. At the same time, the U.S. govern 
ment can also contribute to internal tension in a relatively cohesive bourgeoisie, 
as it did in El Salvador by supporting the Duarte government and refusing to confer 
legitimacy on the more reactionary D'Aubuisson faction of the Salvadoran right.
4. The regime also welcomed the 1988 formation of an alternative elite orga 
nization, c o r d e n ic , which differentiated its approach from the confrontational 
style of c o s e p and looked for new forms of dialogue.
5. In some cases, such as Jamaica during the first Manley government, the use 
of class-based rhetoric and attacks on the bourgeoisie triggered a rise of the elite's 
threat perception, even though the actual reforms introduced by the government 
were modest and domestic property holders were little affected by expropriation. 
See Stephens and Stephens (1986,.
6. The Manley government's decision to grant the Order of Jamaica award to 
the president of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica in August 1978 served 
that purpose as well. See Stephens and Stephens (1986, 211).
7. Stepan's (1978, 292) relatively comprehensive definition of institutionaliza 
tion combines both aspects. Institutionalization, he concludes, "implies that a 
regime has consolidated the new political patterns of succession, control and par 
ticipation, has managed a viable pattern of economic accumulation, has forged 
extensive constituencies for its rule, and has created a significant degree of Grams- 
cian 'hegemonic acceptance' in civil society." I have divided the concept into two 
parts, since institutionalization may not occur simultaneously in both areas. In 
deed, there may be a tension between the two. Steps taken to assure a broad, 
stable mass constituency, for example, may pose a serious challenge to economic 
accumulation.
8. Even in the Mexican case, which is our most successful example of political 
institutionalization, the problems of interelite consolidation were enormous. The 
1934 confrontation between outgoing jeje maximo Calles and incoming President 
Cardenas over who would actually govern was resolved only after ten months of 
dispute and Calles's forcible expulsion from the country. Furthermore, the 1940 
presidential election was characterized by violent confrontations with electoral 
competitors and allegations of extensive electoral fraud. See Cornelius (1973) on 
the process of regime consolidation in Mexico.
9. Scott (1989, 5) developed this idea to describe the "prosaic or first resort 
techniques of resistance by the peasantry, but the analysis may be extended to 
economic elites when these elites are in the (relatively rare) position of being
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politically subordinate. Of course, the business elite has a much larger arsenal of 
weapons to choose from than the peasantry.
io. Nationalist development projects can, of course, have the reverse effect and 
alienate the local producers. Conaghan (1988), for example, argues that the exten 
sive penetration of local businesses by foreign capital in Ecuador fed intense local 
business opposition to the Andean Pact's decision to restrict ownership and profit 
repatriation by foreign firms.
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oppositions that shaped the Sandinista revolution. Rose 
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